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S4.bstract.
This thesis examines the nature and value of art. It is primarily concerned to advance an 
argument which makes sense of the significance we ordinarily afford art, rather than rendering it 
merely aesthetic and thus cognitively trivial. Contrary to philosophical orthodoxy, it is argued 
that 'a rt' does not have two distinct senses. Rather, we should understand art as an inherently 
evaluative, evolving cultural practice. Thus, I argue, art' is essentially a cluster concept.
I consider an account of art according to w hich it is in the pleasure art affords, that its 
value lies. However, though we derive pleasure even from apparently unpleasant artw orks, the 
mark of art's value lies elsewhere. That is, the pleasure we derive from art is the result of an 
artw ork's being of value in some other way. Through critically assessing the standard accounts of 
art's value, I argue that art's pleasures are primarily cognitive. Furthermore, I argue, the cognitive 
value of art arises prim arily from the engagem ent of our im agination and in terpretation of 
artworks. That is, we enjoy the imaginative activity of engaging with artw orks and the promotion 
of particular imaginative understandings.
Furthermore, as imaginative understanding is of fundamental importance in grasping the 
nature of our world and others, art may have a distinctive significance. That is, art may afford 
insights into and thus promote our im aginative understandings of our world and others. Thus, 
through the promotion of imaginative understanding, art may cultivate our moral understanding. 
Therefore, art is of profound significance and import.
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Introduction.
'T he great instrum ent of moral good is the imagination..Poetry enlarges 
the circumference of the imagination by replenishing it with thoughts of 
ever new delight...Poetry strengthens the faculty which is the organ of 
the moral nature of man, in the same m anner as exercise strengthens a 
limb."
Percy Bysshe Shelley, A Defence of Poetry
This is a thesis about the nature and value of art: about how we ought to understand what 
constitutes art and thus why, if at all, art may truly be considered significant. This is an ambitious 
task. However, 1 cannot claim to offer an exhaustive analysis of art and its role in our lives. R ather, 
1 shall be exploring certain key concerns which I take to be fundam entally illum inating in this 
regard. For some, the implicit assum ption in the thesis title, that the nature and value of art are 
closely linked, will itself be highly questionable. Thus, the task of my first chapter is to establish 
that our concept of art is inherently evaluative.
It is typically presum ed that 'a r t ' has two senses: the classificatory and the evaluative. 
Philosophers interested in the definitional question, as to what constitutes 'a rt', have been engaged 
in the process of trying to articulate how, if at all, these two senses are linked. On the one hand, 
there are those who claim there is no link at all. That is, belonging to the category art bears no 
relation to the work's value qua art. On the other hand, many have argued for just such a link. That 
is, knowing something is art involves a recognition that it should realise certain kinds of value.
However, 1 will argue, the very presum ption that art has two distinct senses is itself 
flawed. This is not to revert back to a naive version of essentialism or functionalism regarding 'art'. 
Rather, I will argue, art is an inherently evaluative cultural practice. Furtherm ore, 'a rt ' is an 
inherently value-laden cluster concept. An object must be of a certain kind of artistic value before it 
can be classified as an artwork at all. Thus, what is art, and why, depends upon questions of value.
The rest of my thesis is an attem pt to render my evaluative definition of art substantive 
and plausible. Moreover, through doing so, I hope to show why we rightly consider art to be of such 
great significance. The second chapter examines various possible values art may be concerned with. 
The first possibility examined concerns a direct link to pleasure. After all, the pleasures artw orks 
afford is obviously a strong motivation and reward for our engagement with them. The pleasure 
artworks afford is typically both a consequent of the activity of engaging with the work and partly
constituted in the engagement itself. The problems 'unpleasant' art poses for an account of art's 
value, based on the pleasures it affords, are, I argue, only apparent. We can appreciate this if we 
recognise that we may enjoy experiencing feeling emotions w hich have a negative evaluative 
content. The thrill of fear may be enjoyable after all. Hence we can make sense of the complaint 
that a film was not horrific enough or the criticism that a tragedy left us untouched.
Nonetheless, although it seems that good art does afford us pleasure, its primary value lies 
elsewhere. That is, the m ark of a w ork's value as art, which gives rise to pleasure, inheres in 
something more particular to art. 1 critically assess whether an artw ork's prim ary value lies in its 
aesthetic, expressive or cognitive aspects. U ltim ately, I conclude, a rt's  value is p rim arily  
cognitive. This is based upon the recognition that we may properly value artw orks, even where a 
w ork 's aesthetic aspect is detrim entally effected. Furtherm ore, the in ter-relationship  between 
what is represented and the way it is represented also suggests that art's pleasures derive largely 
from cognitive value. In exploring the kind of cognitive value and pleasures art may afford, we are 
led to recognise that a work's significance seems to lie in the rendering of an aspect and a work's 
power to transfigure one's perceptions of oneself, others and the world. One's emotions, imagination 
or conception of the world may be altered or developed in our engagem ent w ith the w ork as art. 
This suggests that our engagement, and more specifically the imagination, may have a particular 
role to play in art.
The third chapter examines two im portant contemporary accounts of im agination's role in 
art. The first account considered is that articulated by Roger Scruton. For Scruton, the imagination 
irreducibly involves aspects of both thought and sensuous experience. However, Scruton argues, the 
imagination goes beyond mere belief and cannot concern what we know about the real world. Thus, 
Scruton suggests, it is a mistake to question w hether w hat we imagine is true or not. However, 
Scruton fails to recognise that what we imagine can make essential reference to belief and what we 
know. That is, it may be a constitutive part of what I imagine, that 1 believe or know it to be true. 1 
then consider Kendall W alton's account of im agination's role in our engagem ent with artworks. 
Walton provides a highly illuminating account of our spectatorial role in engaging w ith artworks. 
However, fundamentally, Walton's account is problematic. His conception of fiction, as constituted 
by artefacts whose function it is to prescribe our imaginings, threatens to fictionalise virtually 
every w ork we engage with. Fictionality does not follow from an object's properly prescribing 
imaginings. We can and do properly imaginatively engage with artw orks which are essentially 
understood, in our engagement, as non-fiction. The im agination irreducibly involves elements of 
both thought and sensuous experience. Im agination cannot be reduced m erely to entertained 
thought. Furtherm ore, it will become clear that we may also respond em otionally in and as a 
consequent of our imaginings. Nevertheless, any account of imagination hoping to claim adequacy, 
must recognise that we may essentially imagine what we know to be true.
The fourth chapter goes on to develop the idea that the role of the im agination in both art 
and our everyday lives enables us to understand, in a deep way, both ourselves and others. This, in 
turn, paves the way for the idea that art's  prim ary significance lies in its peculiar capacity to
prescribe and enhance such deep understanding. Firstly, I argue that the im agination plays a 
fundam ental role in our ordinary, eveiyday lives. In order to show exactly how this is so, I 
distinguish between two forms of understanding. Thin understanding is constituted by a theory drive 
model of explanation and prediction. Thus, a thin understanding of another involves postulating a 
theory or key set of propositions which are put forw ard to explain their behaviour. Here, 
imagination can be of instrum ental value. For example, we may imagine w hat certain states of 
affairs are or could be like in order to achieve a better theoretical understanding of others and the 
world. What we imagine may prom pt ideas which we can then subject to reasoned and reflective 
consideration, in the appropriate sphere of enquiry. However, my argument is not merely concerned 
to establish an im portant instrum ental role for the imagination, in trying to understand various 
facts, possibilities and afford new insights. This is brought out by considering thick understanding. 
Rather than being theory driven, thick understanding typically involves an imaginative grasp of 
what something or someone would or could have been like. As life is lived from the inside, so thick 
understand ing  involves im agined experience. The im agined experience itself is irreducible; 
compatible with, but not reducible to, thinking w hat som ething is like. Here, im agining is of 
intrinsic value. Through imagining states of affairs, we can understand more fully the possibilities 
and nature of an action or another person. Thus, we can respond more appropriately to actual or 
projected states of affairs. This know ledge by acquaintance, w hether actual or im aginative, is 
constitutive of one's thick understanding. Thus what we may imagine, may justify or manifest our 
full understanding of certain behaviour. Therefore, imagination may play a crucial role in our 
everyday deliberations and reflections.
The value of artw orks in this regard lies in their engagem ent of the im agination. In 
considering the nature of our imaginative engagement with artworks, 1 conclude that divergence of 
interpretations may be blameless and ineliminable based upon two kinds of considerations. The 
first, and less controversial, is that artw orks may justifiably be disam biguated by spectators in 
different ways. Thus, for example, one person may take the Mona Lisa to be smiling intimately and 
alluringly, whilst another may interpret her am biguous expression as one of cold reticence. The 
second source of legitimate variation arises from the different understandings we may bring to bear 
upon a work in our imaginative engagement with it. Thus, for example, one may interpret Henry 
James' The Turn o f the Screio in terms of a psycho analytic distrust of the narrator or, conversely, 
one may take the narrator as straightforw ardly  trustw orthy. The insights of these distinct 
interpretations are based upon bringing distinct understandings, private and public, which enable us 
to engage im aginatively w ith the w ork in the first place. What we aim at in our im aginative 
engagement with an artwork is the promotion of our imaginative understanding of the possibilities, 
values and concerns open to us and how they may inter relate.
The im aginings prom oted by artw orks may enhance and deepen  our im aginative 
understanding. For example, imagining the rage of Othello's jealousy informs our understanding of 
jealousy, in a way in which our own paltry imaginings on their own would not. In complex ways, our 
imaginings concerning what is real, speculative or fictional, can enhance our understanding of the
w orld. The value of artw orks in prom oting im aginative understand ing  derives from the 
relationship between the states of affairs we are prescribed to imagine and the way they are 
represented. In imagining one considers, reflects and feels, both as a part of and in response to the 
state of affairs constructed. The point of an artw ork is to constrain and guide w hat one imagines. 
What enables a w ork to do so rests upon the artist's m anipulation of the raw m aterials, st^'le, 
medium, conventions and genre constraints involved. It is through the various constraints and 
prescriptions of artworks, that one can imagine most vividly and fruitfully. For the imaginings are 
typically guided tow ards an appreciation of the possibilities, actualities, past and present, of 
aspects of the world and its people. The point of art relates both to im agination's place in our 
everyday lives and the im aginative insight art can afford. In short, the artw ork  attem pts to 
convey in the imaginative experience a significant understanding of the world.
The last chapter develops an appreciation of the peculiar and pow erful ways art may 
prescribe our im aginings. What is peculiar to our im aginative engagem ent w ith artw orks, as 
distinct from our more everyday im aginative experience, is the artistic m anipulation of the 
aspectival imaginings prescribed by the artw ork. Thus it is that art can and does distinctively 
cultivate our thick understanding. Coupled w ith the claim that morality depends upon a thick 
understanding of others, in order to make sound moral decisions, we can articulate the close link 
between most art and morality. Through imaginative engagement, art may deepen, modify or alter 
our understandings of ourselves, others and the world. Thus artworks may manifest and promote a 
sound appreciation of aspects of the world and others. Their power, inexhaustibility, irreducibility  
and profundity lies in the insight they may afford into our and other imaginative understandings of 
the world. The primary value of art lies in its engagem ent and developm ent of the imagination, in 
order to cultivate our imaginative understanding. If an artw ork promotes an immoral imaginative 
understanding of the world, then it cultivates a false understanding of the world. A w ork which 
promotes a false imaginative understanding of others and the w orld is disvaluable as art. Since 
knowing what the morally right or good thing to do is, depends upon imaginative understanding, 
there is a necessary link between art and morality. A rtworks may properly m anifest and afford 
m oral insight. W here an artw ork promotes an immoral imaginative understanding, the work is 
disvaluable as art. A proper appreciation of how this is so, must, however, still allow that works 
which promote immoral imaginative understandings may nevertheless be artworks.
Thus I hope to establish that the pleasures we derive from art derive, in large part, from 
the engagement and cultivation of our imaginative understandings. Furthermore, it is a consequence 
of this, that art can develop our moral insight and sensibilities. Thus the core intuition behind the 
Victorian expansion of art galleries, concert halls and m useum s was a sound one. Though it was 
often construed far too crassly, the basic idea that exposure to and engagement with artworks may 
develop our moral sensibilities is right. To travel through the im aginative lands evoked by 
artworks is not just to broaden one's mind. It is, through imaginative experience, to extend and 
deepen one's imaginative understanding, and thus moral understanding, of ourselves, others and our 
world. Thus it is that we may rightly consider art to be of fundamental significance.
Cfiapter 1
f^ve 9{ature OfJTrt: 
TTie TatH (Zo (Be
'Since it is a joy to have the benefit of what is good, it 
is a greater one to experience what is better, 
and in art the best is good enough"
Goethe, Italienische Reise
Introduction.
In the last twenty years, philosophical orthodoxy has held that 'a r t ' has two senses; th e  
classificatory and the evaluative. Quite how they are to be linked, if at all, has been the m atter for 
dispute. Many philosophers hold that the classificatory sense is wholly divorced from questions of 
value. Conversely, others argue there is a link between them; knowing w hat art is involves knowing 
w hat is valuable qua art. The presum ption that 'a r t ' has two senses arose from an attack upon 
essentialism. Essentialist theories typically held it was both a necessary and sufficient condition of an 
artefact being art that it had a particular value. However, it was argued, evaluative theories of art 
could only partially explain why various artefacts were art. For example, a theory which defined art 
in terms of aesthetic qualities could not account for ugly art. Although theories may usefully highlight 
previously neglected aspects of art, they cannot capture the value of art as a whole. ^  One response was 
to argue that defining art was a purely classificatory m atter. For example, it has been argued that 
regarding an artefact in the light of the art world is sufficient for an object to be art.- Artwork status is 
thus considered to be independent of w hether the artw ork is any good or not qua art, therefore 
worthless art may properly accounted for.
The alternative response was to m aintain the link between classifying and evaluating  
something as art along functionalist lines. For example, it may be the proper function of artw orks to 
afford experiences of aesthetic value.^ Typically, functionalism also allows for worthless art because
 ^ Morris Weitz, ‘The Role of Theory in Aesthetics" in J. Margolis (cd.). Philosophy Looks a! the Arts, 3rd cd., 
(Philadelphia; Temple University Press, 1978), pp. 121-131.
^ Arthur Dan to. The Transfiguration o f the Conunonplace: A Philosophy o f Art (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard 
University Press, 1981), and The Philosophical Disenfranchisetnetit o f Art (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1986).
^ Monroe Beardsley, Aesthetics (New York; Harcourt, Brace and World, 1958), pp. 524-535.
an artefact may fail to fulfil its function as art. Thus functionalists also preserve the idea that there 
are two senses to the term 'art'; after all, an object may fail to realise its proper value. In this chapter, 
through progressively examining the best argum ents on both sides, we will find the fundam ental 
assum ption of the entire debate to be flaw ed. 1 am not denying that the term 'a rtw ork ' is used 
descriptively. But the concept which underw rites this use is one which requires the object to be of a 
certain artistic value before it can even be classified as a member of the class 'artw ork '. 'A rt' has onlv 
one sense, which is inherently evaluative. I will eventually argue that the most adequate recognition 
of art's inherently evaluative aspect involves conceiving of art as an evolving cultural practice and a 
cluster concept.
In one sense my definition is circular. Yet it is part of the task of my thesis to render the 
definition informatively so; to elucidate w hat constitutes artistic value. N evertheless, crudely put, 
something must attain a certain threshold of artistic value in order to be art. The characteristics and 
values w hich are typical of art, and feature in the cluster concept are various, but, except for 
artefactuality, they are m atters of artistic value. This is not to deny that an artw ork may possess 
artistically disvaluable features, such as ugliness. Rather, its overall artistic value must outweigh or 
be prom oted by the apparently artistically disvaluable features. Bad art is a rt which achieves the 
minimal standard for artwork status but affords little more. Bad artworks just about keep one interested 
in the same way bad comedians just about make one laugh, jimmy Tarbuck is a bad comedian because 
although he raises a titter, he does so only occasionally and one has to put up w ith much that is 
patently unfunny. Good art, like good comedy, achieves the relevant values and features to a high 
degree. By contrast, something which lacks artistic value, or which just is not funny, cannot be art, or 
comedy, respectively. If one produced such work it would not just be bad art, one would have failed to 
produce art at all. There is no truly worthless art.
Section 1 : *lHe 'EuoCution ofEhe InstitutionaCEHeory ofSlrt.
Morris Weitz's arguments against essentialist definitions of art are based upon an application 
of Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance to the concept of art. Wittgenstein famously elaborated 
this notion in relation to the concept of a game. Although the concept 'gam e' covers many cases, from 
chess to rugby, there is no underlying common essence. Rather, the relationship lies in the criss cross and 
overlapping resemblances of cases. Of course, not just any similarity is at stake, otherw ise the point 
would be trivial. After all, almost anything can be m ade to resemble anything else; for example my 
shoe and the Space Shuttle are both artefacts. Rather, resemblance is a m atter of saliency; which 
features are relevantly similar relative to our purpose in classing certain kinds of objects together. To
bring this out, Wittgenstein uses the image of short threads intertw ining and overlapping to form 
strong rope, with no one continuous thread running throughout."^
Weitz recognised significant core relations between art forms, rules of art making and thus 
artw orks. However, he argued, the inter-relations are ones of family resemblance and do not hold 
across all cases.^ W eitz's argum ent rests upon the observation that, at various stages in art's  
development, all attempts to define what constitutes art, or a particular art form such as tragedy, have 
failed. Each time a definition has been proposed, the explicated rules have been broken and great art 
has resulted; for exam ple, Shakespearean tragedy infringed the rules of A ristotelian tragedv. 
Therefore, he concludes, art has no essence. In terms of classification 'a rt' is an open concept with no 
essential criteria of recognition. 'A rt' in its evaluative sense is honorific and inevitably partial; it is 
typically redefined by criteria chosen on the basis of value preference. Maurice Mandelbaum responded 
by suggesting that even the inter-relations of family resemblance depend upon some underlying 
continuous essence; for example, in a human family there must be a genetic commonality.^^ The rope may 
be intertwining, but in the middle there must be a single continuous thread running throughout; a genetic 
tie.
In fact, neither Weitz's nor M andelbaum 's argum ents achieve w hat their respective authors 
presume. Although great art may break with contemporarily established rules of production, this does 
not establish that art cannot have an underlying essence. Weitz's appeals to empirical considerations 
only show that the concept of art may be one of family resemblance, not that it is. Maybe we just 
haven 't reached the point where we can, uncontroversially, pick out art's essence. Moreover, Weitz 
states it is a precondition of artistic creativity that 'a rt' is an open concept;
"the very expansive, adventurous character of art, its ever-present changes and novel 
creations, makes it logically impossible to ensure any set of defining properties."^
Does this not suggest that originality is required for something to be art? Weitz contradicts his 
own argument, condoning originality as a necessary, though not sufficient, value of art. Indeed, Weitz a t 
one point states that "we can, of course, choose to close the concept. But to do this w ith 'a rt'...is
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3rd éd., (Oxford; Blackwell. 1967), Section 67, p. 32.
^ Morris Weitz, The Opening Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), and “The Role of Theory in 
Aesthetics” in J. Margolis (ed.), Philosophv Looks at the Arts, 3rd cd., (Philadelphia: Temple Uni\ersity Press. 
1978), pp. 121-131.
^ Maurice Mandelbaum, “Family Resemblances and Generalisations Concerning the Arts”, American Philosophical 
Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1965, pp. 219-228.
^ Morris Weitz, “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics” in J. Margolis (ed.). Philosophy Looks at the Arts, 3rd cd., 
(Philadelphia; Temple Unir crsity Press, 1978), p. 127, (italics are my emphasis).
ludicrous since it forecloses on the very conditions of creativity in the arts."^ So an essential definition 
of art is not really logically impossible, just pragmatically undesirable because it would, he thinks, 
exclude originality. Even if Weitz only meant that originality is a precondition of great art, he gives no 
grounds for explaining why this should be so only for great and not all art.
Similarly, M andelbaum 's argum ents are too weak to establish his claims. The required  
relevance depends upon the purposes for which we are categorising the objects concerned. Thus th e  
relevant resemblance might be independent of any properties or features common between the objects 
picked out. Thus in a trial, a box may resemble a particular truck by virtue of its relational position to 
the wire that stands in for traffic lights. The resemblance here concerns the structural analogue and 
does not concern the nature of the two objects involved. Of course, the commonality Mandelbaum argues 
for needn't be one of properties or even states of affairs. However, the analogy from the generative 
causal relation between father and son suggests only that art may have a generative essence, not that it 
does. We may give a complex story about artwork's inter-relations, and the modifying principles w hich  
have held so far, w ithout being able to pick out an essential nature. Furthermore, Mandelbaum does not 
provide any argument to show the supposed generative tie is relevant; we may agree all artw orks are 
intended, yet deny this is relevant to distinguishing an artefact as art. In the trial case what the box 
was made for is irrelevant to its resemblance to the truck.
It was against this philosophical background that George Dickie proposed his institutional 
theory of art. Originally Dickie held that an artefact became art if a recognised representative of the 
artw orld conferred arthood status upon it; an artefact blessed by the artw orld is art.^ There are no 
intrinsic properties by virtue of which something is art, nor do the reasons for status conferral need to 
have anything in common. Rather, it is through their relational properties that artefacts are art. Since 
artw ork status is a purely procedural m atter, the institutional theory severs the link between th e  
classificatory and evaluative senses of 'art'. W hether something is art or not bears no relation to why 
we do, or do not, find it to be of value. The strength of Dickie's account is obvious when one considers 
how, earlier this century, many anthropological artefacts came to be seen as artworks. Picasso's interest 
in and use of such artefacts, coupled with his status in the artworld, can be seen as bringing them into 
a rt's  a r e n a . I n d e e d ,  his d isregard  for the original point of these objects further supports the 
institu tional theory; their status was acquired irrespective of the purpose for which they were 
intentionally designed.
^ ibid.
^ George Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic (New York: Ithaca, 1974), p. 34
* See J. B. Donne, “African Art and Paris Studios 1905-20” in M. Greenhalgh and V. Megaw (eds.). Art in Society 
(London; Duckworth, 1978), pp. 105-120, for a cursory attempt to determine the styles of African art directly 
available to artists, particularly Picasso and Braque, in Paris.
However, to fix art in terms of the contingent institutional developm ent of the practice is 
grossly inadequate. Fam iliar problem s w ith  a rth o o d  sta tu s as a m atte r of conferral arise 
im m ediately.*^ An artist cannot christen a part of nature an artw ork merely because of an act of 
conferral: it is patently false to claim that an artist who has walked the Lake District has thereby 
turned it into a work of art. It may be suggested that Dickie's precondition of artefactuality, for an 
object up for artwork status, blocks this objection. However, since Dickie's construal of artefactuality' 
apparently consists in the act of status conferral itself, the objection holds good.
Furthermore, as Monroe Beardsley has pointed out, the artworld cannot direct who may or may 
not be able to confer arthood status.* -  It is not a formal and structured organisation with dem arcated 
powers of status conferral. The closest arbiter of arthood  status m ight then be the market; what 
designates art is whether it is sold as such. But which part of the market? Anyway, neither Dickie nor 
anyone else could seriously contem plate the idea that the m arket mechanism  determ ines artw ork 
status. The whole point of artw ork status, or honours generally, being of significance, is that it is in 
recognition of something which merits the accord, otherwise the status would be hollow. It is also true 
that the artw orld not only includes artists, critics and dealers, but also the public who visit the 
theatres, galleries and cinemas. Dickie could attem pt to w iden his notion of artw orld representatives, 
from artists to anyone who enters the porous w orld of art. But the whole point of the institutional 
theory was to restrict the powers of status conferral to select representatives of artw orld institutions. 
Not just anyone can decide w hat is art, otherw ise the classification itself th reatens to become 
meaningless. If the notion of the artworld is expanded to include everyone who engages with art, then 
the simplicity and power of the theory is severely dim inished.
So who then, according to the institutional theory, can confer artwork status? If it is the artist, 
then problems re-emerge at a prior stage. The artist must have been recognised as such by a prior status 
conferrer, another artist presumably. Thus the very notions of artw ork status and artist presuppose the 
existence of art and the artw orld. Yet, prior to the first artw ork there cannot have been an artw orld, 
because there was no art. To require an artw orld prior to any art is to put the cart before the horse. 
Dickie cannot explain how the first artworks came about; since artefacts only become art by virtue of 
the artw orld 's status conferral, there cannot be any art. A lthough the institutional theory attem pts to 
explain 'a rt ', it cannot even explain how we came to have any art to w hich the theory should be 
adequate. The institutional theory cannot allow for the obvious possibility that non-members of an 
artw orld can make art. Furthermore, the institutional theory cannot even make sense of private art 
works. A work produced by unknown Frank Auerbach but never seen by anyone else is, on this account.
* * Sec R. A. Sharpe, Contemporary Aesthetics {Bnghion: Han estcr, 1983), pp. 30-36, for a range of objections to 
the notion of art as conferred status.
*2 Monroe Beardsley, “Is Art Essentially Institutional?” in Lars Aagaard-Mogensen (ed.). Culture and Art (New 
Jerse)'; Atlantic Highlands, 1976), pp. 194-209.
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rendered non-art. However, we would obviously consider it an undiscovered artw ork, rather than an 
object waiting to be made into an artwork.
The institutional theory also fails to make sense of an artist failing to produce an artwork. 
Dickie holds that an artist who confers status upon his work has by definition produced art. Yet, artists 
can and do fail to produce artworks: an artist who has just written infantile prose should recognise that 
he has failed to produce art. In striving to make art one tries to realise particular goals and values, and 
trying entails the possibility of failure. An artist cannot alter the status of his w ork merely by an act of 
conferral. Indeed, Dickie's theory cannot allow for critical mistakes or fraud in relation to w hether 
something is an artwork. Dickie's account cannot even make sense of artistic jokes, such as Duchamp's 
Fountain, which concern artw ork status: if Dickie were right, there could be no joke to get. As Richard 
VVollheim suggests, it is w hat the artist does that matters, not what he or others call it.*'^ We judge an 
artwork, not confer status upon it. We consider something to be art precisely because it is of value and 
not the other way around. It is only when we fail to recognise the actual or possible value of a work 
that we seek institutional type explanations. This suggests that art is inherently evaluative.
Art has evolved as a cultural practice because it is valued as contributing to our lives. Now the 
fact that a cultural practice is of value to us does not autom atically prove its value is part of its 
definition; consider science for example. Science is typically conceived of as a value independent 
methodology of enquiry. It aims at increasing our knowledge of the natural world and cannot be directly 
concerned with values. Yet science, like art, is a practice which aims at some good: it aims at truth via 
the mathematical description of the world. Relative to this evaluative aim we classify science as good 
or bad. Good science aims at the truth via a tru th-prom oting method. Conversely, bad science is 
indifferent to truth. For example, whether Cyril Burt was a good scientist or not depends upon whether 
claims concerning his fraudulent research and poor methodology are sound. If he faked results, then the 
truth was not sought. If his methodology was poor, then truth-prom oting m ethods were abandoned. 
Both honesty and discipline are required to be a good scientist. Thus there is an inherently evaluative 
aspect to science; it aims at the value of truth.
Furthermore, the overall classification of science as good or bad is relative to our aims. 
Lysenko's science was bad qua science. He could not make w heat grow since his theories, though 
'ideologically sound', were biologically incorrect.*"* H owever, relative to S talin 's aims, Lysenko's 
science may have been good overall; in helping Stalin's subjugation of Russia. Similarly art aims at 
some good and relative to this evaluative aim we classify works as good or bad qua art. Moreover, we 
classify art overall as good or bad relative to our aims. Art evolves in relation to our interests and
*^  Richard Wollhcim, Painting as an Art (London: Thames and Hudson, 1987), Chapter 1, p. 15.
*"* Anthony O'Hear, Introduction to the Philosophy o f Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 214.
values. Hence art forms such as masonry and landscape gardening have virtually died out whilst film 
has developed exponentially. Thus the concept of art must have an inherently evaluative aspect.
However, Dickie may reply, the argum ent fails to establish that art's classificatory sense must 
involve art's evaluative aspect. It entails merely that the evaluative aspect depends upon the cultural 
practice of art as a whole. Why might 'a rt ' not be merely descriptive but also relative to custom? Art 
would then be what we understand it to be. Thus, since we no longer think an artw ork 's status is related 
to questions of value, it cannot be. The strongest thread throughout the many fractured art movements of 
this century is the obsessive self-preoccupation w ith m aterials, techniques and m ethods. Taking 
D ucham p's work as paradigm atic, it would seem the practice has evolved so that merely calling or 
exhibiting an artefact as art is sufficient for it to be art. The cultural practice of art has itself severed 
the link between classification and evaluation.
Now although such a story has merit, it is far too simple. Of course, much art this century has 
been concerned with its own m ethods and m aterials. H owever, not all m odern  art has been thus 
preoccupied, as William G olding's novels and Stanley Spencer's paintings testify. Nor is such self- 
conscious preoccupation the preserve of modern art, as can be seen from Sterne's Tristram Shandy and 
H ogarth 's False Perspective. Moreover, a concern w ith m ethods and m aterials often arises from a 
concern with the communication of something felt to be of value. For example, the point of futurism 's 
attem pt to foreground certain m ethods of construction was to convey the significance of motion, 
machines and technology for mankind. Most significantly though, if Dickie's story were sound, artists, 
critics and audiences, with no theory-driven axe to grind, would appreciate that w hether som ething is 
art or not is unrelated to its value. This is distinctly not the case, as can be seen from interviews with 
artists, critics' reviews, and listening to ordinary spectators. How should we react to someone who 
suggests a work of modern art cannot be art because children or monkeys could do better? We do not point 
out that the work is in an art gallery. We may not even debate whether a child could have m ade those 
particular marks or not. Rather, we try to persuade and show him that the w ork can be seen to be and 
indeed is of value. The assumption is, if he could see this then he would understand why we treat it is a 
work of art. An artwork must have a certain value. * ^
If Dickie's more conceptual claim is sound, namely, art is as it is understood to be in the making 
of and engagem ent with it, the institutional theory m ust be false. Since we understand  art to be 
intimately linked to questions of value, the ways of going on which constitute art as a practice must 
involve an evaluative aspect. If we came upon a culture where this was not so, then, despite the 
possible similarities, we w ould not call that practice art. Imagine coming across a strange new tribe; 
they too make artefacts which are put out for display and looked at by other members of the tribe.
Which is not the case with someone tiy ing to show that a piece of theory is scientific, this being a question of 
methodology and appropriate form of explanation.
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When asked, they inform us that these artefacts are their art. Then we ask if they could point out for us 
their best artworks. But they quite happily reply that none of their art is any good at all. On closer 
questioning it becomes obvious that this is not because they always fail to produce what they were 
aim ing at. Indeed, the artists are usually perfectly satisfied with what they produce. They shake 
their heads and are bemused at our puzzlem ent. They explain that, for them, w hether som ething is 
'art' bears no relation to whether the object concerned is any good or not.
It's patently false to suggest this tribe hdb Ihe practice of art, as their artefacts are displayed 
w ith no apparent point qua art. The tribe 's purpose may be intelligible in ritualistic terms, the 
representation of particular deities is of wholly instrum ental value. Their production of these objects 
for ritualistic purposes renders their value as art irrelevant. If the objects had no ritual point then the 
intelligibility of the practice would have to involve an historical link to value. The story would relate 
how questions of value came to be divorced uom  the practice, and how the practice was sustained as it 
became severed from its raison d'etre. The explanation would require paradigm  cases of w hat was of 
value as art in their practice at one time, to establish that this was a degeneration in the practice of 
art rather than another practice. W ithout this kind of story there would be no intelligible reasons to 
suggest why they confer honorific arthood status upon these artefacts in the first place. Thus it is 
unintelligible that they could have a concept of art w ithout even some attenuated notion of the link to 
value. The practice of art can only exist residually , apart from its purpose, w here it is artificially 
sustained: for example, art might be artificially sustained by state institutions for official propaganda 
or by investors as commodities to trade, just as religious rituals might be observed for their beauty 
alone. Where this happens the practice teeters on the brink of collapsing back into another. The term 
'a rt' would no longer have any meaningful sense, leaving at best an attenuated institutional residue.
A comparison of our first tribe with the case of another imaginary tribe we meet should prove 
instructive. The second tribe also makes and displays various kinds of artefacts, though, by contrast, not 
everything m ade is displayed, some objects are discarded. However, when tribe members w ander 
around looking at the displayed artefacts, they m urm ur and shake their heads in dism ay. When 
asked, they confirm that these artefacts are art. Yet w hen we ask to be show n good artw orks, they 
reply, unhappily, that none of their art is good. They have both a classificatory sense, which picks out 
certain artefacts as art, from others which are not, and a narrow er evaluative sense, which, in this 
case, picks out nothing. Now we can make sense of this practice as, in some sense, art. Adherents to the 
institutional theory of art may try to claim this picture supports their conception: this tribe has no art 
which is any good and yet, nonetheless, artefacts are classed as art.
However, the institutional theory cannot explain why it is intelligible that this tribe has the 
practice of art, whereas the first one did not. The key difference is that here artefacts can fail to be art. 
This is attributable to their failure to attain a minimal standard. Artefacts m ust achieve a minimal 
standard in order to achieve artwork status at all. There is a purpose for which the artefacts are made.
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one which an intentionally designed object can fail to achieve. In this context, the tribesm en's lack of 
good artw orks means that they have no artefacts w hich are particularly good cases of the class of 
objects which have achieved the necessary standard  for artw ork status. A lthough it may not be a 
particularly brilliant instance, an artefact must be valuable as art to be classified as an artwork. So, 
though they do not have any good art, we can expect to be shown their best artw orks which have 
attained a certain value. A lthough not good art, these artworks will be the best they have so far 
managed to produce. Unfortunately, their best artw orks are only poor paradigm s of art. Nevertheless, 
to distinguish between non-art, mere art and good art depends upon what a rt's  purpose and value is 
taken to be.
Yet, it does seem strange that our second tribe do not consider themselves to have any good art. 
Of course, I am not denying one can have a goal in m ind and consistently fail to realise it. Rather, the 
point is that the standards for artw ork status, and thus for being a good artwork, cannot be fixed and 
absolute. Artwork status depends upon w hether an artefact fulfils the aim and value of art. W hether 
an artwork is good or not depends upon whether it does this well. But how well an artefact fulfils the 
value of art is a relational matter: it is relative to how well other artefacts do. Consider an analogy to 
sprinting. The aim of sprinting is to run fast over short distances. Whether someone is a sprinter or not 
depends upon whether, typically, he runs reasonably fast, w hether he is a good sprinter depends upon 
whether, typically, he runs very fast. But theie ib not some fixed absolute standard which determines 
w hat is fast and very fast, what determ ines this is how fast other people run. This explains why it 
would be ludicrous to say that no-one was a good sprinter until Carl Lewis, Linford Christie et al broke, 
legally, the ten second barrier for the 100 metres.
The relevant s tandard  is relative to the actual achievem ents so far, w hich is why th e  
standard may vary over time. So, of course, it was and remains true that Jesse O w en was a great 
sprinter. In the same way this explains why suggesting that no woman is a good sprinter is ludicrous. 
Women are not the fastest sprinters in the world overall, but, relative to their actual perform ances, 
there are both reasonable and great women sprinters. Increasingly fast performances have meant that 
over time the overall standard has picked up. Since more people can now run faster than before, to be a 
reasonable or good sprinter means one m ust run faster than would have been required in 1983. By 
definition, not everyone can be reasonably ur extremely fast: what it is to be fast involves the exclusion 
of most other runners. To be a good sprin ter cannot require one to achieve some ahistorical fixed 
standard .
The point is that art too is evaluatively relative: what is art and good art cannot be defined by 
some absolute standard but is relative to the artworks produced. Of course, the good art of one age may 
be poor in comparison to the good art of another. Thus, all things considered, art which was originally 
good may well come to be thought of as meiely art, and some works which just made artw ork status may 
fall out of the category altogether. Good art just is the best art produced. Therefore the case which
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makes the most sense is, unsurprisingly, where our imaginary tribe can take us to see various artefacts 
which, they say, are good exemplars of the kind of thing we call 'art'. The objects shown to us are the 
best artefacts which have m anaged to achieve artw ork status. Of course, I am  not denying that 
although they think these objects are good, they may in fact be bad art. However, this will depend 
upon the overall standards or values realised in art more generally. Similarly, the fastest sprinter in 
Scotland may well, relative to the present overall world standards, be pretty slow.
Through pinning down the flaws in the institutional theory we have to come to see that art is 
necessarily an evaluative concept. Furtherm ore, our argum ents have also suggested that to achieve 
arthood status an artefact m ust already have a certain kind of value, to be a good artw ork is to have 
that value to a high degree. Thus one wants to speak of recognising, rather than conferring, arthood 
status. As Wollheim puts it, "it is hard to see how there could be reasons putatively for making an 
artifact a w ork of art which were not better thought of as reasons for it being one." * ^  Art, as it has 
evolved, is made precisely because it is found to be of value. For the cultural practice of art to survive 
and develop, it must be found to be purposeful; otherwise, lacking point, it will stagnate and die. Our 
appeals to consider som ething as art are grounded in an appeal to value; we do not first classify 
something as art and then evaluate it. Art cannot be a purely classificatory concept, detachable from an 
evaluative component. Of course, we consider objects, w ith which we have not had contact as artworks. 
But that is on the basis of many others having done so, finding them to be of value. Fundam ental here is 
our trust in others' judgements, both present and past: we trust the judgements of others regarding what 
we take as scientifically true of the world. One should always remain open to the possibility that an 
artefact is of value as art, though one cannot recognise it; this may be because of prejudice, lack of 
cultivation or blameless personal constitution. As David Hume recognised:
"there still rem ain two sources of variation, which are not sufficient indeed to 
confound all the boundaries of beauty and deformity, but will often serve to produce a 
difference in the degrees of our approbation or blame. The one is the different humours 
of particular men; the other, the particular m anners and opinions of our age and 
country."*^
Richard Wollhcim, ‘The Institutional Theory of Art” in his Art and Its Objects (Cambridge: Canto, Cambridge 
University Press, 1980), pp. 161-162.
David Hume, "Of The Standard of Taste" in G. Dickie, R. Sclafani and R. Roblin (eds.). Aesthetics, 2nd ed., 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), p. 251.
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Section 2 : ffunctionaCism.
One way of cashing out a value-driven conception of art is to argue that art is a functional 
concept: an artw ork is made to fulfil a particular function and evaluated accordingly.*^ M. VV. Rowe 
has recently argued for a functionalist conception of art. Functionalism , as contrasted w ith the 
institutional theory, obviously allows for the possibility of artistic failure; one may fail to realise the 
value-driven goal that constitutes a rt's  function. Rowe goes on to argue that 'a rt ' cannot have two 
senses: it is not just that "the classificatory sense of 'a r t ' does not fit our aesthetic practice and 
discourse, but that such a sense could not exist." * ^ Objects falling under the concept 'a r t ' already have a 
particular kind of value. To attribute 'good artw ork' to an artefact is to recognise that it realises art's 
function to a high degree. A bad artw ork just manages to attain a minim al standard  required for 
artw ork status, realising art's function not particularly well. Thus Rowe's functionalism holds to the 
picture we emerged with when contemplating our primitive tribe with the practice of art: nam ely, that 
there is non-art, art, which m ust have achieved a certain value, and great art, which possesses that 
value to a high degree. Artefacts designed to be art which fail to fulfil art's function are art only in a 
derivative sense, they cannot really be art:
"Evaluation, in fact, is the key to aesthetic essence: it is necessary not only to 
determ ine which objects are good art, but which objects are art at all - the general 
principles that make something good art being the same as those which make it art in 
the first place. Thus, at the upper end of the artistic scale we find works w hich 
succeed to an eminent or outstanding degree, while towards the bottom we find works 
which only just manage to hold the interest of their audience. Below these are works 
which do not succeed in any respect but are still normally works of art in the sense 
that broken tin-openers are still tin-openers. Finally, we have the class of objects 
which are not works of art at all...where we cannot begin to understand how th e  
maker or arranger hoped to hold the attention of his audience."^*^
H ow ever, though an attractive option, the tem ptation to deploy Rowe's argum ents in 
explicating how art is evaluative should be strongly resisted. Firstly, Rowe's argum ents do not even 
entail functionalism . Rowe rightly  recognises that we cannot learn how to classify artw orks
*^M. W. Rowe, “Why ‘Art’ Doesn’t Have Two Senses”. The British Journal o f Aesthetics, Vol. 31, No. 3, 1991, 
pp. 214-221.
*9 ibid., p. 221.
20 ibid., pp. 218-219.
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independently of the evaluative sense of art. Yet neither this, nor the condition of artefactuality, 
entails that art is a functional concept. Of course, the function of knives is to cut, so we evaluate how 
good a knife is according to its sharpness: if a knife is too blunt, or too sharp, it cannot be a good knife.
However, not all concepts which have an inherently evaluative aspect w ork like this. For 
example, we evaluate drinks according to our purposes, but 'drink ' is not a functional concept. A drink 
must be something in liquid form, though this cannot be a sufficient condition as poisonous sap or vinegar 
are not drinks: a drink is not just what one can drink. It m ight be thought that since most drinks are 
artefacts, for example Coke, it is a functional concept and the natural drinks, for example w ater, are 
such by analogy. Thus whether the liquid in my glass is a drink or not depends upon various criteria, for 
example, whether it quenches my thirst and replenishes the water in my body. However, this criterion 
cannot be identified as the function of the concept 'd rink '. For example, although alcoholic drinks 
actually dehydrate us and may not be thirst quenching at ail, we value certain of them as great drinks. 
One cannot claim that alcoholic drinks merely have a nominal status: a glass of wine may be a great 
drink because the taste, the dry fruity flavour, is immensely pleasurable. Even if 'drink ' originally was 
a functional concept, the concept has obviously come apart from the original function.
Another inherently evaluative concept which is non-functional is nationality. What state you 
were born in does not determine your nationality, in the same way that artefactuality or being in an art 
gallery does not determine arthood status. Various factors may be involved ranging from ethnic origin, 
cultural grouping and form of life to questions of individual valuation. Learning to use the terms 'a r t ' 
and 'na tionality ' appropriately  requires an appreciation of their point, but this does not en ta il 
functionality. Thus fanatical nationalists are m istaken in presum ing that a feature such as ethnic 
origin is an  essential feature of nationhood. All that follows from  a concept being inherently  
evaluative is that the values proper to the object are prim ary characteristics, not necessary conditions, 
of belonging to the relevant class. Therefore, 'a rt' may be an evaluative non-functional concept.
The same conclusion follows from the apparen t requirem ent that artw orks are artefacts, 
w hether purposively made or not. I may purposefully make a draw ing, which may be evaluated 
according to whether it represents something. But this does not entail that draw ing has a function, 
namely to represent. After all, a doodle or abstract draw ing may represent nothing and still be a good 
drawing; the colours may be nice, the lines expressive and so on. Rowe's argument gives no good reason to 
step from the w eaker claim that art is inherently evaluative to the stronger claim that art is a 
functional concept. To evaluate an object's status according to certain criteria does not entail th a t the 
criteria must be identified with a particular function.
Secondly, it is not even clear that we only value one thing in artw orks anyway. As Graham 
Oppy points out, even artefacts defined by a single function may be valued according to various criteria: 
in the case of tin-openers, features which are central may include safety and durability as well as
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sh a r p n e ss .2 t  Of course, we value aesthetic qualities in artw orks, but we also seem to value the 
cognitive content, expressiveness and artistic skill of artworks. Rowe's argument does not establish that 
any one of these, aesthetic or not, is even a necessary m aster-quality for artw orks. The aesthetic 
qualities of Barnett Newm an's w ork seems to have little in common with the cognitive qualities of 
William Hogarth's work, yet we consider both to be art. That the question of value is fundamental to 
an artw ork's status does not entail an artw ork's qualities must be bound to the same value. Artw orks 
may be valued appropriately for num erous reasons. After all, different styles and ages may encourage 
different kinds of artw orks, em phasising d istinct qualities, some of w hich may be m utually  
incompatible. Furthermore, the same aesthetic qualities which in one age are sufficient for an artefact 
to be considered art may be insufficient in another age. if it is the experience w ith the artw ork which 
counts, rather than the artw ork's intrinsic qualities, then we may value many qualities in art. That art 
is an inherently evaluative concept does not w arrant the claim that artworks have an aesthetic essence
Lastly, although on the right lines, Rowe's functionalist conception fails to avoid all the old 
problem s w hich motivated the institutional theory 's debunking of value-laden theories in the first 
place. For Rowe, the object concerned must have attained a certain minimal standard to be classed as an 
artw ork or a knife in the first place. If the artefact produced fails to attain the relevant standard  then 
it just cannot be an artwork or a knife: at best it may be a failed work of art or knife. Yet the way his 
account is articulated, Rowe cannot circumnavigate the challenge that not only is there mere art and 
good art, but there is bad art: art which is disvaluable as such. The rise of the institutional theory was, 
in part, due to the incapacity of value-laden theories to account for bad art. Any adequate theory must 
explain why we seem to have both a classificatory sense and evaluative sense to the term  'art'. That 
there is bad art cannot be doubted. Critics may rubbish artw orks as banal, artistically crass or 
disgusting w ithout thereby thinking they have called into question their status. For example, Robert 
Hughes is in no doubt as to the artistic badness of Julian Schnabel, who "has never learned to draw: his 
growth was smothered by his impregnable self-esteem, through whose rhetoric one glimpses a mangled 
form of popular m odernist cliche...The only paintings that carry any kind of conviction are those in 
which Schnabel makes no attem pt to draw  a figure or a motif, but contents him self w ith a murky, 
nostalgic sort of Abstract Expressionist splashing."22 H ughes does not challenge the status of 
Schnabel's work as art, but obviously regards most of it as appallingly bad art.
This would suggest that bad art and bad knives are not just artefacts w hich fail to perform  
their function well, they may hardly perform  the relevant function at all. Thus an extremely blunt 
knife which cannot cut anything is still a knife. Rowe's conception holds that all those works which do
2* Graham Oppy, "On Functional Definitions of Art: A Response to Rowe", The British Journal o f Aesthetics, 
Vol. 33, No. i, 1993, p. 68.
22 Robert Hughes, Nothing I f  Not Critical (London: Collins Harvill, 1990), pp. 306-307.
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not partially realise art's  putative function cannot really be artworks. Yet w orks such as Picasso's 
collage Verre, Bouteille de Vin, fournal sur une table, which lack aesthetic essence, knives which are 
blunt, and tin-openers which cannot open tins, are not just nominally members of their class. The tin- 
opener that cannot open a tin, though a very bad one, may be a tin-opener nonetheless. It may be th e  
form in which the object is produced which determines its status, as distinct from how well it performs 
the function for which it was produced in such a form. After all, a blunt knife may not be a bad knife at 
all, it may just need sharpening: its status does not vary from actual to nominal knife as it becomes 
sharp and blunt by turns.
Artworks, such as Picasso's Verre, Bouteille de Vin, journal sur une table, which fail to fulfil 
art's putative function, may not only undoubtedly be art, they may even be good art. in locating arts 
function in an aesthetic essence Rowe leaves out objects which are obviously, and not just parasitically, 
art, some of which are even good art. The inadequacy of such an account cannot be hidden by weakening 
the criteria to include problematic cases, ranging from Picasso's Vcrrc, Bouteille de Vin, journal sur une 
table  to Duchamp's Fountain. Of course, the functionalist account would then include all artworks in th e  
relevant class. However, it would also include many objects which should not be there at all: if an 
inverted urinal, scrap of urinal or blank white canvas all have the requisite aesthetic qualities to be 
art, then so too do airfix kits, meccano sets and Tonka toy trucks. Moreover, the account would still fail 
to allow that Picasso's Verre, Bouteille de Vin, journal sur une table could be anything other than poor 
art.
A functionalist definition of art hoping to prove adequate should hold that bad artw orks, 
though failing to fulfil their function, are nevertheless, indisputably artw orks. W hether something is 
classified as an artw ork would then depend upon w hether it should fulfil art's function. W hether the 
object actually does so, and how well, determines whether the object is a good or bad artwork. Broken 
tin-openers and ugly artworks are properly classified as art and tin-openers respectively, they may just 
be worthless ones. A sO ppy suggests, an entity can have something as its proper function even when it 
cannot carry it out: a heart is still a heart w hen it stops beating."^ Identifying the proper function of 
objects does include a judgement about what the object is good for. However, this does not entail an object 
m ust partly fulfil that value to be considered a m ember of the relevant kind. Rather, anything w ith  
the proper function, realised or not, is a member of the relevant kind. If functionalism is to rem ain a 
plausible candidate for explaining the concept 'art', it is forced to allow for, rather than preclude, two 
senses to the term 'art'.
E. J. Bond has argued for a more sophisticated version of functionalism, urging us not to took at 
individual artworks but rather, art forms, at the highest level of generality, as paradigm s of art.
Graham Oppy, "On Functional Definitions of Art: A Response to Rowe", The British Journal o f Aesthetics. 
Vol. 33, No. 1, 1993, p. 70.
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Basically, "a thing cannot be acknowledged as an art form unless the purpose or function of art can be 
served within the form, that is unless good or successful works can be produced within it/'^ ’^  This allow s 
that artw orks can fail to fulfil art's  function and yet remain artw orks by virtue of the form within 
which they are made:
"A w ork of art, on this account, becomes sim ply anything belonging to (any 
instantiation of) an art form, e.g., any piece of music, good or bad, and on such an 
account bad music can only be bad art."^^
Thus Bond endorses a two sense functionalist view of art: bad and worthless art is not excluded 
as non-art. The advantage to Bond's conception is that it not only retains the evaluative purpose of art, 
it also differentiates bad art from non-art. However, problems soon become apparent when he suggests 
that "the notion of something being just a work of art, but not belonging to any art form (any art) is an 
absurd o n e . " T h e  obvious problem of logical impossibility looms large on the horizon; after all, not 
every artwork can have belonged to some pre-existent art form. Bond attempts to avoid this problem by 
stipulating that a work which isn 't in an already existing art form itself introduces a new art form: to 
be an artwork just is to be in an art form. However, this move means Bond's theory either stretches the 
term 'art form' to the point of meaninglessness or it is straightforwardly false. If an art form may be any 
form in which any artwork is made, then anything which bears any kind of resemblance to the form of 
previous or future artworks is art. Since anything can be made to resemble anything else in some way, 
the notion is evacuated of meaning. The upshot is that everything may be art, only a tiny proportion of 
which can be any good. Yet part of the veiy point of the concept 'a rt' is to distinguish non-art objects, 
such as electric shavers or Peter and jane books, from artworks, such as Paradise Lost. In trying to avoid 
the threat of logical im possibility  Bond forgets that an art form requires significant artistic  
resemblance: an artefact in that art form m ust typically fulfil art's function.
Bond could respond by pointing to his seven core criteria required for som ething to be an art 
form. Essentially an art form is held to com prehend artefacts which are intended to, and usually do, 
have value as objects of an audience's experience, exhibiting skill, imagination and meaning, upon 
which critical discrim ination can be e x e rc is e d .B u t  then not every artw ork can possibly be produced 
within an art form. Consider how something becomes an art form in the first place. For something to be
J. Bond, ‘The Essential Nature of Art”, The Ainencan Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 12, No. 2, 1975, p. 182. 
ibid., p. 180.
26 ibid., p. 182.
27 ibid., pp. 180-181.
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an art form requires it to be a recognisable artistic pattern or medium. Thus the first artwork produced in 
a particular form is insufficient to establish it as an art form. Whether it becomes established as an art 
form depends upon w hether other artw orks can then be successfully produced, utilising elem ents 
recognisably draw n from or sim ilar to the form suggested by the first artwork. The result can not be a 
foregone conclusion. The art work might have been an atypical result, produced only by the brilliant 
adeptness of a particular artist. In such a case, artw orks can obviously be produced in the form 
concerned, but only rarely. If the artistic result was atypical of the form used then it will not be 
established as an art form. Hence artworks may be produced outside art forms.
The case of chairs constitutes a good example to focus upon. There are a few chairs which are 
artw orks; ranging from chairs m ade in an art nouveau style to those m ade by Charles Rennie 
Mackintosh. However, this has proved insufficient to make chairs an art form. V irtually all chairs 
produced cannot even begin to strive for artwork status, nor are many made for that purpose. In fact, it is 
not the form of the chair which is responsible for these particular works being art, rather it is the art 
nouveau style or general oeuvre of Rennie Mackintosh that are primarily responsible. Similarly, only a 
few television adverts gain recognition as art, for example Tony Kaye's 80-second commercial for 
Dunlop tyres. Although we recognise that a few artw orks have been produced in this form, we do not 
consider every advert, whether for washing pow der or furniture stores, to be art. Yet another fitting 
exam ple concerns established artists such as Ham ish Fulton and Richard Long, who exhibit, as 
artw orks, maps with the routes they have w alked traced upon them. A lthough these w orks are 
established artworks, we do not consider every walk, every map with a route traced upon it, to be art. 
The general point all these cases bear out is that there are forms of artefacts, for example chairs, 
adverts, route traced maps, which typically do not have value as art. Therefore these forms cannot be 
art forms, though a few of their members may count as art for other reasons.
Bond's theory also fails to account for the fact that we do not consider everything produced 
within recognisable art forms to be artworks. An art form is one in which artefacts typically fulfil a rt's  
value. But it does not follow from this that all artefacts produced in an art form are art, though 
worthless or poor. As we have seen. Bond cannot claim an artw ork is by definition in an art form. So 
why should we consider all artefacts produced within art forms to be artworks? If an art form is one 
which typically fulfils art's value, then why shouldn 't the same be true of artworks? Our recognition of 
works as art is based upon seeing in what ways they are or may be seen as valuable. Artefacts which 
are made in a recognisable art form but cannot be seen as fulfilling art's value are not artworks. Consider 
one of the earliest and most established art forms; music. Although music is a recognised art form, we do 
not recognise everything which is music as an artw ork: most radio jingles, com puter game tunes or 
elevator music are not even remotely considered art. The newer artistic m edium s of photography and 
film have become recognised as art forms, yet it w ould be ludicrous to suppose that every family 
holiday snap or home video were artworks.
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A different kind of example might be that of the improvised comedy performed on Whose Line 
Is It Anywayl Recognised art forms from poetry and plays to musicals are mercilessly parodied at the 
suggestion of the audience. This often involves the juxtaposition of a particu lar art form w ith an 
incongruous style, for example a julie Andrews musical in the style of H arold Pinter. It is essential, 
otherw ise it would not be funny as a parody, that w hat is perform ed is recognisably w ith in  the 
relevant art form. However, though extremely funny, we do not consider the comics' performances to be 
art by virtue of their im itation of established art forms. After all, they are comically subverting the 
artistic value of the form being parodied. Parody itself may, of course, be an art form. But then, again, 
we do not recognise every parody as art. Making an artefact w ithin an established art form cannot 
guarantee artwork status.
Bond's stipulation that all artw orks are in art forms and that all works in art forms are art is 
false. Furthermore, since there cannot be pre-existent art forms, prior to the first artworks, his theory is 
crushed by the problem  of logical impossibility. It is tem pting to think that had Bond more fully 
appreciated  the historical nature of art and its forms he could have produced a more plausible 
functionalist account, one which seeks to turn  art's  historical aspect to its advantage. This kind of 
functionalism  will hold that once art has evolved as a distinct practice, w ith developing and 
established art forms, there can be bad and worthless art. Artefacts made w ithin established artistic 
m edia, forms and genres may thus autom atically be art by virtue of their being w ithin stable, 
recognised and developing art forms.
A more historically aware functionalism can thus claim plausibility, on the grounds that it can 
account for bad and worthless art whilst, nevertheless, capturing the value driven  nature of art. It 
would recognise what Oppy requires from a functionalist account, namely that "functional kinds have a 
two-stage definition. First, the proper function of objects of the kind is identified. And then the kind is 
defined to be anything which has that proper function...the definition of functionalist kinds does 
incorporate a judgement about what those kinds are good for - and yet it is not true that anything which 
belongs to the kind must exhibit the value in question."28 This version of sophisticated functionalism 
still allows for a purely dassificatory primary use, albeit a limited one, whilst grounding the concept 
of art on the recognition of art's value. If we take the relevant kind to be identified at the higher level 
of art forms then som ething may be an artw ork w hilst failing to deliver artistic value. Of course, 
artworks produced outside established art forms m ust be of a high artistic value. However, artw orks 
produced within established art forms need not be of any artistic value in order to be art. The function of 
art is the delivery of artistic values. The second stage of the definition allows that works produced in 
art forms are automatically art, w hether they have fulfilled their proper function or not.
Graham Oppv, “On Functional Definitions of Art: A Response to Rowe”, The British Journal o f Aesthetics, 
Vol. 33, No. 1, Î993 p. 70.
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The historically aware functionalist may also refuse to define art in overly restrictive terms. A 
recognition of the historical aspect of art explains why art has been conceived and evolved in different 
ways. Thus the functionalist, as Robert Stecker has proposed, should wisely leave the list of putative 
functions open-ended. Essentially, to be an artw ork an artefact m ust fulfil the functions of art in use 
when it was created or w hen the issue of classification is foregrounded. Artefacts within central art 
forms are art if they attain either intentional or success standards. Artefacts outw ith central art forms 
can only be art if they attain the relevant standard of success.2^ Hence if an artefact is made w ithin an 
established art form and fulfils an artist's intention it may be an artw ork whilst failing to fulfil the 
relevant function.
The conception of historical functionalism being argued for may become clearer by analogy. The 
goal of weapons is to kill, that of art to produce what is of value as art. Artefacts may take established 
forms in order to fulfil their functions and, typically, artefacts produced in these forms achieve their 
respective goals reasonably well, sometimes brilliantly. Established forms of weaponry include knives, 
guns and bombs. Established art forms include paintings, the novel and film. There are also artefacts 
which, although not made in established forms, may still achieve the relevant goal well. Thus they 
become classed as weapons or art respectively, despite their lack of conventional form. For example, a 
macabre Roald Dahl short story describes how a wom an m urders her adulterous husband. Then, by 
following through her contrived alibi, she successfully invites the policemen to eat the m urder weapon; 
a previously frozen and now cooked joint of lamb. A frozen joint of lamb is not a weapon unless it not only 
can be but is used as one to great effect. By contrast, a not very effective gun, w hether it is ever used or 
not, is always a weapon. The same is true with art, a chair is not an artwork unless it not only can be but 
actually is of great artistic value.
By recognising the historical nature of art, the sophisticated functionalist can allow for the 
evolution of art in the first place, and, consequently, new art forms. The traditional objection against 
functionalism , which the institutional theory played upon, was that it could not account for how 
anthropological artefacts became art at the turn of the century. If the sophisticated functionalist holds 
that the function of a thing is not wholly given by its original or intended use, then he can apparently 
resolve the problem. It is not that anthropological artefacts fulfilled the function of art, and thus were 
art, even before the cultural practice existed. Rather, they could only become art when the practice 
evolved. Therefore, certain aspects, which were by-products of their original function, can now be seen 
to fulfil art's historically evolved function. Anthropological artefacts d id n 't have the function of art 
then, but they have it now because of how we use them. Picasso brought anthropological artefacts into 
the arena of art, by, through his work, either adding a new function to the open ended set or fulfilling 
an already established function through different representational means. Thus, when Picasso drew
2^ Robert Stecker, ‘The Boundaries of Art”, The British Journal o f Aesthetics, Vol. 30, No. 3, 1990, p. 271.
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upon such artefacts in his work, he brought those which could fulfil a similar function into the category 
of art.
One might be tempted to suggest functionalism must be inadequate because we do not just value 
artw orks instrum entally. W hether the set of functions is left perpetually open or not, functionalism 
fails to recognise that we also value various properties and features of artw orks, independently of 
whether a particular function is fulfilled or not. In particular, we value the means which achieve the 
given ends in a particular way, for their own sake. An art form is grounded upon formal, structural or 
conventional similarity in the realisation of certain values. Works produced w ithin art forms ty p ica lly  
realise the purpose of art in a way which is already valued, irrespective of w hat the particular artist 
has brought to it himself. However, put like this, the point does not threaten the functionalist. Indeed, 
functionalism can embrace the recognition that we value the means by which the end is achieved on th e  
grounds of appropriateness. For example, the wildly different styles of Pugin 's neo-gothic revival and 
Le Corbusier's modernist architecture were justified on the grounds that they were the most apt forms of 
expression for their respective ends. An artefact produced w ithin established art forms will utilise 
conventions which fittingly achieve art's function, w hether this be the satisfaction of human need or a 
religious reflection of the world. Thus the functionalist will claim to account for the greater likelihood 
of artw ork status for an artefact produced w ithin, as against one produced outw ith, established art 
forms. After all, 'form  follows function' was one of the prim ary slogans of m odernist architectural 
theory.
Of course, it is a contingent w orry w ith the adequacy of the functionalist response that the 
general principle allows so many different styles, when typically it is used to claim supremacy for one 
particu lar style over all others. However, the over-determ inate claims m ade for an art form 's 
universal or historical appropriateness is not the main problem here. Of course, the functionalist can 
allow that we value properties of artistic worth apart from their subservient relation to a particular 
intended goal. For example, we may value the texture and colours of a particular oil painting even 
where they work against the goal the artist is trying to achieve. We value more than the fulfilm ent of 
a particular end in art. Thus, in gothic architecture, we may appropriately value the adorned chevrons, 
columns and fanning leaf like struts, though they are superfluous to the practical end. W hether a work 
realises art's  value, of affording a rich experience, is not necessarily equivalent to w hether the 
intended goal with which the artefact is made was realised or not.
Nevertheless, it is a mistake to presume that giving a historical twist to functionalism renders 
it adequate. Firstly, the functionalist explanation as to how anthropological artefacts became art 
earlier this century is flawed. If functionalism were sound then it should follow from Picasso's bringing 
anthropological artefacts into the sphere of art, that all such artefacts now have the goal of fulfilling 
this function and are thus art. Yet, plainly, we only recognise a few anthropological artefacts as a r t. 
The functionalist account fails to explain why only a few anthropological artefacts are considered art
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rather than all of them. Moreover, allowing any function the possibility of being plugged in to art's 
open set threatens to render the account either uninform ative or non functional. It is uninform ative 
because, unless some further more general function is specified, there is no way of determ ining which 
functions may be plugged in to the set and why. Since it lacks criteria for deciding w hether a particular 
function may be plugged into the open-ended set, the account is vacuous. If criteria are given, then we 
merely return to functionalism's unresolvable problems. For example, one may hold that one of a rt's  
functions is to be expressive, yet obviously not every expressive artefact is art. Thus, being an expressive 
artefact cannot be a sufficient condition for artw ork status. The same will hold true for every putative 
function of art that one can think of. Therefore, though goal-directed, art cannot be a functional concept.
Secondly, functionalism is still committed to holding that a w ork intentionally created within 
an established art form cannot fail to be art. However, the production of an artefact w ithin an 
established art form is insufficient for it to be art: not just any artefact made in an established art form 
is art. Similarly, not just every artefact m ade in the form of a weapon is one. This is why we do not 
consider cur ri/ painting, novel, poem or film to be art. As Ruskin distinguished between architecture as 
an art and building, one m ust distinguish between painting as an art and painted p i c t u r e s . ^ 6  framed 
painting in oils is not autom atically art, nor is a novel autom atically art because it consists of a 
narrated fictional story. The short stories in People's Friend or Jackie certainly fulfil a purpose, but we 
do not consider them to be art. Barbara C artland romance novels. Chuck Norris war movies or most 
am ateur water colours are not art. In both the case of the gun that cannot fire and the poem that merely 
rhym es, the artefact w holly fails to fulfil the value that grounds the established forms of, 
respectively, guns and poetry. Such artefacts are m embers of their forms only parasitically , for 
example through their formal or structural resemblance, and are not weapons and art respectively. 
Indeed, were most or all of the members of their form to fail so radically, then the form would become 
disestablished: it w ould no longer be considered one which typically produces weapons or art 
respectively. There are overall criteria of value as art which artefacts in established art forms must 
typically fulfil in order to be art. Artefacts outw ith established art forms m ust be of a certain higher 
artistic value to qualify as artw orks at all.
F urtherm ore, the sophisticated  functionalist cannot adequately  explain  why artw orks 
produced w ithin established art forms may be of less value than that required for the artw ork status of 
artefacts produced outside established art forms. The features of a particular art form, which ty p ica lly  
belong to works made within it, may be of intrinsic value, independently of what a particu lar artist 
does w ith them. Therefore, artw orks in art forms usually already possess a certain am ount of artistic 
value just by virtue of being m ade w ithin an established art form. Conversely, an  artw ork created 
outw ith established art forms m ust fulfil art's purpose and possess artistic qualities to a high degree.
•^ 6 John Ruskin, The Seven Ixinips o f Architecture, 2nd ed., {London; Blackfriars), Chapter 1, pp. 8-30.
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An established art form may have prima facie value, w hether great or small. Therefore a work 
produced within an established art form, but w hich fails to be art, may lack any other artistic value 
ap art from that afforded by the form itself. A lternatively, a w ork may possess enough artistic 
disvalue to offset the prima facie value of the art form. An artefact produced in recognised art forms 
m ust still attain a certain artistic value, which is why som ething can be just a story and not art. 
Barbara C artland 's romances. Neighbours or Three Men and a Baby, although well m ade w ithin 
established art forms, are not art. Conversely, Tuun Peaks, Eastenders, or John Le Carre's novels may 
qualify for arthood status, though an artefact of their equivalent value produced outw ith established 
art forms may not. Most contemporary art in any but an exceptional age will be unexceptional and of 
lim ited artistic value.
Section 3 : IntentionaCModification
The failure of any form of a functionalist account might drive some toward a heavily revised 
version of the institutional theory. In an attem pt to retain the purely dassificatory notion of art, 
distinct from any evaluative aspect, Dickie has foregrounded the condition of artefactuality and 
revised his original theory.^  ^ Previously Dickie's artefactual condition was quite trivial, the act of 
status conferral was itself considered sufficient to render an object an artefact. Now however, on his 
revised conception, the underlying generative mechanism  is no longer the artw orld, rather it is the 
artist: an artw ork is an artefact intentionally m ade by an artist who intends it to be presented for 
appreciation as an artwork. Thus, for Dickie, it is the intention which determ ines w hether an artefact 
is art, independently of whether it is of value or not.
However, this move is problem atic for the very reason which underlay the institutional 
theory 's plausibility  in the first place. We now appreciate some anthropological, m edieval and 
religious artefacts as art, although they couldn 't have been created with that intention. At the time of 
their creation there w asn 't a cultural practice of art, the objects were intentionally produced for use as 
religious or ritualistic symbols. Therefore, art cannot be fixed merely by the authorial intent to produce 
an artefact for appreciation yua artwork. Dickie's revision is viciously circular. If, for an artefact to be 
art, it m ust be intended by its creator for appreciation as art, what, then, does the latter consist in? 
Surely not its being appreciated as something put forward for appreciation by its creator as something 
to be appreciated!
Dickie might reply that those lacking the practice of art cannot intend to create an artefact for 
consideration qua artwork, yet, nevertheless, there may be a common broad intention. Thus, although
^  ^ George Dickie, The Art Circle (New York: Ha\ en, 1984), pp. 80-82.
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certain artefacts were narrowly intended as objects for ritualistic appreciation and use, the broad 
intention is to create objects for a form of appreciation which is central to art, for example imaginative 
or aesthetic. On the basis of desires and beliefs the m aker deliberates, forms a determ inate intention 
and then acts upon it to fulfil his goal. If the action is carried out successfully the intention determines 
the nature of the action and thus what is produced. Therefore, Dickie may suggest, an object is art if and 
only if it is the result of actions which carry out the author's intention to produce an object for aesthetic, 
artistic or imaginative appreciation, independently of whether the object is found to be of value or not. 
Although it may be differently manifested through distinct cultural practices, the fundam ental broad 
intention may be conceived to be the same.
Yet this makes artworks totally independent of our responses in engaging with them as art. As 
we have already seen, recognising something as art is grounded upon our reasons for doing so. These 
reasons are typically based upon the recognition of features and experiences afforded by the artefact in 
question as having particular kinds of value. Dickie's revised theory still abrogates the requirem ent to 
conform to or explain away art's value-laden grounding. Furthermore, broad intention can only fix the 
nature of the artefact as an object for appreciation if the intent is so diluted as to pick out a category far 
larger than that denoted by the term 'art'. Art is more than the production of artefacts with the broad 
intent to be offered up for any kind of appreciation. The notion of appreciation here has become 
virtually meaningless, including too many cases we would not consider art. For example, jackie Collins 
intends to and does w rite books which her readers appreciate, yet they do not thus automatically 
qualify for status as artworks. To create something with the broad intention of engaging others no more 
makes it art than anything else.
Conversely, if the notion of intent is narrowed down, Dickie's revised account cannot pick out a 11 
artworks as such. This is particularly ironic since the case which now proves so troublesome was one 
which his original theory derived much plausibility from; namely, anthropological artefacts. Only in 
this century have we come to regard certain anthropological artefacts as artworks, but they were not 
art from the moment of their creation. It is not that no one recognised their nature. Indeed, their nature 
as objects for appreciation and engagem ent has virtually always been appreciated, most especially so 
when they were being used within the practices for which they were made. Presumably most of them 
were created with the narrow intention that they be used for ritualistic worship. Furthermore, even if 
some of them were not created with a particular intent in mind, they still could not be created as art: 
one cannot intend to create an object as art where the appropriate concept and practice has not arisen. 
W ithout a contemporary cultural practice and understanding of art, someone can not even intend an 
artefact to be an artwork. Thus Dickie's revised theory fails to account for such artworks.
Furthermore, if Dickie holds it is the narrow intention to produce art which counts, there could 
be no possibility of failure. Yet, despite one's best intentionally guided efforts to produce art, one can 
fail: not everything produced w ith the intention of making art qualifies for that status. It is not just
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that the resultant art may be bad, it may fail to be art at all. That I can try, and thus fail, to produce 
art entails it cannot merely be the intention to make art that counts. I may intend to produce a ripped 
suit, which 1 intend to be appreciated as art. However, I may fulfil the former and not the latter part of 
my intent because the artefact itself is so unstructured. Its features and the experiences it affords are of 
no value as art, indeed we can't even look at it as if it were art. Finally, as certain unintended features 
of a work may add to its value, so, by analogy, an artefact which was not intended as an artw ork may 
later be recognised as one, as the cultural practice of art develops. Indeed such cases are not as rare as 
might be assumed; for example, many films we now consider art were neither intended as, nor taken to 
be, art at the time of their production. A lthough early this century we had an entrenched cultural 
practice of art, film was initially taken as unrelated to, or parasitic upon, other art forms. By contrast, 
we now take it for granted that film is an established art form.
Sim ilarly, the unintended artw ork in already acknowledged forms of art is not so rare; for 
example, certain news photographs from the M agnum news agency, although clearly not intended as 
such, are appropriately recognised as artworks. It is because of the artefact's value that we recognise 
and engage with an artefact as art. The artist intending to create art is engaged in a particular task , 
medium, tradition and so on because he thinks it is of value. That the actual value of the work produced 
may diverge from the artist's assessment is obvious. An artist may think his crushed garbage cans are of 
value as art, though they may well not be. What is central to the artist is that w hat he has produced 
actually is of value, and not merely that he happens to think so. What counts is not the narrow  
intention with which the action was performed but whether the object produced is of artistic value.
An attem pt to shore up Dickie's revised account m ight fall back upon Jerrold Levinson's 
attem pts to define art.^2 Essentially, Levinson's account plugs in the notion of an art-regard to Dickie's 
intentional requirement:
"An artw ork is a thing (item, object, entity) that has been seriously intended for 
regard-as-a-work-of-art, i.e. regard in any way pre-existing artw orks are or were 
correctly regarded
Whether something is an artwork is held to depend upon whether the artist intended his work 
to be art or not. What this amounts to is cashed out by an historical account of the way artw orks may be
^2 Jerrold Levinson, “Defining Art Historically”, 77/e 7<?//r/w/<3/ Vol .  19, No. 3, 1979, pp. 232-
250, “Refining Art Historically”, The Journal o f Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 47, No. 1, 1989, pp. 21-33, and 
“A Refiner’s Reply: Reply to Sartvvell and Kolak”, The Journal o f Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 3, 
1990, pp. 231-235.
Jerrold Levinson, “Refining Art Historically”, The Journal o f Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 47, No. 1, 
1989, p. 21. I take Levinson’s position to be the modified one articulated in this his later paper, where the 
problematic notion of a proprietary intent has dropped out.
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correctly regarded. Levinson explicates the three forms he thinks an intention for art-regard  may 
take.'^"^ A specific art-conscious intent is one where the work is intended to be regarded in a particular 
way in which previous art-works have been regarded. A non-specific art-conscious intent is one where 
the work is intended to be regarded in a way any previous artworks have been regarded. Lastly, an art- 
unconscious intent is where a work is intended for a regard characteristic of an object which possesses 
certain intrinsic features: w here this is in fact a way in which some previous artw orks have been 
regarded. In this way Levinson can allow for naive art making. In general, the art-regard that is 
possible obviously depends upon how past art was correctly regarded. Levinson's definition thus 
requires a story about how such an art-regard may come about in the first place. The objects of certain 
activities came to be treated in a certain manner, these being the objects w hich are retrospectively 
identified as ur-art. Increasingly, new activities arise whose objects are sim ilarly intended to be 
treated as the objects of ur-art. These activities then become associated within the larger category of 
art. Now, other new objects of activities can then become art through an intentional connection w ith the 
established artw orks.
Stephen Davies has falsely criticised Levinson's account on the grounds that the recursion in 
his definition to ur-arts is a m atter of mere stipulation.^^ Yet, as Levinson points out, "one could 
substitu te for the place-holder 'u r-arts '...a  specification in intrinsic term s of the ac tiv ities  that 
archaeological investigation had revealed to be in fact the roots of Western Art. This would in effect 
'complete' the recursive definition of art."^6 attem pting to rebut the criticism that his notion of an 
art-regard is too broad, Levinson specifies that it m ust be totally and substantively the same. Thus 
although we may attend to something as we might attend to an Impressionist work, it cannot be an art- 
regard unless, for instance, we also pay attention to the painterly detail in the same way. Thus a traffic  
light cannot be art-regarded, at least not as paintings are.^7 Furtherm ore, Levinson also allows the 
recognition that the reasons we consider som ething to be art may be fundam entally  linked to 
considerations of value. Thus he concedes that the notion of an art-regard becomes "any way pre­
existing artw orks are or were correctly regarded, so that an experience o f some value be thereby 
obtained."^^
Jerrold Levinson, “Defining Art Historically”, The British Journal o f Aesthetics, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1979, pp. 237- 238.
Stephen Davies, Definitions o f Art (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1991), Chapter 7, p. 170.
^6 Jerrold Levinson, “Defining Art Historically”, The British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1979, p. 244.
^7 Jerrold Le\ inson, “Refining Art Historically”, The Journal o f Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 47, No. I, 
1989, p. 24. This is a point Stephen Davies misses when he emphasises how the Grand Canyon may be brought 
under the notion of an art-regard in his Deflnitions o f Art (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), Chapter 7, pp. 
174-179.
^8 ibid., p. 29.
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Nevertheless, Levinson's theory, whether on its own or as support for the institutional theory, 
is inherently problem atic.^^The notion of an art-regard which does all the work, although tightened 
up, remains suspect. Remember, an artw ork must be seriously intended to be properly regarded in a way 
which is totally and substantively the same regard in which other artw orks are properly regarded. 
But is this requirement not now too narrow? Presumably, that the art-regard m ust be totally the same 
cannot be equivalent to a dem and that it be exactly the same. After all, we do not regard two works by 
the same artist in the same period in exactly the same way, never mind works by two different artists 
in similar or radically different movements. An art-regard being substantively the same must allow for 
irrelevant differences across cases. But what then enables us to pick out whether the difference in our 
art-regard is irrelevant? Levinson's account is thus forced to rely upon criteria of relevancy for which 
he does not provide, apart from the uninform ative and circular explanation that other art-works must 
have, in some sense, been substantively regarded in the same way.
Levinson might then be tempted to cash out the notion of an art-regard in terms of appreciating 
the intrinsic properties or features of an artw ork. But this w ould defeat the point of his preferred 
definition: it would elevate what he has identified as the secondary, m arginal sense of art into the 
primary sense. The story about how artw orks got going in the first place and how works like Kafka's 
are to be identified, in term s of their intrinsic properties, w ould then prove typical ra ther than 
exceptional. The rationale for his proceduralism  would then be lost. Alternatively, Levinson might be 
tem pted to support the notion of an art-regard in terms of how it is intended the object be regarded. This 
too offers no solution. Firstly, the possibility of naive artm aking would be falsely precluded. Secondly, 
the position w ould effectively be only an alternative formulation of Dickie's revised theory, rather 
than one which offers bolstering support for it. After all, Levinson's account was supposed to be an 
improvement upon Dickie's theory. Lastly, Levinson might think the notion of an art-regard m ight be 
cashed out in terms of interpretation, giving a Dantoesque twist to his definition. An artw ork would 
then have to be interpretable in ways in which previous artworks have been. Artworks would thus be 
construed as objects of meaning. Obviously there is a tension here, because the role of intention threatens 
to drop out altogether. But Levinson could argue that it is intention which fixes w hat constitutes a 
correct appreciation of an artwork. Yet, once again, this would return us to the familiar problems which 
plagued Dickie's revised definition.
Attempting to avoid these problems by stipulating that an artw ork 's interpretation m ust be 
linked to the interpretations of previous artw orks w ould be inadequate. After all, artefacts which 
include Liberty's wallpaper. Boots porcelain vases and Impressionistic style painting by numbers k its
See Graham Oppy, “On Defining Art Historically”, British Journal o f Aesthetics, Vol. 32, No. 2, 1992, pp. 153- 
161, for some fairly devastating criticisms of Levinson’s theor) and Jerrold Levinson, “Art Historically Defined: 
Reply to Oppy”, British Journal o f Aesthetics, Vol. 33, No. 4, 1993, pp. 380-385, for an unconvincing sahage 
operation.
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can all be linked to interpretations of previous artw orks: we would not consider any of them to be 
artworks. Thus not just anything that can be interpreted as an artw ork in fact is one. Yet on Levinson's 
account we have no good grounds upon w hich to d istinguish  those objects which are correctly 
appreciated with an art-regard and those that are not. Those that do suggest themselves within his 
theory fail to improve upon Dickie's theory or only serve to undercut the point of his socio-historicai 
account, for example by characterising an art-regard as one required to appreciate properties or features 
proper to an artwork. Levinson's reformulated definition allows that the notion of an art-regard may be 
linked to the valuable experiences artw orks may properly afford. What Levinson fails to do is pursue 
the recognition that som ething's being art is linked to the particular kinds and value of experiences 
which artworks may afford. Perhaps this is because it m ight undercut the point of Levinson's socio- 
historical definition: by seeking to capture the notion of art in terms of certain central features and 
values. We should then, look to an account which places primacy upon the value of art works, rather 
than reducing them  to their p roduction  w ith in  a socio-institu tional context, w hilst p roperly  
incorporating an appreciation of art's historical nature.
Section 4: Sirt as a CuCturaC Practice and CCuster Concept
Richard Wollheim was the first philosopher w ithin contem porary aesthetics to em phasise 
art's  historical character. W ollheim, explicitly paralleling W ittgenstein's description of language, 
argued that art should be conceived as a distinct form of life. W ittgenstein d ispu ted  the assum ption 
that m eaning in language arises from independently  identifiable relations to the w orld. M eaning 
cannot be reduced to a strictly denotative relation, the naming of the independently conceived world. 
N or can meaning be reduced to our characteristic experiences of the world, understood apart from 
language. For W ittgenstein, our experiences are only identifiable and m eaningful from within our 
language. To make sense of a language requires a grasp of the habits, customs and experiences with 
which it is bound. Conversely, these things cannot be properly identified apart from that very 
l a n g u a g e . ~ ^ 6  Language mediates our perceptions of the world and in so doing partly shapes how we see 
it. Regarding art as a form of life is based upon the recognition of art as a vehicle of mediation. This, 
Wollheim suggests, means art m ust evolve w ith a life of its own before it can be subjected to other 
dem ands. Its own autonom ous procedures m ust evolve before it can convey particular meanings. 
Questions concerning the nature and value of art only make sense as the context and developm ent of art 
becomes considerably rich and distinct. The 'life of forms in art' is a precondition of art's value:
■^6 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3rd ed., (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), Sections 19, 23, 241, pp. 
8-9, 11-12 and 88.
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"In creating his forms the artist is operating inside a continuing activity or enterprise, 
and this enterprise has its own repertoire, imposes its own stringencies, offers its own 
opportunities, and thereby provides occasions, inconceivable outside it, for invention 
and audacity/'"^ ^
The possibility of artw orks and their possessing m eaning requires artistic practices. One 
consequence of this is that the artistic impulse cannot be identified independently of the institutions of 
art. Recognising artworks requires the prior recognition of artistic practices. The emerging, evolving 
practice mediates and thus shapes the motive; it is the practice which makes it artistic, as opposed to, 
say, religious. A distinct cultural practice such as art can only emerge and evolve as such w here it is 
valued for particular reasons. One may give a simplified story about the emergence of art in Western 
civilisation from under religion's shadow, but the driving engine of the practice's evolution must concern 
art's value. Art developed out of a recognition of w hat was being done, apart from  its instrum ental 
conception within the framework of religion: valued for its own sake or its entertainment rather than as 
an aid to devotion. Without this recognition there would have been no rationale for art to get going in 
the first place."^2 Thus the context of the practice is required to make sense of the non-arbitrary nature 
of something being a m edium  or w ork of art. The historical precedents set the frame and partly 
determine the kind of order and artistic goals the artist aims for. An artist presupposes or reacts against 
what has gone before within the artistic practice. To see why something is art, or whether an artw ork 
constitutes a significant developm ent of the practice, requires an understanding of the work's inter­
relations to other artworks.
Noël Carroll has recently developed this line of thought, arguing for art as a cultural practice 
w ithin a form of life."^^ A lthough Carroll himself gives no reason for adopting the term  'cu ltu ra l 
practice', rather than 'form  of life', his terminology is more appropriate. A form of life is constituted by 
our communal activities and ways of living in society. It is within this framework that the activities of 
art take up an im portant but partial place. As language-games are part of a form of life so too is art.‘^ '^
Richard Wollheim, Art and Its Objects (Cambridge: Canto, Cambridge Univ ersit}’ Press, 1980), Section 53, pp. 
124-125.
■^2 See John Sommerville, The Secidarization of Early Modern England (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 
for a history' of art's secularisation in England where, for example, “a secular concert life de\ eIoped earlier and more 
actively in London than in any other European city.” Chapter 7, p. 91.
Noël Carroll, “Art, Practice and Narrative”, The Monist, Vol. 71, No. 2, 1988, pp. 140-156.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Itivestigations, 3rd ed., (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), Section 23, pp. 11-12.
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Whether something is an artw ork depends upon whether it can be properly placed within the evolving 
traditions internal to art. Art conceived as a cultural practice is not just made up of customs or habit but;
"a complex body of interrelated hum an activities governed by reasons internal to 
those forms of activity and their co-ordination. Practices are aimed a t achieving 
goods that are appropriate to the forms of activity that compromise them, and these 
reasons and goods, in part, situate the practice in the life of the culture. Such 
practices supply  the fram ew orks in w hich hum an powers are developed and 
expanded.""^^
Integral parts of the cultural practice, such as custom, tradition  and precedence, provide 
resources for its continual development. As art evolves and transforms itself in this manner so artw orks 
are to be identified in terms of narrational strategies of reasoning; for example, those of repetition, 
amplification and repudiation. Through recognising the repetitions of forms or styles of previous art we 
may link a work to past art. For example, we may recognise Glynn Maxwell's verse dram a or Michael 
N ym an's recycling of le itm o tifs  from Purcell as artw orks in this way. A m plification involves 
developing the means for achieving the ends of art forms or genres; an instance of this could be Joseph 
Conrad's development of adventure stories to allow for a self-conscious uncertainty in the actions of the 
heroic. Repudiation is a m atter of opposing pre-existent styles or art forms. That a w ork stands in stark 
contrast to a particular style, whilst invoking the precedence of more tem porally d istant exemplars, 
establishes it as a participant in the practice. For example, Ezra Pound's rejection of Victorian poetry 
from Browning to Tennyson invoked Dante and the poetry of the Italian Renaissance. Picasso's use of 
prim itive styles in his art was part of his repudiation of contemporary academic concerns and styles, 
whilst simultaneously invoking the art of past masters. In so doing Picasso helped to bring into the class 
art objects which previously had no place in the cultural practice. Carroll's basic argum ent is that art 
can only be rendered coherent by the narrational construal of its development, explaining why and on 
what basis the practice evolved. The story of art constrains and enables its nature and value:
"the modes of identifying new objects as art make essential reference, though in 
different ways, to the history of the practice. New objects are identified as artworks 
through histories of art, rather than theories of art."'^^
Noël Carroll, “Art, Practice and Narrative”, The Monist, Vol. 71, No. 2, 1988, p. 143. 
-+6 ibid., p. 149.
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To claim art is a cultural practice does not require necessary or sufficient conditions for 
som ething's being art: the narrational strategies need not converge on a single theory of art. Art is 
understood as a distinctive activity within our form of life, in relation to which it is appropriate to do 
and categorise various sorts of things. Without some sort of understanding of twentieth century art one 
couldn't even begin to make sense of the fact that D ucham p's Fountain has a place in our cultural 
practice of art. Identifying something as art is a m atter of coming to appreciate it as such, even w here it 
may be a poor instance. Art develops from w hat come to be seen as successfully produced paradigm s of 
artistic value. Thus something m ade prim arily as a religious artefact m ight retrospectively become 
art, it may even be considered a prime exemplar of good art.
Prim ary artw orks anchor the practice, gu iding subsequent art and helping to explain the 
transformations of art's practices over the ages. Similarly, various traditions and art forms emerge and 
modify themselves. Of course, where the works produced in distinctive art forms consistently lacks 
artistic value, the forms may m utate or die. A lternatively, the artistic value of an art form may be 
outweighed by other concerns, for example changing socio-economic factors prom oted the death  of 
landscape gardening. Emerging art forms usually establish themselves through the recognisable use of 
aspects of already established art forms. They are confirmed and become dom inant through the 
consistent production of good artworks within them. Realist film, for example, established itself as an 
art form in this manner: using narrative techniques analogous to those developed w ithin the novel. The 
films of D. W. Griffith are prim e exemplars of works which helped to establish a new art form and 
confirm its status: their narrative structure owed m uch to Dickens and they w ere consistently highly 
v a l u e d . “^ 7  Paradigmatic artw orks and art forms are seen to have certain sorts of w orthw hile artistic 
values, which promotes the making of and engaging w ith other artworks.
Robert Stecker is wrong to argue that the conception of art as a cultural practice cannot account 
for artworks produced within non-art practices."^* Indeed, the conception explains the emergence of the 
practice through artw orks which cannot have been produced w ithin established artistic practices. 
How could the practice have got going otherwise? The evolution of art as a distinct practice is grounded 
upon its developm ent of religious practices for different ends, only retrospectively can we recognise 
certain of these religious practices and works as artistic. The first artworks were not produced within 
the practice of art. Similarly, distinct art forms arise from the consistent production of works w ith  a 
high value as art. The production of valuable artw orks in a particular form establishes it as an art
Dilys Powell drew attention to the similarities between the human narratives of Dickens and Griffith when 
reviewing The Birth o f a Nation in 1945. See Christopher Cook (ed.), The Dilys Powell Film Reader (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 357-358. David Bordwell’s Narration in the Fiction Filtn (London: Methuen, 
1985), and John Fell’s Filtn and the Narrative Tradition (Oklahoma: Oklahoma University Press, 1974) also point 
up this fact.
Robert Stecker, “The Boundaries of Art”, The British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 30, No. 3, 1990, p. 269.
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form. Although not all works produced within the established form are art, typically most of them 
will be. Conversely, artefacts produced outside established art forms are unlikely to be artworks unless 
they possess artistic value to a high degree. In order to be art an artefact produced outwith established 
art forms must have greater artistic value than that required for one produced within an established 
art form. If artefacts produced in a particular fom i consistently achieve high artistic value then they 
will establish an art form. If not, though for various reasons of artistic value they are artw orks, the 
form they are in is not an art form.
An example used earlier bears this out; there are a few chairs which are artworks but a chair is 
not an established art form. An art nofmcm/chair may be particularly beautiful and expressive, thus it 
may be considered an artwork. It is the established art nouveau style of the chair which acts here as 
an established art form m ight, rendering  it m ore likely that it will be considered an artw ork. 
Similarly, the oeuvre of an artist such as Charles Rennie Mackintosh may help to bring a chair, w hich 
would not otherwise be thus considered, into the class art. Where an artw ork is produced w ithin an 
established art form, style or genre an artw ork may be good or bad. However, an artefact produced 
outwith an established art form, medium, style or oeimre must be of high artistic value for it to be art. 
It m ust have the features central to the value of art to a high degree to be considered art at all. Thus 
such artw orks cannot be bad or worthless as art. For example, though we may find an artis t's  oil 
paintings increasingly contrived, indiscrim inately threatening and lacking hum anity, his paintings 
may nevertheless be artworks. Figurative oil painting as an established art form allows for bad art. 
However, adverts which have little artistic value are not just bad artw orks, they are not even 
artworks at all. The only adverts which can be artw orks, for example Ridley Scott's Chanel advert, 
are those which have a high artistic value. Works in non-artistic forms, styles and genres m ust have a 
high artistic value to be considered artworks at all.
Conceiving of art as a cultural practice explains why artefacts produced outw ith  established 
art forms and so on m ust have the aspects we value in art to a high degree in order to qualify as 
artworks. If the relevant class of objects to which an artefact belongs is a non-art form, style or genre 
then it cannot be a bad artwork, but if it belongs w ithin an established art form then it may be a good or 
bad artwork; a novel but not a chair may be bad art. It is im portant to realise that once established, an 
art form m ust continue to be constituted by valuable artw orks if it is to survive. Thus film became 
established and survives as an art form because good artw orks came and continue to be consistently 
produced in that medium. This explains why it is only when we perceive an art form to be of no or little 
artistic value that we seek an explanation concerning its survival. The explanation we usually look for 
in this regard  concerns vested institu tional interests. Thus Soviet socialist realism  may be most 
appropria te ly  explained in term s of its ideological prom otion by Stalin and the sim ultaneous 
suppression of abstraction.
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Conceiving of art as a cultural practice also serves to explain how various anthropological 
artefacts came to be recognised as art. Early this century Picasso made various artw orks which drew  
upon the artefacts he had seen in the anthropological m useum  in Paris. By virtue of these artw orks 
being of great artistic value both artists and the public at large came to look upon a few of these 
artefacts as art. Increasingly, as various aspects of primitivism and expressivism developed within a r t, 
certain anthropological artefacts were recognised as art. Now many, though by no means ail, of these 
anthropological artefacts are considered artw orks w ithin particular art forms, hence there are both 
good and bad artworks of this sort. The ferocity of the dispute in Paris over which museum to put many 
of these artefacts in is testimony to the artistic status now accorded to artefacts which were, in the last 
century, most definitely not art.
Graham  Oppy has criticised historical definitions of art on the grounds that they cannot 
account for "the fact that the painting of the fourteenth century was art at that time even though 
nothing like our concept of art had yet been developed.""^^ But this is to miss the point of any 
historically adequate account, namely that such artworks became so retrospectively: the painting could 
only became art once the practice and thus notion of art had evolved. Just as one cannot be courageous 
where a society lacks the concept of courage so artworks cannot be made and engaged with as art where 
the cultural practice of art has not arisen. Furtherm ore, recognising an artefact's artistic value is 
dependent upon the artistic traditions and forms w hich have evolved. Indeed, understanding  an 
artw ork may require concepts which were unavailable to the artist at the time he created it. Thus 
anthropological artefacts can become artworks by virtue of events after their creation.
Sim ilarly, how we properly regard  already established artw orks may be retrospectively 
modified by subsequent events. New reasons and thus new judgements of the same artwork may become 
open to us as a particular art form develops. It is not just a m atter of retrospectively revealing features 
which the work possesses. Rather, certain features can only be seen to be relevant when seen under a 
particular aspect, or an aspect may only arise as a result of non-contem porary developm ents. For 
example, in the cinema of the 1940's and 1950's films were primarily construed in terms of the actors and 
actresses who had starring roles. Thus something was a Bette Davis, Joan Crawford or James Stewart 
film. However, in the light of a symbiotic shift in both cinematic theory and practice, films came to be 
construed predom inantly in term s of their directors. As a result A lfred H itchcock's films, which 
previously had not been seriously regarded , were re-evaluated as art. Sim ilarly, since the form 
established itself as a serious artistic one, many Westerns have come to be re-evaluated as art.
Graham Oppy, “On Defining Art Historically”, The British Journal o f Aesthetics, Vol. 32, No. 2. 1992. pp. 
153- 161 .
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An apposite example, used by Graham McFee, bears this point out well. Bach and Handel are 
rightly regarded as the culmination of High B a r o q u e . ^ 0  strictly speaking, McFee is wrong to suggest 
that only retrospectively could these works have been thus construed. Of course, a contem porary 
construal to that effect would lack the certainty of hindsight: it would have to involve a prediction 
concerning the future developm ent of musical form. Nevertheless, it is the actual development of the  
form which confirms the legitimacy of such a construal. W hether an artefact is art and what features 
are relevant is retrospectively variable. The artistically relevant features of an artefact depend upon 
its inter-relations to other artw orks. This is not to say that any reconstrual in the light of artistic 
developments is legitimate, it m ust be artistically relevant to the object concerned. For example, Shnne  
may rightly be reconstrued in the light of subsequent Westerns such as Unforgiven. By contrast, 
however, a putative artw ork which consists of an em pty picture frame does not license the reconstrual 
of Impressionist works in this regard. The variable realisation of artistic aspects depends not just upon 
the subsequent evolution of the practice but also the object's potential openness to certain developments 
In the first place. If an object does not even potentially possess a particular aspect then any num ber of 
later works will be unable to make sense of it in that light. An artw ork may 'create' its own precursors 
only in the way it may analogously 'create' its own audience.
Kendall Walton once argued, in relation to in terpre ting  artw orks, that the aesthetic and 
artistic properties a work has depends upon w hat categories it is correctly perceived as fitting into.-^ 1 
Our argum ent suggests that this holds not merely in relation to interpreting an artw ork but also applies 
to whether something is an artwork. To be an artwork an object must be correctly perceived as belonging 
to certain categories, and whether it does so may retrospectively change. Presumably such categories 
may range from the socio-institutional context of the object to the evaluative categories which concern 
the object's aesthetic, expressive qualities, the type of experience it affords and so on. However, even 
those categories which are not themselves evaluative are value-driven. The point of an artistic intent 
is, after all, to make something of artistic value. The reason an artw ork is placed in the Whitechapel 
Gallery is because it is thought to afford an artistically valuable experience.
From the low level of fine brushwork to the higher level of belonging to a particular art form, 
the appropriate categories are driven relative to the evolving value of art. If an object falls w ithin 
enough of the relevant categories, or w ithin a few sufficiently well, it is an artw ork. W hether we 
correctly place an artefact in the artistically relevant categories, depends both upon its constitution
Graham McFcc, ‘The Historical Character of Art: A Re-Appraisal”. The British Joiintal o f Aesthetics. Vol. 32 No. 4, 1992, pp. 307-319.
Kendall Walton, “Categories of Art” in J. Margolis (ed.). Philosophy Looks at the Arts (Philadelphia; Temple 
University Press, 1978), pp. 88-114. Walton's position developed in the aforementioned paper is distinct from the 
more radically conventionalised position argued for in his Mitnesis as Make-Believe (Cambridge, Mass.: Har\ard University Press, 1990).
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and inter-relations w ith other artw orks. It is the m ore particular categories which cash out the 
principle that an artefact must possess artistic value in order to be art. Of course, this is compatible 
w ith our claim that a w ork in an established art form requires less artistic value to be art than an 
artefact outw ith established art forms. As distinct cultural practices arise, modify and die the nature 
of artefacts may change as they come under different categories. Thus w hether an artefact is or will be 
art significantly depends upon the evolution and state of art as a cultural practice.
The relativity of art to a cultural practice suggests an artefact may be an artw ork at one time 
and not at another. It m ight be objected that we are now not talking about different conceptions of the 
same thing, but different works. If changing cultural practices decide the nature of the artefact, then 
the essence of the artefact changes as the cultural practices do. If its essential nature is changing thus, 
in what respect can we say we are talking about and judging the same thing? Surely, we w ant to say 
that the prim itive artefact m oved from the anthropological museum to the art m useum  is the same 
object in a non-trivial sense. Of course, but the feature by virtue of which we do so is the object's history. 
The same object is individuated and identified across changes by reference to its origination and 
constitution, which holds both when it is and is not considered an artwork. The same anthropological 
artefact which was not art can now be recognised as being of great artistic value and thus incorporated 
into early twentieth century art. This does not license the projection of any categories upon a dreary 
work to enable us to see it as being of great artistic worth. That one can see how an object might be seen 
as an artistic masterpiece does not make it one. Typically, the intentionally gu ided  action fixes the 
objective non-variant features of an artefact, constraining the potential supervenient features open to 
the cultural practice to realise as art. Artefactuality entails only that the intentionally guided action 
fixes the param eters w ithin w hich the object is or potentially may be construed as art. A non- 
artefactual object's realisation as art is, of course, constrained by its constitution. The aspect of the 
object realised depends upon the interplay betw een the various categories u n d er w hich it is 
appropriately construed and the present cultural practice of art. As the cultural practice changes so 
may an object's realised nature and status change. This returns us to the historical sense of tradition 
fundamental to art, which T. S. Eliot so keenly pointed to:
"No poet, no artist of any art, has his complete meaning alone. His significance, his 
appreciation is the appreciation of his relation to the dead poets and artists. You 
cannot value him alone; you m ust set him, for contrast and comparison, among the 
dead. I mean this as a principle of aesthetic, not merely historical, criticism ....what 
happens when a new work of art is created is something that happens sim ultaneously 
to all the works of art which preceded it."^2
^2 T. S. Eliot, ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent” in F. Kcrmode (ed.). Selected Prose o f  7. ,V. EHot (London: 
Faber and Faber, 1975), p. 38.
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Artefacts may be open to various different categorisations and, as Anita Silvers has pointed 
out, works are often radically re-evaluated.^^ For example, although at one time El Greco's work was 
considered static, repetitious and lacking in invention, it is now considered symbolic, spiritual and 
profound.-^^^ Tire standard is relative to how the practice has thus far developed and is perhaps likely 
to. The art of the past also restricts the retrospective influence that future art may have. It is through 
its inter-relations with other artw orks, past and future, that the artw ork is characterised, from its 
physical features to where and why the object is best classified. Thus the very narratives which tell 
the stories of art also partly  depend upon our interests and purposes w ith regard to the cultural 
practice. This may be a m atter not just of how a particular artw ork is to be construed, but of w h e th er 
something is an artw ork at all.
In this light consider Duchamp's Fountain which, at most stages in the cultural practice of art, 
could not have counted as an artwork. It could not have been valued as art by people of the seventeenth 
century, except perhaps as an object of novel shape and materials. But to appreciate  its aesthetic 
qualities is to fail to see why it is art in the twentieth century, a point most aestheticians fail to grasp 
when dwelling on its supposed aesthetic qualities. If it were merely the urinal's aesthetic qualities at 
issue then there would be no reason why Ducham p's urinal, as distinct from all others, should  be 
appropriately considered art. The point of D ucham p's actions is given within the context of art in the 
early twentieth century: that the urinal was inverted and signed R. Mutt, ironically enough, relates to 
the purported valueless nature of art. The point of Fountain would have been lost had it really been just 
any old object inverted.
Stephen Davies has argued that Carroll's narrational approach m ust collapse back into an 
institutional account. This is because, he argues, narrational strategies m ust rely upon an institutional 
basis to sort out which resemblances and repetitions are artistically significant rather than incidental. 
An artworld framework is required to account for the concept's u n i ty .F i r s t ly ,  it is of interest to note 
that Davies' own inclination for a procedural approach to art masks a belief that art should maximise 
aesthetic in terest and rew ard. Indeed, Davies actually states that, "the p rocedure can operate 
effectively {for a time) even if it becomes divorced from the function that once it was created to
Anita Silvers, ‘The Story of Art Is the Test of Time”, The Journal o f Aestherics and Art Criticism, Vol. 49, No. 
3, 1991, pp. 211-224.
Rudolf Wittkower, “El Greco’s Language of Gesture” in Allegory and the Migration o f Symbols (London: 
Thames and Hudson, 1977), pp. 147-158.
Stephen Davies, Definitiotts o f Art (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), Chapter 7, pp. 167-169.
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s e r v e . "^6 That this can be so only for a time actually bears out rather than undercuts a narrative 
account.
However, C arroll's narrative approach, although identifying the specific generative process 
of historical development underlying all artworks, is inadequate on its own. A narrational construal of 
art is, by itself, insufficient to capture the evolving, underlying nature of the practice. The narrational 
strategies of repetition, amplification and repudiation are held to be internal to the practice itself and 
supposedly do not need to be underw ritten  by any definitional theory. Yet the developm ent of the 
practice itself and the non-linear inclusion of objects previously excluded from the practice depend upon 
inform ative resem blances or aspects. For exam ple, the significant repudiation  of contemporary' 
academic styles within the practice depends upon foregrounding something else found to be of artistic 
value. On the basis of w hat do we determ ine w hether this new style, say, is of artistic value? 
Presumably in relation to whether it possesses or prom otes the values of art. Yet Carroll's strategy 
gives us no substantive criteria according to which we can distinguish a new st)de which promotes 
artistic value from a new style which lacks it. An artefact m ade to reject contem porary art forms may 
well do so w ithout being an artwork. We need some idea about what should be significant about the 
object's repudiation for it to count as an artwork, mere rejection is not enough.
Furthermore, movements such as primitivism did not just draw upon previous artworks but also 
ancient primitive artefacts, some of which were then brought into the category art: their conversation 
was not purely internal to the practice. Recognising new artworks cannot be just a m atter of being 
familiar w ith the class of already established artworks, but must involve an appreciation of why they 
are so. U nderstanding the practice and inter-relations w ithin it is not just a m atter of setting the 
appropriate context. What orders the context, w hat determ ines which objects the narration is about, 
depends upon what are taken to be the key criteria. Therefore, underw riting the narrational approach 
to art there m ust be criteria according to which we can dem arcate w hat ought relevantly to be 
considered art and why. W ithout them there w ould be no adequate basis upon which to explain why 
Duchamp's Fountain or anthropological artefacts may properly be considered art. Indeed, lacking such 
criteria, the narrational approach could not rule out any one story of art from another.
It might be thought that Carroll's approach must, at its core, rely upon functional foundations. 
This would indeed be a dire position to be in because, as we have seen, functionalist approaches prove 
woefully inadequate. However, the narrational strategy need not rest upon functionalism. Rather, it 
can be supported by conceiving of art as a cluster concept. Of course, the proto-system  identified in 
rela tional term s is only recognised as the evolu tion  of the d istinct cu ltu ra l practice of art 
retrospectively. Thus what counts as art is historically variable and the qualities and aspects a w ork
ibid.. Chapter 9, p. 217 (Italics are my emphasis).
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possesses are partly context dependent. Nevertheless, it is the cluster of value driven features which 
identify the links in the chain.
The narrational account of art needn't collapse back into an institutional account since it may be 
underw ritten by a recognition of its point and value, which provides the basis for making judgements 
about what is relevant and why. The narrational approach, recognising art as an historically evolving 
practice, requires criteria for judging the nature and thus value of the practice as a whole. Arts purpose 
and values are given by its evolution and history; the kinds of experiences artw orks afford, w hat 
constitutes the practice. However, the historically contingent and defeasible nature of the practice so 
far is underw ritten by the cluster of features and values which constitute the concept 'art'.
One particular challenge does remain. Paul Ziff has argued that w hether som ething is art or 
not is contestable, as against whether something is a table; he thinks this precisely because art concerns 
questions of value, and which values these are is a contestable m a t t e r . ^ 7  Disputes over the use of the 
term 'artw ork ' revolve around questions of the value of the practice of art (in our society). Thus Ziff 
brings us back full circle to W eitz's claim, that there can be no adequate theory of art;
"Art, as the logic of the concept shows, has no set of necessary and sufficient 
properties; hence a theory of it is logically im possible and not m erely factually 
d ifficult.
Our arguments bear out the spirit of the first part of the assertion, the institutional and various 
functional accounts of art having failed. However, the conclusion is unw arranted. That 'artw ork ' is a 
contested term, w ithout sufficient or necessary criteria, need not preclude us from constructing an 
adequate theory of art. If the concept or practice is to remain art, one should be able to pick out its 
prim ary characteristics and purpose. As we have established, parad igm s of art are central in 
exemplifying the typical characteristics, values and purpose of art. Realising w hether something is an 
artwork, as distinct from an interesting drawing or a mere text, usually concerns the recognition of value. 
However, to be an artwork is not a m atter of possessing any kind of value, for example as an investment, 
but is a status attained in relation to a particu lar cluster of values. 'A rt' is most appropriately  
conceived as a cluster concept; something is art, if it has certain features which are typical of ideal 
cases of art. There is not one particular feature or value that all artw orks share. Rather, there is a 
cluster: being aesthetic, expressive, in an art form and so on.
^7 Paul Ziff, ‘The Task of Defining a Work of Art” in The Philosophical Review. Vol. 62, No. 1, 1953, pp. 58-78.
58 Morris Weilz, “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics” in .1. Margolis (ed.), Philosophy Looks at the Arts 
(Philadelphia; Temple University Press, 1978), p. 122.
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Paradigm atic artw orks possess all or most of these features and values to a high degree. 
However, many other good and ordinary artw orks may lack one or several of them, w hilst having a 
sufficient num ber of the other features to a sufficient extent that they qualify as artw orks. It is not 
necessary for something to be art that it possess any feature or value in particular, nor that it possess a il  
of them. An object is an artwork if it possesses at least some of the features and values which make up 
the concept of art. Thus there are sufficient conditions, an object possessing all of these features and 
values will undoubtedly be art. But the necessary conditions are disjoint: an object may possess any 
combination of a few of these features and be art. A cluster concept does not have necessary conditions as 
they are norm ally understood, that is, as a conjunction. So, although the claim  that there are no 
necessary and sufficient conditions is, as normally interpreted, correct, the conclusion drawn, that there 
can be no theory of art, is false.
As we have established, there are certain value requirements an artefact must fulfil to become 
classified as art, even w ithin an art form it m ust attain a certain level of value. Thus one can indeed 
have bad art, but no art that is utterly worthless. A worthless work may be mistaken for art by some 
curator, critic or artist, but it can only be bogus art. The possibility of mistaken critical recognition is an 
open one. Only this position can explain why artefacts produced w ithin established art forms can fail 
to be artworks. The value required for such artefacts to be art is lower than the value required of an 
object produced outside established art forms and styles. Nevertheless, there remains a requisite value 
threshold for attaining arthood status. The only difference is that in established art forms the 
threshold is lower than that required for artefacts in non-art forms to be art. Therefore, it w ould 
appear, there can be only one inherently evaluative sense to the term  'art'.
Moreover, to look for a definition in terms of strict necessary and sufficient conditions appears a 
hopeless task. Artworks may be purposively made to achieve a particular goal, but that does not entail 
that 'a rt' is a functional concept. For example, Bellini's altarpiece The Baptism o f Christ was designed 
for a religious purpose. Yet, the nature of the work is not reducible to the function it was supposed to 
perform. If it were to be exhibited in the National Gallery, we would not consider its function to be 
falsely abrogated. Rather, on the understanding  that it was designed as an altarpiece, we w ould 
engage w ith it as art; we would look for it to fulfil a different purpose. Similarly, at the more general 
level, art's nature is not reducible to matters of functionality. Therefore, we should seek to characterise 
art as a goal-directed cultural practice, understood in term s of its prim ary characteristics. Such a 
characterisation of art need not collapse back into the inadequacies of a functionalist account. The 
acknowledgement of art as purposive and goal-directed does not commit us to holding that 'a rt ' is a 
functional concept. O ur characterisation of art suggests that 'a rt' is a cluster concept, a m atter w hich 
needn 't render our account uninformative: the circularity of the characterisation need not be vicious. 
Indeed, it is only if we know what art is through our experience with it that we can make sense of art's 
purpose.
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One of the institutional theory's strengths was its simple explanation of how certain primitive 
artefacts came to acquire artw ork status at the turn of the century. Yet this can be better explained by 
the inherently evaluative conception of art as a cultural practice. It is on the basis of artistic value, 
grounded upon the development of art, that we consider newly created or previously non-artistic 
artefacts as potentially up for artw ork status. At the beginning of this century art had developed in 
such a way that certain anthropological artefacts could come to be seen as artw orks. Particular 
developments in art allowed them to speak to our concerns regarding art and the world; Picasso, among 
other artists, made artistic use of his interest in various anthropological artefacts, especially African 
masks. Their influence upon Picasso's means of representation and the concerns of modern art brought 
some of these artefacts into the sphere of art. A lthough Picasso's use of these artefacts apparently  
disregarded their function, they became art because of the artistic features and value he drew attention 
to; something which could only be appreciated as artistic in the light of early twentieth century art.
This is not to say that prior to this century anthropological artefacts did not have any of the 
aesthetic qualities we now attribute to them. It may be that certain of their aesthetic qualities were 
always recognised. However, only post-1900 could we even consider some of them m ight be artworks. 
Bear in mind that som ething's having aesthetic qualities is not sufficient for it to constitute a work of 
art, after all nature is not an artw ork. It is not even straightforw ardly obvious that an  aesthetic 
artefact is a work of art nor that an artw ork should have aesthetic qualities, the two may pull apart. 
Primitive artefacts could not have been characterised as artw orks prior to this century, but, given the 
way art developed, it became open for them to qualify for such status from the 1900's on. The inherently 
evaluative conception of art as a cultural practice explains more fully how and why this is so. As a 
cultural practice, art can and does valorise into other domains: it is not a hermetically sealed activity.
Section 5: Plrtefactnafity, Practice and /^aCue.
It has so far remained an unquestioned assumption that an artw ork m ust be an artefact; that is, 
an object created or modified by an agent's intentionally guided action. It is im portant to realise that an 
artefact cannot merely be an object which we use or one of socio cultural significance, as some 
apparently  hold.^^ Furthermore, as an object we have created or modified, an artefact needn 't be of a 
m aterial nature.60 For example, whether God is an artefact of our culture or not depends upon whether 
He exists, not upon the socio cultural significance of Christianity. If God does not exist then he is, as a
For example Joseph Margolis makes this assumption in his Art and Philosophy (Brighton: Harvester Press, 
1980), pp. 84-87.
60 Many people assume an artefact must be a material object, see, for example, Stephen Davies, Definitions of Art 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), Chapter 5, pp. 124-125 and 139-141.
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creation of our thought, an artefact, despite being only a mental and not a m aterial object. The main 
point here is that recognising 'art' as a cluster concept brings the assumed condition of artefactuality 
into question. Artefactuality itself, ra ther than being a precondition of art, may merely be one of the 
cluster of conditions which make up the concept of art. If this is the case then artw orks are only 
typically, not necessarily, artefacts. This is supported  by the consideration that a piece of driftwood 
picked up from the beach may be considered an artw ork because it possesses or promotes artistic values 
to a high degree. The sea formed grooves may be beautifully expressive, the colour and tone delightful, 
the knots in the wood symbolic and so on.
Those who hold that artefactuality is a necessary condition of art may deny that pieces of 
driftwood are or could become artworks. For example, Monroe Beardsley denies that such objects could 
ever be artworks.^  ^The grounds for tills claim are presum ably that only artefacts could possibly fulfil 
art's function. As we have seen, the functionalist approach to defining art is inadequate, so the point 
should be modified in terms of artistic goals. Nevertheless, the point does not hold good. If we assume, 
as Beardsley does, that the prim ary goal of art is aesthetic value, then obviously natural objects may 
possess aesthetic features and fulfil the prim ary goal of art. Beardsley may deny this by suggesting 
that an object's purpose is fixed by or requires intentional activity or m anipulation. But in certain cases 
the socio cultural purpose of an object can come apart from the intended one. For example, a religious 
icon m ade to prom ote faith may now be established in the National Gallery as an artwork. VVe mav 
legitimately go to see such an object in order to appreciate its aesthetic qualities. Just as, in this case, 
the purpose of an object may vary depending upon cultural practices, so too may the m atter of whether 
an object has any purpose.
We can treat a non-intended object as if it had been created to achieve a particu lar goal. Of 
course, there must be good reason for doing so, namely, that it fulfils artistic goals well. Thus, a piece of 
driftwood may be an artwork but it cannot be bad art, A piece of driftwood may come to be art because, 
as a contingent matter, it happens to possess aesthetic features or promotes artistic values. We should 
not be overly surprised at this. That we are able to do so is, of course, parasitic upon our intentionally 
guided activities which constitute the m ain practice of art. That we are able to recognise non- 
artefactual objects as artworks is only possible against a background where artworks are understood to 
be typically artefactual.
It m ight be further suggested that artefactuality need not even be a typical requirem ent for 
artw ork status. If pieces of driftwood may become artworks, it would seem to be only contingently true 
that non-artefactual objects prom ote artistic values to a lesser extent than intentionally produced 
objects. If certain kinds of non-artefactual objects, such as pieces of driftwood, were typically found to
^ * See Monroe Beardsley, “Redefining Art” in M. Wreen and D. Callen (eds.). The Aesthetic Point o f View (Ithaca; 
Cornell University Press, 1982), pp. 298-315.
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promote a rfs  value well then they would establish an art form and perhaps could constitute the major 
part or all of the cultural practice. W hether the object is intentionally created or m anipulated would 
then be irrelevant to the w ork 's status as art. Michel Foucault's comments regarding the minimal 
significance of the medieval author point tow ards such a p o s i t i o n . ^ ’ ^  He holds that, as in m edieval 
times, the regulative ideal of maximal value should guide our categorisation and assessment of books 
and artw orks generally. The constraining conception of intentional action should not be seen as 
constituting the work's nature: we should be able to make of and value w hat we will in seeking to 
maximise the object's value for ourselves. This conclusion is thought to follow from the recognition that 
an author's intent cannot fully determ ine an object's nature. Therefore, artefactuality may not even be a 
typical condition of artw ork status.
Now, that authorial intention cannot wholly fix an artw ork 's nature can be supported  by 
argument. Firstly, where an artistic intention fails, an artw ork may nevertheless be produced. Richard 
Wollheim is w rong to hold that if an artefact fails to conform to the artistic intent with which it was 
produced it cannot thus represent, be expressive or, by extension, be an artwork.^^ Although the w ork is 
other than it was intended to be it may, nevertheless, be expressive and of artistic value. Secondly, 
even where the artist's intention is successfully fulfilled, the nature of the artw ork produced is not 
necessarily fixed. For an action may have accidental or non-intended features which are relevant to th e  
artefact as art and affect its value. Hence it may be true that the broad expressive brush strokes of late 
Titian were unintended and can be explained in relation to his failing sight, yet they constitute part of 
the nature of the work: they add  to its value, and the w ork would be essentially different w ithout 
them. Thus it may be true of both the act and the resultant product that they have unintended features 
which are essential to the work as art. A lthough the intention, beliefs and action may explain why th e  
action occurred, they are not identical w ith or wholly constitutive of the nature of the act and the 
work. Furthermore, not only may features of a w ork be independent of the intention w ith which the 
action was perform ed but some may vary across people, time and culture. This is because the relevant 
features are not just determ ined by authorial intent but also by the prevailing conventions of art. 
Therefore, independently of w hether the object arises from a retrospectively identifiable successfully 
fulfilled intention or not, the cultural practice plays a significant role in fixing the nature of the 
artefact as art.
However, it does not follow from the tru th  of this claim that artefactuality is not a typical 
pre-condition of artwork status: i.e. that we can have a practice of art constituted for the most part by 
non-artefactual objects. The necessary conventionality of a cultural practice does not entail that the
See Michel Foucault, “What is an Author?” in P. Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader (New York: Pantheon, 
1984), pp. 101-120.
Richard Wollheim, Painting as an Art (London: Thames and Hudson, 1987), Chapter 2, pp. 46-51.
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artefactual grounding of art is itself a m atter of convention. This would only follow if the condition of 
artefactuality were shown to be radically contingent and not a necessarily typical conceptual relation. 
But artw ork status cannot be so wholly severed from intentional human activity. Firstly, a rte fac tu a lity  
is required as a typical condition to distinguish the practice of art from the parts of nature which may 
happen to be aesthetically valuable. Unless we conceive of the world as the intentional product of 
God's design, it makes no sense to conceive of the natural world as an artwork.
Of course we can conceive of parts of the world as if they were artworks, but only in a parasitic 
sense. However, this is not to make artefactuality a necessary condition of art. For example, consider a 
rock whose surface has been naturally eroded in a certain way. If read as if they were English words, 
they might read as a beautiful poem. Of course, the marks could be taken as meaning something else in a 
different language. Nonetheless, although not written by an intentional agent, we may take the marks 
as if they were meaningful words. They correspond to signs within one of our intentionally guided 
representational systems, in this case the language of English. The w ords in the rock could not be 
considered as words if it were not for the hum an intentionally guided, communal practice of linguistic 
communication, just as we may parasitically consider the marks to be meaningful words, so too we may 
consider them  to constitute a poem. We may parasitically consider a few non-artefactual objects to be 
art, but only by virtue of the practice itself being grounded upon human intentionally guided activity.
It is also im portant to realise that not just any aspect of nature which can be seen as artistically 
valuable can be parasitically regarded as art. For example, although an aesthetic piece of driftwood 
may be considered art, a sunset, no matter how beautiful, cannot be up for artw ork status. This is because 
whereas the driftwood could have been intentionally produced by a human agent, a sunset could not. 
Only those non-artefactual objects which could have been humanly worked may parasitically be up for 
artw ork status. It must be said that in the future sunsets may come to be up for artwork status, if we come 
to control and manipulate sunsets as we may landscape, cultivate and order gardens. Art as a cultural 
practice is grounded upon the intentionally  gu ided  production  of artefacts of artistic value for 
appreciation. It is the typical artistic value of what is produced that makes the activity worthw hile 
and enables non-artefactual objects to be parasitically considered as art.
Artworks are not out there in nature, waiting for us to pluck them from the air. Rather, they 
rest upon the constructions of hum an activities and practice. Artworks can only parasitically be in 
nature, grounded upon the prim ary  hum an in ten tionally  guided activities w hich constitute the 
m ainstream of the practice. A rock's markings may be taken as an artwork, but this does not mean the 
practice of art is divorcable from intentional activity. There could not be a practice where all the 
artworks, for example, were products of nature and non-intended. If someone were to call such objects art 
they might mean a different thing by the same word. Alternatively a special explanation w ould have 
to come in, explaining how artw orks survived only in this special, parasitic sense. One m ight 
conceivably imagine such a situation in a state w here all artefactual artworks w ere destroyed and all
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art making activities banned. However, eventually, sundered from its primary sense, art could no longer 
survive and the practice would either die or transm ute into something else.
The nature and value of an object may change whilst its identity, arising from its originating 
and causal history, remains. It would be a category mistake to conflate identity with class: the value of 
an object as art may be independent of w hat it was originally created for. Thus an artefact may be 
picked out consistently across physical erosion, conceptual change and cultural m odification, 
independen tly  of its class and value. Thus religious myths, prim itive artefacts and m edieval 
m anuscripts may change in terms of their value and yet still remain the same artefacts. What is central 
to an object as art is the question of artistic value. A lthough the water left is continuous w ith the 
materials worked upon by the artist for his ice or water sculpture , the puddles he leaves behind may no 
longer constitute an artwork: they no longer retain the shape and form which made them valuable as 
art. To identify religious myths, ritualistic artefacts, m edieval manuscripts or found objects as art is to 
assert that they are of value qua art. To identify a novel as art is to say that it is both in a particular 
established art form and that it has attained the m inim al value threshold appropriate to being art 
w ithin that particular art form.
The artist's purposive actions, the artefact itself and the evolution of the forms of art and the 
cultural practice in general all symbiotically w ork to determ ine the actual and potential nature, and 
thus value, of artworks. Indeed, these factors determ ine whether an object qualifies as art at all. The 
object's narrative and the practice of art thus explains why it has the qualities, value and artw ork 
status it does at a particular time and place, as well as tentatively indicating possibilities to come. A 
better understanding of artw orks and art must thus involve an appreciation of how and why the 
practice, form and object are shaped thus. Thus we can recognise both the basis upon which religious 
artefacts were made and how, despite this, they came to be properly valued as artworks.
However, as we saw earlier, our position should not be confused with the radical claim that if 
something can be construed as art then it ought to be and thus is art.^^ Stephen Davies has suggested 
that merely because a 'discoverer' works against a background of art history and conventions of art then 
her "works must be seen as referring to all the aesthetic techniques and properties that she has 
eschewed. The same is true of the 'beach artist'. Similarly, the Conceptual artist cannot but refer to the 
physical properties that are absent for their relevance in his work.''^^^ Thus w hether something is art 
or not has been rendered a matter of complete contingency and luck. The art historical context is confused 
with the found object itself. The object is understood as necessarily referring to all the absent properties, 
and thus artistic values, that it does not actually have: from painted and carved media to ugly and 
beautiful qualities. Presum ably, all o ther art objects thus construed m ust be the same. Yet we
Arthur Danto’s claims suggest something like this position; namely, if something can be interpreted in an 
artistically signilicant way then it is art.
Stephen Davies, Definitions o f Art (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), Chapter 5, p. 141.
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discriminate between artworks on the grounds that the relevant features and artistic values are in fact 
distinct: which is why our critical evaluations of them differ. It is also true that artworks may be o ther 
than how we construe them to be. The construal which maximises an object's artistic value may not be a 
legitimate one.
The point of the practice of art as a whole, and in which its value inheres, is the constraining 
and opening out of possibilities for our engagement. Found art can only be art if the object could have 
been made by hum an activity and if it is of a high artistic value. O ur ability to treat such objects as art 
is parasitic upon our understanding of art and artw orks as the result of purposive actions intentionally 
guided towards the goal and value of art. This is not equivalent to holding that som ething is an 
artw ork  only if a m aker in tended an artefact to have artistic value. A lthough we must regard 
something as if it were purposively made for it to be art, artefactuality is only a typical requirem ent of 
artworks. We can properly recognise accidentally or incidentally produced objects as artworks because 
of their high artistic value. Nevertheless, found art is parasitic upon our understanding of artworks as 
products of hum an purposive activity, created in order to realise certain values. A rtefactuality is 
criterial of art in much the same way as pain behaviour is criterial of pain. That is, we could not have 
the concept of art w ithout artefactuality. Yet there are parasitic, fringe cases which constitute non- 
artefactual art in much the same way as there is sim ulated or concealed pain. The link is not a m atter 
of logical deduction, but it is certainly criterial.
The cultural practice and thus the concept of art is value-driven. Of course, since artefactuality 
is a typical condition, not all of the prim ary characteristics which make up the cluster concept of art 
are them selves evaluative. Nevertheless, the point and purpose of art fundam entally comes to rest 
upon artistic value. The value threshold for artw ork status differs depending upon whether the object 
belongs within established art forms or not, a m atter dependent upon the enduring nature of the practice 
and its constitutive works, t  herefore som ething is an artw ork if and only if, as a m em ber of an 
established art form, it achieves a certain threshold of artistic value, or, if it is outw ith established 
art forms, it is of exceptional value q tia art.
It might be objected that my definition allows the use of drugs to promote otherwise worthless 
objects into artw ork status. Similarly, it m ight allow artefacts such as Rorschach tests to become 
artworks since we may find them artistically valuable; our engagement here involves mere projection 
onto the pattern before us. Indeed, the objection goes, my definition as it is neither rules such cases in or 
out: it is circular and uninformative. My definition is indeed formally circular, but not viciously so. It is 
the task of the rest of this thesis to render the definition informative: that is, to explicate exactly 
w hat artistic value am ounts to and upon w hat basis it rests. It is upon the following argum ents then 
that my definitional thesis stands or falls. Thus we m ust move on to the substantive question of just 
w hat artistic value could or should be. N ow  the path is open for us to exam ine the prim ary 
characteristics and values of art, w hat the cultural practice is for.
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Cfiapter Z
FLrt’s TCeasures.
'T he  whole of the truth lies in the presentation; therefore the 
expression should be studied in the interest of veracity. 
This is the only morality of a r t  apart from subject." 
Joseph Conrad.
Introduction.
Having found that 'art' is an inherently evaluative concept, we must now seek to find out what 
sort of value is involved. One of the strongest and most commonly intuitive understandings of the nature 
and value of art concerns a direct relation to pleasure. The pleasure we get in and through art is 
obviously a strong motivation for engaging with artworks. That we reach for the television switch, the 
bookcase or labour to reach the art gallery is typically m otivated by the hope that we will enjoy and 
thus take pleasure in what we see or read. Thus Joseph Conrad's writings may be good because 1 am 
entertained by adventurous stories w ith dense descriptions of both the natural and social world. The 
pleasure artworks afford is typically both a consequent of the activity of engaging with the work and 
partly constituted in the engagement itself.
After articulating a broad characterisation of the possible relationship between art and 
pleasure I consider a fundam ental objection. Namely, that there exists fundam entally unpleasant art. 
Various accounts are then considered, all of which explain the apparent unpleasantness as unfortunate 
by-products of what gives rise to pleasure. Thus, for example, Noël Carroll argues that feeling afraid is 
an unfortunate corollary of the violation of our categorial scheme, which is what affords us pleasure. 
However, all such accounts are flawed because they cannot make sense of a perfectly reasonable claim. 
Namely, that an artw ork may not be horrific enough or evoke the apparently  unpleasant tragic 
emotions within us. However, a variation of the pleasure account does prove adequate to the problem. 
This involves the recognition that we enjoy feeling the evaluatively negative emotions, the emotions 
being individuated according to their forma! objects.
I then move on to consider if there are pleasures particular to art. The aesthetic features of art, 
although properly considered valuable, were found not to be art's prim ary value. What we mainly 
value is cognitive features in art, even w here they detrim entally effect a w ork 's aesthetic aspect. 
Furthermore, the importance in expression of what is expressed also suggests that art's pleasures derive 
largely from cognitive value. Thus I explore the kind of cognitive value w hich may be central to art. 
This intuition is supported by the recognition that art can affect the way we see w hat is around us,
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encouraging new ways of perceiving and conceiving of the world. Engaging with Monet's Banks o f th e  
Seine, Vetheuil, highlights the shifting nature of our sensory perception, encountering Francis Bacon's 
work may suggest the potential distortion, corruption and decay inherent in people's physiognomy. 
Indeed, this might provide the basis for an even stronger claim, that art provides the perceptual and 
conceptual categories w ith which we perceive and conceive the world. This claim is made, for instance, 
by Kenneth Clark when he argues that the significance of landscape, its m eanings and our relations to 
it are grounded and dependent upon the way the landscape has been worked and rendered in art, art 
creates meaning.^ A work is of value as art if it affords certain kinds of cognitive pleasures. These 
pleasures include a work's significance.
Section 1: ‘PCeasure
If art is connected to considerations of value, we m ust attempt to articulate what sort of value it 
is. One plausible candidate concerns the apparent pleasure artw orks afford. Indeed, the similarity of 
many radically different kinds of artworks seems to lie precisely in the fact that they afford pleasure 
of some sort. From the entertainment of Disney's fa/? fnsn? to the chilly delight properly evoked in our 
response to Fians Holbein's The Ambassadors, we derive some sort of pleasure from our engagement with 
them. But of what kind? The idea that the pleasures we derive in engaging with artworks should be 
distinct may seem puzzling. After all, it would be odd to think that the pleasures in art are peculiarly 
unrelated to the pleasures afforded in other spheres of our lives. It m ight be thought that though 
pleasure may arise form different sources, the pleasure afforded by particular things is general. Thus 
our pleasures may not themselves be conceived of as distinct in kind. Rather, it may be thought, their 
origin in particular sensations or activities, from eating ice-cream and w atching movies to climbing 
mountains, is w hat differentiates the pleasure taken.
The basic idea here is that our pleasures are differentiated according to the particular objects 
they are intentionally directed toward. The pleasure I feel at the end of a game of football is of th e  
same kind as I get from finding out that Manchester United cannot achieve the unique treble. Yet what I 
derive the pleasure from in each case is different. One is an activity and the other a piece of 
information about a certain state of affairs. Thus, on this view, for something to be good art it m ust both 
give pleasure and be understood to belong w ithin the evolved practice of art. W hat de linea tes 
something as art, and precludes other things from being art, is whether the pleasure affording object or 
activity is justifiably conceived as belonging to the historically evolved practice. W hether the art is
Kenneth Clark, Landscape into Art (London: John Murray, 1949).
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good will depend upon whether general pleasure is taken in and resultant from engaging with it. The 
activity marks out the kind, the am ount of pleasure its value.
However, this view renders the kind of pleasures afforded by art indistinguishable from those 
afforded by other activities. Thus any activity or object which affords pleasure is rendered a potential 
artwork. Yet this entails that there can be no justification for one particular pleasure affording artefact 
being art, and another not, apart from the contingent m atter that one object falls w ithin the historical 
rem it of the practice. But any conception which fails to distinguish between the particular pleasures 
afforded by the M om  L/sa and my cousin's Fisher Price train set, is wholly inadequate to the value of 
art. Obviously the relevant kinds of pleasure cannot be differentiated merely by the objects to which 
they are intentionally directed towards. On this basis, every individual pleasure w ould have to be 
held to be distinctive in kind. Rather, we are interested in what is distinctive of the pleasure itself. 
Thus we should be able to distinguish whether pleasure taken in a different object is essentially the 
same or a different kind of pleasure.
Pleasure is not merely a matter of feeling brute internal sensations, triggered off by the outside 
world. Firstly, the particular kind of sensation we feel is intim ately linked to certain behavioural 
responses. Secondly, we may derive pleasure from an activity w hich provokes typically unpleasant 
sensations. As A lasdair MacIntyre suggests, som ething's being pleasurable is "a property of certain 
activities and experiences which are treated as standard  objects of desire, which help to define not 
merely the desired, but the desirable."^ Pleasure is necessarily shaped, formed and given expression 
through and by the activity concerned: it is activity specific. The particular tasks engaged in th e  
activity, shape the nature of the particular pleasure. Furthermore, the pleasure involved needn 't be 
sensation-like, but may arise from the enjoyment taken in the very activity or process. In relation to art, 
pleasure typically involves enjoying doing something: enjoying oneself in listening to or engaging with 
an artwork, rather than passively waiting for some pleasurable sensation to arise.^ Thus pleasures are 
not just group relative, but activity relative. We take pleasure in and not merely consequent upon th e  
process or particular activity. The physical exertion of stop and start running, tackling, leaping for the 
ball, striking it sweetly with the outside of the foot and team work are all constitutive parts of the 
p leasure we take in playing football. Take them  aw ay and  there are general sim ilarities to the 
pleasure taken in tennis. Yet, just as obviously, they cannot be the same as the pleasures afforded in the 
swing of the racket, the m ental tussle w ith just one opponent and so on. Chess may afford certain 
pleasures sim ilar to those taken in tennis, the psychological battle of wills, but unlike football and
^ Alasdair MacIntyre, "Pleasure as a Reason for Action" in his Against the Self-Images o f the Age (London: 
Duckworth, 1971), pp. 189-190.
^ See Jerrold Levinson's "Pleasure and the Value of Works of Art", British Journal o f Aesthetics, Vol. 32, No. 4, 
1992, pp. 295-306.
51
tennis, it is not a physical game. Thus the pleasure taken in particular types of physical activity is 
unavailable to the chess player.
Famously W ittgenstein talked of family resemblance in relation to concepts like 'gam e'. The 
basic idea is that there are a criss cross of overlapping similar features but no necessary, let alone 
sufficient, conditions for something to be a game."*" This is true of the kinds of pleasures we take in 
particular activities. Indeed, it is a constitutive part of an activity being different that it provokes, in 
part, a distinctive kind of pleasure, from engaging w ith artworks to playing sport. Furthermore, th is  
entails, that w ithin the pleasures distinctive to art there will be pleasures distinctive of particular a r t  
forms and media. That is, art pleasures will be partly constituted and differentiated by the procedures 
and distinctive forms of engagement the artw ork affords us. After all, a constituent part of the pleasure 
derived from a particular thing or activity inheres in the particular and distinct nature of that thing or 
ac tiv ity .
Undeniably the pleasures afforded by art are themselves distinct and multifarious: ranging 
from the m edia utilised, the manipulation of genre constraints, the aesthetic features, the im aginative 
engagement afforded to the insight revealed. Indeed, it may seem, as Jerrold Levinson remarks, that a r t 
does not rate well in terms of hedonistic return w hen com pared with many other activities.^ What we 
still require are criteria which enable us to explain which pleasures are irrelevant to the work as art 
and why. For example, I may derive a great am ount of pleasure from the fact that I bought an artw ork 
last year at half the am ount for which is it now presently valued. Nevertheless, we want to be able to 
say that the pleasure afforded by the w ork as an investm ent is irrelevant. Rather than looking to 
quantify undifferentiated pleasure, we must recognise that the pleasures afforded m ust be linked to the 
nature of the work as art.
However, before we move on to consider the particular pleasures art may afford, we must deal 
w ith the standard objection to any pleasure account of art. That is, there can be and indeed are highly 
unpleasant and highly valuable artw orks, from Francis Bacon's portraits, representing grotesque 
misshapen bodies, to David C ronenberg's films, w ith their violently explosive heads and horrifying, 
repulsive figures. Indeed various visual artists and perform ers even use the most unpleasant and 
disgusting material in their work, ranging from faeces, urine and sperm  to a foetus. Thus, artw orks 
which we properly value as such may be unpleasant. Therefore, any account which locates art's value 
in the pleasure it affords must be inadequate.
It m ight be thought that unpleasant artworks can be plausibly explained away. Thus, it m ight 
be suggested, it remains true that for an artefact to be considered art, it must afford certain kinds of
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), Sections 67-75, pp. 32-35.
Jerrold Levinson, "Pleasure and the Value of Works of Art", Br/rA/i 7o//r«a/o/AcsZ/icf/rx, Vol. 32, No. 4, 1992, 
p. 301.
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pleasure. This includes artefacts which may also involve distinctly unpleasant m aterials, emotions 
and thoughts. Firstly, although an artw ork may be constituted from unpleasant m aterials or involve 
unpleasant scenes, it may still provoke pleasure in those who engage w ith it. This is because the 
m anipulation and inter action of materials or features used, may lead to overall pleasurable results. 
For example, something we would ordinarily find disgusting might afford pleasure if it is m anipulated 
in a certain way and we are constrained to regard it in a certain light. The peculiar orange m edium  
bathing the crucifix in Andre Serranno's Piss Christ constitutes a particularly pleasing, lum inous 
aesthetically pleasing light, if looked at independently of the m aterial's particular associations. Thus 
the contribution of materials we would norm ally consider unpleasant, such as various bodily fluids, 
may constitute valuable features of the artwork. That is, normally unpleasant features may afford us 
pleasure in our engagement with the work as art.
Secondly, even artw orks which afford displeasure can be accounted for. The status of an 
artefact which affords certain kinds of pleasure is not necessarily invalidated by the fact that i t  
involves unpleasantness in various respects. This is not to deny that things which afford displeasure in 
art are disvaluable. Rather, it is to recognise that an artw ork which affords pleasure in one respect 
may afford displeasure in another. To the extent the w ork affords displeasure, it is of disvalue as art. 
Nonetheless, if the kind of pleasure afforded is great, delightful or highly artistic, it may outweigh 
the displeasure afforded. Thus, though its value is dim inished by the unpleasantness involved, on 
balance, the artefact may be of value as art. Hence an artw ork which involves unpleasantness or 
affords displeasure may justifiably be recognised as art. A pleasure account of the value of art may thus 
apparently cope adequately with the problem  posed by unpleasant art. An artw ork is not necessarily 
invalidated as such if it affords or involves displeasure. However, it is m arred as art to the extent it 
does. Thus, a consequence of this account is that unpleasant art can never be truly great art. Displeasure 
and unpleasantness is still considered an unfortunate by-product or aspect of an artwork.
On this construal Francis Bacon's artistry in oils and m anipulation of conventions and style, 
th rough  affo rd ing  pleasure, is w hat w arran ts  his w ork  status as art. H ow ever, given the 
fundam entally  horrific, threatening and unp leasan t content of the w ork, it is also artistically  
disvaluable in these respects. Where the former value outw eighs the latter disvalue, his w ork is 
appropriately considered art. W here the disvalue of the unpleasant content outw eighs the artistry 
displayed, and thus pleasure afforded. Bacon fails to make a good work or even, possibly, an artwork a t 
all. Thus it is that the pleasure account can allow  that som ething's being unpleasant does not 
necessarily preclude it from being art. Therefore, it can account for unpleasant art.
Yet, the account of unpleasant art as articulated above misses one crucial point. Namely, that 
in some artworks, the high degree of unpleasantness involved is central to them  as art. That is, the 
displeasure afforded may not be just an unfortunate by-product. Rather, it may be fundamental to the 
work as art. For example, we miss the entire point of Serranno's Piss Christ if we fail to realise w hat
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the m edium  is. If the account just given were sound, then our ignorance of the medium used would be an 
irrelevance to the work as art. Indeed, as the unpleasant associations m ight get in the way of the 
pleasure afforded by the colour, it would consider such ignorance a positive asset. Yet, the fact that the 
m edium  is highlighted in the work's title ought to indicate that it is centrally relevant to the work. If 
we were to engage with the w ork w hilst rem aining ignorant of the nature of the m edium  or whilst 
putting aside thoughts and associations concerned w ith the medium, we w ould not be attending to it 
properly. We would not think it appropriate to divest the work's symbolic imagery and the crucifix of 
all its associations in order to engage w ith the work. Indeed, even if this was possible, we would 
hardly derive much pleasure from the work by divesting it of all apparent content. The whole point of 
the w ork lies in the juxtaposition of m eaning and associations of the m edium  used and the crucifix 
suspended in it. If this were not so, then everything bar the colour of the work would be redundant.
The repellent contrast of material and imagery is not an unfortunate side-effect of the pleasure 
afforded by some other aspect of the work. Rather, the use and foregrounding of the urine is central to 
the work as art. This may reduce the pleasure we m ight otherwise have derived from looking at the 
work. Nonetheless, this does not entail that the work is of lesser value as art. Indeed, the m edium  used, 
and the resultant juxtapositions, means the work is of greater value as art, not less. It is im portant to 
realise that this is not an isolated and exceptional case. Consider, for example, certain highly popular 
kinds of film. Feeling unpleasant emotions, such as fear and repulsion, and imagining horrific states of 
affairs are central to horror movies. Indeed, this is precisely what is constitutive of the genre. It would 
make little sense to claim that these aspects of horror movies are unfortunate features which render th e  
films disvaluable as art. If this were so, then someone who claimed that Hell Raiser was not horrific 
or scary enough would be unintelligible. A lternatively, he could be thought of as being scary himself: 
since his com plaint shows that he takes pleasure in what is intrinsically unpleasant, he m ust be 
unbalanced.
But the com plaint that Francis Ford C oppola 's Dracula was a d isappointm ent, precisely 
because it was neither horrific or scary, does make sense. This is because the state of affairs represented 
certainly ought to evoke unpleasant emotions as key constituents in our response to the work. Its failure 
to do so, diminishes rather than enhances its value as an artwork. Thus artw orks whose whole point is 
to give rise to unpleasant associations, emotions and thoughts in the spectator are valued as art. Such 
artworks cannot be explained away on the grounds that they afford pleasure and are of value as art in 
other respects. The pleasure account cannot explain the value of artworks which repel us or prescribe us 
to imagine horrific states of affairs. Thus the pleasure account of art's value m ust be, the objector will 
claim, inadequate.
However, Noël Carroll has recently given an argum ent which, he claims, both upholds the 
pleasure account of art and, nevertheless, remains true to the value we place on works of horror as art.^
^ Noël Carroll, The Philosophy o f Horror {hondon: Routledge, 1990), Chapter 4, pp. 158-195.
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C arroll's argum ent is, essentially, that our pleasure in such cases arises from the provocation and 
subsequent sating of our curiosity. What we are concerned to provoke and explore in the case of horror 
films is our fascination with anomalies. That is, our curiosity with things which violate our categorial 
schemes. For example, monsters violate our standard categories in various ways. Thus they are taken to 
violate the natural order, the way the w orld is. It is for this very reason that compel our interests, 
curiosity and thus attention. Yet, at the very same time, and for the very same reasons, we find them 
compelling, we find monsters disgusting, repulsive and horrific. The abrogation of our standard  
categories of thought is where Carroll locates both the centrally unpleasant nature of horror films and 
the fascination, interest and pleasure they afford. Thus Carroll's argum ent can explain why removing 
the unpleasant aspects of the work would not enhance its value as art but actually diminish it:
"The fascination of the horrific being comes in tandem with disturbance, and, in fact, 1 
would subm it that for those who are attracted to the genre, the fascination at least 
compensates for the disturbance."^
This explains, Carroll argues, how we may derive pleasure from our encounters w ith 
intrinsically unpleasant things in art. Furthermore, in engaging with a film, we can afford to explore 
horrific creatures and situations in a way we could not in the real world. This is because we cannot be 
threatened by an imaginary state of affairs in the way we could be if w hat we were im agining was 
actually happening. Hence we may enjoy contemplating the horrific in art, a matter which might not so 
readily give rise to pleasure if the m onsters represented were part of our everyday w orld and 
constituted an actual threat to ourselves. After all, terrible threats or tragic events in our lives do not 
give rise to pleasure. Thus in art, we can experience w hat it m ight be like, what it w ould be 
appropriate to think and feel, w ithout the potentially terrible cost which w ould follow in the real 
world. Therefore we can consider, provoke and satiate our curiosity about horrific states of affairs in a r t 
in ways we could or would not in our everyday life. So, Carroll argues, he can explain how we may gain 
pleasure from our experiences, through art, with what are disgusting or horrific creatures and events.
In ordinary contexts we may not be able to explore our curiosity about creatures and events 
which challenge the way we categorise the world. This may be due to social taboos or real emotional 
and physical threats. However, in art these constraints fall away and we can provoke, extend and 
indulge our curiosity. Carroll's attem pt to resolve the paradox of horror still repudiates the idea that 
we enjoy or take pleasure in being scared, disgusted or repelled. The unpleasant thoughts, feelings and 
emotion are still conceived of as by-products. However, if w e are to explore the ideas, concepts and
^ Noël Can oil. The Philosophy o f Horror (London; Routledge, 1990), Chapter 4. p. 189. The italics arc my 
emphasis.
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categorial violations which give rise to the pleasures distinctive of art-horror, the unfortunate by­
products are necessary. Thus our interest in the genre of horror, and the Gothic novel from which it 
evolved, lies in the curious violation of the lim ited mechanistic norms of nature and our conceptual 
framework. The fact that they m ust scare us to do so, is the price we must pay. O ur enjoyment of and 
fascination for art-horror is due to the curiosity it provokes in us and ultimately satiates. What both 
gives us pleasure and scares us is the categorial violations of our understanding of the world.
However, Carroll's argum ent is inadequate. It still cannot properly explain the delight we feel 
from experiencing unpleasant emotions. Firstly, C arroll's argum ent equates the dem and that a film 
should be more scary to the dem and that it should explore more fully the relevant categorial violation. 
But the assimilation is a false one. Imagine A lien  had the section cut from it w hich portrayed the 
creature lunging at Dallas, the captain of the spacecraft. This would neither lessen the w ork 's 
exploration of the m onster as a creature violating our standard categories, nor would it d im inish the 
narrative structure. However, it w ould significantly dim inish the fright and fear we feel in engaging 
with the film. Therefore, on Carroll's account. A lien  would be a better artw ork with this scene cut out. 
Yet this is the exact opposite of what is the case. If the scene was cut from the film, we would think it 
of lesser value as art. This is precisely because we enjoy and value the unpleasant fear we feel, 
independently  of w hether it ex tends our curiosity  about the m onster v io lating  our standard  
conceptualisation of the world.
Secondly, Carroll's account works far better for our appreciation of horror than it does in the 
case of tragedy. Whether a tragedy affords us pleasure or not does not seem to depend upon its violation 
of our categorial schemes at all. For example, Greek tragedy seems to have concerned and extended, 
rather than abrogated, their structured understanding of the world.^ Similarly, the value of King Lenr 
lies not in its confronting us w ith disgusting violations of our standard concepts. Rather, its value lies 
centrally in its exploration of the way standard conceptions of the w orld, and various familial and 
hum an relationships, may be flawed w ith potentially savage consequences. Lastly, the pleasure we 
feel does not just derive from the fact that the object of fear is not a threat. For example, if one had been 
under the misapprehension that Welles' broadcast of War of the Worlds was a report, one m ight still 
have felt pleasure in relation to the fear evoked. Indeed, Carroll fails not only to recognise that we 
may enjoy feeling unpleasant emotions in art, but that we do so in our everyday lives too. For example, 
soldiers, mountaineers, racing drivers, divers, paragliders, circus perform ers and people who enjoy 
various fun fair rides all typically enjoy w hat are highly dangerous activities. Indeed, if these 
activities were rendered devoid of their danger and the 'thrill of fear' lost, then the enjoyment taken in 
the respective activities could hardly be the same at all.
8
for
Sec Aeschylus, The Oresteian Trilogy, tr. P. Vellacotl, (Harmondsvvorlh: Penguin, 1959), Introduction, pp. 15-37 
>r a discussion of Aeschylus’ work in these terms.
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Now, we might think of tragedy as expressing or extending our own fears and anguish, thus "by 
means of pity and fear bringing about the purgation of such emotions."^ On this construal, tragedy takes 
us through a gam ut of emotions, from joy to unpleasant emotions such as grief and sorrow. By the end, 
the audience should be left weary, emotionally drained and in a pleasurable state. One must be very 
careful here, since if we are merely concerned w ith the expression of the emotions, then art is being 
problematically conceived as an outlet for the em otionally constipated. Art is not reducible to the 
purging of pent up, unformed emotions. If this were so, the pleasure arising from art would be reduced to 
a form of relief, instrumentally derived from the therapy art is held to afford. On such an account we 
would be better off going to a psychotherapist or role-play encounter group rather than vicariously 
expressing our emotions through art.
However, as Susan Feagin and Jerrold Levinson have argued, the pleasure taken in tragedy, and 
thus from the expression of unpleasant emotions and thoughts, may derive from the nature of our 
response.*^ The tragic expression of a character's p ligh t in the face of fate renders apposite our 
anguished, sym pathetic emotional reaction. A lthough the feelings that the tragedy gives rise to are 
them selves unpleasant, we derive overall pleasure because this is w hat we ought to feel when 
confronted with such a state of affairs. Indeed, this serves to confirm that we are the type of person 
who is outraged by injustice. What gives us pleasure concerns our attitude to our lower level responses to 
w hat is unpleasant. Thus what grounds our pleasure is the realisation that we too care for our fellow 
man as we should. Therefore, this account, as opposed to Carroll's, can make proper sense of the dem and 
that a work was not scary enough. On this account, such a dem and represents the claim that the work 
failed to evoke the appropriate response regarding w hat it prescribes us to imagine. The pleasure 
afforded by such artworks arises from our meta-response to what is portrayed. The unpleasant emotions 
and thoughts are ineliminably involved but, through their appositeness to the events portrayed, give 
rise to a higher order pleasure. For example Bacon’s horrific, masked, stunted and smeared grotesque 
figures are unpleasant. The pleasure does not lie in his vision of people as inherently corrupted and 
rotten. Rather, we derive pleasure from the fact that we are repulsed by it. We do not take pleasure in 
what is intrinsically unpleasant, but we may take pleasure from the appropriateness of our reaction to 
what is represented.
However, yet again, the unpleasant emotions which are central to tragedy and horror stories 
are considered to be unfortunate pre-requisites for the real source of pleasure. If this were so, then 
presumably we would have to make sure we were in a psychologically robust state in order to undergo
Aristotle, On The Art o f Poetry, in Classical Literary Criticism, tr. T.S. Dorseh, (London; Penguin, 1965), 
Chapter 6, p. 39.
* Susan Feagin, "The Pleasures of Tragedy", A/wcr/rnn (Jwnr/cr/v, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1983, pp. 95-104
and Jerrold Levinson, "Pleasure and the Value of Works of Art", British Journal o f Aesthetics, Vol. 32, No. 4, 1992, 
p. 300.
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the unfortunate requirem ents which enable us to achieve such higher order pleasure. Yet, going to 
watch tragedies or horror movies requires no such steeling of one's self. Furthermore, we do not enjoy 
unpleasant thoughts and emotions just because they confirm our responses as appropriate. Moreover, as 
Berys Gaut argues, our delight camiot be explained away in terms of our being able to control where our 
thoughts and emotions are directed.* * The racing car driver does not thrill to the bend he takes at 100 
m.p.h. because it confirms to him  that he is the k ind of person who is afraid of dying. Indeed, the 
pleasure could not even derive, at least wholly, from the fact that he is in control and takes the bend 
well. After all, the racing car driver will still delight in his fear even when he thinks he may be losing 
control and slipping the curve. Rather, his delight consists precisely in his feeling the fear as he takes 
the curve. That is, his very feeling of fear is partly constitutive of his enjoyment of racing. Sim ilarly, 
our delight at the fear we feel does not arise because it confirms the kind of person we are. Moreover, it 
does not arise because we control the direction of our thoughts and feelings. Rather, it consists in the 
feeling of fear itself. This explains why it is that we often find it hardest to look away when the film 
or play is at its most horrific. The unpleasant emotions themselves actually afford us a peculiar kind of 
pleasure.
It is im portant to realise that the recognition that emotions such as fear may be pleasurable, 
need not involve the claim that their unpleasantness is merely a contingent matter.*^ Rather, it is 
constitutive of feeling fear that it is typically an unpleasant feeling to have. One is typically afraid of 
something because it is threatening or nasty and this is usually enough for our appropriate emotional 
reactions regarding them to be themselves unpleasant.
There are certain ideal hum an standards by virtue of which we find certain things to be 
constitutively pleasurable or not and which thus, typically, give rise to enjoyable feelings or feelings of 
displeasure. Certain tastes or sensations are pleasurable as such under standard conditions. In normal 
cases where someone fails, say, to delight in quenching their thirst or in being reunited with a friend we 
look for an explanation. If the failure to derive pleasure from such cases is beyond the standard limits 
of taste or desire variation, then it m ust be explained in terms of the subject's divergence from our norms 
of desire. However, in secondary cases, where we can inhibit or modify the standard conditions through 
interference or convention, then sensations which are typically unpleasant may become pleasant and 
vice versa. Thus, as Berys Gaut suggests, our emotions, in this case negative ones, may constitutively
* * Beiys Gaut, "The Paradox of Horror", British Journal o f Aesthetics, Vol. 33, No. 4, 1993, pp. 333-345.
See Joe Simpson, Touching The Void (London; Jonathan Cape, 1988), for a description of the dangers of 
mountaineering in similar terms.
Kendall Waiton, Mimesis as Make-Believe (Cambridge Mass.: Har\ ard Uni\ crsity Press, 1990), Chapter 7, pp. 
251, 252, 256 makes this claim.
*’*■ Sec Alasdair MacIntyre's "Pleasure as a Reason for Action" in his Against the Self-Images o f the Age (London; 
Duckworth, 1971), pp. 173-190.
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include negative evaluative thoughts, are individuated according to their formal objects and yet be 
experienced as enjoyable. One retains a negative evaluation of the emotion's object whilst experiencing 
it as pleasant.
The context of art enables unpleasant events and objects to be represented and contemplated in 
the know ledge that the rules which typically gu ide our behaviour tow ards such things can be 
suspended, allowing us to derive pleasure from our experience of them through art. This also holds true 
for multifarious other activities ranging from video games and roller coaster rides to mountaineering. 
One of the attractions of sadomasochism is that it involves controlled ritualistic role play enabling 
people to engage in and enjoy activities which, outside such a controlled artificial context, would both 
be highly dangerous and socially threatening. Thus we now have a sound explanation of how dangerous 
activities, works of horror and even works of tragedy can afford pleasurable experiences. That is, we 
may enjoy being scared witless by A lien  or entertaining Bacon's brutal vision of the human condition. 
People who do all sorts of things, from fighting to m otor racing, may enjoy the thrill of fear. Thus 
unpleasant features, characters or states of affairs may afford pleasure in art. They cannot be wholly 
explained away as unfortunate by-products of something else we take pleasure in. Rather they may 
give us pleasure directly in our engagement with the artw ork. Therefore the pleasure account of art 
holds good. The question now is, what sort of pleasure?
To make an artwork usually involves skilfully crafting and constructing an object which affords 
pleasure both in and resultant from our engagem ent w ith it. The intuition that art should be linked 
with questions of skill arises from recognising that artw orks are typically unique objects. Artistic skill 
goes above and beyond the m erely rule governed activity, constructively adapting  the m aterial, 
conventions and subject m atter to achieve an artistic purpose. Part of the pleasures an artw ork may 
afford us lies in our appreciation of the artistry involved. Yet w hat is the skill for? After all, mass 
produced objects may give us more pleasure than contem plating the skill of a draughtsm an. Moreover, 
objects which conspicuously lack artistic skill may be artworks. For example, D ucham p's Fountain is 
hardly a result of skilled craftsm anship. Rather, we may value it for its intellectual jokiness and 
bravado. Conversely, artistically produced objects may fail to qualify as artw orks. Artistic skill is the 
versatile or keen manipulation of materials and conventions in order to make art. We value skill as a 
part of the goal directed activity, ra ther than as the end point of it. After all, one may enjoy the 
exercise of many skills, from the wizardry of a sober George Best to the intellectual dexterity of a great 
philosopher. What we need to know, is w hat the artistry, where it is used, is directed towards.
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Section 2: Flhe Cuft OfCHie Siestfietic SittitucCe.
Perhaps the most immediate candidate for the pleasures of art concerns aesthetic qualities, the 
primary paradigm  of which is beauty. Much is made of our experience with artw orks being essentially 
aesthetic, the idea has both a strong intellectual pedigree and an intuitive hold over us. Thus art's  
pleasures may be thought to arise from the perception of aesthetic qualities, which provoke a peculiar 
delight in us. One way of making sense of this idea, is in terms of an aesthetic attitude. That is, in order 
to appreciate a work's aesthetic features, we should take up a particular, appropriate a ttitude tow ard 
it. Thus, an object is conceived to be of value as art if and only if it affords pleasure in our engagement 
w ith it, where we bring an aesthetic attitude to bear upon it.
So w hat is distinctive of an aesthetic attitude? It cannot be mere detachment. We may distance 
ourselves from artworks in the sense that we do not conceive of ourselves as moving in the same world or 
spatio-temporal framework as those who are represented. Thus one does not attem pt the impossible by 
intruding upona performance of Of/?c/lo. There may be some truth to Coleridge's 'w illing suspension of 
disbelief', but this will concern our understanding of the structural status and constraints of storytelling. 
A m atter which seems fundamentally unrelated to a distinctive attitude concerning the aesthetic.
Im m anuel Kant's Critique o f fudgeuient has spaw ned m any conceptions of the aesthetic 
attitude, w hich is typically taken to be a disinterested delight in a w ork 's aesthetic features. For 
Kant, the subject's feeling of pleasure in a judgem ent of taste is not linked determ inately to a concept. 
The judgem ent of taste is non-cognitive and based upon the free play betw een the faculties of 
imagination and understanding in the experience, unsubordinated by a determ inate concept. Thus one's 
contemplation of beauty in a pure judgement of taste, does not refer to conceptualised reality. Hence our 
pleasure and delight in a pure aesthetic judgement is disinterested with regard to the real existence of 
the object concerned. This is in contrast to our delight in what is merely agreeable, which is linked to 
desire and thus interest in the object's existence. Thus, Kant claims in the second moment, since the 
aesthetic experience does not result from an appeal to our particular interests, the judgem ent of taste 
grounds a universal claim.
Disinterested delight legitimises one to claim sim ilar assent from others w ith  respect to the 
experience and judgement of beauty. The judgement is singular because there must be no reference to basic 
categories or general concepts. If one's judgement is influenced by particular inclinations and desires, 
then one has brought the object under a determ inate concept and it cannot be a judgem ent of taste. For 
Kant, any personal interest in the delight deprives the judgem ent of taste of its im partiality and thus 
universality. Hence, it is confused to m uddle charm or emotion with beauty. The pure judgement of taste
Immanuel Kant, The Critique Of Judgement, tr. J. C. Meredith, (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1928), Book I 
Analytic of the Beautiful, Second Moment; Of The Judgement Of Taste; Moment of Quantity, Section 9, p. 58.
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is one where the pleasure lies in an object's finality of form.*^ That is, our experience with the object, 
which gives rise to the judgem ent of taste, relates to its formal qualities. If the w ork is aesthetically 
pleasing, this is because its qualities prom otes the harm onious in ter play of im agination and 
understanding.
Thus in appreciating a Degas' nude, if the judgem ent is to be pure, one m ust disengage oneself 
from concerns wliich involve lustful desires and an interest in the existence of w hat is portrayed. Kant 
reinforces the necessity of such disinterest by affirming that beauty, and thus the pure judgem ent of 
taste, has no concern with what is useful.*^ Where judging the beauty of something involves bringing 
the object under a determinate concept, then the beauty is dependent and thus the judgement impure:
"the beauty of a m an...presupposes a concept of the end that defines w hat the thing 
has to be, and consequently a concept of its perfection; and is therefore m erely 
appendant beauty,"*^
However, it is by virtue of the judgement being disinterested and thus presupposing our common 
sense, grounded upon our hum an faculties of imagination and understanding, that w e may claim that 
everyone ought to agree with our judgem ent of t a s t e .T h i s  is, for Kant, what constitutes a judgem ent 
being aesthetic and an object beautiful. The strong aesthetic conception of Kant's thesis stems from 
aspects of German Romanticism and was most strongly advocated this century by Edward Bullough, in 
terms of psychical distance. Bullough argues that, by a strong effort of will, one m ust abstract from the 
stimulus object our associated personal practical ends or needs. Hence the threatening terror of a sea fog 
can become a source of enjoym ent or delight. Psychical distance is thought of as akin to a new 
illum inating light upon familiar objects:
"an impression which we experience sometimes in instants of direst extremity, when 
our practical interest snaps like a w ire from sheer over-tension, and we watch the 
consummation of some im pending catastrophe w ith the marvelling concern of a mere 
spectator."^*^
ibid.. Third Moment: Of Judgements Of Taste: Moment Of The Relation Of The Ends Brought Under Rev iew In 
Such Judgements, Section 13, p. 65.
ibid.. Section 15, pp. 69 - 71.
ibid., Section 16, p. 73.
ibid., Fourth Moment, Of The Judgement of Taste: Moment Of The Modalitv Of The Delight In The Object, pp. 
81-85.
Edward Bullough, "Psychical Distance' as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle" in P. A. Werhane (ed.). 
Philosophical Issues in Art (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1984), p. 393.
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Bullough allows that personal experience and associations may enhance one's appreciation of 
the object. However, this is only so where psychical distance is maintained and not broken dow n under 
the weight of personal resonances, as may be the case w ith a jealous husband w atching O thello . 
Similarly, Bullough argues, the practical activities of criticism are incom patible w ith the requisite 
distanced attitude, it is only by switching between the dem ands of the two, that the critic can hope to 
both appreciate and criticise the artwork.
What then is there to the notion of distance which is distinctive and aesthetically significant? 
Perhaps the key lies in a proper understanding of the notion of disinterestedness. Kant held that to be 
disinterested is to be unconcerned w ith the use, purpose or end of the object w hich is regarded 
aesthetically. Thus aesthetic contem plation of the object and its form is independent of any concerns, 
other than w ith its phenom enal qualities or appearance. Therefore any interest in the existence of 
w hat is portrayed in a w ork of art is precluded in an aesthetic judgem ent. The point of aesthetic 
engagement is the appreciation of sensible form unconstrained by determ inate cognitive, moral or other 
concerns. The aesthetic attitude, being disinterested, is a particular form of attending which makes 
this possible. Hence it is unreasonable, because impossible, to engage with a particular work for the 
sake of improved historical understanding and, concomitantly, to expect an aesthetic reward. To use an 
artw ork for some ulterior non-aesthetic purpose, is to fail to treat the work as art. An artw ork cannot be 
engaged w ith aesthetically, w hilst one has an ulterior interest foregrounded in one's engagement with 
it.
Gestalt psychology may be adduced to support the case for an aesthetic attitude. The core idea 
is that there are different modes of attending to things. For example, the famous duck-rabbit draw ing 
can be seen either as a rabbit's head or a duck's. Thus, the dawning of different aspects may be subject to 
the influence of one’s w i l l .S im i l a r ly ,  taking up an aesthetic attitude tow ard something, distancing 
oneself from one's interests and concerns, may similarly be a m atter of will. The aesthetic attitude is 
thus a particu lar and peculiar way of regard ing  the w orld, applicable to virtually  everything. 
Furthermore, as a distinct mode of attending, it may be switched on and off at will. One may be able to 
aesthetically appreciate appearances as diverse as the beaut}/  ^ of Snowdonia, the colour and pattern of 
a dying accident victim's blood or the works of Kandinsky and Klee.
One m ight be tem pted to suppose the aesthetic attitude is concerned w ith form alone, 
uninterested in the w ork's or w orld 's content. Indeed, just such an assum ption underlies Clive Bell's 
dismissal of a work's cognitive content as irrelevant. Bell proudly coined the term 'significant form', for 
wliich he gave no sustained argument, and presumed aesthetic engagement must be understood as solely
2* See Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968), Ilxi, pp. 194-195.
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sensible. Thus Bell managed to add a normative drive to twentieth century visual art's abstraction from 
content toward purity of form. For Bell aspects of form constitute a work's aesthetic features, which can 
only be appreciated by taking up the appropriate aesthetic stance. That is, disinterested with regard 
to the purpose or content of the work.^2 Thus one is free to be absorbed by and enjoy the positive 
aesthetic features of the artwork.
However, such a crude account of the aesthetic attitude sails past Kant's subtleties only to 
founder upon stock objections. Firstly, if we are supposed to respond to 'significant form', separable from 
content, it is unclear how beautiful aspects of, for example, nature are distinct from artw orks. If the 
mode of aesthetic attention can be brought to bear fruitfully upon other aspects of the world, then what 
is so peculiarly delightful about artworks? Indeed, why, in order to appreciate an artwork, must one be 
disinterested in such a radical manner? After all, do we not usually engage w ith artw orks or derive 
pleasure from them in part because of what they depict. Their various characters, themes and stories 
are surely of proper interest to us? It is precisely in their representation of aspects of the world, that 
artw orks typically differ from nature. We typically attend to artw orks because of w hat and how a 
work represents something may capture our imagination, involve our emotions or stimulate thought 
about the object w ith wliich it is concerned.
Conversely, an artist such as Renoir may paint a particular model precisely because he desires 
her. Yet his portrait of may be im mensely aesthetically rew arding. Indeed, it is impossible to be 
wholly disinterested in Bell's coarse sense, when engaging with and judging artworks. The claims of th e  
strong thesis falsely presuppose that the aesthetic attitude involves a complete separation of form and 
content, engaging solely w ith form, and the false separation of art from life. Aesthetic features and 
form cannot be apprehended or cognised independently of their content and embodiment. As Gombrich 
has argued, a picture cannot merely be 'read  off' the surface, abstracting form from content, for the 
spectator must necessarily make a cognitive or imaginative c o n t r ib u t io n I n  perceiving and engaging 
w ith  an object, one is already necessarily conceptualising and categorising reality Therefore, we 
cannot be so radically disinterested as to wholly disregard a work's content.
Michael Baxandall's study of fifteenth century Italy, through showing how Renaissance man 
m atched his concepts w ith pictorial style, em phasises the centrality of cognitive style.^^ Form is 
necessarily not independent of content, they are inseparable. The particular way colours have been 
worked and juxtaposed is significant for what the w ork is doing, the shaping partly constitutes the
Clive Bell, Art, 2nd ed., (London: Chatto and Windus, 1915), p. 12.
2^ E. H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion (Oxford: Phaidon, 1977), Part III: The Beholder's Share pp. 154 - 244,
2“*^ R. L. Gregor) , Eye and Brain, 3rd ed., (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1990), Chapter 10
2^ Michael Baxandall, Paintitig and Experience in Fifteetnh Century Italy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 
Chapter II, Section 3, pp. 36-40.
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content and the content guides the shaping. Thus our conceptual categories are significant even with 
regard to perceptual representation. Far from abstracting away all our hum an interests, artw orks 
typically concern and engage w ith them. Furtherm ore, if we respond w ith  deligh t to the way 
something has been represented, pcirt of our response depends upon what it is we take to be represented. 
For example, the delight Turner's Burial at Sea affords is not merely a m atter of the arrangem ent of 
lines and colours. It arises, in part, from  our recognition that the way the colours and lines are 
m anipulated  intim ate the shifting reflections, depths, lum inous light and  threat that one m ight 
encounter at sea. O ur aesthetic appreciation involves understanding that Turner's particular working of 
line, colour and texture is appropriate to the content: representing a ship burning out at sea. It is a 
fallacy to th ink the pursu it of aesthetic pleasure involves formal purity, divested of content. The 
aesthetic attitude cannot consist in abstracting the 'superfluities' of content from a work to engage with 
the underlying 'significant form.' The search for pure form might be historically useful in explaining 
the attem pt to strip bare the methods of construction, but it is necessarily inadequate to the very value 
and point of such construction in the first place.
A more sophisticated conception, whilst still holding the aesthetic attitude is a distinct mode 
of engagement required to appreciate aesthetic features, can allow an inform ing interest in the w ork's 
content. That is, w hat is depicted may inter-relate w ith and thus effect the value of the w ork 's 
aesthetic features.2<^Thus one can aesthetically appreciate the curve of a tree trunk and its branches, 
seeing in it the lean curve of a lithe body and arms. Yet, all the wlule, one is conscious of it as a swaying 
tree and the respective thoughts or feelings in one's contemplation shape and modify each other. Our 
aesthetic appreciation depends upon the recognition that the object concerned is a tree and the thought 
that it is body like. Even in  the most im pressionistic cases, we necessarily bring our concepts and 
categorisations of the world into play. Yet, if this is so, how is the distinction to be draw n between the 
aesthetic m ode of attending and other modes?
The fundamental problem, as George Dickie has pointed out, is that typically the distinction is 
d raw n along motivational lines.2 ' Dickie argues that the aesthetic attitude is essentially a m yth that 
has outplayed its theoretical usefulness. Of course, we may distinguish the ways we may approach an 
artw ork. Thus the purpose appears to define the attitude. Namely, to engage w ith the object for its 
aesthetic value without any other ulterior motive, such as study for examinations, historical interest or 
one's personal curiosity regarding a particular actress. Therefore, Dickie argues, the aesthetic attitude 
is merely an ordinary act of attending done on a particular basis. It is a motivational distinction, rather 
than a perceptual one grounded upon a distinctive type of interest.
2^ Jerome Stolnitz, "The Actualities of Non-Aesthetic Experience" in M. Mitias (ed.). Possibility o f the Aesthetic 
Experience (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), pp. 27-46.
2"^  George Dickie, "The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude", A/n<?r«-a« P/a7o5'op/Hrfl/Q/mr/cr/v, Vol. I, No. 1, 1964, 
pp. 56-65.
64
This, Dickie claims, explains why we can appropriately treat and enjoy som ething as art, 
independently of our m otivation for engaging w ith it in the first place. For example, consider two 
people who both go to a music concert. One of them goes because he is studying the piece being performed 
for an examination. Both people can still enjoy the piece as music, independently of the reasons they  
came to sit in their seats. Thus studying a particular play for A level does not preclude one from 
appropriately engaging w ith and enjoying a performance. Indeed the study may aid one's understanding 
and appreciation of the play, w hilst the enhanced enjoyment may make sense of and spur one on to 
further study. Com ing to an  artw ork  for particu lar reasons need not adversely  influence one's 
engagement and may even serve to enhance it. Another interesting case is that of film. Many people go 
to see films without presuming a particular attitude or even motivation is required in order to properly 
enjoy them. Indeed, the most vital art forms are often those which pervade everyday life and are 
treated w ith robustness, as the novel was in  the nineteenth century.
If the aesthetic attitude is distinguished by the purpose of our engagement with a work, then it 
cannot go through to the engagement itself. Divergent reasons for a particular action or regard do not 
entail qualitatively different acts or forms of regard. The m etaphorical requirem ent to take up an 
aesthetic attitude can only signify that we m ust focus our attention upon the w ork in question, and the 
inter-relation of the parts to the whole, if we are to enjoy it as art. Thus for an object to qualify as an 
artwork it m ust only repay focused attention. A lthough the object of attention may posses distinctively 
aesthetic features, the atten tion  itself is not distinctively aesthetic. Indeed, one's absorption in 
attending to a particular work, suggests that a close concern with cognitive, moral and other concerns 
serves to heighten our interest and engagement. To be disinterested is only to attend from a certain kind 
of motive. For Dickie, whatever the motive, the form of attending itself remains the same. Thus a critic 
may be attending to a work in order to produce his new spaper piece the next day. His motivation, and 
perhaps his search for reasons for his evaluation, may be different from that of the average gallery 
goer. However, the form of his attending is not. The only difference there could be is the degree or 
closeness w ith which he is attending. The aesthetic attitude cannot refer to a distinct way of attending, 
Dickie claims, but is merely elliptical for ordinary attending done for a particular reason. A lthough 
grounded in one's interest in aesthetic features, the aesthetic attitude can only am ount to focused 
attention.
Denying the distinctness of the aesthetic attitude undercuts argum ents which suggest art's 
aesthetic value is independent of cognitive values and concerns. However, Dickie goes too far in 
suggesting there is nothing at all distinctive about the aesthetic attitude. The cult of the aesthetic 
attitude arose, in part, because of the recognition that there may be a right and w rong way of looking at 
something as art. A glimpse of Dickie's mistake lies in his complete separation between the nature of 
the act and the motive, purpose or intention in engaging w ith the artwork. One only needs to look at 
certain cases of focused attending to realise that something distinctive may be going on after all.
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Take three examples of attention concerning a production of Richard III; a) attending for its 
historical context, to extract historical inform ation and understanding, b) attending to the production 
for its entertaining narrative, w ondering w hat will happen next, who will trium ph and so on. c) 
attending to the production for its aesthetic value and reward, an appreciation of the structure of the 
set, the musicality of the language and so on. 1 am not saying that these three cases are m utually 
incompatible. Indeed, they typically inter-relate. However, it is possible to have the first two cases 
without the third. Therefore focused attention must be insufficient to pick out the form of attending to a 
work required to find it aesthetically rew arding. Thus there is som ething in the aesthetic attitude to 
be salvaged. Although the difference is more a question of degree than type, nonetheless one can attend 
in a m anner which foregrounds aesthetic features. If we turn  our m inds back to Kant's conception of 
disinterestedness, the delight taken in the object was not a form of attention constrained by purpose or 
motive. Thus, though our engagem ent may be m otivated by interested desires, we may still take 
disinterested pleasure in it. Independently of the connection between the object and what we desire or 
strive for, we can take pleasure from our engagement w ith the work a l o n e . 2 *
However, though there may be a weak form of aesthetic attention, its satisfaction cannot 
provide the prim ary value of art. What is often forgotten when arguing about the aesthetic attitude is 
that, at least for Kant and the early Germ an Romantics, the paradigm  case for rew arding aesthetic 
attention was nature. Thus, as a general form of attention brought to bear upon the world, everything, 
from aspects of nature to artworks and everyday objects, may repay aesthetic attention. Though it may 
explain certain pleasures in art, the aesthetic attitude is not particular to or distinctive of art.
Yet surely the practice of art evolved through its paradigm atic concern w ith  beauty and 
aesthetic features? What may be distinctive of art is how it promotes aesthetic value, in ways which 
nature could not. Thus instead of relying upon the aesthetic attitude, the aesthetic thesis may be better 
construed in terms of artistically worked aesthetic properties. Thus Monroe Beardsley has argued from 
the artw ork as an autonomous object to the conclusion that only the non-referential features of a work 
are significant in terms of value. H is three prim ary criteria of formal unity, complexity and intensity 
are all positively evaluative in a w eak sense and constitute the aesthetic value of the work. These 
general principles are further filled out by lower level properties, such as delicacy or elegance.2^ Thus 
art's value is rendered distinct.
The possible m edia, shaping and content of artw orks provides a proliferation of distinct 
aesthetic pleasures, which nature or everyday objects cannot afford. For example, at a sim ple level
2* According to Kant, this would derive from the free pla) of the imagination and understanding that occurs in 
relation to the object. See Michael McGhee, "A Fat Worm of Error?", British Journal o f Aesthetics, Vol. 31, No. 3, 
1991, pp. 222-229, and Nick Zangwill, "UnKantian Notions of Disinterest", British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 32, 
No. 2, 1992, pp. 149-152.
29 Monroe Beardsley, Aesthetics (New York; Harcourt, Brace and World, 1958), Section 24, pp. 456-470.
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Barnett N ew m an's flatly applied colours gain in aesthetic power w hen entitled Adam. At a more 
com plicated level, the beauty of M ichelangelo's The Expulsion of Adam and Eve from Paradise is 
enhanced by the work's imagery. Furthermore, the aesthetic power of a work depends, in part, upon 
what the work is being used to represent. After all, the artistically appropriate rendering of a whim 
will prove less aesthetically valuable than the appropriate  artistic representation of a fundam ental 
desire, interest or value. The inter-relation between how something is expressed and what is expressed 
can promote or diminish a work's aesthetic value. Thus Beardsley does not exclude cognitive content as 
necessarily superfluous to the w ork as art. Nevertheless, cognitive significance is held to be valuable 
only to the extent it prom otes the value of the w ork 's aesthetic features, that is, it is only of 
instrum ental value in so far as it prom otes the prim ary aesthetic criteria of unity, complexity and 
intensity.
Beardsley's attem pt to allow for the contextual variance of a feature's value, whilst striving to 
m aintain that unity, complexity and intensity are objectively valuable, general and unvarying is 
problem atic. Beardsley claim s that only the secondary  evaluative princip les are contextually 
dependent. Yet, these secondary principles are always to be explained and subsum ed by the general and 
strongly objective prim ary criteria. W hilst the secondary critical criteria are subord inate  and 
conditional, the prim ary criteria "always contribute positively to the value of a work, in so far as they 
are present. And their absence is always a deficiency, however it may be made up in other ways."-^** 
The basic explanation then is that in a work, such as King Lear, a comic scene may add value or detract 
from it. However, this depends upon the comic scene's relation to some prim ary feature, such as 
dramatic intensity, to which it is detracting from or adding to.
However, the specific, context variant value of Beardsley's secondary features, from the more 
general features, such as gracefulness, elegance and comedic aspects, to highly specific features, such as 
the fine brushwork, striking im ageiy or tonal structure, serves only to h ighlight the necessary inter­
relations between what is represented, the way it is represented and the work's resultant value. The 
application and value of the various secondary features may rival each other. For example, whether a 
work is graceful or not may compete with w hether it possess a vital pow er or intensity. Competition, 
conflict and trade-offs at the level of secondary principles suggests this may be true at the prim ary 
level. If raw power conflicts with gracefulness or comedy then it seems that a w ork's intensity can only 
be increased at the expense of a work's complexity. If conflict at the prim ary level is due to conflict at 
the secondary level, then it is likely that the contextual variation of features and value seeps upw ards 
too. thus, for example, a w ork w hich possesses intensity may do so at the expense of unity and 
complexity. Thus, it may be, that the intensity the w ork possesses is even disvaluable. That is, the
Monroe Beardsley, "On The Generality of Critical Reasons", Journal o f Philosophy. Vol. LIX, No. 18, 1962, 
pp. 477-486.
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ugliness, power and lack of subtlety may all add up to the work's intensity and constitute its disvalue as 
a rt.
As substantive principles, the three prim ary criteria are cashed out in term s of secondary 
principles, which themselves conflict, trade-off each other and are thus contextually variant. This 
contextual variation rises upw ard, necessarily infecting his primary criteria. Given this, the autom atic 
ascrip tion  of positive value to his p rim ary  aesthetic criteria looks highly dubious. Indeed, 
incoherence, simplicity or ugliness of expression or conception (as opposed to unity, intensity and 
complexity), may be of positive value in certain cases. Hence works as various as Last Year at 
Marienbad, Gorecki's 3rd Symphony and Francis Bacon's Crucifixion Triptych are valued as art 
prim arily for these very reasons. Frank Sibley's a ttem pt to argue for and  list positive aesthetic 
qualities is a trivial escape for B eardsley.^* The mere fact that certain properties have inheren t 
aesthetic merit does not entail that the addition of such a property to a work will im prove its value as 
a whole. The resultant interaction of aesthetic features may detract from the w ork 's value as art. As 
Sibley points out, one good making feature can undermine others.
Even more problematic for Beardsley is his conception of the value of cognitive elements in art. 
Beardsley argues they only m atter in so far as they contribute to his prim ary aesthetic qualities of 
unity, complexity and intensity. Effectively, B eardsley 's is an error theory regard ing  cognitive 
elements in art. They are an unfortunate by-product in artw orks and we do not, properly speaking, 
respond to cognitive value in art. Essentially on this conception we have a strong divide between art, 
concerned with artistically worked aesthetic features, and commercial or propagandist products which 
serve merely to entertain or communicate a given message.
1 he artistic m axim isation of aesthetic w orth is, qua art, an end in itself. As art a w ork may 
have cognitive content, but can only be relevant to the extent it maximises aesthetic features. For 
example, the sim plicity of encapsulation may be aesthetically valuable, w hether in an equation, 
philosophical axiom or artwork. Furthermore, cognitive content may maximise the aesthetic value of a 
non-cognitive aesthetic feature. Thus relevant know ledge or sym bolism  may enhance aesthetic 
features. For example, religious sym bolism  may enhance the aesthetic value of a portra it or our 
know ledge of chaos theory may lend significance to the aesthetic beauty of the M andelbrot set. 
Nevertheless, the realm of the aesthetic is conceived as fundamentally separate from and autonomous 
w ith regard to other spheres of life, w hether commercial, moral or political. By contrast, everyday, 
commercial culture may be regarded as prim arily concerned with the communication of something. 
Where cognitive concerns predominate, whether it be to communicate a particular message or merely to 
entertain, everyday culture cannot hope to rise to the level of art.^2 p is on this basis, Roger Scruton
^ * Frank Sibley, "General Criteria and Reasons in Aesthetics" in J. Fisher (ed.), Essays on Aesihetics: Perspectives 
on the Work o f Monroe Beardsley (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983), pp. 3-20.
^2 See "Art, Education and Politics: An Inter\'ie\v with Roger Scruton", Cogito, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 1-5.
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argues, that m odernist art was bound to fail. M odernism 's failure, on this conception, lies in its 
promotion of function above form. That is, it placed the goal and purpose of building above the 
promotion of aesthetic features.^^ Art has as its autonom ous goal the prom otion of aesthetic values, to 
which all other considerations are subservient.
However, an inkling of the problems here arises when one considers how such a strict divide is 
out of step with the actual developm ent of art. Far from being independent of non-aesthetic purposes, 
art has typically been produced to serve a variety of purposes, whether the form of patronage be 
religious, public, private or commercial. After all the flattery, p ropaganda and m aterialism  which 
they served did not prevent Reynolds, Eisenstein or Hollywood from producing art. Typically Greek, 
Gothic and Georgian architecture all had an end or goal of serving practical needs such as housing, 
places for worship, civic monuments and so on. Thus whether a work of art is produced or not need not 
depend upon whether the prim ary purpose of creation is the promotion of artistically worked aesthetic 
features or the promotion of moral insight, religious worship or housing Lloyd's Insurance Brokers.
More significantly, we sometimes value cognitive aspects of artw orks even where they do not 
maximise, and might even diminish, the w ork's aesthetic value. The value of Last Year at Marienbad 
lies in the very frustration of one's a ttem pt to engage w ith it, serving to foreground cognitive 
significance through narrative incoherence. Another example is Magritte's Ceci n'est pas une pipe. The 
whole point is dependent upon the spectator realising both that the thing represented is a pipe and yet, 
since it is a painting, that it is not. If it were just a question of aesthetic effect, the title would be 
irrelevant. In actuality, it is a constitutive part of the necessary cognitive content of the work. 
Similarly, the value of D ucham p's w ork lies principally in the idea or thought at work, rather than 
how the object looks.^^To conceive of them as artworks because of their incidental aesthetic features is 
to miss their point and value as art. This is not to suggest that an artw ork is thus equivalent to every 
other form of discourse which includes cognitive content. This would be to assim ilate, falsely, artw orks 
to mere illustrations, sermons or works of philosophy. Art manipulates content in order to promote our 
pleasure in engaging w ith it. Thus w hether a w ork is of value as art is not m erely dependent upon 
cognitive features but upon the way in w hich these cognitive aspects are m anifested. Hence much 
propaganda, though attem pting to be art, fails.
See Roger Scruton, “Aesthetic Education and Design”, The Aesthetic Undersiamlitig (Manchester: Carcanet, 
1983), pp. 189-221.
Timothy Binkley, "Piece: Contra Aesthetics" in J. Margolis (ed.). Philosophy Looks At The Arts (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1978), pp. 25-44. Recognition of this point, however, does not entail, as Binkley thinks 
it does, that arthood is determined by cultural context or institutionally.
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Ideas cannot be wholly assim ilated to aesthetic features, if the term  'aesthetic' is not to be 
rendered v a c u o u s .T o  say that anything and everything which is of value in artw orks is aesthetic is 
to evacuate all meaning from the term. The term 'aesthetic' has come to us from Baumgarten, refracted 
through German Romanticism, to delineate features which sensibly please us independently of, or aside 
from, cognitive and moral properties. To stipulate cognitive properties are aesthetic is to emasculate 
the term, falsely conflating it w ith  the artistically w orked features of artw orks. Moreover, nature 
would then have to be conceived as being deprived of the main 'aesthetic' features in art. It would 
make no sense under such a radically revised notion to describe nature as aesthetic, a travesty given 
that nature was originally the paradigm atic case of the aesthetic. It is surely better to keep the 
evolved use of the term which has definite, m eaningful application to both nature and art, and 
recognise that artistic features are not wholly reducible to aesthetic ones.
Furthermore, the dom inance of an aesthetic response to an artw ork may also be singularly 
inappropria te  and inadequate to the nature of w hat is depicted. For exam ple, the aesthetic 
contemplation of Andrea Mantegna's A/l(n'h/rdo7/( o f St. Sebastian w ith its piercing arrows and gushing 
blood is aesthetically rew arding. Yet, w ithout the horror, w onder and sym pathy constitutive of our 
moral and perhaps religious reaction to w hat is portrayed, our engagem ent w ith the work remains 
inadequate. The aesthetic enjoym ent derived  from  John Singer Sargent's rep resen ta tion  of a 
configuration of gassed hum ans is an inadequate response to their deaths as depicted. S im ilarly , the 
ugly bru tality  of Francis Bacon's Reclining Person with Hypodermic Syringe may be highly  
aesthetically disvaluable. If someone were to say the cognitive aspects of The Accused were irrelevant 
to the film's value as art, we would rightly think they were missing the point. It is not m erely that the 
cognitive content of artworks may be central to them as art. Rather, the value of an artw ork's content is 
not reducible to the extent it prom otes aesthetic value. The value of an artw ork  may lie in its 
meaningful engagement with significant questions about the way the world is and the way we are or 
could be.
B eardsley 's argum ent that art cannot have cognitive value because good artw orks often 
m anifest contradictory and incompatible world views is f l a w e d O f  course, Dante's Divine Comedy 
and Lucretius' On the Nature o f Things explicate and manifest opposed metaphysical understandings 
of the w orld, Christian and pagan respectively. Furtherm ore, their presum ed understandings of the 
world cannot both be sound, at least in all respects. Yet, we respond to cognitive features in their own 
right and appreciate them  as valuable to a w ork qua art, even where this may detract from a work's 
aesthetic value. Moreover, truth is only one aspect or part of cognitive value. Thus although the nature
Classic cases of this elision are to be found in George Dickie's Evaluating Art (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1988), and Ron Bontekoe and Jamie Crooks' "The Inter-relationship of Moral and Aesthetic Excellence", 
British Journal o f Aesthetic.s Vol. 32, No. 3, 1992 pp. 209-220.
Monroe Beardsley, Aesthetics (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1958), Section 23, pp. 426-429.
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of the flaw may justifiably detract from the w ork's value as art, we can and do value works we think 
are plainly w rong in their understand ing  of the w orld. Cognitive value is not straightforw ardly 
determined by or a function of truth narrowly construed. If something is interesting or original, that also 
contributes to cognitive excellence. After all, most philosophical works we value may be contradictory 
in various respects. Yet, nevertheless, they may be of great value as philosopliical works.
The aesthetic is not an autonomous realm, subordinating all other considerations. Most art does 
not merely aim at the artistic working and production of aesthetic features but usually has some other 
goal; to communicate something, entertain, engage the imagination. It may be as simple and as difficult 
as attem pting to stretch our understand ing  of an artistic medium . For example, we may value 
originality independently of aesthetic concerns. Thus a work may be valued because of its relation to a 
particular artistic tradition in opening up new possibilities and even great art can be aesthetically 
disvaluable. Aesthetic value contributes to the value of art but art is not exhausted by it. With 
different works and forms of art, focusing primarily upon a work's aesthetic features may be more or less 
appropriate. Thus an openness to possible aesthetic features and their im port is required. The seed of 
tru th  in the aesthetic account is that it is a prim ary  characteristic of art that it possesses positive 
aesthetic features. After all, a chair or tapestry is not usually considered art unless it has positive 
aesthetic features to a high degree. But in art far m ore is involved than mere concern with aesthe tic  
properties. There is also a direct concern with and for cognitive content. Aesthetic properties, although 
properly valued in art, are not w hat this cultural practice is prim arily about. Hence, to treat a work 
appropriately as art may not involve taking up an aesthetic attitude toward it at all.
Section 3: ‘ETcpressivisnu
The recognition that the way something is represented is as im portant as w hat is represented, 
may suggest that art's prim ary pleasures are afforded through a w ork's expressive aspects. Art as 
expression has a distinguished pedigree from Kant through Romanticism to the twentieth century, 
typically conceiving of art as giving expressive form to our ideas or the venting of our emotions. Leo 
Tolstoy argued that art aims instrumentally to produce a sense of spiritual union, based upon the a r tis t 's  
intentional arousal of his felt emotions in the spectators:
"Art is a hum an activity consisting in this, that one man consciously, by means of 
certain external signs, hands on to others feelings he has lived through, and that 
other people are infected by these feelings and also experience them."^^
Leo Tolstoy, tr. A. Maude, What is Art? (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Mcrrill, I960), Chapter 5, p. 51.
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Although for Tolstoy only a few moral and religious emotions are worthy of communication, we 
will consider his argument as one generally concerned with instrumental expression. Expression here is 
not conceived merely as an em otional outpouring, bu t is intentionally directed tow ard someone. 
Tolstoy's instrumentalist conception tends to disregard the artworks themselves. His concern with art is 
only as an expressive means of communicating the artist's feelings to the spectator. Art as expressive 
communication certainly seems plausible, providing an explanation of both the artist's guiding purpose 
and the point of spectatorial engagem ent. However, Tolstoy's crude causalism entails, falsely, that a 
spectator must be moved by the artist's felt emotions. Yet, artworks do not always move the spectator. 
We may contem plate an artw ork, recognise w hat is expressed and m ove on unaffected, w ithout 
laughing or bursting into tears. We can see sadness is expressed, without ourselves feeling sad.
However, the recognition of a w ork's expressive aspect apart from one's particular em otional 
reaction does not entail there is no conceptual link. For this kind of case cannot generalise out across our 
engagement w ith art. To know in a particular individual case that what is expressed is sad, one must 
know that it is typically appropriate to react to such a state of affairs or portrayal in a certain way, 
for example with sympathy. That is, I m ust know vicariously that 1 ought to be sad, by virtue of my 
typical and apt responses to other such states of affairs or expressive features. Yet even where we do 
feel in our response to the artwork, we do not necessarily manifest the relevant emotions while engaging 
with the artwork. After all, our understanding of art, the relevant conventions and the social context in 
the gallery may inhibits the evidencing of one's inner emotional states.
Furthermore, the emotion appropriately aroused may not be identical w ith the emotional state 
of the artist. The spectator's emotions may respond to and thus be different from those expressed in the 
work. For example, the sense of utter loneliness and melancholic isolation expressed in Mario Sironi's 
Solitude  m ay not appropriately  evoke these feelings in ourselves, but, rather, evoke feelings of 
sym pathy. Conversely, the artist may himself have been in a different emotional state from the one 
expressed in the work. For example, Sironi may have been joyful and contented w hen he painted 
Solitude. That is, what is being expressed may be distinct from what is felt by either the artist or the 
spectator. The point is that though 1 make a recognisably brutal gesture or work, it is not a necessary 
condition of the gesture or w ork's being violent that 1 am, though this may ad d  to its force and 
piquancy.^^ Thus an artwork cannot be a neutral, transparent vehicle for accessing the artist's feelings. 
Rather, the various media, styles, conventions and way they are m anipulated constitute and shape 
what the artw ork expresses in particular and distinct ways.
Presumably it was the recognition of this fact which underlay Olivier’s comment to Dustin Hoffman, to the 
effect that Hoffman could always try acting. Indeed, being a method actor may not just facilitate but can also hinder 
an expressive perf ormance, as Daniel Day-Lewis discovered when his lead role in Hamlet induced a nervous 
breakdown.
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R. G. Collingwood has articulated a more sophisticated variation of the Romantic paradigm , 
distinguishing the expression of emotion from its arousal.'^^ He dismisses the idea that art proper has 
the function of generating emotions, as it does on Tolstoy's crude arousal theory. Rather, he argues, art 
is not to be conceived as a m eans to any end, w hether that of arousing em otion or any other. For 
Collingwood, the artwork, as a creation of the artist's imagination, inheres in his mind. It is an idea 
which is wholly independent of the object through which it is to be communicated. Thus the artefact 
produced is only a material springboard for the audience to recreate the sam e im aginative object. 
Producing an artwork, Collingwood argues, is not a m atter of m anipulating various materials. Art, 
unlike craft, should not be conceived as a skill by virtue of which certain desired states are produced in 
the audience. The question of usefulness or psychological reaction is considered irrelevant to whether 
something is
The work takes shape only in its imaginative creation in the artist's m ind, it is not pre-guided 
tow ard a particular end. This, Collingwood argues, shows why art and representation cannot be 
identified: representation is always conceived as a means to the end of re-evoking certain emotions for 
am usem ent's sake,*^  ^ Yet in C ollingw ood's general theory, both the m aterial object and w hat is 
identified as the true artw ork, w hat the artist has im agined, are a means to an end. The purpose of 
artistic creation and spectatorial engagem ent is, according to Collingwood, the expression of our 
feelings. Thus Collingwood is disingenuous: the grounds upon which he dism isses religious art, as 
having an overriding end, apply to his own conception."^^ Thus, for Collingwood, art's significance lies 
in the creative expression of emotion.
Now, obviously, internal inconsistency in Collingwood's overall theory renders it problematic. 
Yet Collingwood's essential point, namely that art is primarily concerned w ith the expression of our 
emotions, may remain sound. Yet, his conception of artw orks as essentially produced internal to the 
artist's m ind is problematic. This renders the m aterial object incidental and s u b s i d i a r y T h e  artefact 
is a work only in a secondary sense, by virtue of its relation to the m ental work, and Collingwood's 
analogy to engineering plans is meant to illustrate how this can be so. The plans themselves are, he 
says, in the engineer's head, and the specifications serve merely to communicate the plan. The plans 
themselves do not require embodiment in order to be plans. When thinking about music as paradigm atic .
R.G. Collingwood, The Principles o f Art (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1938). 
ibid.. Book I, Chapter II, pp. 32-36. 
ibid.. Chapter III, pp. 42-56.
ibid.. Chapters IV and V, pp. 57-104 and Book III, Chapter XV, p. 336, where Collingwood identifies the true 
end of art proper as the creative expression of our emotions.
ibid.. Chapter VII, p. 130.
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this may seem plausible enough, but transferred to painting the claim looks ridiculous. As Richard 
Wollheim argues, Collingwood fails to appreciate the type/token  distinction:
"Works of art fall into two very different categories. Some, like poems or pieces of 
music, are types: others, like paintings, are particulars. This d istinction  is not 
explicitly recognised by C ollingw ood, and  1 should  like to suggest that his 
indifference to it is responsible for some of the unjustified plausibility that attaches 
to it on a cursory reading.""^"^
Artw orks can 't be appropriately  conceived as mental scores prior to and independent of 
notation, i.e. merely as a means for the audience to reconstruct their own performance of the artwork. 
Firstly, C ollingw ood's recognition of the collaborative role of the audience in reconstructing the 
im aginative w ork renders his theory problematic."^^ If the true im agined artw ork really is in the 
artist's  head, how can w hat is im agined by the audience be the same artw ork, given the various 
inevitable individual discrepancies in each one's imaginings? Indeed, surely they must then all be 
different works. Presumably the audience may strive, but cannot know, w hether it is the artist's work 
they are engaging with or whether they are just making up their own. Secondly, Collingwood's analogy 
between artw orks and plans fails even in the case of music. Musical harmonies, sound, cannot exist in 
one's head, rather it m ust be perceived. O ne's m ind is not an internal processing room, containing five 
inner senses waiting for the im aginative reconstruction. What Collingwood fails to appreciate is that 
the a rtw ork  is constitu ted  by the particu la r m aterials, forms and m edia ou t of w hich it is 
constructively fashioned by the artist. This entails that w hat the artist is attem pting to express, will 
be given shape by and constituted in particular ways. Thus, contrary to Collingwood's conception, it is 
not wholly arbitrary that the sadness an artist expresses is expressed in paint rather than music, in an 
expressionist genre and so on. The form of expression, even the mere m ateriality of the paint, and the 
conventions m anipulated, necessarily make a difference to what is expressed. As Peter Fuller suggests:
Richard Wollheim, "On An Alleged Inconsistency in Collingwood's Aesthetic" in his On Art and the Mind 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 256. For further explication of the type/token distinction 
see Richard Wollhcim's Art and its Objects (Cambridge: Canto, Cambridge University Press, 1^2), Sections 35-37, 
pp. 74-84.
ibid.. Book III, Chapter XIV, Section 5, pp. 311 - 314.
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"Expression through painting is thus in itself a specific material process: indeed, it is 
only through this process that the artist's way of seeing, and beyond that of course 
his whole imaginative conception of his world, is made concretely visible to us.""^^
What guides and constrains our im agination is the w ork itself, the performance or particular 
embodiment partly constitutes and shapes the nature of what is to be imagined. Thus a work cannot be 
completed in the artist's head. Moreover, the artist's original conception may progress or modify as he 
draws upon and develops his original idea. The artist himself may not know w hat ultimate shape the 
work will take until he himself comes to a stop, then, retrospectively, he will he be able to see which 
elements led where, what he reacted to and why. The artist may have been capable of foreseeing all 
this, but not necessarily so. It is only in retrospect that the artist knows w hether the work has turned 
out as he thought it would. The w ords on paper, the marks on canvas, are responded to and developed 
by the artist in the light of his idea. Thus, Collingwood wrongly severs expression from its m aterial 
m anifestation, which is partly constitutive of w hat is expressed. The expressive capacity of sound or 
movement depends upon the conventionalisation of everyday sound and movement. An understanding of 
how and why something expresses sadness, necessarily shapes our understanding of that sadness. Our 
im agination engages with, and the artist's transforms, the constituted artefact. Collingwood's idealism  
ultimately denies the significance of one's experience with the artwork itself.
Furthermore, Collingwood's theory renders every imagined expressive act, in principle, a work 
of art. Yet, we do not always take pleasure in or value as art the mere expression of emotions, thoughts 
and sensibilities. After all, w hat is expressed may itself be highly disvaluable. The Texas Chain Saw 
Massacre may be violently expressive, producing strong emotional reactions. Yet we do not necessarily 
take pleasure in having our emotional range extended in this way. Similarly, the 'V' sign may be 
forcefully expressive and clearly understood by all. Yet, its mere expressiveness does not qualify it for 
artw ork status. Pleasure is not afforded by any expression or evocation of any emotion. Indeed, an 
intensely expressive work may be of disvalue as art precisely because of what is expressed or the way it 
is expressed.
The recognition of the im portant inter-relations between what is m eant and the way it is 
expressed dictates that it is just as im portant that w hat is expressed is valuable. If how something is 
expressed is inseparable from and partly constitutive of what is expressed, then the w orth of the work 
as art appears to rest just as much upon the value of what is said. For example, the expression of naive 
emotions m ars the value of David Copperfield as art, rather than enhancing it. Some of Dickens' 
passages are almost unbearable in their sentim entality, giving expression to the crassest 'poor but
Peter Fuller, Seeing Through Berger (London: The Claridge Press, 1988), p. 25. For a more philosophically 
sophisticated articulation of the same point see Michael Podro's "On Depiction And The Golden Calf" in A. Hanison 
(ed.). Philosophy and the Visual Arts (Boston: D. Reidel, 1987), pp. 3-22.
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honest folk' sentiments. It is despite these expressive aspects, rather than because of them, that one 
enjoys Dickens' novel as art. These sentiments are disvaluable merely because they are expressed. If, 
however, these sentiments were meant as a reflection of how a particular character in the novel views 
the w orld, thus reflecting his simplistic outlook, then it w ould be a different m atter. Thus in H ard  
Times the cold calculative and simplistic world view of Mr. Grad grind is aptly expressed and revealed 
to be inadequate, thus enhancing the value of the novel as art. But in David Copperfield the 
sentimental, patronising view of the suffering and therefore virtuous poor is given expression as a sound 
appreciation of the world. Thus it is a key manifestation of the understanding m otivating the work. In 
such a case, where the expression is inadequate to or at odds with what such people would be like, then 
rather than enhancing the value of the work as art the expression mars it.
It is a necessary part of an artw ork being expressive that in the creation, engagem ent w ith and 
reaction to artworks our feelings are typically engaged. Emotions are not merely consequent upon but a 
constitutive part of our experience with artworks, and it is here, the expressivist argues, that the value 
of art lies. Thus art can be distinguished from philosophy or scientific theory, which are a m atter of 
non-expressive propositional content. The semi-opaque nature of the particular art forms, genres and 
conventions necessarily shape the nature of the expression, some being more open to the expression of 
certain features than others. How something is expressed transforms, modifies and partly constitutes 
what is expressed and it is through the m anipulation of the media, forms and genres of art that the 
nature of expression develops in art. Hence an expressive artw ork constitutes m uch more than the 
propositional or cognitive content communicable in a paraphrase. Thus the expressive theorist claims to 
make sense of the fact that, in art, the way som ething is portrayed is as im portant as w hat is 
represented. That is, artworks, properly speaking, afford pleasure through their expressive shaping 
and communication of the object portrayed. Remove the expressive features of art and what was 
communicated is immediately impoverished and emasculated, reduced to mere cognitive paraphrase.
Yet, even then the expressivist can only capture an attenuated conception of art. Good artworks, 
ranging from Brechtian theatre to cubist portraits, may preclude the involvem ent of our emotions in 
engaging w ith them as art. It is not just that the cognitive content of artw orks is central to them as art. 
Rather, the value of a w ork 's cognitive content does not rest wholly upon the extent to w hich it 
enhances a work's expressive value. The appropriateness of the way something is expressed is not just a 
m atter of harmony with w hat is being expressed. Rather, it is crucial to the pleasure we derive not only 
that concerns of expression and coherence are considered, but that the meaning and significance of what 
is potrayed is considered. A w ork 's value cannot depend wholly upon the extent to which w hat is 
expressed coheres w ith the way it is expressed. For example, the artistic value of M arinetti's work, 
and futurism  generally, is prom oted by the inter-tw ining of their original pictorial style, expressing 
rapid, dynamic movement and their vision of the machine led future. Nevertheless, the pleasure we 
derive from these works as art is m arred to the extent they express a Fascistic understanding of the
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world: that is, a glorification of macliines, technology, speed and a false aestheticization of war. The 
cognitive content of a work, as such, may mar or prom ote the delight we may properly take in it. This 
suggests, that we should look to the kind of cognitive value artworks afford, in order to explain the 
pleasures we take in art.
Section 4: Cognitivism.,
Naturally enough, Monroe Beardsley has argued that any form of cognitivism m ust be false 
because either a work tells us about things, the world, which entails a referential function, or it does 
not, in which case the work cannot be about anything. If reference is a necessary condition for cognition, 
how can abstract works be art? For abstract art carmot refer to, let alone inform our perception of, the 
world."^^ Nelson Goodman responded by arguing reference is essential in art and that abstract art does 
so, at least by virtue of exemplification."^^ It may be protested that Goodman does not commit himself 
to an account of art's  value. How ever, as Dickie has pointed out, G oodm an in fact suggests an 
instrum entalist theory, for w hich art's  value lies in the production of an experience based upon 
cognitive efficacy
Goodman explicates the notion of exemplification using a swatch as an example. A swatch is a 
sample of cloth one would be shown in a tailor's outfitters. The sample is itself, and thus it exemplifies, 
the cloth from which a suit can be made. However, only certain properties of the suit material are 
exemplified. After all, not every property of the swatch is relevant to it as a sample. For example, the 
size and edging of the sample are redundant in terms of reference: they tell us nothing about the 
properties the suit will have. Conversely, the colour, pattern and constitution of the m aterial do refer. 
Thus, Goodm an argues, certain things can refer to others through exemplification, i.e. by virtue of 
possessing the self same properties. Abstract artw orks are, he suggests, cases of self-exemplification. 
They exemplify the properties they themselves possess; that is, they are self-referring, both swatch 
and cloth. Indeed one of the defining features of a much wider range of post-modern art is often taken to 
be a high degree of playful self-awareness. A rtw orks are supposedly constantly engaged in self­
referral at various levels. This is, of course, not a feature unique to postmodernism, as can be seen from
Monroe Beardsley, "Languages of Art and Art Criticism", Vol. 12, No. 1, 1978, pp. 95-118.
Nelson Goodman, Languages o f Art (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Mcrrill, 1968), and his "Reply to Beardsley", 
Erkenntnis, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1978, pp. 169 - 173.
George Dickie's observation is made in Evaluatitig Art (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), Chapter 6, 
pp. 101-113. However, Dickie falsely attributes the notion that this is an aesthetic experience to Goodman. Nelson 
Goodman's remarks on value can be found in his iMnguages of Art (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), pp. 255- 
265, and "When is Art?" in Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978), pp. 57-70.
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Tristram Shandy or Northanger /Uj/jci/. Thus it is, that the cognitive features of a work, and self- 
exemplification in particular, are, it is argued by Goodman, constitutive of art's status and value.
But Goodman doesn't tell us how to establish w hich properties are self-exemplifying. Say one 
is looking at three indistinct rectangles of blue from the opposite end of an art gallery; a colour sample, 
a canvas, and a patch where the decorator has started to paint the wall.^^ Goodman's criteria don't 
explain why we should regard the painting as exem plifying the properties it possesses and thus 
referring whilst the painted wall does n o t Exemplification cannot provide sufficient information to 
discrim inate between these objects appropriately, thus it cannot be the central value of art. Goodman 
could reply that the relevant inform ation depends upon appropriately understanding the context and 
practices of art. The conventions of art-m aking and art-reception establish which properties are self- 
exemplifying. Thus the context determines which properties are relevant or not, such as the weight of 
the frame, and thus the value of the work.
More significantly though, as Dickie goes on to argue, exemplification cannot be the only or 
ultim ate arbiter of value. This is because over and  above the process of exemplification, we value 
certain features more then others. Two abstracts sim ilar in all respects except their colour may be 
valued differently: we have good reason to think that a work in m eridian blue is of greater aesthetic 
value than one in drab, m uddy brown.-"'* On G oodm an's flawed analysis, both artw orks would be 
accorded the same value. Yet though both works may seif-exemplify, we would actually value one as 
art more because of the difference in aesthetic value. There is nothing in the nature of being a symbol 
and having reference, that precludes an  artw ork being of value independently  of its referen tia l 
relation. Beauty may be incidental to an icon's religious function, as a referent for contemplation. Yet its 
aesthetic features would certainly enhance its value as art. Furthermore, the aesthetic features mav 
add to the cognitive value of the work, through symbolising and manifesting virtue in beauty. Thus, it 
may be disvaluable for an icon to render someone morally adm irab le aesthetically  d ispleasing. 
Therefore, the mere process of reference does not exhaust cognitive value. After all, what is ac tually  
referred to and the way this is done so can and does affect the value of the work.
It m ight be thought that Goodman's cognitivism insufficiently captures the role of the emotions 
in art. Indeed, it seems unable to m ake any sense at all in our ascribing em otional predicates to 
artw orks. However, it is typical of our discourse regarding art that we talk in term s of emotions, 
feelings and moods. For example, the pleasure afforded by horror films and tragedy is appropriately 
explained by our experiencing of fear, sadness or despair as pleasurable. However, Goodman would 
defend his claim by arguing that the emotions function cognitively. Thus, his cognitivist view actually
See George Dickie, Evaluating Art (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), Chapter 6, pp. 107-109. The 
example here is an adapted and simplified version of one Dickie discusses with more Dantoesque objects.
'"’ * ibid., pp. 110-1II.
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embraces the emotions. Thus our fear is directed tow ard the formal object, the fearful: in coming to 
appreciate an object as fearful we come to fear it. Hence our emotions arise in relation to and thus as a 
constitutive part of what we imagine. That we are scared of or horrified by w hat is depicted is because 
of the threatening or horrific nature of what is represented, whether we are dealing w ith the actual 
invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union in 1968 or the fictional Invasion of the Body 
SnatchersS^
Thus the cognitivist can account for cases where we criticise an artwork because it fails to evoke 
the feelings which are or would be appropriate to the represented state of affairs. Thus, for example, 
although Peter Greenaway's films are clever, cognitively dense and aesthetically pleasing, they fail 
as great art precisely because they fail to engage the appropriate emotions. For the same reason, if a 
review stated that the critic had remained wholly unm oved by a production of King Lear, one would 
naturally infer that either the production or the critic was appalling. If one justifiably esteemed the 
critic's judgement, one would bet on the former. This is not to say that all artworks must engage or arouse 
our emotions. For example, Brechtian theatre's value lies in the very fact that it works against our 
emotional engagement. However, in Brecht's work, the emotional distance serves to heighten the 
work's cognitive value. It foregrounds the constructed nature of both the work itself and of ourselves as 
socio-political animals. Thus, by precluding our em otional engagem ent, B recht's w ork explores 
particular interests and concerns, thus enhancing the work's overall cognitive value as art. By contrast, 
the emotional numbness of much of Greenaway's work serves only to highlight his failure to explore our 
interests and concerns. Thus G reenaw ay's films, though aesthetically beautiful, fail to evoke an 
appropriate response. Therefore, the lack of an emotional response in Greenaw ay's work diminishes 
the work's cognitive value as art.
If what is expressed is as significant than the way something is expressed, perhaps then th e  
cognitive value of art lies in its representation or expression of truth, i.e. the way the world is or should 
be. The value of the work's aesthetic and expressive features may then depend, at least in part, upon 
the work's representation of the way the w orld is or ought to be. After all we do take pleasure in the 
representation of appearances and what we take to be reality, so the pleasure we take in art may arise 
from its representation of the world. To dismiss this thesis on the grounds that we appreciate artw orks 
with opposed understandings of the world, or by citing Dante's Divine Cotnedy as great art, though its 
theological understanding  of the w orld is untenable, is too quick. Still, there w ould seem to be 
something to it, because we would seem to value artworks less as art w here they m anifest a flawed 
understanding of the world. Thus one might suggest, as Peter Adams does, that Nazi art is incapable of
See Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Mcrrill, 1968), Chapter VI.4, pp. 245-252.
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being great precisely because of its moral corruption: its inability to represent true moral ideals whilst 
glorifying or manifesting as good fundamentally evil ones.^-^
When we talk of representing the truth or the real world in relation to art, we often think of 
particular styles and genres in various m edia which are typically grouped under the headings of 
realism or naturalism. Realism brings to m ind figurative painting in classical three point perspective, 
the novels of Dickens or Zola and the films of Renoir or David Lean. Now, critics are often dismissive of 
particular realist styles and tend to make exaggerated claims, on this basis, that realism, the idea 
that art may truly represent the w orld, is a myth. Tw entieth century art is often seen as valuably 
breaking w ith  the self-imposed constraints of realism, to explore freer, more artistic forms. As an 
argument, as distinct from polem ic in favour of particu lar styles, this is hopeless. That Ulysses 
radically breaks with a particular realist style and tradition in novels does not preclude Joyce's work 
from representing the way the world is. Indeed, Joyce's stream of consciousness writing is often praised 
on this basis when contrasted with the 'artificial' conventions of pre-m odern novelists. Yet, realism 
cannot be such tout court, but only in virtue of some respect or other. For example, since it is necessarily in 
two dim ensions, a pain ting  cannot be w holly realistic. N onetheless, it may aim  at verid ical 
representation in some respect.
It is often assum ed, falsely, that Nelson G oodm an exploded the 'm y th ' of realism . Yet 
Languages of Art does not deny the possibility of realism. Rather, it locates our sense of realism in our 
habituation to certain representational styles, as opposed to some absolute correspondence to reality. 
The touchstone of realism is not some natural fidelity to or quantity of inform ation about the world. 
Rather, for Goodman, it is a m atter of how easily the conceptual scheme used is com prehended as a 
representation. This is dependent upon how stereotyped the mode of representation is and how 
commonplace the use of its labels are. Thus, for Goodman, realism is relative because it is "determ ined 
by the system of representation standard for a given culture or person at a given time."-"'** Despite the 
failure of certain semioticians and deconstructionists to grasp the point, it does not follow from the 
necessary conventionalisation of our perception  an d  represen ta tion  of reality that all w ays of 
perceiving are equally sound.-"'-"' Even given radical conventionalisation, it is still possible for art to 
represent truths concerning our world. For truth, on Goodman's conception, is now relative to a world, the  
latter being fixed by our perceptions, cognitions and desires.^*' Thus we may get pleasure from having
See Stuart Hampshire, Innocence and Evil (London: Penguin, 1989), pp. 66-78, for an argument to suggest the 
world understanding promoted by Nazism has not one one redeeming feature.
Nelson Goodman, iMUguages o f Art (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), Chapter 1.8, p. 37.
The leading figures of the respective schools both make this assumption, see Jacques Derrida's Of Gratmnatology, 
tr. G. Spivak, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976), and Umberto Eco's Semiotics and the Philosophy 
o f Language (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984).
See Nelson Goodman, "When is Art?" in tVay.v of World Making (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978), pp. 57-70.
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the way we perceive confirmed or extended by art, which could partly explain the outrage at and then 
glorification of cubism. It was only w hen people became habituated to the shifting, fragm entary 
representations of cubism, that they could derive pleasure and thus value from the works as art. Thus 
Picasso was right to tell G ertrude Stein that although her portrait d idn 't look like her at the time he 
finished it, in time it would come to do so.
Certain perceptual system s and artistic styles will prove to be better, more appropriate and 
fruitful than others in various respects. So perhaps, as Gombrich suggests, our pleasure in art lies in the 
perceptual cognitive fit between the conceptual scheme the viewer brings to bear, that of the artist and 
the way the world is represented.^^ However, the cognitive pleasures of art do not merely concern the 
w orld 's appearances but, furthermore, the expression or representation of more profound truths. Thus, 
not only is pleasure afforded in art by confirming the way we perceive but by opening out new ways of 
perceiving and representing our worlds. Thus the displacement of one's norm al categorisations of the 
world may be of value, through developing sounder ways of perceiving and understanding the world. It 
must be realised that the mere subversion of our normal categorisations and understandings of the world 
may afford little pleasure, no significance and great disvalue. Empty meaningless subversions, from 
defaecation to w ild dadaist or expressionist rantings, are more likely to provoke displeasure and 
disgust rather than appreciation. Categorial displacement is only of value in art if it promotes insight 
into our world.
But what kind of truth could art possibly lay claim to? It m ight be thought that any claims to 
tru th  on the part of art m ust be trivial. If artw orks are merely particular representations of possible 
and impossible worlds, then whether they are significant or not will depend upon their theoretical 
relation to the actual world. How useful artworks are, will thus depend upon the relation of the claims 
made to fields of enquiry such as philosophy, psychology or natural science. Only reflective enquiry can 
render meaningful and consider the status of claims that may contingently be m ade in artworks. Thus 
the m eaningful claims put forw ard, for example, w ithin Sartre 's novels should more properly be 
considered as such within the sphere of philosophy. The notions of radical freedom, bad faith and so o i 
should be subjected to rigorous philosophical analysis in order to test their possible truth. How they 
are represented in a novel can have no bearing on their truth.
Philosophical claims can certainly be represented in artworks: for example, how Mathieu acts 
in his particular dilemmas, w hether to marry, w hether to look after his m other or go off to fight for 
France, represents a particular vision of existentialism . The way Sartre represents this vision may 
afford us great pleasure, but its significance cannot lie in the work as art. The propositions expressed in 
art are better and more appropriately articulated in the relevant practice or activity to which the
E. H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion (Oxford: Phaidon Press, 1977), especially Part III, pp. 154-245.
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hypothetical claim relates. Therefore, a lthough they may enhance a w ork 's aesthetic value, the 
meaningful propositions art offers us cannot properly belong to art per se. This picture underlies the 
aesthetic conception of art. Art cannot be properly concerned with meaning or truth, therefore it is an 
autonom ous, herm etically sealed activity w hich is cognitively trivial and concerned only w ith 
aesthetic features.^^ When engaging w ith artw orks we properly delight only in their beautiful or 
skilful representation of various states of affairs.
Indeed, it is on the basis of this understanding of art that both the aesthete and the puritan rest 
upon common ground. At best, works which contingently put forward meaningful claims may be valuable 
by virtue of their expression. At worst, they may be positively disvaluable, to the extent they are 
deceptive. Hence Plato suggested both art and artists should be escorted from his city state.^'^ For a 
puritanical Platonist:
"poetry has no serious value or claim to truth, and we shall w arn its hearers to fear 
its effects on the constitution of their inner selves, and tell them to adopt the view of 
poetry we have described.
Plato m ight perhaps allow a certain kind of art for reasons akin to the point and purpose of 
religious icons. Through beauty and representation, art may focus the m ind of the devoted spectator 
upon the significance of what is portrayed. Art may thus, for Plato, have an instrum ental value by 
pointing us toward the good. However, to allow any other kind of art w ould be to allow the baser 
elements in us to dominate, overriding the proper control of reason.^' * Certain kinds of art are deceptive 
and thus dangerous because they prom ote the false assum ption that the artw ork affords privileged 
knowledge about what is true and good.^2 Moreover, Plato suggests, art panders to our basest instincts 
and lower, non-rational part of our nature, perhaps in the form of immediate, vicarious gratification. 
Indeed, it encourages the identification of wisdom  or know ledge w ith w hat pleases. The only thing 
which would warrant our pleasure in art is precisely w hat it lacks, a significant relation to truth.
See Jerome Slolnitz’s “On the Cognitive Triviality of Art”, British Journal o f Aestbelics, Vol. 30, No. 3, 1992. 191-200, for an argument of this kind.
See Plato's Republic , tr. D. Lee, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), Part 01, Section I, p. 157,1. 398, where he 
states certain poets or artists are to be honoured, but firmly escorted beyond the walls of the city state.
ibid.. Part X, Section 3, pp. 438-439, I. 608.
For an idiosyncratic interpretation of Plato on art see Iris Murdoch. The Fire and The Sun: Why Plato Banished 
the Artists (London: Chatto and Windus, 1977), where it is argued that good art, for Plato, involves the 
contemplation of that which is eternal and not subject to the subjection of our wanton human self.
'^2 Plato, The Republic, tr. D. Lee, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), Part X, Section 1, pp. 426-431 1 598d- 602b.
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Hence, for Plato, art's false charm can only m islead. The puritanical disreputability  of art derives 
from its capacity to move and engage audiences regarding non-existent or false events and characters. 
Therefore art serves only to fan our base emotions and desires, watering "them when they ought to be 
left to wither, and makes them control us when we ought, in the interests of our own greater welfare and 
happiness, to control them."^^
The aesthete's diagnosis of a rt's  nature is identical to the puritanical conception, but w ith 
inverse consequences. Rather than holding art is a w orrying vehicle of deception, the aestheticist 
argues that it renders art no more than an innocent and pleasant distraction. A rt's 'tru th ' is indeed 
w ithout significance, but this realisation is considered sufficient to render art harmless. Thus art's  
proper value can only derive from the pleasure afforded by the work's expression or representation. Art 
has no rightful claim to a form of knowledge and cannot be subjugated to the service of truth, morals or 
political ideals. Hence, for Jerome Stolnitz, it is how the message is conveyed, the methods, procedures 
and autonom ous activities of art itself, that m atters in art.*^ "* Stolnitz suggests that even in the most 
likely historical cases, art's influence cannot be show n to have had a significant impact upon people’s 
thoughts and actions. Art may contingently be a conveyer or facilitator of ideas and understanding. But 
these are not the proper concern of art, which can only be a form of transient relief from life. Art cannot, 
for Stolnitz, be an edifying force which effects life.
As with the puritans, so too w ith Stolnitz; there can be no significant artistic truth. For because 
artworks we value highly may contradict each other, and confirmation or refutation is precluded as 
relevant, art is reduced to trading in communal platitudes. Art is an end and of value in itself aside and 
isolable from the use and application to which it is put. As Oscar Wilde w ould have us believe, 'a rt is 
useless and that is its point'. The lack of a driving purpose is thus conceived as art's glory. Even where 
significant truths are revealed in art, they are not truths proper to art per se:
"None of its truths are peculiar to art. All are proper to some extra artistic sphere of 
the great world. So considered, there are no artistic truths. Not one."^^
The polarisation between the puritan  and aesthete results from opposite evaluations of the 
pleasure involved. For the puritan  all pleasure is prima facie bad, unless rendered subservient to th e  
prom otion of truth. For the aestheticist, pleasure is prima facie good and necessarily innocent if there is
ibid.. Section 3, p. 437,1. 606d.
Jerome Stolnitz, "On the Historical Triviality of Art", British Journal o f Aesthetics, Vol. 31, No. 3. 1991, pp. 
195-202, and "On the Cognitive Triviality of Art", British Journal o f Aesthetics, Vol. 32, No. 3, 1992, pp. 191- 
200.
Jerome Stolnitz, "On the Cognitive Triviality of Art", British Journal o f Aesthetics, Vol. 32, No. 3. 1992, p. 
198.
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no significant relation to truth or falsehood. But both conceptions of the value of art rest upon the same 
diagnosis, that what is said is separable from and not properly related to the way it is said. Only the 
means of representation or expression are thus held to be the true province of art per sc. Fundam entally 
art is thought to bear no particular relationship to truth or significance and that is held to be its virtue 
or vice respectively.
Stolnitz's argument partly trades upon a crude invocation of historical explanation. In order to 
argue that history shows art has no significant cognitive or edifying influence, Stolnitz challenges us to 
point to a case where engagement with an artw ork directly caused certain actions to take place. Art can, 
he suggests, be explained as deriving from and thus confirming ideas of the day. However, it cannot 
produce any distinctive ideas of its own. Therefore, he concludes, art m ust be devoid of any significant 
relation to truth and action. Yet, we can object, no cultural practice centrally related to understanding, 
including religious or philosophical argum ent, bears such a straightforw ard relation to action. The 
relationship of any given cultural practice to action in part depends upon how it is understood both as a 
practice consisting of various activities and in relation to the culture at large. The practice of 
philosophy or art more generally feed off and in turn modify and alter perceptions, sentiments and 
ideas. The relation is symbiotic, thus the causal arrow  cannot just run one way. Just as a pliilosophical 
world view may filter dow n and modify an accepted understanding of the world, so too with insights 
revealed in artworks.
Furthermore, it is not so obvious that cases of art influencing the general culture and thought of 
a form of life are hard to come by. For example, in the Renaissance, w here art first began to flower 
outside the walls of religion, key ideas were pu t forw ard by poets as well as theologians. The new 
architecture changed the scale of building, the landscape, to a hum an size, manifesting the guiding 
ideal of m an's moral dignity. Through Alberti, and more im portantly Michelangelo, the body became 
transfigured from a vessel of shame to an expression of noble, hum an and thus Godly perfection. Indeed, 
it m ight be argued, as Kenneth Clark puts it, that "the most profound thought of the time was not 
expressed in words, but in visual i m a g e r y A r t 's  valuation of the poetic, pictorial space, and freeing 
of the subject in relation to the object depicted, m odified and developed a new  culture, a new 
understanding of m an and of his relationship to the world. Stolnitz forgets that it is the understanding, 
developed through artistic, religious, moral and other cultural practices, which frames and gives point 
to enquiry and questioning. The responses, aspirations and ends of people must be understood within a 
cultural framework, which may itself be partly constituted and modified by people's engagement with 
a rt.
U nderlying S toln itz 's accusations of the historical and m oral triv ia lity  of a r t is the 
presum ption that it is only ideas, understood in terms of propositional tru th  and falsity, which effect
Kenneth Clark, Civilisation (London; BBC and John Murra) , 1969), Chapter 5, p. 126.
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hum an action. Ideas may contingently appear in artw orks, thus art may accidentally affect hum an 
understanding. But it is not proper to the realm and purpose of art that it give rise to such ideas. 
U nderstanding is conceived as fundam entally separable from the practice of art and subject to the 
enquiry and questioning of d iscip lines such as psychology or philosophy w hich em pirically or 
conceptually test, confirm or refute relevant ideas. Since art allows contradictory ideas and world 
views embodied in its works irrespective of their tru th  or falsity, then ideas m ust be irrelevant to and 
separable from the point and purpose of art.
A t one level this crude claim is a reform ulation of B eardsley's m isplaced objection to 
cognitivism, and on the same grounds will not do. Not only do we value cognitive features in art in a 
way which is irreducible to the merely aesthetic, but cognitive value itself is not reducible to truth. Just 
as we value philosophical works which contradict each other, so too in art; in terest, originality , 
density and thematic developm ent are all partly constitutive of som ething's overall cognitive value. 
We may think Kant's philosophy profoundly m istaken, whilst consistently holding him to be a great 
philosopher. Similarly, we can value artworks which afford distinct understandings of the world and 
are illuminating in different ways. Furthermore, as argued in relation to expression, the representation 
of people and ideas in art is in a significant sense inseparable from the characters or ideas themselves. 
The rendering forms a constitutive part of what is to be imagined in one's engagement with the artw ork. 
W hat is depicted in art bears a particular and distinctive inter-relation to the way it is depicted. 
Through representing hum an dram as, conflicts and trium phs, art engages our emotions, interest and 
entertains us. Moreover, artworks may thus represent concrete situations and persons in terms of which 
we can view the world. The views of the w orld thus afforded may themselves be productive of new 
insights into it. Therefore, it would seem, art can teach us truths about the world. They may engage, 
refine or modify our understanding of the human world. .As Roger Scruton argues, (though the emphasis 
upon redemptive experience seems misplaced):
'T o  possess a culture is not only to possess a body of knowledge or expertise; it is not 
sim ply to have accum ulated facts, references and theories. It is to possess a 
sensibility, a response, a way of seeing things, which is in some special way 
redemptive. Culture is not a m atter of academic knowledge but of participation. And 
participation changes not merely your thoughts and beliefs but your perceptions and
emotions."^2
O ne's sensibilities, the sentim ents and values from  w hich action springs constitute an 
understanding of life. This may both modify and be modified by, but is not reducible to, theoretical 
knowledge, which involves propositional tru th  claims. U nderstanding others requires not merely
Roger Scruton, Essays on Dover Beach (Manchester; Carcanct, 1992), p. 106.
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knowledge of the collection of truth claims they make about the world. Rather, more im portantly, it 
involves grasping their concepts, emotions and values. Without tliis form of understanding appropriate 
to the hum an world, as distinct from the understanding appropriate to scientific understanding,, we 
cannot see the point and purpose of other people's actions. Understanding from within a person's reasons 
for acting, her beliefs, desires, affections and so on, is what enables us to see the kind of person she is 
and her conception of the world she lives in. In art the material, media and conventions manipulated to 
represent or express an object, form a constitutive part of the nature of that object, as it understood to be 
in our engagement with it. Thus the pleasure appropriate to art must bear some relation to the nature of 
our engagement with it as art.
The real question  then, is w hether art bears a significant, d istinctive relation to our 
understanding and the claims such a form of understanding may be entitled to make. This suggests that 
an artw ork  may be of value to the extent it engages and deepens one's cognitive and emotional 
sensibilities, and the pleasure afforded is related to or invested in our hum an interests and concerns. 
That is, art's distinctive pleasures and value may lie in the imaginative understandings of others lives, 
ourselves and our world that artw orks may afford. For, it w ould seem, art may intim ate or reveal 
im portant insights about the world, others and oneself. An artw ork may afford us a glimpse of what a 
particular world is or would be like, what it does or would feel like to move within this or that kind of 
universe. Such an awareness m ight encourage us to see the actual world in a different, more adequate 
light and consequently effect our thoughts and actions. Retrospectively, we may perhaps see and be 
able to give reasons as to why the understanding afforded by the artw ork is sounder than our prior 
understanding. Yet we may, perhaps, only have arrived at this understanding through engaging with 
an artwork.
This suggests that w hat is central to art concerns the imagination. For through engaging the 
imagination, a w ork may enable us to grasp, through the im aginary experience, w hat the w orld 
represented w ould be like. If this is true, then art may prom ote understand ing  in a way more 
fundam ental than propositional knowledge or theories of truth could. Stolnitz's challenge would then 
be rendered redundant and art may be proved to be of the profoundest hum an import. The imagination in 
art may deepen the nuances of our emotional lives and understanding and its value may lie in this as 
m uch as it lies in the pleasure the engagem ent of our imagination itself may afford. The skilful and 
knowing construction of the work itself, its aesthetic, cognitive and expressive qualities and features 
are all characteristically valued in art. Yet the prim ary value of art seems to lie elsewhere: th e  
pleasures which arise from the deepening of our emotional and cognitive sensibilities. Art may, it is 
suggested, extend our sensibilities and understanding through its engagement of our imagination. Thus it 
is to an investigation of the concept of imagination, w hat is involved when we imagine, that we must 
now turn.
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CHapUr 3
Imagination.
'Only in m en's imagination does every truth find an effective 
and undeniable existence. Imagination, not invention, 
is the supreme m aster of art, as of life."
Joseph Conrad
IntrocCuction.
Historically im agination has been thought to play a central role in hum an experience and 
judgement.* It has been both lauded and derided; praised as a guide or contributor to tru th  and 
denigrated as a bewitching distraction away from it. The first account of im agination's role in art 1 
consider is that advanced by Roger Scruton. For Scruton, the imagination, significantly conceived, is not 
required to unify our ord inary  perception, experience and thought. Rather, Scruton argues, the 
im agination goes beyond mere belief and cannot concern w hat we know about the real w orld. For 
Scruton, it is inappropriate to ask whether w hat is imagined is true or not. The appeal here lies in the 
distinction between the real, what is true of the actual world, and what is im agined. For Scruton, what 
we actually experience and know ought not to be confused with the merely imaginary. A great virtue of 
Scruton's account is that it captures the irreducible conjunction of elements in imagination; aspects of 
both thought and sensuous experience. However, Scruton's account is ultimately flawed. Scruton fails to 
allow that what one imagines may make essential reference to belief and w hat we know. After all, it 
may be a constitutive part of what 1 imagine, that 1 believe or know it to be true.
1 then move on to consider Kendall Walton's conception of imagination's role in our engagement 
w ith artworks and representations generally. Walton distinguishes imagining propositions, imagining 
that p, from im agining things or experiencing something. The significance of W alton's account lies in 
the analysis he provides of our spectatorial role in engaging w ith artw orks and representations 
generally. However, a fundam ental flaw of W alton's account lies in his insistence that our emotional 
responses in engaging w ith artw orks m ust themselves be make-believe. We will see that, in fact, we 
may feel genuine emotions not only consequent upon, but as a constitutive part of, our im aginings. 
Nevertheless, W alton's general account can accom m odate this m odification. A more problem atic
* See J. M. Cooking's Imagination (London: Rontledge, 1991), and James Engell, The Creative Imagination 
(Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), which trace the history and evolution of the concept. See 
Richard Kearney's The Wake o f Imagination (London: Hutchinson, 1988), for a pessimistic assessment of the place 
of imagination in the modem world and postmodern culture.
assumption for lus general theory, is the claim that all im aginings are necessarily de se. As we shall 
see, we can and do imagine things w ithout having to im agine that we are internal to the w orld 
imagined. Furtherm ore, Walton construes fiction in terms of artefacts whose job it is to engage and 
prescribe our imaginings. However, fictionality does not flow automatically from an object's proper 
function being to prescribe imaginings. Rather, it flows from whether what is imagined is to be properly 
understood as asserted or treated merely as i f  it were asserted.
The results of this critical survey will go much of the way to helping us develop a sound account 
of imagination and its role in art. We will find that the im agination irreducibly involves elements of 
both thought and sensuous experience. Imagination cannot be reduced merely to entertained thought. 
Furthermore, it will become clear that we may also respond emotionally in and as a consequent of our 
imaginings. It is also true that any account of im agination hoping to claim adequacy, must recognise 
that we may essentially im agine w hat we know to be true. This chapter paves the way for the idea 
that the role of the im agination in both art and our everyday lives enables us to understand, in a deep 
way, both ourselves and others. Thus, paving the way for the idea that art's  prim ary significance lies 
in its peculiar capacity to prescribe and enhance such deep understanding.
Section 1: SBasic distinctions.
Firstly, we must recognise some basic distinctions that any account of im agination m ust remain 
adequate to. We need to distinguish and account for different senses of imagination; in relation to 
perception, perceptual imagining, imagining states of affairs and creativity. Indeed if 'im agination' is 
more than a loose association of uses, contrary to w hat Strawson suggests, then what we identify as its 
prim ary sense had better adequately explain them all.2 We must be careful to distinguish ordinary 
perception from perceptually im agining. One could be tem pted to th ink  this is equivalen t to a 
distinction between ordinary  and  highly in terpretative perception. The basic thought w ould be 
something like the following; since seeing a m irage or having an hallucination involves perceiving 
something which is not there, it must be a case of imagining. However, this m ust be wrong. Perceptual 
experiences which involve m istaking illusions, or one thing for som ething else, are actually cases of 
misperception. We should not endorse a conception which, through equating every case of misperception 
w ith imagining, precludes the possibility of misperceiving.
Consider a common enough case of misperception: you walk into a dark  room and see a shape in 
the corner. Looking closer, on the basis of various discernible features, you perceive it to be a crouching
87 I
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2 P. F. Strawson, "Imagination and Perception", in his Freedom and Resentment (London: Methuen, 1974), pp. 45- 
65.
figure. Yet, when you bravely switch the light on, fearing the worst, the shape is revealed to be the 
stool that is always there. Based upon the m inim al perceptual cues afforded by the dim  light, you 
m isperceived the stool as a thief. A rarer case of false perceptual belief, m ight be the am putee who 
vividly 'feels' his toe itching. Before he remembers what has happened, he may try to scratch his non­
existent foot. He misinterprets, and is thus deceived by, the perceptual sensations he felt. As we have 
seen, ordinary perception involves construing perceptual cues under a particular form. It involves 
making hypotheses about what exactly the perceived evidence is evidence for. Thus, perception just is 
the constructive interpretation of our experience. Therefore, even cases w here the w orld 's perceptual 
clues are radically indeterm inate, or m isconstrued, are still cases of ordinary perception. Highly 
interpretative perception is still the constructive interpretation of perceptual cues; there are just more 
gaps to fill in. Ordinary perception itself goes beyond w hat is given, to render our experience of the 
world as coherent and intelligible as possible.
Now, although the mechanism involved may be the same, perceptually imagining something is 
a different kind of case. This is because the objects of imagining are created in a way in wliich ordinary 
sensations are not. In the im agined case there may be nothing we actually perceive to discrim inate 
between. This is why one's own description of what one imagines may be privileged in a way in which 
one's description of what one sees is not.^ My report that 1 imagine Churchill is true just because of w h a t 
I im agine seeing. Contrastingly, w hether 1 actually see a tree or not depends not just upon w hat I 
perceive the object as, but upon w hat it actually is. Perceptual im agining does not involve asserting 
one's perceptual experience to be true of the world. Rather, one merely entertains visual images as if 
they were. 1 might look up and imagine I see a face in a cloud.
This is not to deny that perceptual imagining may be based upon perceptual cues afforded by 
the world. I might look at a picture and imagine that 1 see Gertrude Stein before me. Of course, I might 
have misperceived the picture marks. Perceptual imagining may be grounded upon perceptual cues, 
which can be subject to misinterpretation. However, I am denying that the question of misperception 
arises in relation to what is imagined. If 1 perceptually imagine a face in the cloud, unless 1 am  sadly 
confused, 1 do not think that there is a question about w hether there really is a face there or not. I see 
the cloud as if it were a face, 1 entertain the image, without asserting that the im age's content holds of 
the world. Nevertheless, the im age's content does have a relation to the w orld, hence we 'see' the 
content in the picture. Thus, what 1 perceptually imagine may depend upon what 1 perceive. Therefore 1 
may 'see' G ertrude Stein in the picture, and that does depend upon actual relations to the world: 
namely the paint marks and conventions involved. Perceptual imagining then is intimately linked to, 
though not identifiable with, imagistic imagining.
^ Sec Anthony Kenny, Metaphysics o f Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 118.
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It might, of course, be denied that there is im agistic imagining in any significant sense. For 
example, Dennett has argued that all imagining is equivalent to non-pictorial description."* There are, 
according to such views, no mental images. Incompleteness is thus a matter of the am ount of information 
afforded by the relevant description. But why, then, is imagistic imagining perspectival in the way 
ordinary perception is? 1 may see and perceptually imagine the moral philosophy departm ent from a 
particular viewpoint. Thus, because of the mental imagery involved, my description of the philosophy 
departm ent may be lim ited to this particular view point. But if perceptual im agining was really 
reducible to description, unhindered by mental imagery, it would be hard to see why this should be so.
A related point, is that we may imagine something better than we are able to describe it. Thus, 
when trying to remember something, we may have to bring the image to mind. In order to relate w hat a 
particular sign said, I may have to visualise it. 1 may well be able to imagine my favourite painting 
much better than 1 am able to describe it. Indeed, both perceptual im agining and imagistic imagining 
appear to be similar to knowledge by acquaintance in certain ways. Conversely, my highly inform ative 
description of how a com puter works may well outstrip my capacity to visualise the various processes 
involved. An account which assimilates all imagining to linguistic description can not account for these 
salient aspects of perceptual imaginings. Indeed, it is hard to see how anyone could account for the 
perceptual feel of this kind of im agining w ithou t thereby accepting m ental images. Im agistic 
imagining would seem to involve entertaining sensory presentations by virtue of m ental images. It 
should also be noted that since one is imagining seeing an image, rather than perceptually imagining it, 
imagistic imagining is free of perceptual constraints. The essential contrast though, remains between 
ordinary perception and perceptual imagining. O ur ordinary  perceptual schem ata m ediate the basic 
sense data of our experience: all perception is guided by hypothesis-m aking about the world, based 
upon perceptual cues. By contrast, perceptual imagining involves going beyond what one asserts to be 
there. Thus, perceptually entertaining the face in the clouds cannot be open to the possibility of 
misperception.
We must also be able to distinguish perceptual imagining from im aginings which concern or 
conceive of different states of affairs. The distinction should not preclude imagining what something or 
someone is like from involving perceptual imagining, indeed it may be a crucial constituent part of it. 
However, this sense of imagining would seem to involve a descriptional form of thought. Thus it may be 
akin to, though not reducible to, knowledge by description. What it would be like to be a particular 
person obviously involves imagining over and above merely perceptual imagining or imagining seeing. 
For example, it may include feelings and emotions, as a constitutive part of the im agined experience. 
Furtherm ore, im agining possible and impossible states of affairs m ust be intim ately linked to our
■* D. C. Dennett, “Mental Imagery”, Content and Consciousness, 2nd ed., (London: Routlcdge and Kegan Paul, 
1986), Chapter 6, pp. 132-146.
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understanding. For example, what we imagine it w ould be like to have been Napoleon or Raskolnikov 
depends upon our understanding of both them and their worlds.
It should also be recognised, that im agining states of affairs is com patible w ith imagining 
states of affairs we believe or know to be true. Thus, provided I am not perceiving it now, I can imagine 
that my dog is asleep, the street lights are on and that my car is in the drive. This sense of imagination 
should not be equated with the merely imaginary; w hat necessarily cannot be true. We may imagine 
states of affairs w hich could, in principle, never be true. However, that is not a m atter of the 
im agination's involvement as such. Rather, it is the status of what is im agined which is then at issue: 
w hether something is either logically impossible or fictional. Logically impossible or fictional entities 
are in principle false (though a fictional work about a putative future could, incidentally, turn out to be 
true). What we imagine is far broader than states of affairs which are, in principle, not open to the 
question of truth or falsity. We can imagine what was, is, or could be, the case. A good historian may 
actually imagine what it was like when the Roman Empire collapsed. In trying to understand our own 
situation, we may imagine what other people do or m ight think of us. In trying to decide what to do, 
whether to keep a secret, skip work or make defence cuts, we may have to im agine what the effect of 
our actions may be, in order to appreciate fully their nature
Thus, it seems, the primary sense of im agination should be identified w ith entertaining states 
of affairs. Perceptual and imagistic im agining are distinctive kinds of entertaining states of affairs, as 
they involve entertaining perceptual images. By contrast, being imaginative is not a distinctive kind of 
imagining but, rather, is parasitic upon this sense. To be imaginative is to be creative and original. The 
intuition underlying this usage, is the idea that someone who is creative m ust have entertained many 
possibilities. In order to come to this original solution, she m ust have im agined the effects of this and 
other possibilities open to him. Thus, one m ight display a leap of creative thought in response to a 
scientific problem, a chess m anoeuvre or a philosophical challenge. A problem  may be imaginatively 
solved by dissolving standard  categories and reconstructing them  in the light of new insights. 
A lternatively , an im aginative solution m ight involve creatively extrapolating from aspects of the 
problem usually thought of as irrelevant. An artist’s draw ing can be imaginative in this sense, and thus 
distinct from the mass of others, in uniquely solving or posing an artistic problem. Having sketched 
some fundamental distinctions, we must look to an account which builds upon these insights. One theory 
which promises to develop more fully our understanding of imagination has been articulated by Roger 
Scruton. It is to liis account we must now turn.
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Section 2: Scruton on Imagination.
Roger Scruton's Art and Imagination offers us a carefully delineated  conception of th e  
imagination. Scruton emphasises that there are pre-conceptual inter-sense modalities out of which the 
mind builds up its ideas. Imagination is possible only given the prior basic cognisance of the world, and 
is thus dependent upon our distinct but inter-penetrating sense modalities. The key to Scruton's theory 
involves a distinction between belief and other m odes of thought; all belief, but not all thought, is 
asserted. In judging something, we must believe and thus assert certain things to be true. By contrast, we 
sometimes entertain thoughts which are unasserted. In Kantian terms one could talk of the 'free play' 
of concepts. One is only entertaining thoughts about, rather than asserting thoughts to be true of, the 
w orld. We have before our m inds propositions w hich are merely though t of as possibilities or 
suppositions. It is this kind of process w hich p a r tly  constitutes im agination. The process itself, 
whether the proposition is asserted or not, is independent of the thought content:
"when we imagine something, or tell a story, while being indifferent to its truth, the 
content of our thought is the content of a belief; but the thought process itself is 
independent of this belief.""'
The thought process involved in imagination is distinct from that involved in acquiring beliefs 
and knowledge about the world. In imagining, one thinks of an  object as som ething else in a m anner 
which is indifferent to the tru th  value of w hat is im agined. Thinking of som ething may involve 
entertaining thoughts about it. For example, one may think of a particular friend as a witch. In this 
sense, 'thinking o f involves no essential reference to belief and is truth indifferent. However, the mere 
thinking of possibilities is insufficient to d istinguish  im agination. After all, one can speculate or 
conceive of possibilities w ithout im agining them. So, Scruton argues, the 'th inking  o f  involved in 
imagination should be conceived in a m anner analogous to the way we conceive of 'seeing as'. Thinking 
of my friend as a witch, in one sense, obviously involves more than entertaining a proposition. It has th e  
characteristic of a disposition, rather than an act, in being subject to the will and, though unasserted, 
properly strikes me as particularly apt. Thus, Scruton suggests, conceiving of im agination as just 
unasserted thought, a mere proposition which is entertained as 'fitting' its subject, is too simplistic. We 
should look for an account which is more adequate to the subtle relationship between im aginative 
thoughts and their objects. Nevertheless, it is the core insight of this crude idea that Scruton develops. 
Ultimately, for Scruton, our experience of reality and our imaginary experiences are distinguished in 
terms of whether the experience's sensual, conceptual and emotional content is asserted or known to be
Roger Scruton, Art andImaginalion (Methuen: London, 1974), Chapter 7, p. 89.
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true of the world or not. Scruton conceives of imagining and belief as necessarily involving two distinct 
processes.
Scruton starts by countering the phenomenological refutation of im agery as private mental 
pictures. The standard  objections to this line are threefold: it cannot d istingu ish  imagery from 
sensation, it renders the image a private object about which nothing can be said, and, lastly, it cannot 
account for imagery's intentionality. However, the recognition that imagination is akin to thought, in 
the way suggested above, rebuts these criticisms. The element of thought in imagination allows us to 
distinguish sensation from im agery and allow s for public criteria, so one can determ ine w hether 
something is being pictured. Furthermore, both thought and imagination are m ental activities, though 
doing something imaginatively is not. Thus, since the acts or activities are voluntary, the aspect of 
intentionality can be captured. This is in contrast to belief, which is not voluntary. As with a kind of 
'seeing as', imagination has the characteristic of a disposition or inclination in being subject to the will. 
W hether 1 see the arc of a tree branch as the curvature of a hum an arm, the snout of some mythical 
beast or anything else is up to me: I can change what 1 see it as at will. We can ask someone to imagine a 
particular scene, and it is in this respect that im agination is like, but not identical with, unasserted 
thought:
"Images, like im agination generally, share this feature of subjection to the will.
Forming an image is som ething 1 can do: it is not always som ething 1 suffer or 
undergo."*^
The close relation to unasserted thought, Scruton argues, suggests imagination involves going 
beyond what is believed. Of course, Scruton allows, one may believe something is as it is imagined to be. 
However, Scruton asserts, one cannot know or justifiably think something, which is a m atter of definite 
assertion, and imagine it, which is a speculative thought. Imagining som ething is conceived to be a 
special case of 'thinking of x as y'. Thus it involves two objects: both what is to be imagined, and how, 
under w hat description, it is to be described. Furtherm ore, the descriptions m ust be, in some way, 
appropriate to the object which is to be im agined. As a rational activity, there m ust be a relation 
between w hat and how something is to be imagined. After all, the reason we entertain a proposition 
fundamentally concerns the subject matter.
Having sketched a distinction between im agination and other thought processes, Scruton then 
considers the nature and place of imagery in relation to imagination. Four features of imagery, as w ith 
im agination generally, place it firmly w ithin the realm  of thought. Firstly, it has the intentionality 
characteristic of thought. Hence an image is always of an object seen as something. This is why what
6 ibid., p. 97.
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can be imagined can also be thought of. Secondly, images are objects of im mediate knowledge: what 
image we have before us is immediately known. Thirdly, imagery is subject to the will. Thus, Scruton 
distinguishes the element of thought in imagination from what is involved in dream ing or eidetic after 
images. Lastly, we identify and ascribe imagery in a similar way to thoughts. The prim ary criteria for 
saying someone is imagining or thinking something is verbal: consisting mainly in descriptions offered 
of the relevant thought or image. Conversely, two characteristically sensuous features distinguish 
im agery and im agination from  m erely unasserted  thought. The irreducib le  analogy betw een 
im agination and sensation involves the recognition that both have an  intensity and exact duration. 
Imagery is also publicly describable in the way sensation is. Indeed, we talk about images in ways we 
talk about oiu* genuine sense experiences. If imagery were reducible to mere thought, we could not hope 
to make sense of such talk. The way in which an image is like an experience cannot be given by a 
description of the experience itself.
The imaginative experience itself is irreducible and irreplaceable by description, otherw ise its 
point would be otiose. Imagining, which involves imagery, is what is involved w hen one conjures up a 
putative experience. However, Scruton argues, im agining an experience is essentially distinct from 
knowing what an experience is like. For example, im agery and imagining is held, by Scruton, to be 
essentially distinct from the images of memory. To know what an experience is like, one must have had 
the experience. Only imagery not afforded by experience can be entertained, rather than asserted, of 
the world. As Scruton argued that belief is necessarily distinguished from imagination, so he argues 
that im agery, when it is not a form of rem em bering, is to be distinguished from know ledge by 
acquaintance. Imagining, by definition, must involve going beyond what one has experienced. Of course, 
one may experience something as it was imagined to be. However, one cannot both experience something 
and imagine it or experience it and then imagine it as something one experienced. W hereas 1 previously 
suggested imagination may, in certain cases, be akin to knowledge by acquaintance, Scruton wants to 
distinguish them sharply from each other. Imagination, for Scruton, must involve going beyond what is 
taken to be true of the world. Knowledge by acquaintance, however, concerns some kind of experience of 
just what is taken to be true. As we shall see, the way Scruton opposes them  will cause fundam ental 
problems for his theory.
Scruton rightly recognises the two senses involved in our talk of im agination in perception. 
Firstly, we talk of im agination as the forming of hypotheses for perceptual judgem ent. Imagination in 
this trivial sense concerns the thought laden nature of ordinary perception. O rdinary sense experience 
involves asserted thought and is related to belief, hence it is involuntary and independent of control by 
our thoughts. However, Scruton argues, the distinct and significant sense is unrelated to judgement. This 
kind of perception possesses the m ixture of characteristics from thought and sensation w hich he 
identified in imagery, and is a form of "seeing as'. The element of unasserted thought in 'seeing as' is 
intentional, an object of knowledge, publicly describable, unasserted and subject to the will.
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'Seeing as' also has the sensuous aspects of duration and experience, though it perhaps lacks 
the attribute of vividness. This metaphorical sense, distinct from perceptual hypothesising, involves 
noticing an aspect in a way wliich is not directly related to judgement. This is not a case of merely seeing 
resemblances, which does not involve seeing under an aspect. Conversely, it is not a case of a change in 
aspect. Rather, where previously there was no aspect at all, an aspect daw ns and thus illum inates. 
This kind of'seeing as' goes beyond both w hat is perceptually given and w hat is asserted or believed. 
Furtherm ore, the unasserted thought entertained in w hat is im agined is open to the question of 
'fittingness'. Reason guides and determ ines w hether w hat is seen in the object is appropriate to it. 
Im agination, for Scruton, involves a species of thought whose distinctive features are liable to 
em bodim ent in this kind of experience, in 'seeing as', the thought is not isolable from or describable 
independently of the experience itself. The essential contrast here is, once again, the relation between 
im agination and belief:
"the relation betw een 'seeing  as' and perception m irrors the relation  between 
im agination and belief. 'Seeing as' is like an 'unasserted ' visual experience: it is the 
embodiment of a thought which, if 'asserted ', would amount to a genuine perception, 
just as imagination, if 'asserted', amounts to a genuine belief."^
The thought in imagination is irreducibly sensuous and sui generis. N evertheless, it is the 
unasserted nature of imagination, in particular 'seeing as', which is essential, and, for Scruton, dictates 
the structure of aesthetic experience. This is borne out by the fact that one can give partial descriptions 
of the thought, distinguishable from genuine belief, em bodied in the experience. One can hear and 
should be able to describe the sadness in the music, just as one can see and describe a man in a picture. 
However, there is no fact of the m atter in the way there is when we describe a person as sad. For 
example, two aspects and rival interpretations may be perceived in the first order features of a work, 
both of which may be equally supported by identical descriptions of the work. There can be no question 
here as to which is the right aspect or interpretation;
"In other words, the judgem ent is wholly unlike the interpretation of the feelings and 
emotions of another man, where, however many rival opinions there may be, not more 
than one of them can be right. In the case of the aesthetic judgement, the phenom enon 
of a double aspect may endure w ith just the same degree of tenacity as the double 
aspect of an ambiguous figure."^
^ ibid.. Chapter 8, p. 120.
 ^ ibid.. Chapter 9, p. 126.
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This is precisely because, as Kant held, Scruton conceives of aesthetic judgem ent as necessarily 
subjective. Since we do not actually ascribe qualities to the object, the judgement concerns the perceiver's 
response. Scruton's position involves the denial that the sadness we hear in a piece of music is actually 
a property of it: the sadness is unattributed. Of course, we could imagine a subject for the sadness. But it 
could not be present in  the way it could be in a picture: the sadness freely floats in the music. So, if there 
is no literal sadness, no subject to be sad, w hat thought is embodied in the music? As with 'seeing as', 
the thought is to be defined in terms of the experience, it is an "unasserted auditory perception of
sadness It is not that the music is analogous to the emotion, but rather that the experience of hearing
music is analogous to the experience of hearing the emotion."^
The thought element involved in imagination, unasserted thought, is distinct from the thought 
involved in belief and judgem ent, asserted thought. Furthermore, the emotions involved in aesthetic 
experience are founded upon imagination. O ur response to a sad person is grounded upon belief, my 
response to a sad work is grounded upon unasserted thought. Now, normally emotions are, in part, 
identified in terms of belief; to fear x involves believing that x is threatening. How is this comparable 
w ith an emotion based upon entertaining unasserted propositions? Well, we can and do imagine what 
we would feel and think if a situation were as portrayed. We feel in the same way, and the feeling is 
classed by reference to what we would feel in the portrayed situation. Of course, our emotional intensity 
in art is usually less than in real life. However, this is not so much a question of whether the thought 
and em otion is asserted or not. Rather, it concerns how vivid the im aginative experience is. 
im agination and aesthetic experience is more than unasserted thought, though grounded upon it. It 
involves unasserted emotion, divorced from belief and desire. Indeed, this is testable by the behaviour 
which would normally be taken as expressing an actual asserted emotion. After all, emotions, whether 
asserted or not, cannot be described wholly independently of their expression.
On this basis, Scruton goes on to argue that understanding is a prerequisite of experiencing art. 
Art is not properly understood as an instrum ent for prom oting knowledge. Rather, it is the object of an 
aesthetic experience. Art should be understood in terms of the capacity for felt experience. The auditory  
experience itself is essential to understand ing  m usic, allow ing for a sense of auditory  rational 
development. To hear the notes as a melody and as a string of notes respectively, differs w ith regard to 
the respective experiences, not the material object. It is not just a matter of bringing a concept to bear. 
Hence the experience is not describable in terms of the application of an independently  specifiable 
concept. Concept application is dependent upon, rather than prior to, experience. 'Perceiving as' is the 
sensory em bodim ent of an unasserted thought. One which, Scruton argues, cannot be specified 
independently of the perception;
9 ibid., p. 127.
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"such thought-impregnated perceptions seem to lie at the heart of our understanding 
of art. It is because we can see patterns and figures that we can see representation in 
painting, and it is because we can hear m elodies and sequences that we can hear 
expression in music. In other words, the m edia of painting and music are of th e ir  
nature open to just the kind of imaginative interpretation that we have placed at the 
heart of the aesthetic attitude: the possibility of aesthetic appreciation is intrinsic 
to the m edia themselves."^®
A lthough the aspect can change as one's understanding of a particular work or tradition 
develops, the process of comparison still, ultimately, rests upon experience, indeed, understanding the 
different art forms, for Scruton, involves certain sui generis capacities for experience. Interpretation is 
of significance only when "it leads to experience in  the sense that, only w hen know ledge alters the 
experience of a work of art does it become part of one's understanding."  ^ *
Scruton's account is fundamentally opposed to the romantic notion that im agination is the font 
of all knowledge. Since they are asserted, facts and beliefs are about the real world. For something to 
be asserted means it is proposed as true of the actual world, hence its relation to belief, sense experience 
and its non-voluntary character. Conversely, it is irrelevant for the entertained unasserted thought in 
im agination w hether it is true or not of the actual w orld. One cannot understand w hat is being 
entertained in this manner as open to that sort of question. Since the thought in w hat is im agined is 
unasserted, im agination cannot concern the real w orld. Im agination's characteristically voluntary 
nature follows from its indifference to the question of truth. Both belief and im agination involve th e  
inter action between thought and sense impression, but they do so on a different basis. Thus, Scruton 
argues, affording distinct kinds of experiences. The two fundamentally different processes, for Scruton, 
entail fundam entally  d ifferent activities. L istening to establish facts about the w orld is to be 
contrasted with listening for aesthetic experience and reward.
Now, some might argue, Scruton's account is w rong to hold that all imaginings are necessarily 
subject to the wholesale guidance and direction of the will. O rdinarily, some im aginings occur and 
reoccur independently of the will. Thus these im aginings are not wholly subject to the will. Therefore 
they are not, properly speaking, voluntary. For example, im aginings w hich occur in day dream s, 
nightmares and unprom pted memories are, typically, not subject to the guidance of one's will. This is not 
to deny that in moments of semi-consciousness, one may be able to control and guide, in some way, what 
is being imagined. Nevertheless, in many dream s and when engaging w ith art, our imaginings are not
ibid., Chapter 12, p. 181.
11 ibid., p. 187.
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wholly subject to the will. Indeed, the point of engaging with artw orks revolves around the fact that 
the work itself vividly constrains, prescribes and promotes what we should imagine. What we should 
imagine when watching O f//c//o, may be independent of what we might will to happen. We may will 
Othello not to kill Desdemona, yet, if we are to engage properly with the play, we must imagine that 
he does so. Moreover, the emotions w ithin our imaginary experiences, especially regarding artworks, 
are similarly not wholly subject to the will. Even in our everyday imaginings and thoughts, emotions 
often occur and reoccur independently of the will.
In our dream s and nightmares, we may feel enthralled, frightened or angry independently of 
what we would will. Our conscious, everyday imaginings may also involve involuntary feelings within 
and in response to what is imagined. For example, for some unknown, subliminal reason 1 may imagine 
that I'm  giving a simple lecture, in front of hundreds of students. 1 im agine that 1 suddenly forget 
absolutely everything, and, stranded  w ithout my notes, I feel chronically em barrassed. The actual 
feeling is not a result of my willing myself to feel em barrassed and ashamed. Rather, it is a natural 
response arising from spontaneously imagining myself in such a position. Moreover, my feelings arise 
independently of how I would like to respond or appear. Since, in art, our imaginative engagement is 
prescribed, our responses arising from artw orks are, apparently, even less subject to the will. Whether 
I’m imagining Dracula preying upon Lucy Marker, or believing the asserted thought that I’m about to 
fall from the cliff face, the fear 1 feel cannot be turned on and off at will.
However, the objection that not all imaginings are subject to the will is too quick. Scruton could 
reply, to the suggested counter examples, that dream s and memories cannot be cases of imagining. In 
dreams one usually believes that w hat one is dream ing is happening. In the case of memories, one 
believes that what one is remembering is what has happened. As dreams and memories involve belief, 
for Scruton, they necessarily cannot be imaginings. Furthermore, Scruton's account does not deny that 
w hat we imagine is constrained by the artwork. The fact that w hat we imagine may be spontaneous or 
prescribed by an artwork, does not entail that it they cannot be subject to the w ill. Rather, w hether 
what is imagined is subject to the will or not, depends upon whether it is asserted of the world or not. 
Thus, whether there is an actual fact of the m atter or not is recognised to be irrelevant. Imagining the 
face in the cloud, or Othello's jealousy, is subject to what we would will, as opposed to some fact about 
the w orld. This should not be confused w ith the fact that w ithin the play O thello  there are certain 
facts about various events, actions and characters: we may assert certain facts about the world of th e  
work. However, this is w ithin a context of understanding the w ork's w orld itself as unasserted. The 
asserted tru th  claims about w hat O thello does are understood as operational only w ith in  the 
im aginary world. The imaginary w orld itself is understood as unasserted in relation to the actual 
world. Thus, w ithin the imaginary world of O thello , it is true that Othello is a Moor, a renowned 
general, m anipulated by lago and believes that Desdem ona has been unfaithful to him. However, 
viewed externally, the imaginary world of O th ello  necessarily concerns only unasserted propositions.
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Presumably, Scruton would suggest, the emotions we feel in what we imagine are voluntary on 
the same basis. Adm ittedly, one's responses to an imagined situation may not be wholly voluntary in 
one sense. Our imaginative engagement w ith a w ork is subject to the situation, events and characters 
described. We are prescribed to imagine particular things when engaging w ith an artwork. Similarly, 
the situation, events and people in the real world constrain and prescribe certain beliefs and emotional 
responses. Although our possible range of actions is w ider, because the causal relations are radically 
different, our emotional responses to O thello  are, in one sense, no more voluntary than they are in the 
real world. They both depend upon what we take to be happening in the real and im agined world 
respectively. However, whether we carry on imagining what the work prescribes or not is a voluntary 
matter. What we imagine is voluntary in a way in which what we believe about the world is not: we 
may walk out of O thello  in a way in which we cannot walk out upon the world. The difference lies not 
in the voluntary, as opposed to non-voluntary, nature of the emotional responses which arise. Rather, i t 
is the status of what is being responded to that matters.
in the case of imagination, we are responding to a world which is non-assertorially entertained. 
By contrast, Scruton would suggest, emotion proper arises from dealing with w hat is asserted or what 
we believe to be true of the actual world. In imagination there is no fact of the matter we are responding 
to: our feelings arise from what we will, rather than what we take, to be true of the world. A statement 
prescribing us to imagine certain things is an assertion regarding an imaginary world, but the im aginary 
world itself must, by definition, remain unasserted. Thus, Scruton would suggest, we should be careful to 
distinguish between what the fact of the m atter is about; the actual world or an imaginary one. If it is 
of an imaginary one, such as O thello , then it is som ething created by will rather than constituted by 
the way the w orld is. The tru th  of this claim in no way involves the denial that artw orks may 
prescribe particular, vivid imaginings.
However, endemic to Scruton's theory, and the defence offered against the objection just 
discussed, is a fundam ental flaw. It lies in Scruton's contrast between belief, which involves asserted 
thought, and imagination, which involves unasserted thought. What is imagined, for Scruton, cannot 
be understood as open to the question of truth or falsity. This does not mean that Scruton thus renders 
the perceptions, emotions and thoughts in w hat one im agines as necessarily fictional or necessarily 
concerning fictional objects. If this were so, then, Scruton would be defining imagination in terms of w h a t 
is understood to be fictional. But, if I cannot imagine w hat 1 know to be true, then imagination cannot be 
wholly separated from belief. W hether I can imagine the events described in Genesis and John's gospel, 
on this construal, would depend upon whether I believe them  to be true or not. Imagination would thus 
require reference to belief. Furtherm ore, it is obviously w rong to hold that only beliefs, and not 
imaginings, can be mistaken. We can and do imagine things we believe to be true: for example, that 
Caesar crossed the Rubicon. Since we often consider various of our im aginings to be true, fictionality 
fails to capture what is imagined. Imagination is not merely coextensive with fictionality.
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However, Scruton's account may appear undam aged by such a charge. After all, as I was careful 
to point out, Scruton allows that one can believe something to be as it was imagined. Scruton's account 
holds that w hen 1 imagine something, w hether there is a fact of the matter or not is wholly irrelevant. 
This is very different from the suggestion that im agining something commits one to holding that there 
can not be a fact of the matter. Scruton's account does not entail that w hat is im agined is thereby 
rendered fictional. Rather, for Scruton, the question as to the truth, falsity or fictionality of what is 
imagined cannot arise. This is not because he holds one cannot imagine w hat one believes to be true. 
Rather, imagining necessarily involves going beyond what one believes, thus we cannot imagine what 
we know to be true:
"imagination goes beyond what is given in ordinary prediction and belief. This is not 
to say that one cannot believe that X is as one im agines it to be. But one cannot 
imagine X to be as one knows or has good reason to think it to be. In imagination one is 
engaging in speculation, and one is not typically aim ing at a definite assertion as to 
how things are. In imagination, therefore, one goes beyond what is strictly given."
It is this which, for Scruton, underlies the recognition that imagining something does not entail 
any commitment to believing in its existence. Therefore, im agination cannot involve any essential 
reference to belief.
Nevertheless, the key thought underly ing the objection is sound. It is not true that all 
imagination necessarily goes beyond belief. After all, it can be a significant part of the content of what 
is imagined that it is true. One can imagine what is outside the room or who is knocking on the door. It 
can be central to the content of w hat one imagines, that w hat one imagines is true of the world. For 
example, 1 may imagine that the person who has just knocked upon my door is my girlfriend. I imagine 
her beautiful, impatient and I call out 'just coming darling'. 1 grab my coat, and open the door ready to 
go; but I find that, unfortunately, it is the w indow  cleaner. This is not just a case of false belief. Of 
course I believed the wrong person was at the door. But, significantly, I im agined her standing at the 
door, looking a certain way, w ith a certain attitude. Since it is central to what I imagined that I took it 
to be true of the world, it is not merely a contingent coincidence or an irrelevancy as to whether it is true 
or not.
Consider the case of historical works. H istory obviously concerns asserting and justifying 
propositions about the past, and thus involves beliefs about that past. Nevertheless, we can and do 
imagine things we take to be true about the historical past. Indeed one m ight w ant to say that the 
imaginative aspect is what m arks out say Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire from more
ibid., p. 98.
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contemporary and, academically speaking, accurate descriptions. To imagine w hat the historical work 
prescribes is not necessarily to suspend or go beyond one's belief concerning events which actuallv 
happened, as Scruton would have us believe. It is central to imagining what Gibbon prescribes that one 
understands, as one imagines it, what one imagines to be true of the ancient Roman world. Indeed, what 
one imagines in such cases may modify or deepen our understanding of the facts. Thus we may imagine 
what we know and what we imagine may even effect our beliefs.
Of course, Scruton's theory does not deny that Gibbon asserts something about the Roman world 
which 1 may believe. Similarly, Scruton's theory does not deny that I can also imagine or non- 
assertorially entertain w hat Gibbon says about the Roman world. Indeed, Scruton does not even deny 
that I can imagine the Roman world prescribed by Gibbon, and then believe it was as 1 imagined it to be. 
I can imagine what is asserted and what I believe. But, Scruton holds, 1 can do so only if I treat what is 
asserted or believed as i f  it were unasserted. Thus, for example, Scruton m ight reply that Gibbon's 
writing is imaginative precisely because he gets us to imagine images of, say, Roman processions. This is 
to go beyond what we believe to be true because we aren 't committed to the claim that everything 
looked as we imagine it.
Of course. Gibbon may well get us to imagine colourful aspects of Roman life, without thereby 
committing us to believing that things were as we imagine them. However, w hat Scruton's theory  
denies, falsely, is that 1 can imagine the Roman w orld prescribed by Gibbon, and believe it was thus, a s 
I imagine it. Imagination, for Scruton, is tru th  indifferent because what 1 imagine, as I im agine it, 
cannot be considered open to the question of truth or falsity. Imagining something, for Scruton, means I 
can neither believe nor disbelieve it: the question cannot, of necessity, arise. W hether I believe w hat I 
imagine can only be resolved once we take the thought or perception to be asserted. Assertion makes 
essential reference to belief, and thus cannot, for Scruton, ever incorporate a case of imagination.
Yet, as 1 have suggested, 1 can take what 1 imagine, as 1 imagine it, to be true. The object of our 
imagining and of our belief may rightly be understood as one and the same. It may be an essential part 
of what I am  imagining that this is w hat things are really like. For example, 1 can imagine that the 
grass is green on the other side of the hill, and it is a constituent part of that im agining that 1 take 
w hat 1 imagine to be true. Thus w hen I reach the brow  of the hill, and find the grass is parched and 
brown, it makes sense to say that w hat 1 imagined, not just what 1 thought, was mistaken. In this kind 
of case, contra Scruton, what 1 imagine makes essential reference to belief. Since, by Scruton's definition, 
there can be nothing about which imaginings could be mistaken, Scruton's theory cannot ever make sense 
of the claim that our imaginings can be mistaken.
Scruton's theory holds that if I imagine something, 1 necessarily cannot believe or know it to be 
true: this is false. Im agination can involve reference to belief. If it is a significant part of the content 
that what I im agine is true, then, in this case, w hat 1 im agine depends upon, rather than being 
essentially contrasted w ith, w hat 1 believe. Perhaps Scruton's failure arises from  a failure to
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distinguish the basis of a certain kind of knowledge from actually knowing and believing something. To 
know something, is to know reasons why something is so. It involves an appreciation of what follows 
from what, a recognition that the definiens and defined are co-extensive, recognising that all the 
various instances are covered, and an informed grasp of why this is so. Of course, one may have a true 
belief w ithout knowing why it holds good. Im agination may make essential reference to belief but it 
need not require recourse to reasons which justify that belief. Nevertheless, it may be essential to what 
I imagine, that what I imagine is what I know to be true.
Of course, in the case of imagining a roman procession, as prescribed by Gibbon, we may take 
certain propositions as assertions and other aspects as mere imaginative evocations. The imaginative 
evocation may only provide a context within which to make sense of the facts. Thus, these aspects may 
not be appropriately understood as open to the question of truth. They may just provide an imaginative 
fram ew ork to be entertained, whilst enabling one to assim ilate the actual history of Rome. Thus, 
although it would be detrim ental to the w ork as history if Gibbon's dates and names were wrong, it 
would not m atter if the imaginative evocation of the procession was flawed. However, such a response 
is far too crude. When 1 imagined the grass was green on the other side of the hill, the colour 1 imagined 
it to be was not superfluous to what I took to be true. The response fails to take account of the possible 
inter-relations between what is imagined, the evocation, and the facts. For what is im agined may not 
only provide the fram ew ork w ith in  which the facts make sense, it may concern the very facts 
them selves.
Consider the imaginings Gibbon prescribes not merely in relation to processions but in promoting 
an understanding of Roman life itself. The imaginings prescribed may constitute an essential part of 
what we should take from that historical work and understand as true of that period. Indeed, the point 
of the work, as history, is to achieve a fit between what is imagined and the facts; in order to promote a 
reasonable historical understanding. What we imagine in such cases may be, as we suggested earlier but 
was denied by Scruton, akin to knowledge by acquaintance. That we imagine Rome in a certain way, 
imagine certain things under particular descriptions may justifiably lead us to modify our beliefs. It is a 
false dichotomy, to oppose, as a m atter of principle, the imaginative aspects of such a w ork w ith the 
propositions it puts forward. The imaginative enhancem ent or vivification of the work's content may 
merely render the proposition's more immediate and plausible. However, w hat we are prescribed to 
im agine may also essentially constitute what we are to take as true: for example, that Julius Caesar 
looked a certain way. Furthermore, in other cases, w hat we imagine may well undercut the p lausib ility  
of w hat is asserted. For example, as David Pole has suggested, to read the Bible merely as literature 
would fundamentally alter one's response to it, where it was also conceived as sometMng to be believed:
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"one's response, w hatever fullness it may achieve, can never be the sam e as the 
response of either a reader persuaded  as he reads or a reader who w ants no 
persuading."
All of wliich may be effected by the imaginative representation of the work's content. Where 
we take the nature of what is asserted to be crass or implausible, our response to the work's content 
necessarily alters. For example, how we im agine w hat Swift suggests in solving the Irish problem, 
depends upon whether we take it in full seriousness or not. Furthermore, whether we take it correctly or 
not does not just depend upon our response, but also depends upon truths about the work itself. What we 
may imagine about the world may wholly depend upon what we believe of the w orld, in a way which 
is not reducible to a matter of our projective, subjective responses. Scruton is forced to concede that what 
we imagine may be properly understood, in our imaginings, as true of the w orld. This suggests an 
adequate account of our engagement with works, and the imaginings prescribed by them, may be better 
understood in terms of make-believe. Thus, independently  of w hether what we imagine is properly 
understood as asserted of the world or not, what we are doing is making believe that it is so. After all, 
we can make-believe what is understood to be true of the world; but it is not required for make-believe 
that this is so.
W hether what we make-believe is held to be true of the world or not bears no relation to the 
distinctive processes involved. Rather, it concerns the status of the w ork itself: w hether we should 
take it as asserted or not. Believing something involves a commitment to holding it as true of the world. 
We may essentially imagine w hat we believe to be true. Conversely, what we may imagine may also 
leave the question, as to its truth or falsity, open. Imagination is not truth indifferent in Scruton's sense: 
imagining something does not entail, as Scruton held, that its truth value is necessarily left an open 
matter. It is not nonsensical to ask w hether w hat one imagines is also true or sound. The element of 
thought in im agination is not necessarily equivalent to non-asserted thought. We can im agine 
something and, as a constituent part of the im agining, justifiably believe it to be true of the w orld. 
Imagination is truth indifferent because it allows us to imagine true, false and fictional things; all of 
which we can recognise as such. What imagination cannot apparently do, is provide grounds other than 
the experience itself, for appreciating why som ething may be true or not. A Scrutonian account 
fundamentally modified along these lines, suggests something like the position developed over many 
years by Kendall Walton. It is to Walton's theory we must now turn.
David Pole, “Art, Imagination and Mr. Scruion", British Journal of Aesthetics. Vol. 16, No. 3, 1976, p. 203.
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Section 3: SI lMa/^ -(BeCiez>e SoCution
Kendall Walton has most recently and comprehensively articulated his theory in Mimesis as 
M ake-B elieve, specifically in relation to the representational arts. The key analogy upon which 
W alton's edifice is built is, literally, child's play. Central to a child's game, and participation within 
it, is the capacity to make-believe. For example, a child makes-believe that daddy is a m onster and 
thus, appropriately , the child shrieks w hen he lum bers tow ards her. Thus the child actively 
participates in the game of make-believe; her making believe makes it true, w ithin the world of the 
game, that the father is a monster and she is threatened. Walton is careful to recognise the difference 
between voluntary and involuntary imaginings, delineated in terms of deliberateness and spontaneity. 
For example, involuntary spontaneous imaginings may occur in dreams, unsuppressable hallucinations, 
memories or may merely spring up uncalled for. ^
Nevertheless, the key to W alton's theory lies in children's games of make-believe. One such 
game he discusses, involves pretending that m ud lum ps are in fact pies. The children imagine certain 
propositions, which they understand to be licensed by the rules of the game. In this game of make- 
believe, the lumps of m ud are props and act as a boon to the imagination. The defining characteristic of 
a prop is that it generates fictional t r u t h s . T h e  m ud lum ps are used as props to aid and promote 
various imaginings, which help to make the game more interesting. A nother case Walton takes as 
paradigm atic is one where tree stum ps are imagined to be bears. The shape of the stumps themselves 
may add to the vividness and character of the children's imaginings: this stum p may look like a nice, 
peaceful bear, whereas the dark, large one may look fierce and evil. Of course, it is crucial to the game 
that everyone agrees and understands that, w ithin the world of the game, all tree stum ps are bears. If 
this convention is sufficiently internalised, then tree stum ps may provoke imaginings automatically in 
the participating children. Thus, whilst playing the game, a child may turn around and be surprised by 
a 'beari hiding behind a bush. ^  ®
W alton's idea is that appreciators of represen ta tional art sim ilarly participate w ith in  the 
fictional worlds prescribed by the artworks. The representational work, like the tree stump, is a prop in 
a game of make-believe. A lthough they may not be the object of imaginings, props constrain and license 
w hat we imagine. Proper representations direct how and in  w hat ways one's im aginings, as a 
participant in a game of make-believe, are to be prescribed. We make-believe w hat it would be like to 
do or be something or someone. In the bear game, w hat is make-believedly true depends upon w hat the
'"^Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe (Cixmbndgc, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), Chapter 1, pp. 
13-16.
ibid., p. 21.
ibid., pp. 35-43.
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group of children have decided: the conventions they have explicitly agreed upon or implicitly 
understood as operative. Representational works prescribe and license our imaginings via principles of 
generation. The principles of generation are taken to constrain and prescribe what is to be imagined 
and under what circumstances. Of course, from a given cluster of directly generated fictional truths, 
other fictional truths are indirectly implied. These indirectly generated fictional truths, which may or 
may not actually be imagined, may themselves modify the originally generated set. A prop becomes a 
representation when its proper function is to prescribe imaginings. So, a representation is something 
properly used by an appreciator as a prop in a game of make-believe. It prescribes the partic ipa to r's  
imaginings as he engages with the prop in playing the game. ^  ^
Representations, then, are better than merely stipulated props or verbal instructions. This is 
because im aginers using props require less reflective deliberation. T heir partic ipa tion  is m ore 
spontaneous in response to the constructed resemblance. Indeed, representations prom ote the vivacity of 
our im aginings in a way in w hich, typically, we could not achieve for ourselves. M oreover, 
representations enhance the richness of our im aginings, m andating particular im aginings, as the 
spectators participate in the relevant game of make-believe w ith it. An artw ork visually represents an 
objectif and only if it is make-believe of one's seeing of the work that it is a seeing of the object and, 
concomitantly, that the w ork prescribes or licenses one to imagine particular things according to its 
proper function. ^  ® Indeed, Walton seems to hold that the representational function itself determ ines 
fictionality. For Walton, representations are to be distinguished from works of non-fiction:
"to be fictional is, at bottom, to possess the function of serving as a prop in games of
m ake-believe."2®
For Walton, the imaginings prescribed by a work are fixed by the prop 's authorised function 
and features. W hether and what one is to imagine is not merely a question of individual whim but is 
constrained by, because grounded upon, what is identified as the object's relevant function. The possible 
legitimate games one may play with a w ork are delineated according to w hat the object's function is 
taken to be. Similarly, w ithin the game of make-believe, what the prop prescribes and licenses one to 
imagine depends upon the rules and conventions appropriately understood as operative. Indeed, this 
suggests that, for Walton, fiction itself is to be understood as society relative. W hether something is
ibid.. Chapter 4, pp. 144-161. 
ibid., pp. 51-54.
Function for Walton is a loose and relative notion; to the extent it allows a radical se\erance from the typical 
condition of artefactuality, it must be inherently flawed for the reasons articulated in Chapter 1.
2® ibid.. Chapter 2, p. 102.
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fictional or not flows from w hat the function of the work in question is relevantly taken to be. Thus, 
what was non-fiction for the ancient Greeks may well be fiction for us.^ ^
The basic role of the spectator consists, as in the children's game, of participating in a game of 
make-believe. A representation is properly used w ith in  the game as a prop prescribing certain 
imaginings. One is minimally constrained to im agine the propositions prescribed as fictional by the 
representation in the game of make-believe. Now, the child is a reflexive prop in his game of make- 
believe, as both imaginer and object of what is imagined. Similarly, Walton argues, the appreciator is 
a reflexive prop in the game of make-believe that he plays using the representation. The role of the 
appreciator, for W alton, can only involve de se Imaginings. The im agination is essentially self- 
concerning and experienced from the inside. Minimally, then:
"all im agining involves a k ind of self-im agining (im agining de se), of w hich 
im agining from the inside is the most com m on variety. Specifically, the m inim al 
self-imagining that seems to accompany all im agining is that of being aw are of 
whatever else it is that one imagines."^^
The spectator is a self-reflexive prop in his game of make-believe. Thus, part of his imaginings 
will necessarily involve fictional propositions, beliefs and know ledge about himself. For Walton, 
im agining som ething necessarily involves im agining oneself believing or know ing that.^^ In our 
imaginings we must, at least, conceive of ourselves as an observer of the characters and events in the 
imaginary world. Therefore in engaging with a picture, one's imaginings must involve an imaginary self 
who is looking at whatever is portrayed. It is a necessary and constitutive part of w hat one imagines, 
that one imagines oneself to be in the make-believe world. In engaging w ith Georges Clarin's portrait 
Sarah Bernhardt, it m ust be make-believedly true that I am looking at and thus in the presence of 
Sarah Bernhardt. If 1 point to the picture and say 'th is is Sarah Bernhardt', this is part of my make- 
believing this is so. Since it can only be a fictional truth, this is a form of verbal participation in my 
game of make-believe.
However, the assum ption that our spectatorial im aginative engagem ent requires us to be 
internal to the im aginary w orld is problematic. A case W alton focuses on is M ichelangelo's ceiling 
panels in the Sistine Chapel. Prior to the existence of anyone else, God creates the planets, earth and 
Adam.2^ For Walton, w hat spectators do is make-believe of their seeing of the representation that it is
ibid.. Chapter 1, pp. 51-53, 59-62 and Chapter 2, pp. 91-92. 
22 ibid.. Chapter 1, p. 29.
2^ ibid., Chapter I, pp. 28-35 and Chapter 6, pp. 213-220.
2“1 ibid.. Chapter 6, pp. 237-239.
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actually a seeing of the creation. On his account, this must involve spectators imagining themselves to 
be there in order to see the creation.2^ W hat kind of non-hum an entities distinct from God the 
spectators m ust imagine themselves to be, Walton suggests, is a backgrounded question.2® Since it is 
irrelevant to the point of what is being imagined, it is obviously a silly question to raise.
Yet, surely, such questions are silly precisely because we don't need to m ake-believe that our 
seeing is a personal seeing-of something at all. As Gregory Currie has argued, Walton's account is open 
to the spectre of endless background regression and the pointless postulation of possible entities. By 
contrast, any adequate account w ould not allow the possibility of such questions in the first place.2^ 
Consider the opening sequence of Stanley Kubrick's The Shining, when the camera shoots over, dow n 
and around the landscape. In our imaginative engagem ent w ith it, we don 't typically make-believe 
that we are somehow flying; w hether in a helicopter, as a bird or some other flying entity. Imagining a 
bird's eye view of a landscape need not involve supposing that, internal to the imaginary world, one is 
a bird. Similarly, when we watch interspliced two person dialogues, the camera shots switch from one 
person to the other. Yet we do not make-believe that there is a third invisible person hovering around 
the place; turning his, her or its head this way and that.
Walton assumes that to imagine seeing x is equivalent to imagining oneself seeing x. Thus to 
imagine seeing an oak tree's contours, height and surroundings just is to have im agined that '1', as a 
make-believe entity, am in the im agined world. But when one imagines particular events, objects and 
people, one may imagine only seeing them. It doesn 't follow from this, that one m ust imagine that 
oneself is there doing the seeing as an onlooker. We make-believe upon the basis of the objects and 
images which are visually presented to us, and it is perhaps their peculiarly perceptual presentation 
or determ ination of the content of w hat we are to make-believe which explains cinema's immediacy.
An oft imagined case of vertigo, w ith m etaphysical associations, shows this to be so. We may 
imagine looking down from some great height, the top of some impossibly high building perhaps. Down 
below we see tiny figures scurrying backwards and forwards, like so m any insignificant, trivial ants. 
We also imagine that we are dow n there somewhere, a tiny insignificant part of some insignificant, 
trivial whole. Now, it is not true that we imagine ourselves to be both at the top of the tower and down 
there at the bottom. It is essential to such an imagining that we are at the bottom  somewhere. If this 
were not so, w hat we w ould be im agining, its very nature, w ould change. For then we w ould be
2^ See Kendall Walton’s "Seeing-In and Seeing Fictionally", in J. Hopkins and A. Savile (eds.). Psychoanalysis, 
Mind and Art: Perspectives on Richard Wollheim (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 281-291, for his most recent 
position on representation, where depiction is held to involve a perceptual game of make-believe.
2® Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe (Cambodge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), Chapter 4, pp. 
174-182.
22 Gregor) Currie, “Visual Fictions”, The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 163, 1991, pp. 129-143.
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imagining ourselves to be above and beyond the trivial lives of others; a Nietzschean superman. But it 
is essential to the im agining I am describing, that we im agine ourselves to be as insignificant as 
everyone else. This particu lar im agining, the very sense of m etaphysical vertigo and absurdity , 
depends precisely upon the very impersonal nature of the imagining concerned. Imaginings need not 
presuppose a particular make-believe person or entity from whose epistemological perspective one is 
m ake-believedly seeing the im agined world. Even perceptual im aginings do not straightforw ardly  
entail ontological commitments about the imaginary existence of a perceiver in the same world.
This objection is reinforced if we consider it in another way. One's responses to a particular 
character represented in a w ork are grounded upon entertaining thoughts about him and the situation 
he is in. Thus our attitude to the character depicted depends upon understanding his actions and 
responses as grounded upon certain beliefs. However, it is not necessary to this process that one imagines 
oneself to be perceiving his actions or situation. Of course, where one is identifying w ith the character 
involved, one may imagine oneself to be that character. In identifying w ith Othello, I imagine things 
from his point of view. Thus I might feel sorry for and angry toward Othello on the basis of w hat I felt. 
Of course, I would not then feel sorry for and angry w ith myself: this w ould involve mistakenly taking 
myself to be Othello. But, not all im aginings involve such character identification. We may well 
imagine Othello without make-believedly being or even seeing him.
As Bernard Williams pointed out many years ago, in relation to visualising an unseen object, it 
may be intensionally contained in the imagining that the object is not seen by anyone.2* As a spectator, I 
am not necessarily in the im aginary world of the w ork itself: hence I may 'see' an unseen murder. 
W alton's inability to recognise that not all im aginings are essentially personal derives from the false 
assum ption that our spectatorial imaginative engagement m ust be internal to the imaginary world. Of 
course, imaginatively engaging with a work presupposes a distinction between w hat is internal to the 
im aginary world and the external actual world. In the external world, the representation constrains 
and prescribes what we are to imagine. However, W alton's assumption that there m ust be a personal 
entity or floating Cartesian 'F internal to the imaginary world, in order for us to imagine anything at 
all, is false. W alton's model of participants in a child 's game of m ake-believe begins to look less 
compelling.
The most controversial aspect of W alton's theory, has proved to concern the nature of the 
emotions in our imaginings.2® The problem  arises because it seems paradoxical to say that we genuinely 
feel for fictional characters we know do not exist. W alton argues that our actual emotions cannot be
2® Bernard Williams, "Imagination and the Self" in his Problems o f the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1973), pp. 34-35.
2® The amount of literature on this subject is now almost overwhelming. See Alex Neill. “Fiction and the 
Emotions'', American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 1, 1993, pp. 1-13, for most of the relevant 
contemporaiy references.
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involved as part of our imaginings at all. Rather, our emotions can only be fictional: they are imagined 
witliin the make-believe world of the game. We may only feel, what he terms, quasi-fear, in response 
to what we are authorised to make-believe. As the child recoils in make-believe fear from her father, 
so we may only m ake-believedly fear the daleks in Dr. Who. The picture of em otion Walton 
presupposes, is essentially cognitive. Our emotions are partly defined by our appraisal of the relevant 
object. Thus to feel fear, involves not only feeling adrenaline course through my veins, my palms going 
sweaty and my heart racing. It m ust also involve my evaluation of the object of my em otion as 
threatening. The process of cognitive evaluation and distinct appraisal, serves to determ ine both th e  
felt quality and emotional state.^® Furthermore, real emotions, Walton holds, require the belief that 
what the emotion is directed tow ards actually exists.^  ^Thus we can only m ake-believedly fear and
pity fictional characters.^2
A lthough many of the criticisms directed at W alton's account fail to hit the mark, the most 
fundam ental objection to this aspect of W alton's account has been pressed by Peter Lamarque and, 
subsequently, Noël Carroll.-^^ The key to their objection is their challenge to W alton's belief-existence 
claim. They claim that genuine emotion does not require belief in the existence of its intentional object. 
Thus, they argue, we can and do have genuine emotional responses to works of fiction as a constituent 
part of our imaginings. For example, one can be afraid of Dracula independently  of w hether one 
actually believes he exists or not. It is the content of the thought that we react to, quite apart from 
whether the entities or states of affairs in question exist or not. Walton has responded by arguing that 
if we were afraid of the mere thought, then either we w ould simply stop im agining those states of 
affairs, or we would run from the cinema.^"* Existence, or non-existence, Walton claims, is a constituent 
part of the nature of a character or state of affairs. It is a necessary constituent part of feeling fear, that 
we act in certain ways; by running from what we are scared of. Since we know the monster is make-
^® For a critical sur\ ey of contemporaiy psychological research, which accords with such a conception, see both B. 
Parkinson and A. S. R. Manstcad, “Appraisal as a Cause of Emotion”, and J. D. Laird and C. Bresler, “The Process 
of Emotional Experience”, in M. S. Clark (ed.). Emotion: Review of Personality and Social Psychology (New bury 
Park, California: S.A.G.E., 1992), pp. 213-234.
Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard Universitv Press, 1990), Chapter 5, pp. 
195-204.
^2 ibid., Chapter 7, pp. 240-255,
See Peter Lamarque, “How Can We Fear and Pity Fictions”, Br/7/x/i Jowma/q/’Ac.yf/icnV.y, Vol. 21, No. 4. 1981, 
Peter Lamarque, P/i//o5op//vfl«d/'7c/io«( Aberdeen; Aberdeen University Press, 1983), pp. 52-72, and Noel Carroll, 
The Philosophy of Horror (New York: Routledge, 1990), Chapter 2, pp. 77-88. Both were responding primarily to 
Kendall Walton's "Fearing Fictions”, Joitrtial o f Philosophy, Vol. 75, No. 1, 1978, pp. 5-27.
Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), Chapter 5, pp. 
202-203 and Kendall Walton, "'Replx to Reviewers", Philosophy atid Phenotnetiological Research. Vol. 51, No. 2, 
1991.
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believe, we do not run from the cinema. Thus, Walton argues, we cannot really be afraid. Therefore, 
genuine fear must rest upon the belief that what we are afraid of exists.
However, it is W alton's reply here that is misdirected. Lamarque and Carroll's argument is not 
that it is the mere thought itself that one is afraid of. Rather, it is the thought content: the nature of 
the character or state of affairs. For example, when watching Dr. W ho  we are not afraid of our 
thinking of the daleks, but of the daleks themselves. Now, it is obviously true that our actions may 
differ in encountering a real and a make-believe threat: in one case we may flee and in the other we 
rem ain seated, though trem bling. However, this does not show that w e're not afraid . W alton's 
requirement, of a necessary causal link between emotion and action, is too strong. I am not denying that 
particular emotions typically lead to certain kinds of actions. An emotion arises in response to, or 
involves some kind of appraisal of, a particular situation. Thus my fear of the guy w ho's pulled a knife 
is partly constitutive of my disposition to fight or run. But in particular cases, genuine emotions may not 
result in their typical actions. This is, presumably, because they arise in response to cases where acting 
would not or could not make a difference. These cases, presumably, would include those where what we 
are responding to is make-believe. Therefore, the fact that we do not run from the cinema, does not 
establish that we cannot really be feeling true fear.
We can be afraid of something, even though what we are afraid of is a non-existent entity. We 
imagine we are threatened and this is an adequate object of fear. Now there may be particular emotions 
which we cannot genuinely feel for non-existent or unknow n characters. For example, it would seem 
quixotic to claim we could feel true love for an imaginary character, such as Anna Karenin. Similarly, i t 
w ould be odd to claim love for someone who exists, but of whom we've only ever heard. The only 
difference is that in the fictional case, it is in principle impossible to meet the person. By contrast, in 
the real w orld, it is merely a contingent matter. However, all this merely points up the fact that 
particular emotions depend upon knowledge of, and reciprocal relations w ith, a particular person. It 
does not entail that we cannot feel certain genuine emotions w ith regard to fictional, historical or 
contemporary but distant states of affairs and the characters caught up in them. We fear not just actual 
states of affairs, but possible and imagined ones. This explains why we can be afraid of w hat was, 
what is, what might be, what could have been and w hat could never be.
We can be afraid of a possible state of affairs, such as that depicted in 1984, independently of a 
concern as to w hether it is realised or not. Similarly, we may be afraid of a fictional, logically 
impossible character, such as a time travelling vampire. We couldn't be afraid of such a creation if 
existence, or even its possibility, was a necessary requirem ent for genuine emotion. Dracula is horrific 
because, fictionally, he has certain powers over and evil designs upon other characters: we both fear 
Dracula ourselves and may be genuinely concerned for the characters he threatens. We fear the 
collection of properties that go to m ake up Dracula, independently of w hether the statem ent about 
their combination in this character has truth value or not. It is Dracula's properties, both presumed and
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explicit, that one is genuinely repulsed by and frightened of in one's imaginings. The very notion of an 
entity that preys upon the sexually innocent at will, has powers to transport himself as a vapour 
through walls, windows and doors, and remains invulnerable to the actions of the virtuous is itself 
horrifying. My enchantm ent with, or repulsion at, a description of a state of affairs may be quite 
independent of whether they are imaginary or real. This also serves to explain more plausibly why 
artworks may fail to engage us emotionally. W hat we are prescribed to imagine, or the way we are 
prescribed to imagine it, may not actually move us to feel anything. Thus we can see why Wild Palms is 
flawed as an artwork. What we are prescribed to imagine is horrifying, but the way it is done precludes 
our proper emotional responses to it. What one imagines thus involves entertaining thought content, and 
one may be actually, rather than make-believedly, moved by what one imagines. This chimes in far 
better w ith our ordinary understanding  of the sensations and responses we typically have when 
engaging w ith works than W alton's make-believe conception.
Perhaps W alton's insistent clinging to the false belief-existence claim results from his 
preoccupation w ith the child 's game of make-believe. But even his conception of this model should 
include not just actors playing w ithin the game, but onlookers too. If his model is thus widened, then 
there remains no apparent reason which explains why he should seek to retain the claim. For example, 
in filming Silence of the Lambs Jodie Foster may well only have felt quasi-fear when Anthony Hopkins 
snapped at her. However, witliin the w orld of the work, what is make-believedly true is that Starling 
is afraid. In engaging w ith the work, in m ake-believedly seeing Hannibal Lecter leer at Starling, we 
should feel genuinely afraid. Our fear is a response to Starling's encounter w ith LectePs caged but evil 
presence. This fear partly concerns a fear for Starling, but we are also afraid of the nature of Lecter 
himself. Although we do not take ourselves to be internal to the im aginary w orld, we are genuinely 
afraid. We are not pretending to respond to w hat is make-believedly true, rather we are actually 
responding to what is make-believedly true. Since we understand perfectly well that w e're watching a 
film, we do not flee.
Walton's theory may thus actually misdescribe even his paradigm atic case, that of Charles.^^ 
Charles is described as make-believedly afraid for himself in his game of make-believe with the film. 
He is make-believedly threatened as the monster looms up. A lthough he has quasi-fear sensations, he 
cannot be genuinely afraid and thus feels no urge to run. Of course, his emotions may arise in response to 
the plight of those im agined characters who are threatened witliin the fictional world. H e's a f ra id  
for the running crowd, and, in particular, for the film 's heroine who has fallen over in her attem pt to 
escape. What he may fear is what, m ake-believedly, the m onster will do to various characters. He 
may actually fear for the heroine's make-believe life. Therefore, it is the content of the thought w hich
Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe (Cambridge, Mass.; Harv ard University Press, 1990), Chapter 7, pp. 
240-255.
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provokes fear for the fictional characters involved. Furthermore, as we have argued, Charles may be 
afraid for himself just by virtue of the thought content of what is imagined. Just as someone afraid of 
heights can be afraid of the (content of the) thought that they might fall, so Charles may be afraid of 
the monster. Indeed, although Charles is afraid of something in particular, the fictional monster, he 
may not be afraid for anyone in particu lar at all. C ontrary to W alton's m odel, our em otional 
engagem ent does not require us to be internal to the im aginary w orld. Fearing a m onster is not 
necessarily equivalent to fearing for either oneself or other particular people, fictional or otherwise,
Walton's misdescription arises, in part, from an attem pt to em phasise that all imaginings are 
de se. Thus, in describing Charles, he talks of how  Charles feels as someone internal to the game of 
make-believe. This lends a false plausibility to the idea that Charles, sitting in the cinema seat, is 
only make-believing that he is feeling scared. However, as we saw earlier, Charles imaginings needn 't 
hede se. Since he needn't be a part of that imaginary world, we more naturally talk of Charles ac tually  
being afraid for the fictional characters. We n eedn 't be fictional characters in an imaginary game 
world to imagine and feel for fictional characters and states of affairs, indeed, we needn't be imaginary 
characters in the world to feel afraid for ourselves. The emotional responses w ithin our imaginings are 
thus not merely make-believe emotions, to be contrasted w ith emotions directed tow ard the real world. 
Rather, they are genuine emotions wliich are directed tow ard objects which may be either asserted or 
make-believe. It is the content of what we imagine which naturally gives rise to real emotion. Walton 
is forced to concede that we can genuinely emotionally respond in our engagement with artworks and his 
model again looks even less compelling.
Section 4: WaCton iModifiecC.
H ow ever, W alton 's theory  can be m odified , w hilst leaving his fundam en tal insight 
apparently intact. That we actually feel emotions in our engagement with artworks, is quite compatible 
with Walton's conception of our engagement. We use the work as a prop, in our game of make-believe, to 
prescribe our imaginings, which may include feeling genuine emotions. Furthermore, if Walton's model 
is w idened to encompass the onlooker's role and allow that not all imaginings are de se, it looks stronger 
than ever. Of fundamental import, however, is the fact that W alton's account construes our imaginings 
as truth indifferent. Hence we can make-believe that som ething is the case and consistently hold that 
it may or may not be true. As we saw earlier, Walton is careful to recognise from the outset, "imagining 
som ething is entirely  com patible w ith know ing it to be true."^® M aking-believe concerns the
Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe (Cambridge, Mass.: Harv ard University Press, 1990), Chapter 1, p.
13.
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imaginative process involved. W hether something is open to the question of tru th  or falsity concerns 
the proper status of the w ork itself, whether it is to be externally understood as asserted or not. Thus we 
can make-believe that the person knocking on my door is a particular friend of mine, and be right or 
wrong.
W alton's theory thus m odified is obviously com patible w ith  w hat we discovered w hen 
examining Scruton's account. It is not the process of imagining or making-believe that renders something 
fictional, as Scruton's theory w ould have had us believe. Rather, it is the status of w hat we are 
supposed to be making believe about. As we saw, one can be prescribed to imagine both fiction and what 
is actually true. Furthermore, rather than pretending to attribute properties and characteristics to a 
pre tended  character, we actually attribu te properties and characteristics in our im aginings. The 
question of w hether the character is pretended or not, then concerns w hether we take him to be 
fictional or not. The content of the work concerns what is to be imagined, whereas whether the work is 
fictional or not concerns the work's status. If one understands the world one is prescribed to imagine as 
fictional, one still actually asserts of that world certain properties. However, externally to w hat is 
imagined, the world is understood as fictional. It is part of the engagement of our imagination w ith the 
artwork, that internally we take these characters and events to be true of the w orld. Im agination 
explains fictionality rather than, effectively, being defined in terms of it. Thus imagining, in contrast 
to Scruton's unadulterated account, may make essential reference to belief.
However, our m odification of W alton's theory rem ains incomplete. W alton's theory is still 
rendered problematic by its delineation of fiction in terms of what is im agined. W alton assim ilates, 
falsely, artefactual representations with the category of fictionality. Man m ade objects whose proper 
function it is to prescribe imaginings, as props in a game of make-believe are, necessarily, for Walton, 
fictions. A prop is anything which, by virtue of principles of generation, prescribes and prom pts 
imaginings. The crucial assum ption Walton makes is that;
"Propositions whose imaginings are m andated are fic tiona l, and the fact that a given 
proposition is fictional is a fictional truth. Fictional worlds are associated w ith 
collections of fictional truths; w hat is fictional is fictional in a given w orld - the 
world of a game of make-believe, for example, or that of a representational work of 
art. "3 2
Walton's conception of spectators participating in games of make-believe, using the work as a 
prop, entails that w hat is fictional is, for Walton, defined in terms of w hat is im agined. A fictional 
proposition just is a proposition we are prescribed or perm itted to imagine in a game of make-believe:
32 ibid., p. 69.
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what we make-believe in our game with this kind of prop is necessarily fictional. By contrast, it is not 
the function of non-fiction to serve as props in games of make-believe. Non-fictionai works are used to 
claim tru th  for certain propositions, ra ther than to make propositions fictional. Thus non-fictionai 
assertions must be justified; we only consider them to the extent we have good reason to think they may 
be true. However, in fictional works, the mere prescription is sufficient warrant. The primary function 
of representations is to serve as props in games of make-believe, in which we imagine fictional truths. 
Contrastingly, non-fiction is essentially concerned w ith communicating som ething about the actual 
world. At the heart of the m atter is W alton's core intuition:
"fictionality has nothing essentially to do w ith w hat is or is not real or true or 
factual; that it is perfectly compatible w ith assertion and communication, including 
straigh tforw ard  reporting  of the m ost o rd inary  m atters of fact, yet entirely  
independent of them...to be fictional is, at bottom, to possess the function of serving as 
a prop in games of make-believe."^^
Walton explicitly claims that fictions, as cultural constructs, are society relative. The prim ary 
function of a fiction is to prescribe im aginings as a part of one's game of make-believe. However, 
w hether som ething actually has that function or not may vary across cultures. This is not to equate, 
straightforwardly, the way something is used w ith its relevant function. After all, Walton presumably 
wants to allow that we can mistakenly misuse an object for the wrong function. Nevertheless, the claim 
of functional relativity am ounts to the idea that m yths which were once non-fiction, for the Greeks 
say, may appropriately be considered as fiction by ourselves today. Their function has essentially  
changed from one of communicating m eaning and inform ation about the w orld, to one of prescribing 
imaginings in a game of make-believe. Now, many works appear to be mixtures of both fiction and non­
fiction. For example, in reading Berkeley's Dialogues we are prescribed to im agine a certain fictional 
conversation. Conversely, in Conan D oyle's Sherlock Holm es stories, one may take as true his 
descriptions of Baker Street. N evertheless, W alton states it is the essen tial, ra ther than  the 
contingent, function of the object which determ ines its status. The fictional elem ent in Berkeley's 
Dialogues is peripheral, as is the informative content about Baker Street in Conan Doyle's stories. The 
status of these particular elements are thus unrelated to the essential, overall function of the respective 
w orks w ithin which they are contained.
However, Walton's conception is confronted by certain puzzling cases. For example, in the case 
of the New Journalism, w hat we are prescribed to imagine is not a merely contingent matter. Rather, it 
is an essential means to conveying the relevant inform ation or understanding about the world. New
3* ibid.. Chapter 2, p. 102.
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Journalism's function is both to convey information or promote understanding, and to serve as a prop to 
prescribe imaginings in games of make-believe. Walton rightly goes so far as to recognise here, as he 
also does in relation to history, that the one may indeed inform and help the other.3® Nevertheless, 
Walton keeps the two functions separate: the one m ust be subservient to the other. If the cognitive 
dimension of a work properly serves to contribute to its role in our games of make-believe, then the work 
is a representation and thus fiction. If the imaginings prescribed properly serve to convey information, 
then the work is non-fictionai.
Yet, in the case of New Journalism, the works can apparently be properly construed as either 
fiction or non-fiction. Walton then suggests we should not seek to pin dow n one function or the other as 
primary. After all, many fictional and historical works seek both to prom ote understanding about the 
world and prescribe imaginings. So, W alton suggests, a game of make-believe w ith a novel may be as 
good as a game of make-believe with a w ork of history. Henry Treece's fictional Eagle of the Ninth, 
may promote a sound understanding of what it was like for Roman soldiers in a hostile, savage Britain. 
Similarly, Gibbon's non-fictionai Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire may, through its prescriptions 
to imagine certain things, promote a sound historical understanding.
All this is quite true. But, the dichotomy Walton suggests is a false one. W hen reading the New 
journalism , we do not either treat it as non-fiction or a prop prescribing im aginings. Rather, the 
imaginings prescribed are taken to be a constitutive element of the inform ation or understanding it 
actually seeks to convey about actual states of affairs. Similarly, it may be essential to particular 
historical works that certain imaginings are m andated. In these cases, in order to know or understand 
what it is we are being told about the world, we must first of all imagine certain things. The function of 
the work to prescribe certain imaginings in a game of make-believe cannot, here, be separated from its 
function to communicate meaningfully about the w orld. The fact that w hat we are to im agine is 
grounded upon experiences, evidence or arguments about the world, does not entail that we are not or 
cannot be imagining in a game of make-believe. To believe that Caesar was great it may be necessary 
for me to imagine just w hat he thought, felt and  did. Walton rightly allows that these functions can 
happily co-exist. Where he goes wrong is in assuming that all works w ith which we may legitim ately 
play games of make-believe are thus fictions. A work whose job it is to prescribe im aginings is not 
automatically fiction, precisely because w hat we are prescribed to m ake-believe may be asserted as 
true of the world. In such a case, the work must be non-fiction. It is not the fact that we are prescribed to 
imagine som ething in a game of make-believe that determ ines fictionality. Rather, it is a m atter of 
whether the status of w hat we are prescribed to make-believe is asserted or not.
A challenge, on W alton's behalf, m ight focus upon cases such as myths, intended to be literal 
accounts of the world's beginnings. Though they were intended as, and are false as, assertions about the
3® ibid., Chapter 2, pp. 80-81, 93, 95.
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beginnings of the universe, we nevertheless use them  as representations; i.e. in our games of make- 
believe. What the myth prescribes us to imagine should not be taken literally, as actually referring to 
persons or corresponding to the world. Thus they are to be properly regarded as fiction. Thus it would 
seem we can appropriately consider falsified m yths as fiction despite, rather than being a m atter 
independent of, the originating perform er's intention in telling the tale. This is because the function of 
the m yth can change, from claims about the nature of the universe, to being a proper subject for our 
games of make-believe. The point and purpose of fictions is to engage the imagination in games of 
make-believe. Therefore stories which are im aginatively valuable, though originally asserted as true 
of and later falsified in regard to certain events in the world, may come to be properly regarded as 
fictions. A Homeric myth, such as the tale of Troy, originally asserted as true, may prove to be false. 
Yet it may be so imaginatively fruitful, that it still compels and engages the imagination. Thus on the 
grounds of imaginative value, we come to recognise it appropriately as fiction.
This objection does not not straightforw ardly involve conflating fact with fiction, rendering the 
distinction itself a matter of cultural relativity. The W altonian point should be distinguished from the 
superficially similar position of C. G. Prado and Edward Branigan. Prado and Branigan move from the 
merely organisational role of narrative, to the claim that there is no such thing as fictional discourse. 
Their grounds for doing so involve the claim that there are only integral value-laden narratives. But to 
think it follows from this that the fact fiction distinction itself is m erely a fiction, is intellectual 
confusion at its crassest.^® Rather, W alton w ants to allow that a representation of great im aginative 
value whose assertions have been falsified, for example mythic stories, may properly come to be 
regarded as fiction, despite the authorial intent w ith which they were uttered. Someone in a society 
w ithout art may create an  artefact which later, w ithin the context of the evolved practice of art, may 
properly be recognised as art. Similarly, W alton claims, a story teller may narrate a tale w hich he 
takes to be literally true about the origins of the universe or the gods and later it may come to be 
appropriately regarded as fiction, resulting from its imaginative value.
The point is a good one and sound, except for what is at issue. For the im aginative value of the 
representation does not arise a fte r  its falsification as a myth, which claims to reveal knowledge about 
the world. Of course, we must recognise that the m yth's relation to the world, from knowledge claims to 
fiction, is thereby radically transform ed. The lim itations inherent to fictionality, upon the kinds of 
truth claims available to it, entail that the story's possible relation to the world changes if it comes to 
be properly regarded as fiction. Hence the intuition expressed by the phrase 'm ere fiction'. If a w ork is 
a fiction, it cannot refer to and correspond w ith the nature of the w orld and events in it in the way
They both manage to conflate indeterminacy of representation with indeterminacy of truth, which is then 
identified with fiction. The distinction between fiction and non-fiction is thus reduced to, as Branigan puts it, "our 
understanding of the specificity of the references being made to the world of a given community." See C. G. Prado, 
Making Believe (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984), Chapter 6, and Edward Branigan, Narrative, 
Comprehension atid Filtn (London: Routledge, 1992), Chapter 7, p. 204.
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assertions daim  to do so. Therefore, a Christian may justifiably be hurt if the Bible is dism issed as 
merely a beautiful or utopian fiction. What is in dispute here is precisely w hether the Bible, properlv 
construed, does make truth claims about the nature of certain events, the world and the d i v i n i t y B u t  
even if the Bible is properly construed as making such truth claims, it still prescribes us to make- 
believe certain things. That is, non-fictionai works may still prescribe us to im agine certain things 
within a game of make-believe. Thus a w ork's or m yth's status is not wholly determ ined by whether 
we make-believe in relation to it or not. Rather, it concerns how we are properly to understand the 
status of what we make-believe.
Scruton's account too narrowly limited the range of the im agined to the realm  of fiction, 
precluding the possibility of im agining non-fictionai assertions. Conversely, W alton's conception 
threatens to fictionalise virtually everything. For Walton, the proper engagem ent of our imagination 
in a game of make-believe, with an artefactual representation, is what it is for a work to be fictional. 
Furthermore, what is fictional is relativised to the societally appropriate understanding of the work 
involved. W hether an object can legitimately be used as a prop to prescribe im aginings in  a game of 
make-believe, depends upon what the relevant com m unity takes its function to be. Thus all history 
books, biographies, science books, philosophical treatises, portraits, photographs and so on which 
engage the im agination are potentially or actually fiction. What is history for the Greeks may be 
fiction for us, what is science for us may constitute science fiction for another culture.
Walton recognises that truthful assertion or belief is compatible w ith w hat is imagined. 1 may 
be told what to believe through what 1 am  prescribed to imagine. Thus the propositions 1 may imagine 
may be properly understood as open to the question of truth or falsity, even where there is no other way 
of getting at the truth. However, Walton fails to recognise that a w ork's fictional status depends not 
upon whether we play a game of make-believe w ith it. Rather, it depends upon w hether what we are 
prescribed to imagine in the game of make-believe, is asserted as true of the w orld or not. Thus New 
Journalism or Gibbon's Decline and Fall o f the Roman Empire are not either fiction or non-fiction, 
depending upon whether one engages with them in a game of make-believe or not. Rather, they are 
works of non-fiction, which essentially involve imaginings witliin games of make-believe.
The flaws we have identified with W alton's account flow from W alton's misconstrual of his 
own model: that of the child participating in a game of make-believe. It is true that when the child 
runs from daddy or the tree stum p she doesn’t actually take them to be a m onster or a bear respectively. 
Rather, she takes her father or the tree stum p to stand for the relevant entities in the game she is 
playing. It is indeed make-believedly true that the monster is coming to get her; it is actually true that 
her father is walking tow ards her and they are playing a certain kind of game. This is w hat leads
This is precisely the kind of vvorrv’ that works against claims of the Iris Murdoch or Don Cupitt type; that mere 
religious sentiment, or the mere striving for transcendence, is all that is essential to Christianity.
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W alton to think that as spectators "we participate in the appropriate games (of make-believe], we 
pretend to attribute properties by means of them, but there are no properties that we thus pretend to 
attribute to a n y t h i n g . " ' ^ 2  vvhat legitim ises the child 's im aginings are their assertion, or principle 
governed generation, in the game. Now although beliefs are not held because we may imagine or assert 
them, nevertheless, we may imagine things which we do believe or in order to believe them. .4 
representation prescribes certain things to be imagined. However, as W alton recognised, what we 
make-believedly see, may well be asserted as true. Thus, his model should incorporate the position of 
not just participants but the role of onlooker. For the onlooker may make-believe of what he sees, that 
it is what actually happened. Thus it does not follow that a work, whose proper function is to prescribe 
imaginings in a game of make-believe, is a work of fiction: Gibbon's Decline and Fall is undoubtedly a 
work of non-fiction.
A spectator's appreciation is grounded upon the thoughts and feelings entertained in response to 
the make-believe world of the game. The thoughts and feelings we entertain about Caesar may not only 
result from, but result in, certain beliefs about Caesar. Of course, the grounds for what we imagine and 
believe here are not their mere assertion. What we believe and imagine is grounded not just upon what 
we imagine, but propositions, evidence and argum ent about the way the Roman world was. However, 
we may well imagine in a game of make-believe, with a historical work or a piece of New Journalism, 
w hat we may essentially believe or come to believe. W hether a w ork is fictional or not, does not just 
depend upon whether its function is to prescribe im aginings. Rather, fictionality relates to w hether 
w hat one is prescribed to im agine should be taken as a m atter of pre tended  rather than actual 
assertion: as i f  what one imagines were true of the world."^-^ yhus we may imagine the prescriptions 
m andated by a work, w ithin a game of m ake-believe, and believe its assertions: such works are 
unambiguously works of non-fiction. We may make-believe, prescribed by representations, both w hat 
we may historically believe to be true and  what is fictional respectively; that Rome really was as 
Gibbon prescribes us to imagine it and that Los Angeles is as it is shown to be in Blade Runner. Thus it 
cannot be true, that a work's function to prescribe imaginings in a game of make-believe, determines its 
status as fiction.
■^2 Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), Chapter 11, p. 
429. The insertion in brackets is mine for purposes of clarification.
"^ 3 See John Searle’s “The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse”, New Literary History, Vol. 6, 1975, pp. 319-322 
for the seminal articulation of this view and Peter Lamarque's "Narrative and In\ ention: The Limits of Fictionality" 
in C. Nash (ed.). Narrative in Culture (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 131-153. My point does not require an 
argument to determine whether or not the fictional status of a work is wholly determined by the artist’s actions or 
whether it requires reference to an audience. It only needs the recognition that fictional status must be narrov\ er than 
works which prescribe imaginings in games of make-believe.
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Section 5: Imagination; PI Summary.
Im agination in art, and m ore generally , is not to be straigh tfo rw ard ly  equaled w ith 
conceivability. Conceivability, as a function of thought, involves merely considering states of a ffa irs  
and exam ining counterfactual propositions. Im agination, by contrast, constitutively involves both 
entertaining thought content and an irreducible elem ent of sensuous experience. Furtherm ore our 
im aginings also typically involve the emotions, both as a part of the state of affairs imagined and in 
response to them. Central to the imaginative activity is the experience itself. Im agination does not 
itself determ ine w hat is fictional or open to the question of truth or falsity. O ur im aginings may be 
prescribed independently of both the status of w hat one is guided to imagine, and whether we would 
will ourselves to imagine these things.
Nevertheless, it may also be a constitutive part of what we are prescribed to imagine that we 
know what we imagine to be true. Furthermore, that a work's function may be to prescribe imaginings in 
our game of make-believe, does not automatically entail that the work itself m ust be fiction. Thus the 
prim ary sense of imagination is to entertain thought content, typically conjoined w ith a sense of what i t 
would feel like; to imagine something is to imagine what it was, is, could or would be like, including 
what one would, could or should feel, if a certain  state of affairs obtained. Im agining typically 
involves both entertaining thought content and feeling, both in terms of experiences and emotions, about 
a certain state of affairs. The thoughts, sensuous experience and feelings w hich constitute w hat is 
im agined will typically have a developm ental and modificatory effect on each other, as thoughts, 
experience and feelings do in our everyday lives.
It may be objected that feelings and emotions are not essential to my imagining something. For 
example, I may well imagine Mount Etna exploding, but it is surely not necessarily true that I imagine 
what 1 would feel like if 1 saw it. Similarly, 1 m ight imagine the tree outside or even that I am dead 
w ithout actually feeling anything toward the im agined state of affairs. However, the objection fails to 
appreciate that im agination only typically involves our feelings and emotions. Of course, I may 
imagine Mount Etna exploding and thus the fear I w ould  feel were I present in the state of affairs 
imagined. Similarly, 1 may look at a painting and perceptually im agine the volcanic lava shooting 
skyward in beautiful, searing arcs and falling to trace its deadly, golden way below. Thus 1 may feel a 
certain dread in my imagining, which perhaps enhances the terrifying beauty of the image. Thus 1 may 
feel a certain kind of pleasure or sublime delight. However, it is not strictly necessary that I have a 
felt response in my im agining tow ard the im agined state of affairs. It is, however, necessarily, 
typically true that felt responses are involved in w hat I imagine.
For example, when we engage w ith works which concern various characters, we may im agine 
w hat they w ould feel were the state of affairs as represented. Conversely, the aspect under w hich I 
imagine M ount Etna may well not be one which essentially takes a character's viewpoint at all, w ith in
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the represented state of affairs. Of course, it may be appropriate that 1 fully imagine what a certain 
character feels in response to this state of affairs. In which case, I should also im agine the feelings and 
emotions of fear he would feel. But this is not necessarily true and would depend upon the aim of and 
the way in which our imaginings are being guided. We may be prescribed to imagine perceptually w hat 
the explosion w ould  look like w ithou t any feeling whatsoever. N evertheless, that em otional 
involvem ent is a typical condition explains why it is a strong criticism of a w ork like O liver Stone's 
Wild Palms that our imaginative engagement w ith it is emotionally poor. We are supposed to care for 
and sym pathise w ith certain characters in this futuristic retro world of conspiracies. Yet, and this is 
the problem, they hardly engage our feelings and sym pathy at all. Their lack of depth as believable 
hum an characters renders our im aginative engagem ent much the poorer. By contrast, though David 
Lynch's Tzain Peaks was far m ore idiosyncratic, the em otional engagem ent w ithin our prescribed 
imaginings could be so great that it was, at times, compulsive viewing.
It m ight be objected specifically in relation to art, that works such as Alain Resnais' Last Year 
at Marienbad preclude the involvement of our emotions in our imaginative engagement and yet are still 
regarded as good art. However, Last Year at Marienbad actually undercuts the whole process of 
imaginative engagement, not just the elem ent of our feelings w ithin it. Thus it artistically highlights 
both the fragility of imaginative engagement and the very nature of the process itself: this is precisely 
why it is a good artwork. It engages the imagination and then proceeds to undercut the just established 
imaginative understanding of w hat is happening. Nevertheless, it m ust still engage the im agination, 
if only to undercut it, in order to be the kind of film it is: one which concerns the nature of imaginative 
engagement and understanding. Thus whilst Last Year at Marienbad's, undercutting of our feeling, and 
imaginative engagement as a whole, adds to its value, the failure of Wild Palms to engage our feelings 
as an essential part of the imaginative engagement it prescribes, shows it to be a poor artwork.
I am  not claiming that it is a necessary part of perceptually imagining something like Mount 
Etna exploding that we feel anything. In our entertaimnent of the appropriate visual images it may be 
inappropriate to highlight a particular emotional response or indeed any em otional response at all. 
This might, for example, be true if we were aim ing to realise the elegant, formal beauty of such a 
majestic sight of nature. Nevertheless, our emotions typically do play a central part in our imaginings 
of certain states of affairs. Im agining w hat it w ould be like to live in a particular w orld will usually 
include the emotions, as a constituent part of the im agined experience. Indeed, if the emotions are 
lacking this is usually  because the relevant character or state of affairs dictates a response of 
emotional numbness or frigidity.
The distinction between thought and imagination is then to be grounded upon the realisation 
that thought is abstracted from, though it may reflect upon, experience and feelings. By contrast, the 
im agination involves characteristics of both thought and sensuous experience, whilst also typically 
involving the emotions. That im agination concerns the realisation of w hat a certain  state of affairs
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could be, or would have been, like, serves to explain im agination's indifference to fictionality. It is not 
that im agination is truth indifferent in the way Scruton conceived it, w hat we imagine may be what 
we know. Rather, whether we imagine som ething or not bears no distinctive relation to the status of 
what is imagined, whether it should properly be regarded as fictional or asserted as true of the world. 
After all, what is imagined may be properly taken as true of the world and enhance our understanding 
of it: what is imagined may be understood as how things are known to be.
We are necessarily constrained by what we can properly take up a fictional stance toward. But 
there are no kinds of imaginings precluded by or peculiar to fictional states of affairs, as opposed to the 
kinds of imaginings possible regarding asserted or known states of affairs. In im aginatively engaging 
w ith a work, say Hard Times, the prepositional content or sense remains constant, and open to true or 
false statem ents about it, independently  of w hether its status is that of fiction or assertion. In 
historical or scientific discourse and speculation one is typically concerned w ith knowledge and beliefs 
about the world. Contrastingly, in fiction we acquire beliefs and knowledge about the characters, events 
and states of affairs w ithin the story. A lthough the events and characters portrayed w ithin the story 
stipulated as fiction do not exist, we can make sense of something being fictionally true. Thus one may 
assert propositions assessable as true or false about particular fictional states of affairs: our beliefs 
regarding what is fictionally true of Hard Times may be justified or not.
Of course, fiction may mistakenly be read as history and vice versa. However, on our account, 
the reader will be mistaken because misinform ed or uninform ed about the w ork 's status, regarding 
w hether it portrays a pretend or asserted state of affairs. So we should  d istingu ish  the internal 
perspective from w ithin the stories in which people are referred to via their particular properties and 
characteristics and the external perspective which concerns their relation to the real world, whether 
the set of properties are definitive of a fictional or actual character. It is from the external perspective 
that the story itself may either be fictional or asserted. Of course we should  recognise that the 
characters and states of affairs we im agine w hich are fictional are inheren tly  incom plete or 
indeterm inate . Im aginative descrip tion  per se may be inherently  inde term inate  and open to 
m ultifarious different imaginative constructions. However, fictional characters are necessarily more 
radically indeterm inate than past or actual persons. A lthough the salient prim ary properties of the 
character Sherlock Holmes are given in the relevant works of fiction by Sir A rthur Conan Doyle, there 
will be various innumerable properties for which it is neither true nor false that Sherlock Holmes has 
them. This is obviously not the case regarding actual people such as myself, historical persons such as 
Julius Caesar, or possible individuals; otherwise they would be different people. Thus my picture of 
Sherlock Holmes may justifiably and blamelessly differ from yours. Fictional character identity, then.
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may be relative to interpretation. However, the possibilities themselves are nevertheless anchored to 
how the character was presented and thus the original prim ary properties identified.'^^
Nevertheless, what we imagine can be directly concerned with how we relate to the world and 
each other. Furthermore, since even imagining impossible and fictional states of affairs is intimately 
linked to our understanding, w hat we im agine may, at least indirectly, concern our relations to the 
world and others. For example, what we imagine a friend or Mr. Gradgrind is like, depends upon our 
understanding of both them and their worlds. In what we imagine, as in everyday life, our feelings and 
emotions typically play a significant part in our appraisal, attitude and understanding of the relevant 
states of affairs. Indeed not only can w hat we imagine incorporate both particular and general truths 
about the world but it must presuppose a background of assertions, beliefs and understandings concerning 
the world. To make sense of what we imagine, we m ust be able to find intelligible, even if they are not 
shared, various background assumptions m ade about the nature of the world. Since the characters and 
events are themselves subject to and the creation of artistic control and invention, prescribed imaginings 
m ore readily lend them selves to the them atic in terpretation  and understanding  of the tensions, 
possibilities and significances regarding hum an life. A m atter which is far harder to manifest in the 
mere description of or reflection upon actual events.
O ur account of imagination as irreducibly combining the entertainm ent of thought content with 
characteristics of sensuous experience and, typically, responding em otionally, suggests that the 
phenomenology of imagination spreads over all areas of our lives and activities. O ur account however 
does not render the concept trivial. For example reading Kant's Critique of Pure Reason does not involve 
the imagination: 1 reflectively try to make out and follow the argument, entertain propositions, and 
feel variously puzzled, elated and despairing in my failure or otherwise to apprehend what is going on. 
If im agination is identified w ith the speculative thinking involved in  the construction of possible 
worlds, as Sabina Lovibond also suggests, then far from being distinct, im agination would be merely a 
form of thoughh^^ Sim ilarly A lan W hite suggests that im agination is envisaged possibility, so 
believing "p is to think t h a t  p is the case. To im agine that p is to think o f  p as possibly being the 
case."‘^ ^Im agination then is identified with the speculative thought involved in thinking that..., or 
conceiving of possible states of affairs. But the charge of triviality, though it holds against these 
notions, fails to hold against our account. Im agination is to be d istinguished  from  thought and 
conceivability, rather than identified w ith them. Thought involves the utilisation and application of
Although we are anchored to these original primary characteristics, it also seems possible that these may 
themselves come to be modified through our interpretations. See Hartley Slater, "Fictions", British Journal o f 
Aesthetics, Vol. 27, No. 2, 1987, pp. 145-155, for a recognition of the distinctive kind of inherent indeterminacy of 
fictional reference.
Sabina Lovibond, Realism and Imagination in Ethics (Oxford; Blackwell, 1983), p. 198.
Alan R. While, The [jinguage o f Imagination (Oxford; Blackwell, 1990), Chapter 16, p. 148.
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concepts in categorising the w orld around us. It can be imaginative in the sense of being inventive: 
developing concepts and their application in innovative ways, as contrasted w ith their ordinary use 
and implementation. Conceiving of something involves thinking about what would constitute a possible 
or probable state of affairs.
W hite fails to appreciate that im agining typically involves sensuous, emotional aspects of 
experience as constitutive of or in response to im possible, possible, or actual states of affairs."^^ 
Imagination cannot be reduced to mere thought: this w ould be to ignore the prim ary nature of the 
imaginative experience. The thought T desire ice-cream' makes essential reference to desire. The desire 
is part of the thought content. However, in im agining w hat we desire we not only entertain the 
relevant thought content but also the look or feel of the ice-cream: the 99 flake it would come with, the 
cardboard feel of the cone, the cold soft taste and so on. O ur im agining w hat we desire typically 
includes irreducibly what, under some description, it w ould feel like. Thus, w hat we may imagine may- 
well serve as a sounding board when deliberating about our action. 1 m ight im agine the ice-cream to 
help me decide w hether 1 w ant a W all's Feast or a Magnum, or even w hether I w ant an ice-cream at 
all. Imagining is thus, at least potentially, a key element in our deliberation about what we should do. 
Of course I may prove to have incorrectly imagined w hat it would be like, but then w hat is im agined is 
not the actual experience. Yet if one's memory, skill and understanding is reasonable then it should give 
a pretty good idea. Imagination allows for the possibility of knowledge by acquaintance regarding 
what something might be like or what someone may be feeling, as opposed to knowledge by description 
and deduction.
This is not to say that the typical conjunction of sense, feeling and thought is sufficient for 
imagining. After all, if the m onster bursts through the screen, Charles is definitely not im agining the 
monster. Rather it is in the irreducible conjunction of sentim ent and thought in projected experiences, as 
distinct from what is immediately taken to be the case, that one imagines. One may thus imagine that 
one's friend is studying next door, that Napoleon looked like this or how Raskolnikov felt. W hether 
the status of what is imagined is personal memory, history or fiction, one may imagine it. Conversely, 
merely to reflect upon what was or is true, or upon fiction, is not necessarily to imagine. One can also 
imagine what one may speculate to be possibly true, though there may be no way of knowing whether 
what one speculates and imagines is indeed true or not because of present evidential indeterminacy. For 
example, we may not be able to know whether Henry gave a St. Crispin's Day speech before Agincourt 
or whether my friend is under emotional pressure, as he w ouldn't admit to it even if he was.
In everyday life our imagination is usually concerned with what we and others do, would do or 
would think and feel under certain states of affairs. We commonly rely on our imagination to inform our
ibid.. Chapter 20, p. 184, where, though White stales that imagining "something is to think of it as possibly 
being so., to think of it in a certain way. Thus...what we are imagining is what it is or would be like", he still 
insists on conceiving of imagination as merely involving thinking q/possible experiences and feelings, rather than 
typically including imaginatively hav ing them.
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understanding and thus actions. What I imagine my friends feel like and what I would feel like if I 
stayed in tonight informs my deliberation about what 1 should do. The engagement of our imagination 
w ith works of art is sim ilarly concerned w ith  states of affairs, actual, possible, im possible and 
fictional. Quite w hat this may mean for the prim ary nature and value of art, is, however, a task for 
the next chapter.
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Cfiapter 4
Imagination, Interpretation and Art.
'Fine art is that in which the hand, the head 
and the heart of man go together."
John Ruskin The Two Paths
Introduction.
Imagining in art, and more generally, is not to be conceived as a hermetically sealed activity. 
Rather, it typically relates to our everyday lives. We commonly imagine w hat certain states of affairs 
are or would be like. Of course, the state of affairs one imagines may be fairly minimal, say for the sake 
of a philosophy example. N evertheless, im agining can play a crucial role in trying to understand 
various facts, possibilities and afford new insights. For example, imagining what it is like to undergo 
harsh examinations, be jobless or mugged, may enhance our understanding of such predicaments and 
those placed in them. In particular, the imaginings promoted by artworks may enhance and deepen our 
understanding. For example, im agining the rage of O thello 's jealousy informs our understanding of 
jealousy, in a way in which our ow n paltry im aginings on their own would not. Even im agining 
im possible states of affairs, for exam ple w hat life w ould have been like w ithout com puters or 
communism, can inform our understanding. Thus, in complex ways, our imaginings concerning what is 
real, speculative or fictional, can enhance our understanding of the world.
In order to articulate more precisely how imagination may contribute to understanding, 1 w ill 
d istinguish  two types of understanding . Firstly, there is thin understanding. Essentially, this is 
constituted by theoretical explanation, w hether im plicit or explicit. Thus, a thin understanding of 
trial by ordeal, and why it seemed rational from a m edieval viewpoint, involves forming a theory 
w hich strives to make coherent, consistent sense of the relevant behaviour. W hat we imagine in this 
regard, may help us instrumentally: in articulating or modifying the appropriate theoretical model for 
explaining such behaviour. Secondly, there is thick understand ing , w hich does not require  a 
determ inate theory. Essentially, this is constituted by our imaginative grasp of what something would 
or could have been like. As life is lived from the inside, so thick understanding involves im agined 
experience. The im agined experience itself is irreducible: com patible w ith, but not reducible to, 
thinking what something is like. Through imagining states of affairs, we can understand more fully the 
possibilities and nature of an action. Thus we can respond more appropriately to actual or projected 
states of affairs. For example, our thick understanding of trial by ordeal arises from imagining w hat it
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was like to experience and feel approval for it. This knowledge by acquaintance, whether actual or 
imaginative, is constitutive of one's thick understanding. Thus what we may imagine, may justify or 
manifest our full understanding of certain behaviour. Therefore, imagination plays a crucial role in our 
everyday deliberations and reflections, from how one understands a situation to whether one should act 
to avoid or bring about various possibilities.
The value of artw orks in this regard, lies not merely in im agination's engagement. Rather, 
through engaging the im agination, artw orks m ay manifest, prescribe and prom ote im aginative 
understanding . It is not just the state of affairs that one imagines which is crucial, but the way they are 
represented and thus imagined. In imagining one considers, reflects and feels, both as a part of and in 
response to the state of affairs constructed. The point of an artw ork is to constrain and guide what one 
imagines. What enables a work to do so rests upon the artist's m anipulation of the raw materials, sty le, 
m edium , conventions and genre constraints involved. It is th rough the various constraints and 
prescriptions of artworks, that one can im agine most vividly and fruitfully. For the imaginings are 
typically guided towards an appreciation of the possibilities, actualities, past and present, of aspects 
of the w orld and its people. Art affords pleasure, but this is because of a rt's  value. The point of art 
relates both to im agination's place in our everyday lives and the imaginative insight art can afford. In 
short, the artw ork attempts to convey in the imaginative experience a significant, thick understanding.
To say that all art is a lie is to betray a fundam ental m isconception about the nature of 
im agination and art. Good art may, through im aginative engagement, deepen, modify or alter our 
private and common understandings of ourselves, others and the world. A rtw orks may m anifest and 
promote a sound appreciation of aspects of the w orld and  others. Their power, inexhaustibility, 
irreducibility and profundity may also afford new insight into our im aginative understanding of the 
world. The pity we feel for Winston and the sad horror directed toward the w orld of 1984, may serve to 
elicit a deeper understanding of the nature of totalitarian states.
Im aginative understanding fundamentally concerns how we perceive, experience, react to, and 
thus value, the world and others in various ways. Artworks constrain the im agination to engage with 
particular expressions or depictions of events which prescribe certain imaginative understandings. The 
im aginative engagem ent w ith art affords a prim ary and distinct opportunity  to learn from one's 
experience, through the im aginative understanding  prom oted by the w ork, concerning our social 
practices and forms of life. This is of great importance. After all, the cultural practice of art, and the 
paradigm atic works w ithin it, constitute, explore and create a constitutive part of our im aginative 
understanding of the world. That is, art informs and partially constitutes interpretations of ourselves, 
others and the world.
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Section 1: ^eoreticaC and Imaginative Understanding.
Understanding is usually conceived as the background against which we can construe and value 
aspects and events within the world. It provides the framework for knowledge, from which the light of 
reason projects onto and makes sense of the world. Thus, it might be thought, im agination's importance 
and contribution to understanding may lie in aiding our hypothesising about the world. Imagining may 
just be a more vivid way of speculating about what the world was, is, will be or indeed would otherwise 
be like. So the imagination may help us to conceive of various possibilities, given various basic beliefs 
about the world. A hypothesis may then be formed and tested against the postulated understanding of 
the world, hopefully helping us to predict what is likely to be or have been true. Thus the imagination 
may be thought of as an optional aid in forming possible understandings of the world.
The implications of this view are clear. The im agination cannot itself be significantly related 
to understanding. Of course, our imaginings may vivify or provoke speculations about the world. Indeed, 
they can suggest to us various propositions or even theories about the world. These are themselves 
assessable as true or false. However, this cannot be properly considered imagination's concern. If what 
we imagine is to enhance our understanding, it must concern propositions and theories about the world, 
w hether im plicitly or explicitly held. If the propositions im plicit w ithin our im aginings are not 
trivial, then they are more properly a m atter for forms of reasoned enquiry. The significant content of 
what we imagine is wholly independent of whether we imagine it or not. Thus, though our imaginings 
may enhance our speculations, what we imagine is itself subject to the reasoned dem ands of the re levant 
discipline, w hether philosophy, psychology or the natural sciences. On this picture of understanding, 
the imagination can be nothing but trivial. This is not to deny that our im aginings may have some 
value. However, truth and knowledge fundam entally concern how our categories and concepts may 
soundly represent the world. Im agination's possible enhancement of our speculations about the world 
can only be of instrum ental value. Thus our im agination may contingently prom ote the sound 
modification of a scientific theory, enabling the scientist to predict more accurately what is likely to or 
will happen. Through imagining possibilities, the scientist may be able to extrapolate more justifiably 
from established facts. Yet w hether the extrapolation actually is more justifiable or not does not 
concern the im agination. Rather, it rests upon theoretical considerations and the relevant mode of 
enquiry.
Now, one might be im pressed by the role im agination plays in our day to day lives. Thus, 
whilst accepting that im agination plays no significant role in an absolute conception of the world, one 
may suggest it may play a substantive role in relation to the hum an social w orld. ^  The basic idea 
relates to the marked contrast between the scientific understanding of the natural world and, given the
See Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits o f Philosophy (London: Fontana, 1985), pp. 111-112, 138-140.
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intentionality of hum an action, the herm eneutic understanding appropriate  to man and his social 
world. An absolute conception of the w orld is one w hich contains all those entities and characteristics 
of the world which exist independently  of hum an perception or conception. The basic materials or 
substances studied by science exist independently of hum an conception and understanding, from chemical 
elements to gravity and the solar system. Thus, w hether the earth is round or not is objective in a full 
blooded sense; it is a m atter which is true or false independently of how we happen to conceive it. 
However, conceiving of and understanding the hum an social world is different in kind. This is because 
the intentionality of hum an action entails an inelim inable element of subjectivity, concerning the 
nature and interpretation of our actions.
Consider what it is we do when we walk through the park. Obviously, in one sense, we are 
doing many things at once. Under descriptions appropriate to an absolute conception of the w orld; 
various chemicals are inter acting in our brains, movement is being stim ulated, oxygen is circulating, 
cells are growing and decaying and the rubber on the soles of my shoes is wearing out. However, under 
descriptions appropriate to the hum an social world, we are also doing various other things; watching 
people pass by, idly loitering, expanding our territorial identity and so on. What distinguishes hum an 
action is the fact that we perform our actions under an intentional description. In performing the actions 
I do, I have a particular intention; w hether it is merely to walk in the park or to fetch some more 
cigarettes. This is precisely why various kinds of things, ranging from manners and taste to morals, 
could not be captured in an absolute conception of the world. U nderstanding hum an action involves 
grasping an agent's or culture 's self-interpretation of their actions and form of life. Hence it m ust 
involve an  inelim inably subjective element. This, however, does not preclude the recognition of 
objectivity in the sense that one may be right or wrong about how an action is to be understood. After al l ,  
we want to allow that even our own self-understandings may, in some sense, turn  out to be mistaken.
The idea being put forw ard is that our im aginings may significantly figure in our self- 
interpretations and understandings of others.^ Thus, the imagination may be substantively concerned 
w ith our hum an inter-relations w ithin the w orld, in a way in which it cannot be regarding scientific 
understanding. What we imagine may not only reflect who we are, but shape what we become, in a way 
in which w hat we imagine cannot effect w hat is scientifically true of the w orld. What we im agine 
typically relates to predictions and hypotheses about the hum an w orld. For example, my present 
imaginings might revolve around meeting various different types of people under various circumstances. 
Effectively, they might be exploring how a coarse, class based categorisation of others is inadequate to 
a proper concern for understanding others. Conversely, I might be preoccupied with imagining various 
different kinds of life for myself. I might imagine w hat it would be like to be living a cosmopolitan life
2 See Charles Taylor, “Self-Interpreting Animals”, in his Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 
Volume I  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 45-76, where it is argued that our self-interpretations 
are constitutive of what we are. Taylor, however, makes no mention of the imagination.
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in London, dropping in on friends living in Netting Hill, hanging out in Soho, talking about art and 
mixing with media types from The Late Shozo. 1 might also imagine myself settling down to live in a 
substantial provincial city, getting  m arried  to the w om an 1 love, w orking away w orthily but 
insignificantly in the recesses of academe and so on. Through my im aginings the attractions of both 
possibilities may be m ore vividly realised and thus articulated . Furtherm ore, based upon my 
imaginings, I may opt to strive for one ra ther than  the other possibility, even w hilst w istfully 
recognising the attractions of the possibility rejected. Thus w hat I have im agined has not only 
contributed to my self-understanding, but it has also constructively helped to shape the person 1 w ill 
become. Thus, in contrast to the scientific w orld, it seems our im aginings can significantly and 
substantially contribute to the nature and understanding of our hum an private and public worlds. 
Furthermore, the imagination is not just invoked to aid deliberations over fundamental matters. We use 
it all the time. For example, I may think I'd  like my hair cutting in a particular way or 1 may think I 
w ant a particular ice-cream. But, through imagining w hat the hair cut or ice-cream would actually be 
like, I find 1 want no such thing.
H owever, as yet, this conception of the role of our im agination is inadequate. We m ust 
presuppose some sort of understanding to sort out what is essentially relevant from w hat is not. If our 
imaginings are merely particular representations of possible and impossible worlds, then w hether they 
are significant or not may still depend upon their theoretical relation to the actual world. How useful 
w hat we imagine is, may still depend upon its relation to anthropology, psychology, sociology or other 
appropriate kinds of theoretical explanations of our social world. Im agination may thus rem ain a 
helpful bu t optional tool for disciplines properly concerned w ith explaining the propositions and 
beliefs involved in the predictive understand ing  of hum an beings. The im agination may aid the 
formulations of theoretical understanding, as it may in the case of the natural sciences, by suggesting 
possibilities. The im agined possibilities can then be disam biguated into predictive assertions, which 
may be tested under controlled conditions or looked for in their ordinary environment.
W hether a class driven conception of the w orld is sound or not is, properly speaking, a matter 
for normative moral psychology and not my imagination. Only theoretical reflection, it is presumed, 
can help us to understand and make predictions about the hum an world. Im agination is insignificant 
and trivial on its own terms. Any significance it does have is contingent, i.e. parasitic upon theoretical 
understanding. At best, imaginings may be entertaining, internally coherent and of instrum ental value. 
Thus, on this conception, one can fully and soundly understand something independently of any relation 
to the imagination at all. Of course, such a conception of understanding needn 't involve the commitment 
that hum an agents themselves acted explicitly on the basis of the theory taken to be explanatory. 
After all, Freudianism  attem pts to explain behaviour in terms of the unconscious. Nonetheless, the 
presumption is, one cannot have an understanding of something without thereby having a theory which 
seeks to explain it.
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Yet, at an everyday level, it seems false to suggest that we bring even a tacit theory to bear: 
this is why we find the idea that everyone has their own 'philosophy' ludicrous. For example. Mother 
Theresa may well know what is good w ithout being able to articulate or commit herself to a particular 
moral theory. Consider an everyday case where someone's behaviour might be puzzling. For example, a 
good friend's wife leaves him and he carries on acting as if nothing more than a trivial inconvenience 
has occurred. We find this puzzling because we know that despite various difficulties, this friend had 
seemed a devoted husband. On the face of it, the inference we may draw  is that he w asn 't so committed 
to his marriage as we had thought. Indeed, his behaviour may theoretically be taken as sym ptomatic 
of the reason the marriage failed. However, we may also imaginatively put ourselves in his shoes. It is 
im portant to realise that here we are not interested in w hat 1 would have done and felt under those 
conditions. Rather, we want to im agine what he would or is feeling and thinking in his position. In 
imagining the way the break up happened and all the rest of it, we may come to appreciate what he 
was and is going through. Thus, through such imaginative acquaintance, we may come to appreciate 
that, despite his outw ard lack of feeling, he is actually enraged, bereft and distraught.
In attem pting to understand what is going on, we may imaginatively construct some sense of 
what the relevant state of affairs was like, what the person involved thought and felt. Thus, through 
a vivid imaginative experience, we may come to understand someone better and the way they're acting. 
A lthough compatible with theoretical understanding, imagining in this way is essentially linked to a 
non-theoretical form of understanding. This involves, for example, im agining w hat the o ther d id , 
m ight or w ould think and feel in the case as represented. Since 'understanding  from the inside ' is 
constituted by experience, actual or imagined, it is irreducible to theoretical propositions, of whatever 
discipline.
Thin understanding rests upon propositional assumptions or theories, w hether explicit or tacit. 
Thus, th in ly  m aking sense of som ething involves constructing the best theory or explanation 
conceivable. Therefore one aims for theoretical consistency, coherence, an error theory to explain away 
ordinary intuitions which don 't accord with the proposed explanation, and predictiveness. Essentially, 
thin or non-imaginative understanding is constituted by theoretical assumptions and presuppositions, 
dependent upon and placeable w ith in  a general presum ed theory. Thus, in thinly understanding 
something, one has grasped a theory or key set of propositions, on the basis of which one can predict 
what is or will be the case.
Thin understanding, thus conceived, applies both to a scientific understanding of the natural 
world and the hum an social w orld. The predictiveness of a scientific understanding of the natu ra l 
world arises from theories concerning the activities of the natural w orld w hich are not peculiar 
products of hum an consciousness and action. The thin understanding of hum an behaviour and institutions 
is a m atter of normative social explanation and prediction, grounded upon the intentionality of hum an 
behaviour. Thinly understand ing  another, for example, may thus u tilise  the classification of
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individuals into types, according to w hat are taken to be the relevant features and characteristics. A 
developm ental psychology theory may then both provide an exp lanation  as to why certain  
characteristics develop as they do, are taken to be relevant, have the force they are accorded and 
allow for or explain the individual variation w ithin the personal type categories.
The contrast between thin and thick understanding should not be thought of as equivalent to a 
contrast between the purely descriptive and the normative. Tliin understanding, at least of the hum an 
world, inevitably embodies a norm ative notion of w hat it concerns. Thus classical economics theory 
seeks to explain choices of economic goods based upon a conception of what constitutes truly rational 
decision making. Hence, if a person's choices do not match up to those dictated by the application of th e  
economist's model, then the economist will usually conclude that the person choosing has misunderstood 
their situation, is a faulty deliberator or is acting akratically. The fundam ental assum ptions of the 
theory, that the economist is operating w ith a sound conception of hum an nature, will only rarely be 
examined when the anomalies produced by applying the relevant theory become particularly puzzling 
or overwhelming.^ Similarly, many historians take it as axiomatic that trial by ordeal is and thus was 
irrational, as contrasted w ith  our enlightened and  progressive ideas. Therefore, they typically 
presume, those who believed and took part in trial by ordeal were either rationally  defective or 
akratic. The 'w eakness' of those presum ed to be sufficiently rational is usually explained away by 
references to the relations of power and the oppressive function of the Church.^
Recently in the philosophy of m ind, there has been a direct challenge to the idea that 
predicting and explaining the behaviour of others requires the possession of a tacit theory about the 
propositional attitudes of folk p sy ch o lo g y .R a th e r, it is claim ed, we understand  others via our 
simulation of the states, practical reasoning and actions of others. Hence no theory, tacit or otherwise, 
is required. It is the simulation process which enables us to explain and predict the behaviour of others, 
independently  of any theoretical considerations. This position is strengthened if we understand  
properly the contrast between thin and thick understanding. Thin understanding involves theore tical 
propositions which m ust themselves be seen in terms of a norm ative theory. Thick understanding, 
however, essentially involves a typically felt grasp of w hat intuitions, feelings, desires, emotions.
^ T. S. Kuhn, The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962) is the classic 
statement of this conception of theoretical development and change.
A rare and informative exception t>eing Robert Bartlett's Trial By Fire and Water (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).
^ R. M. Gordon’s “Folk Psychology as Simulation”, Mind and iMuguage, Vol. 1, pp. 158-171, first proposed the 
simulation theory and was followed by A. 1. Goldman’s “Interpretation Psychologized”, Mind and Language. Vol. 4, 
pp. 161-185. For a thorough overview of the current state of dispute see Mind and Language, Vol. 7, Nos. 1 and 2. 
See in particular Simon Blackburn, “Theory, Observation and Drama", pp. 187-203 , where Collingwood’s emphasis 
upon the importance of dramatic understanding is discussed in this light.
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concerns, purposes and people are significant/^ That is, we can only be understood properly by those who 
can imaginatively reconstruct the nature of our particular sentiments, thoughts and actions.^ Thus how 
we imagine a situation might be or a character might feel, based upon the information we possess, is of 
crucial importance. If our imaginings are sound, we will know what the person we are im aginatively 
em pathising w ith is thinking and feeling or w hat the situation would really be like. Thus, we may 
have a deeper appreciation of how another conceives of themselves and their actions. Therefore our 
imaginings can afford insight into w hat actions another is inclined tow ards and why, enabling us to 
predict and more fully appreciate their behaviour.
It is im portant to emphasise that understanding another in this sense is not truly a m atter of 
what I would feel if I were in their shoes. Rather, we are interested in w hat they are thinking and 
feeling in the situation. That is how, given their character, they conceive of their situation and are 
thus predisposed to act. For example, we may be interested in taking our flirtation with another a step 
further. What we want to know is w hether the other person has the same interest or not. We do not 
then refer to some psychological theory about sexuality, desire and behaviour. Rather, we try to 
imagine w hat they are thinking and feeling concomitant w ith their actual behaviour. Thus we should 
be, if our imaginings are sensitive and sound, in a better position to know w hat her likely desires and 
beliefs and probable actions will be. We might carry on flirting in ways to test w hether her actual 
behaviour is consistent w ith what we imagine to be true. Then, presumably, we are in a better position 
to know whether to make advances or not and how to frame them. On the basis of what we imagine, in 
relation to her behaviour, we judge how she will act and thus how we ought to act.
Of course, propositions which could be taken as support for various theories can be extracted. 
Indeed, what we should not be claiming is that im aginative understanding somehow rules out or 
precludes theoretical understanding. However, we do not require a theory in order to understand others. 
Our theoretically indeterminate imaginative understanding is not reducible to theoretical abstraction. 
Imaginative understanding is an appreciation, achieved through actual or im aginative experience, of 
w hat the world was, is or could be like. As such, it typically includes what it would or does feel like to 
be or act thus. Therefore one can im aginatively understand another w ithout presupposing or being 
committed to a particular theory. Imagination and imaginative understanding are thus essential to and
^ I have adapted the terminology of Bernard Williams’ contrast between thin and thick concepts, for my contrast 
between the two distinct kinds of understanding. Williams argues that our everyday, specific, substantive, thick 
ethical notions ha\ e both specific criteria of application and express judgements of value, for example concepts such 
as courage, generosity and kindness. The application of these concepts to people constitutively includes an 
evaluation of them. See Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits o f Philosophy (London: Fontana, 1985), pp. 129- 
130, 143-145.
^ There are similarities here to the thought of Giambattista Vico, shorn of his commitment to the idea of a 
cyclically ordered socio-cultural progress. See Giambattista Vico, Selected Writings, (ed.) L. Pompa (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982).
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below  abstracted  theoretical thought. The critical theories developed by reason may have a 
modificatory effect upon our imaginative understanding. The relationship m ust be a symbiotic one. 
N evertheless, it is the imaginative understanding which grounds theory. In one sense then theory, 
w hether psychological or moral, is an abstracted guide book of rules which rests upon our hum anly 
vital imaginative understanding. Thus it should be no surprise that ordinarily we can make perfectly 
good claims to understand ourselves and others, w ithout committing ourselves to a particular theory, 
w hether explicitly or im plicitly held.
The contrast can be articulated more clearly if we consider a particular example. We may form 
a theory about, say, the behaviour of a certain group w ithout imaginative understanding. That is, we 
may deduce various propositions, belief systems and theoretical constructs w hich underlie their 
practices. This enables us to predict, explain and thus thinly understand their behaviour. Yet, even 
where the predictions and explanations seem sound, we may lack a full understanding of why it is these 
people behave the way they do. For, just as one may conceive w ithout im agining, so too one may 
p rovide a theoretical explanation w ithou t im aginatively understanding  w hat one is seeking to 
explain. Imaginative understanding, however, more fully concerns experiences afforded by the nature of 
the practice for the participants. In this case, imaginative understanding should not be identified with 
w hat we w ould think or feel in the given situation. O ne's own im aginative understanding of the 
practice itself may well be radically different from those one is trying im aginatively to understand. 
R ather, it will involve try ing im aginatively  to understand  the practice in  term s of how the 
participants themselves think and feel in and w ith regard to it. How they make sense of the defining 
events in these terms is not reducible to theoretical understanding.
Thus, far from presuming trial by ordeal is reducible to faulty deliberation or akrasia, a true 
g rasp  of the practice may be g rounded  upon appreciating the partic ipan ts ' ow n im aginative 
understanding of it. Those who condoned trial by ordeal, took part in it, institutionalised it, sought to 
m odify it and finally d id  away w ith  it, stood in distinctive relations to it in their im aginative 
understanding. This can be significantly explained by, but is not reducible to, their attitudes to the 
natural world as subject to the will of a just, benevolent God and to clerics, as representatives of th a t  
higher order, who possess superior understanding. The imaginative understanding, and thus the nature 
of trial by ordeal, came to be modified by the evolving critical understanding of the Church. Of course, 
if we cannot imagine ever having the relevant beliefs and feelings, then we will fail to understand 
participants in trial by ordeal. That is, unless one grasps how trial by ordeal was seen as a fitting 
ordeal w ith just results, then one will be unable to fully grasp how contem poraries understood th e  
nature of the practice, which the theory is purportedly about.
Of course, what we can imagine and thus imaginatively understand is dependent upon, and thus 
to some extent limited by, our own experience. This is not to say that our experience determ ines w hat we 
can imagine. Only to recognise that though we can im agine states of affairs and characters radically
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different from our own, there must be key aspects which are relatable to aspects of our own experience. 
Where this is not so, the intelligibility of what we imagine increasingly comes into question and may 
eventually break down. Hence, w ithout great im aginative effort, those who participated in trial by 
ordeal and felt approval for it may seem distinctly alien to us, even where we possess a theory which 
explains their behaviour, it is also im portant to realise that 1 am not denying that the im aginative 
understanding of those internal to a practice may be mistaken. In which case, though what we would 
feel in their position may not be relevant to w hat they thought and felt, it may be directly relevant to 
a sound imaginative understanding of the practice itself. Nevertheless, we m ust at least seek to account 
for why the participants possessed the imaginative understanding, or m isunderstanding, that they d id . 
For norm ally, we take it that practices are in part constituted by the im aginative understandings 
participants have of them.
The value of theoretical understanding lies in its critical m odification of and inter-relation 
with our imaginative understanding. After all, our imagination may fail; one might be unable to grasp 
w hat it w ould be like to see and experience the w orld in a particular way. N evertheless, we aim to 
achieve a deep appreciation of what is the case. Thus a theory concerning the nature and value of art 
should fruitfully inform our imaginative understanding and appreciation of art. For example, the 
theory may emphasise essentially relevant information, which we lacked before. U nderstanding as a 
whole is concerned not just with how the world might or could have been, but how it is; w hether people 
did understand trial by ordeal in  that way, w hether God is, whether my friend does need help and 
support. Nevertheless, it is imaginative understanding which fundamentally grounds the possibility of 
seeing things aright.
It m ight be objected that my argum en t m erely show s that im agination  may help in 
reconstructing why something looked rational from som eone's viewpoint, i.e. how it m ade sense to 
them. Of course, how we grasp the structure, the relation of the whole to the parts, may be through 
imagining. Nevertheless, w hat I im agine only reveals the person's implicit theory about the world. 
That is, understanding something only depends upon grasping the theoretical structure which renders it 
intelligible. Hence experience, w hether actual or im aginative, is not required for a distinct form of 
understanding. Adm ittedly, the imaginative reconstruction may have modified our understanding. For 
example, through imagining myself giving up a football ticket to stay w ith an ill friend, I may be 
forced to change my previous understanding of hum an nature: it cannot now be psychological egoism. 
However, this only shows that it is the normativity of thin understanding which does any substantive 
work. That is, it is the constraints of conceptual thinking and cognitive concepts w hich render 
psychological egoism false, not w hat I contingently happen to imagine in relation to it. After all, the 
same conclusion could have been reached w ithout reference to im aginative reconstruction. Indeed, 
imagination, it may be suggested, can only bear a contingent or accidental relation to w hat is sound. 
What I happen to imagine and its relation to egoism is a matter of speculation and, if sound, a m atter of
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luck. For w hat I imagine is dictated by me, what is sound is dictated by logic and the nature of the 
concepts involved. Hence the attem pt to say what it was like to experience trial by ordeal, and feel 
approval for it, is instrum ental in so far as it prom otes, and is m easured in accordance w ith, th in  
understanding. Thus we may only allow an instrum ental role for the imagination, in understanding the 
world and deliberating about it.
Of course our understanding of another may come apart in one sense. We may be able to predict 
another's actions, based upon a theory we possess. Yet, at the same time, we may be unable to 
understand, imaginatively, the reasoning, concerns, intuitions or feelings the other has, in order to 
behave the way he does and we have theoretically predicted. That is, we cannot imagine who or what 
he is and understands himself to be doing. This is something like the problems encountered in trying to 
properly understand those who took part in trial by ordeal. What tliis shows is the im portance of the 
imagination in cultivating our understanding of others. Moreover, by the same token, it may play an 
essential part in cultivating our im aginative understanding of ourselves. Imaginings, prom pted by 
desires or motivations, may be contemplated in the light of beliefs concerning what I want, should want 
and the options open me. My imaginings may help me to clarify which reasons for acting are stronger or 
better than other reasons I may have, and even how they might be combined. Indeed, even in my acting, 
I may im agine various possibilities. These may lead me to re-evaluate my action in the light of 
features or considerations I could not foresee in my prior deliberation about action. For an agent may 
discover, by deliberating as he acts, that a relevant belief may have been wrong, or there are features 
of the situation or action he had not previously foreseen.* Therefore, the im agination can be allowed a 
significant role in the deliberative process, w hilst still involving the recognition that it is an 
instrumental, contingent aid to our theoretical understanding.
W hat one imagines may lead to a more crystallised cognitive appraisal of the situation or 
dilem ma one is placed in. Nevertheless, the idea goes, it is the cognitive appraisal which determ ines 
w hat action one will carry out. What one has imagined, by itself, cannot w arrant any particular act. 
We do not need to postulate or afford significance to a distinctive im aginative understanding. In our 
ordinary, everyday carryings on, we do presuppose a certain understanding and on that basis pursue our 
projects, goals and interests. Furthermore, how to achieve our goals, and the understanding itself, may 
be subject to alteration resulting both from our imaginative engagement w ith the world and our critical 
reflection. N evertheless, the objector w ill argue, it still rem ains true that it is the theoretical 
understanding that is modified by such deliberation. W hether what I have im agined is significant or 
not depends wholly upon its relation to our theoretical understanding.
* Sec Andrew Harrison, Making and Thinking (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1978), Chapter 2, pp. 34-59, for a 
narrower contrast between thought about and thought in action.
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Section Z: Cfide Tiimacy o f  Imaginative Understanding
However, the recognition that deliberation is not, and should not be, just a matter of thought 
but, typically, constitutively includes im agination, which also em braces not just thoughts but 
intuitions, feelings and emotions, is a significant concession. Thus what we imagine may enable us to 
make sense of our situation  and the relevant state of affairs. Furtherm ore, the results of our 
deliberations are grounded upon our imaginative understanding of the relevant possible state of affairs. 
O ur action in the inter-play betw een the w orld and  ourselves is m ediated and m odified by the 
imaginative understanding we bring to bear. The aim of the deliberative process is to guide our actions 
according to what we should do, a matter which is dependent upon a sound imaginative understanding 
of the actual and thus potential states of affairs. Therefore thought, both about and in action, can only 
be a part of the deliberative process. Deliberation necessarily typically involves the imagination.
Imaginatively understanding the nature of a situation and what one both could and should do 
typically involves imagining how things could and would be. Thus one must imagine how things might 
be if one were to act according to the various options being considered or, even, upon other possibilities. 
Only in our imaginative acquaintance could we come across, appropriately evaluate, respond to and 
thus modify our action in the light of relevant features. For example, certain reasons for acting may 
only emerge through imaginative experience and thus only through imaginative acquaintance w ith the 
act may it be retrospectively clear. Thus only after having imagined what becoming an academic would 
be like, may 1 properly appreciate the point and value of academic disciplines, traditions and so on. 
Thus we can come to recognise qualities which we perhaps could not have done before. Therefore, w hat 
we imagine may enable us to articulate and capture qualities and considerations we previously had not 
had any acquaintance with, possibly leading to the redescription of academia in the light of an aspect 
not previously considered. Hence the process is an ongoing one which continually clarifies the in ter­
relations, importance and deepens our imaginative understanding of ourselves others and the world.
Im aginative acquaintance may be explainable by, but is not constituted, by or reducible to, 
theoretical explanation. Of course, inadequate understanding may be due to our lack of imaginative 
sensitivity or lack of experience. Since our imaginative understanding of the possible states of affairs 
may be faulty or insufficiently determ inate, we may fail to appreciate reasons for acting or relevant 
aspects of the actual state of affairs. We may m isunderstand how things are through im aginatively 
m isunderstanding how things will be. But the possibility of failure does not alter the fact that 
imagination may afford insight into the significance or otherwise of possible states of affairs and their 
relation to our imaginative understanding.
Our imaginative experience of and w ith regard to the world, and thus in art, is of prim ary 
importance, enabling us to appreciate and im aginatively understand possibilities in a way otherwise 
not be available to us. Thus if, as an atheist, one's deliberations concerning Christianity were limited to
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considering the philosophical arguments and theories given for theism, one might fail to understand at 
all how anyone could justifiably be a Christian. Yet, if one were to imagine richly the kind of world a 
Christian takes it to be, the kind of world he aims at, the kind of person he strives to be as manifested 
by Christ, then one m ight understand. Tlurough im agining what it w ould  be like to be a Christian, 
including what one would feel in response to others and the world, the possibility of understanding w hy 
people are C hristian  may be affo rded , even though  one m ay still take C hristian ity  to be 
philosophically flaw ed.
In Dostoevsky's Crime and Punishment, Raskolnikov originally thinks that he m urdered on the 
understanding that he was setting out to promote the interests of himself, his mother, his sister and to 
benefit society at large. Yet in acting on this basis he comes to find that, far from acting rightly, he has 
contravened all that makes m an a moral hum an being. He has acted against the common hum an 
sentiments of fellow feeling which, far from being peripheral or reactionary, are the well spring of the 
moral life. Through the consequent alienation from his fellow man, juxtaposed w ith actions of 
spontaneous generosity, Raskolnikov comes to question why he really acted as he did. It is in the light 
of Iris modifying imaginative understanding that he, in part, comes to appreciate the nature of what he 
has done and thus the need to repent. Thus, it may be the case that only after an action is done can the 
nature of an agent's act be identified. Thus his very experience changes, due to the modification of his 
imaginative understanding of the world. O ur thought about and in action concerns the principles we 
infer ought to be followed, and the considerations that arise in our acting w hich influence their 
application. Yet in deliberation, our im agination is prim ary in prom oting a sound im aginative 
understanding of the particular nature of the situation, experience and action. It is not merely a question 
of being sensitive to the im agined possibilities, but of being sensitive to and looking for a sound 
imaginative understanding of what one is and should be doing. It is this which grounds our theoretical 
reasoning and logical inferences, which themselves may modify and be modified. O ur experience and a 
sound imaginative understanding of it and the world is primary.
Furthermore, the significance of what we imagine is not reducible to the assent or rejection of it 
by our theoretical understanding. For the significance of w hat we im agine lies in the im aginative 
experience afforded and how we understand its relation to our actual experience and situation to be.^ 
Thus it is of fundam ental im portance that we can imagine how the relevant state of affairs are, from 
the relevant perspective. This is because, as David Lewis has argued:
David Metier, Proceedings o f the Aristotelian Society, Vol. XCIII, No. 1, 1993, pp. 1-17, argues not only that 
knowing what an experience is like is essential to deliberation, but that the ability to recognise experiences includes 
the capacity to know how to imagine that experience.
137
"to find out whether something is a value requires a difficult im aginative exercise.
And if you are to be sure of your answer, you need to be sure that you have gained the 
fullest imaginative acquaintance that is hum anly possible."
That is, it is our experiencing a situation in a certain way, whether actual or imaginative, that 
enables us to makes sense of it, an essential part of which involves ascribing value and significance to it. 
Thus som ething's significance depends upon its relevance and relation to our desires, purposes and 
understanding. Of course, what we imagine may be mistaken, just as our propositional knowledge mav 
turn out to be false. But the fallibility of knowledge by imaginative acquaintance does not dam age the 
claim that imaginative acquaintance may w arrant particular judgem ents. The core idea is that the 
nature, quality and value of certain kinds of things cannot be discovered independently of any relation 
to experience. From whether we w ould like a 99 flake ice-cream to which life we should choose, our 
imaginative experience is the prim ary way of discovering the nature and value of the choices open to 
us.
Of course, we could rely upon merely extrapolating from previous experiences or depend upon 
the advice of others. Nevertheless, our imaginative acquaintance carries the burden of discovery and 
thus justification for a particular understanding and choice of action. The concrete, perspectival grasp 
embodied in what we imagine, may afford a fuller knowledge of what we may do: knowledge which is 
otherw ise unavailable. Hence the more significant our deliberations are, the more recourse we may 
make to what we imagine. Imagination is a prerequisite for a thick understanding of others. What we 
imagine in this regard aims to capture the essential, defining characteristics of the state of affairs. 
A lthough, the interpretations are typically perspectival, they may be more or less sound. Thus our 
imaginative experience can help us to have the appropriate imaginative understanding, directing our 
emotions in the right context toward the right objects. Thus we may know w hat we should fear, adm ire 
or recognise what we ought to do.
Our deliberations concerning the nature of a situation, and what we should do, are not reducible 
to theoretical propositions concerning our beliefs and desires, from which one makes logical inferences. 
Theorising can still be done w ithout any im aginative understanding or feel for what one is dealing 
with. But in deliberating, we depend upon our attem pts to im agine w hat it w ould be like if we 
performed a particular action and thus realised a particular value. In doing so we do not depend upon or 
refer back to a norm ative theory of rationality. Rather, we are being rational in our im aginative
David Lewis, "Dispositional Theories of Value", Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Vol. LXIIL 1989. 
pp. 113-137. Lewis’ argument for a dispositional theor} of value amounts to the claim that what is \ aluable is a 
matter of what we desire to desire under certain ideal conditions. One can agree with Lewis both in this regard and 
regarding the necessity of imaginative acquaintance, without being committed to his particular understanding of the 
reality of possible worlds.
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deliberations. The im agination enables a concrete realisation of the nature and significance of 
particular people, actions or values. This is of crucial importance as our beliefs are grounded upon our 
im aginative understanding of the world and others. The thought in our deliberation often slides over 
the surface of reality, from the too fam iliar to the previously unencountered. Contrastingly, through 
our imaginings, we can hope to capture the sense in which things have a certain significance for us. 
Thought may tell us something, but w ithout the apt vivification by the imagination, our apprehension 
of it remains poor and attenuated. Thus, merely to know that smoking is bad for you or that one should 
tolerate others does not, of itself, lead to stopping smoking or toleration. Knowing a fact cannot be 
equated w ith the understanding afforded by the appropriate imaginative experience. e
Rather than providing only prim itive fantasy and illusion, as contrasted w ith theoretical 
reasoning and logical deduction, im agination is required for a genuine proper understanding of the 
hum an world, others, and ourselves. Critically reflective theoretical reasoning is grounded upon what 
we take to be the appropriate way of responding to others, what it is appropriate to tliink, feel and do. 
Imagination mediates and partly constitutes our understanding of just who we are, the nature of others 
and the world in general. In other words, there must be an imaginative understanding of the world and 
others in the first place in order for theoretical thought to have something to reflect critically upon 
and modify. Therefore imagination, far from being relegated to some m arginalised, independent sphere 
of the aesthetic, is central to hum an understanding.
O ur imaginative understanding of the w orld arises from the engagem ent of our biologically 
grounded faculties, in particular our im agination, w ith the world and what our parents or teachers 
encourage us to understand. Thus our imaginative understanding is promoted, developed and built up in 
an incrementally modificatory process. O ur engagem ent w ith the w orld requires the imagination, 
modifies our evolved and evolving im aginative understanding. It is the imagination which grounds 
critical theories we may develop and which themselves have a two way modificatory relationship to 
our full understanding. We should always remain open to the possibility that both our im aginative and 
theoretical understandings of others and the world are inadequate or mistaken. Hence it is im portant to 
remain open to different imaginative understandings of the w orld and others. Through imagining and 
the developm ent of one's im aginative understanding  one may have reason to think that the world 
differs from how one previously took it to be. Thus one may re-examine one's theoretical understanding 
in a different light. It enables us to understand more deeply a potential self, actual friend or possible 
world.
The prim acy of im aginative u n d ers tan d in g  reveals the fundam ental im portance and 
pervasiveness of imagining, from children's games of make-believe to day dream ing or going to the 
movies. ^   ^ Indeed, as we shall see, Schiller was right to compare playing gam es with art in this
* * See P. L. Harris, “From Simulation to Folk Psychology: The Case lor Development”, Mind andIxinguage, Vol. 
7, Nos. 1 and 2, pp. 120-144, where it is argued that what is crucial to children’s social interaction is the
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r e g a r d /2 Of course, as Frances Berenson has intim ated, our personal attitudes play a primary part in 
our understanding of others/'^ What 1 am suggesting is that what underw rites our personal attitudes is 
our capacity to im aginatively understand  others. It is also w hat enables us to in ter act and 
communicate m eaningfully with others. Indeed, w ithout this capacity it is doubtful we could form 
many of our most significant kinds of relationships, from parental love or friendship to being lovers. It 
is fundamental to these kinds of relationships that we exercise our capacity to imagine how others do 
and would think and feel. Thus it is that we can take their interests, as distinct from what would be our 
interests, into account. Therefore it is this capacity which, at least in part, enables us to w iden our 
circle of concern from ourselves to others in their own right.
Furthermore, the primacy of imaginative understanding also serves to explain just why it is 
that we should be so affected by the suffering of others. Those who imagine themselves in the position 
of those who are suffering, rather than those who avoid doing so, are typically moved to a much 
greater extent. Their imaginings will promote a far deeper understanding of what is going on. Of course, 
a truly evil person may have such an understand ing  through im agining and yet react w ith glee. 
Nevertheless, imagining another's suffering, the sensations, aches, feelings and desires, will typically 
prom ote our imaginative understanding and thus sym pathy. This is probably why in the Mil gram  
experiments, the most infamous psychology experiment of the 1950's, most of the test subjects ended up 
suffering severe shock, trauma and in some case breakdowns. Under the duress of authority, they had 
knowingly committed actions which, so they thought, directly led to the death of another subject. Of 
course, part of the shock arises from the mere thought that they had done som ething which, under 
normal circumstances, would have constituted directly killing another hum an being. But a significant 
part of the stress during the experim ent and in the post-experiment reports, concerns what they had 
imagined the subject in the 'electric' chair to have been going through, as they pushed the electricity 
voltage way past the danger level. No doubt it was those who had most vividly imagined what the 
other person was supposedly going through, who went through the greatest stress and trauma. For what 
they im agined brought vividly home to them  the nature of what they were doing. Of course, the
development of their imaginative capacity: to imagine that others may have beliefs at txlds with their ow n. This is 
something which, it is claimed, autistic children do not develop, hence their incapacity to understand others.
Friedrich Schiller, letters On the Aesthetic Education o f Man, (tr.) E. M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957).
Frances Berenson, “Understanding Art and Understanding Persons”, in S. C. Bro\^ n (ed.). Objectivity and Cultural 
Divergence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 43-60. Berenson argues that personal knowledge, as 
distinct from scientific knowledge, involves our rellections, feelings and personal attitudes tow ard things.
See Eddy Van Avermaet, “Social Influence in Small Groups” in Miles Hevvstone (ed.), Social Psychology 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), pp. 372-380, for a discussion of Milgram’s experiments.
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resultant effect depended upon them having a moral understanding of what they were doing in the first 
place.
The importance of imaginative understanding also reveals to us how art in particular may be 
significant. As we saw in the last chapter, the im agination may be prescribed and promoted in our 
engagem ent with artworks in peculiarly vivid, subtle and powerful ways. It is because of this, that 
artworks may extend our imaginative experience in ways in which our imaginations, left on their own 
would not be able to do. That is, artw orks may enable us to transcend im aginatively the otherw ise 
im aginatively limiting constraints of our actual experience. Artworks enhance the im agination 's 
capacity to cultivate our thick understanding of events, including ones we have not lived through. 
Artistic materials, conventions and genres are shaped purposively by artists to engage our imagination 
and prom ote our imaginative understanding. Of course, it is true that merely im agining allows our 
actual and theoretical understandings to rem ain open to the possibility that things are not as we 
conceive them to be. For example, imagining black swans shows us that it is not essential to being a swan 
that it should be white.
However, artw orks can cultivate our openness and develop our understanding in far more 
complex and subtle ways. They can cultivate our imaginings and possible imaginative understandings 
with regard to interests and concerns radically different from our own. Hence we may learn more deeply 
from works which shed light upon the w orld, conceived under different aspects or im aginative 
understandings. For example, we might be predisposed toward an understanding of the world which 
dem ands that people ought to receive their 'just' deserts. Yet, through reading Crime and Punishment, 
we may come to see how one might understand the world in a different light, one which does not make 
such a dem and, at least of this world. W hether one goes on to take it as an adequate understanding of 
our w orld will depend not only upon the imaginative understanding evoked by the artw ork, but also 
upon how one conceives of the relation between the world of the work and our world. We may, for 
example, accept the relation suggested by the author or we may take the relation to be otherwise.
The importance of imaginative understanding enables us to refute the view that art, properly 
speaking, cannot be significant. ^  ^ If understanding were merely a matter of propositional theories, then 
an artw ork 's significance w ould be contingent and rest upon the relevant area of enquiry, w hether 
philosophy, psychology or the natural sciences. And shorn of such subject matter, what could art be but 
a m atter of aesthetic beauty and disinterested delight? Yet, as we have seen, the meaning of a work of 
art plays a central role in w hat we normally take much art to be about. From The Divine Comedy to 
Blade Runner, art meaningfully engages w ith significant questions about the way the world is, the way 
we are or could be. But this is to forget that w hat is prim ary is our experience w ith the artw ork itself.
Jerome Slolnit/, "On the Cogniti\e Trhialitv of Art", British Journal o f Aesthetics, Vol. 32, No. 3, 1992, pp. 
191-200.
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Such amnesia inevitably results in a pointing away from what the theories are supposed to be about, 
but cannot themselves re p la ce /^  T hat is, the nature of the object concerned as m anifested in our 
experience w ith it. The following example, used by Peter Winch, from George Eliot's Middleuiarch, 
points up the inadequacies of such a conception of understanding.^^ The following extract arises when 
the em otionally arid  Mr. Causaubon has taken Dorothea to see the w onders of Rome for their 
honeymoon:
"W hat was fresh to her m ind was worn out to his; and such capacity of thought and 
feeling as had ever been stimulated in him by the general life of m ankind had long 
shrunk to a sort of dried preparation, a lifeless embalment of knowledge.
When he said 'D oes this in terest you Dorothea? Shall we stay a little 
longer? 1 am ready to stay if you wish it,' - it seemed to her as if going or staying were 
alike dreary. Or, 'Should you like to go to the Farnesina, D orothea? It contains 
celebrated frescoes designed or painted by Raphael, which most persons think worth 
while to visit.'
'But do you care about them?' was always Dorothea's question.
'They are, 1 believe, highly esteemed. Some of them represent the fable of 
Cupid and Psyche, which is probably the romantic invention of a literary period, and 
cannot I think be reckoned as a genuine mythical product. But if you like these wall- 
paintings, we can easily drive thither; and  you will then, I think, have seen the 
chief work of Raphael, any of which it were a pity to omit in a visit to Rome. He is 
the painter who has been held to combine the most complete grace of form  with 
sublimity of expression. Such at least 1 have gathered to be the opinion of the 
cognoscenti.'
There is hardly any contact more depressing to a young ardent creature than 
that of a m ind in which years full of know ledge seem to have issued in a blank 
absence of interest or sympathy." ^  *
What Causaubon and all those w ith a theory driven model of understanding fail to appreciate 
is that w hat ought to be prim ary is w hat Dorothea is attending to: namely, the work itself and the
See Matthew Kieran, ‘The Impo\ crishment of Art". British Journal o f Aesthetics, (forthcoming), for a more 
detailed development of this thought.
Peter Winch used the example to illustrate the related point that one should judge based on one's own experience, 
rather than that of others. See Peter Winch, "Text and Context", Trying To Make Sense (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), 
pp. 18-32.
** George Eliot, Middletmrch (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965), Chapter 20, pp. 228-229.
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experience properly afforded by it. Significance in art relates to hum an understanding in the full 
blooded im aginative sense. That is, appreciating through one's im aginative engagem ent with the 
artwork, how the world as it is represented may be, and thus, in such a world, what one would or should 
th ink  an d  feel. O ur im aginative engagem ent w ith  an artw ork  may prom ote an im aginative 
understanding, which itself may bear a complex relationship  to our actual w orld. For how an 
impossible, possible or actual world is represented and what the imaginative understanding promoted 
is, may not straightforw ardly be the im aginative understanding of our w orld that the artist seeks to 
promote. For example, Dostoevsky's Notes From The Underground manifests an understanding of the 
world which suggests people are evil, mean and irrational because of, and not despite, their humanity. 
Yet this is only a partial aspect of the imaginative understanding which Dostoevsky and the work 
ultimately promotes concerning our world. One is supposed to see, through the underground character, a 
possibility he seeks to deny; nam ely, that it is in this condition that hum anity 's  moral worth and 
greatness lies, which allows for the possibility of redemption.
The engagem ent and prescription of our im agination by the artw ork  aims to prom ote the 
imaginative understanding of the world portrayed, whether fictional or not, and thus, depending upon 
its relation to this w orld, shed some light on our form of life, w hether in its more parochial or 
transcendent aspects. Historical w ork though factually faulty, may still evoke a better im aginative 
understanding than other more factually accurate historical works. Hence Gibbon's Decline and Fall of 
the Roman Empire may yet guide us to a deeper appreciation of Roman civilisation. It is the primacy of 
experience, whether imagined or not, which grounds deep understanding. It is the imagination which 
allows us the possibility of properly understanding  others in a way w hich cannot be grasped by 
theoretical explanation. Moreover, im aginative openness to the w orld and others is essential to 
p revent the concrétisation of thin understand ing . Theoretical understand ing  severed from the 
im aginative understanding will inevitably end up bypassing or short circuiting the very thing it was 
supposed to explain in the first place. Indeed, the possible intrusion of reality, the way the w orld is as 
distinct from the way it is theoretically taken to be may then be precluded. If our imaginations are not 
cultivated and continually exercised in their openness to the world and others, then we may become 
like the utilitarian Mr. G radgrind or the critically obsessed Mr. Causaubon. For example, for one who 
cannot even imagine the point of art, let alone understand it, art m ust be nebulous and at best trivial. 
Art may then be falsely conceived as just a m atter of social ostentation or elitism . Such a failure to 
appreciate the point of a ttending  to artw orks itself displays a patent lack of im agination. The 
imagination can help us to look at the world and others in new lights.
If one's experience is not merely the self-confirmation of our theoretical understanding, if there 
is to be true, genuine, inter action w ith others and the w orld, then im aginative understanding  is 
requisite. Theoretical understanding  presupposes a sym biotic re lationship  w ith  our im aginative 
understanding. Imaginative understanding opens up the possibility of discovering that our theoretical
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understanding may be flawed and vice versa. Hence neither properly operates in a circular, self- 
confirmatory way. Moreover, the im agination allows us to understand fully w hat we may only thinly 
understand, in terms of theory and predictive accuracy. If we imagine what the world would be like 
u n d er the relevant construal, w hat the practice is like for those w ho take part in it, and our 
imagination does not fail us, then we will be able more fully to understand the point and purpose of the 
particular activity involved. Where the faculty of im agination is sustained, developed and promoted, 
we can and do notice things which do not confirm, or may even suggest there is something fundam entally 
wrong with, our present privileged understanding of the world, others and ourselves.
Imagining how things could be promotes our imaginative understanding, which may lead one to 
look at things differently. Thus new horizons may open up through noticing things which are contrary 
to one's general understanding of life. Openness to life, the dem ands the world and others make upon us, 
requires imagination. Imagination is required for a full understanding of a potential self, actual friend 
or possible world whereas, for example, a psychological theory is not, except in a trivial, uninteresting 
way. The imaginative understanding of another is not a m atter of w hat 1 w ould think in his position, 
but rather what is it that he w ould think and feel The better I understand another, based upon such 
im aginative experience, the more I can imagine w hat he is likely to do or how he is likely to react, 
independently of theory.
It is through the cultivation and prom otion of imagination and im aginative understanding, in 
helping us to remain imaginatively open, that art has a great and significant role to play. O ur interest 
in stories, or past and potential futures, is not merely based upon entertainment or whimsy. In engaging 
our im agination, art prom otes particu lar im aginative understandings of the w orld, others and 
ourselves. Central to art is the peculiarly powerful engagement of the imagination. What distinguishes 
great literature from a hypothetical philosophy example or a Barbara Cartland novel is not a m atter 
of fictionality or predictive ness, bu t the vivid imaginative experience with and deep understanding of 
a possible world. Thus art is concerned w ith and fundamentally relates to our relationships regarding 
the world and others. The relationship the im agined characters have to their w orld, to the other 
characters, is prescribed and prom oted by the artw ork to deepen our understanding of that possible 
world. Since the artistically postulated w orld bears a complex relation to our w orld, it deepens our 
im aginative understanding  of ourselves and others. George Eliot in M iddlem arch, th ro u g h  the 
description of Causaubon and Dorothea in Venice, shows how one who mistakes truth for what others, 
especially critics, say, misses the point that it is ultimately the experience our understanding should be 
faithful to. Thus the process of imagining and engaging w ith art ought to be continuous. Art fuels th e  
symbiotic interplay between our imaginative and thin understanding and thus it is that art may serve 
to educate.
Now the relationsliip between postulated imaginative understandings and their relevance to 
our world is not peculiar to art. ft is central to our attem pts to understand things in our everyday lives.
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But the artwork engages the imagination and promotes our imaginative understanding of the world in 
particularly powerful and vivid ways. This is the very point of artistic conventions and genres; to 
prescribe better imaginings. It is this w hich allows art to be peculiarly and distinctively significant. 
The imaginative understanding promoted by a work, which may be indeterm inate, interacts w ith one's 
own imaginative understanding of what such a world or the people within it would be like. Thus we 
may criticise an artist on the grounds that he lacks a sound understanding of hum an action, which is 
revealing both about the w riter and those w ho make the criticism. Art can be true to life. It can 
manifest a false or a sound imaginative understanding of the world and others: how, given a certain 
situation, certain people and their inter-relations would work out.
M oreover, the relation of a represented w orld to ours may itself betray a better or worse 
understanding. It may be, on one end of the scale, fantastical or, on the other, faithful to what we are 
actually like. Art can thus capture or be false to the nature and reality of our hum an world, whether in 
a highly parochial or more transcendent regard. At its best, art, whether fictional or not, is faithful to 
and expresses a sound im aginative understanding of the hum an world. A rt's significance involves a 
pow erfu l experien tial re lation th ro u g h  w hat is im agined , w hich prom otes our im aginative 
understanding. Thus art is neither merely cognitively trivial nor potentially equivalent to all other 
forms of discourse. The imaginative understanding and its relation to our world may be subjected to 
questions of truth or falsity. Thus, in relation to the imagined experience, art can be potentially more, 
rather than less faithful to how the w orld is, than theories which seek to explain human behaviour. 
Indeed without imaginative understanding, there would be nothing for theoretical understanding to get 
to grips with.
Section 3: Imaginative T,ngagement and Interpretation.
Having established the importance of imagination to deliberation and understanding, we can 
now move on to consider, more specifically, its role in relation to art. The imagination is central to the 
interpreting process in our engagem ent w ith art. Our imaginative acquaintance w ith characters and 
states of affairs, fictional or not, may be significantly cultivated through engaging w ith artw orks.*^ 
W hat is distinctive of artw orks is their representation of the state of affairs to be imagined and the 
evocation they afford. Imaginative understanding em erges from the process of interpreting, that is, 
actively p laying w ith how the w orld m ight be. Hence we can and do develop new ways of
* ^ Frank Palmer’s LiteratureaiidMoral Understanding (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1992) seems to confuse fictionality 
with literary significance along these lines, see especially pp. 174-180. But Gibbon’s Decline and Fall o f the Roman 
Empire can be artistically significant, cultivate our imaginative understanding and be true regarding actual states of 
affairs. Conversely, a fictional story may neither promote understanding or be artistically significant.
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understanding the world. The imagination enables us to understand imaginatively our experience and 
the dem ands of the world, offering increased potential and possibilities. O ur im aginings test the 
imaginative possibilities within the world, even potentialities not directly open to us. Thus they may 
develop and promote distinct imaginative understandings. As 1 have shown, this is far from being 
distinctive of art. However, it is certainly characteristic of our experience with artw orks that we look 
for and are concerned with interpreting them.
From reading Thomas The Tank Engine as children and studying King Lear for A-level to 
watching Blade R/nuifr on Saturday night at the cinema, we typically look to make sense of what we 
are confronted with. We look for possible meanings, allegories, allusions, all of which may enable us to 
make sense of our imaginative experience. When we do so, the pleasure is often immense. Sometimes, 
when we fail to do so, the disappointment and frustration can be great. The distinctiveness of art in this 
regard lies in the m anipulation of media, conventions and genres to vivify our imaginings. Thus it is, 
that creating and engaging w ith artw orks is perhaps the most powerful means we have of enhancing 
our im aginative understandings. O ur im aginings are prescribed in order to prom ote alternative 
imaginative understandings which may jar, modify and develop our own understanding of the world 
and others. Artworks may vividly convey the sense of a potential world and its possible relations to our 
own. Thus, for example, W ordsworth may enhance our particular understanding and appreciation of th e  
Lakes and landscape in general.
Of course, an artist may bring private associations and meanings to bear in his creation of an 
artwork; associations which may not be available to the w ider public. Yet, if the poem is successful, 
the artw ork will prove imaginatively valuable to even those readers unaw are of the poet's private 
associations. Artworks, an artist's oeuvre or an artistic genre may modify and contribute significantly to 
our own imaginative understanding. Thus, for example, the art of a civilisation may critically reflect 
its particular nature, self-understandings and form of life.
However, the question now is, w hat is involved in interpreting an artwork? Detectivists hold 
that w hat the w ork prescribes one to im agine, usually taken as identical w ith the authorially 
intended prescriptions, is to be discovered. That is, w hat we are prescribed to imagine is determ ined 
wholly independently of the audience. However, f will argue, spectatorial im aginative engagem ent 
with art is also, in a significant sense, constructivist.^^ The imaginative understandings promoted in 
artw orks through our im aginings are both engaged w ith and, in that engagem ent, constructively 
constituted. Conversely, the recognition that interpretation is in one sense constructivist does not, as 
m any typically assum e, rule out the recognition that part of our im aginative engagem ent and
20 See Berys Gaut, "Making Sense of Films: Neoformalism and its Limits", Forum for Modern Language Studies, 
(forthcoming), which is the source for the terminology of constructivism and detectivism. The latter term Gaut 
adapted from Mark Johnston. Gaut's position is more strongly deiectivist than my own and says little explicitly 
concerned with the imagination.
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interpretation is inherently detectivist. That is, the artw ork itself constitutes a fram ework around 
which one's imaginings are constructed. Thus, full blooded constructivism cannot be sound. That is, w hat 
should be imagined is not wholly determined by or reducible to what the audience imagine. Hence, we 
can m isinterpret an artw ork. The dichotom y between detectivism and constructivism  is unhelpful. 
Rather, we should recognise that the sense in which our engagement is constructive enables the work to 
prescribe, to a significant extent, our imaginings.
One way we may bring this out, is by considering the developm ent of shared artistic  
conventions. The construction of conventions is itself a collaborative process, w here the im aginative 
engagement of spectators helps to create meaning, evolving over time and artistic developm ent. Yet the 
point of developing artistic conventions, is to facilitate and guide our imaginative engagement. For 
example, understanding genre conventions involves an awareness of their construction, development and 
modification. Such an understanding enables the artist to m anipulate and develop genre conventions in 
order to prescribe certain spectatorial imaginings. The very nature of the artistic m edium  is, in part, 
constituted through its artistic developm ent and m anipulation. The artistic histoiy of a medium, and 
the cultural practice of art, influences the potential range and nature of expression, representation or 
imaginative possibilities open to a m edium  at a given time. For example, the newly evolving artistic 
medium of film, at the turn of the century, adapted genre and artistic conventions from more established 
media, such as literature.^  ^Thus, once established, it could develop more distinct means of expression 
and representation.
The artistic m edium  is constituted by the raw materials, physical and conventional, open to 
artistic m anipulation. It is a pool of artistic resources available to the artist to dip into to create, 
modify and develop his work. Physically distinct m aterials which are w orked, from oil paints to 
water colours to film, contribute different aspects to the nature of the work. The physical m aterials 
m anipulated partly constitute, and thus bring distinct particular features to, the nature of the w ork 
created. Thus a water colour, oil or photograph of Mont Sainte-Victoire will distinctly shape what we 
are prescribed to imagine. The horizons of our imaginative engagement will in each case be different. 
The same is true of more conventionally constitutive aspects of a medium: the conventions themselves 
shape the very nature of what it is we are to imagine. For example, the constraints of the Gothic genre 
have several constitutive features; the self-conscious narrative, the struggle betw een rational and 
emotional forces, between virtue and evil am idst dark  neo-medieval settings. These conventions are
21 Dilys Powell drew attention to D. W. Griffith’s use of literaiy narrative in her review of The Birth o f a Nation. 
See Christopher Cook (ed.). The Dilys Powell Film Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 357-358. 
David BoïdweW s Narration in the Fiction Film (London; Methuen, 1985), and John Fell’s Fihn and the Narrative 
Tradition (Oklahoma; Oklahoma University Press, 1974), also point up this fact. D. J. Wenden, The Birth o f The 
Movies (London: MacDonald, 1974), Chapter 2, pp. 50-51 expliciliy states that Griffith himself professed a debt for 
his ‘cut back’ techniques to Dickens.
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grounded upon the construction and developm ent of particular works, as the m edium  or form of a r t 
evolves and develops.
Typically, an artist will treat the m edium  and genre conventions as raw materials w hich he 
can work up and develop in a particular way. The frame of the spectator is assum ed in order for the 
artw ork to be intelligible and imaginatively engaging. Spectators are presumed capable of detecting or 
recognising the basic constructed tools. This enables the confident im aginative m anipulation and 
development of the medium, conventions and genre by the artist. The artist and audience are dependent 
upon their understanding of the m edium  and conventions which are treated as given, so they may be 
m anipulated and engaged with. On this basis our im aginative understanding of particu lar artistic  
m edia, narratives, oeuvres and so on may not only be engaged but developed.
Consider Tim Burton's Edzmrd Scissorhands; a filmic fable set w ithin a recognisable Gothic 
genre, but located in m iddle-tow n America. The central premise to the whole film is a trope of the 
Gothic genre, namely the monster-as-innocent. Edward, a creation unfinished by his deceased inventor, 
is not a malevolent outside force bringing irrational, corrupting forces into a small town community. 
Rather, he is an innocent who is persecuted by these very forces, present w ithin everyday m iddle 
America. It is Edward who brings out the potential innocence or evil in others. In our imaginative 
engagem ent we become more aware of the nature of the Gotliic genre. S im ilarly, C lint Eastw ood's 
Unfovgiven deconstructs the genre of the Western. Central to this genre is the strong, autonomous, and 
courageous frontiersm an whose moral authority is his own. Yet in Unforgiven, he is represented as 
degenerating into a brutalised nihilist. The vanity of conceiving of the ind ividual will as the only 
locus of value and authority is subverted. Thus, the W estern's delusions of heroism and virtue are 
stripped away. One is left only w ith indifference to savage violence and the annihilation of life. By 
subverting the genre in this way, not only is our understanding  of the w estern enhanced, but our 
imaginative grasp of a particular way of conceiving the world is itself promoted.
Nevertheless, though the m anipulation of materials and conventions means our imaginations 
are prescribed by the artwork, our imaginative engagement is also constructive. That is, far from being 
told everything, the imagination is engaged and prescribed to imagine in an open-ended way. Indeed, 
for there to be genre constructions to be detected at all, there must have been imaginatively constructive 
engagement. For example, in the early cinema, audiences could not assume that the shot of a train going 
in, followed by a shot of a train coming out of a tunnel, involved the same train. Quickly though, linear 
narrative came to be generally understood as arising from juxtaposed camera shots.^^ Thus something 
we presume to be basic and naturally obvious is, in fact, a constructed cinematic convention, which, as 
part of our general understanding of cinema, is now unthinkingly detected by us as spectators.
22 See D. J. Wenden, The Birth o f The Movies (London; MacDonald, 1974), Chapter 1, pp. 20-22 for an account ol 
the development of narrali\ c shots by Edward Porter.
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Once constructed, conventions may only be pointed up when m anipulated to frustrate our 
conventional expectations. For example, in Stanley Kubrick's The Shiniitg, one character flies and 
drives back through blizzards to get to the possessed house. We follow his dogged progress, as the 
terrorised wife and child are pursued by the evil husband, jack. Conventionally such a character would 
of course 'save the day' once he arrives. But our expectations are jolted, and our awareness of this as a 
genre convention highlighted, w hen he is killed upon arrival by Jack. W ithout constructive 
imaginative engagement and experience in the first place, there could be no general understanding of 
these conventions to be developed or jolted. Indeed, there could be no meaning which could be assumed to 
be generally understood by the audience. Imaginative engagement, interpretation and understanding is 
what grounds the shared, constructed frame upon which an artist depends to m anipulate and prescribe 
our imaginings.
The Kuleshov effect shows just how constructive our imaginative engagement with films can be. 
Kuleshov interspliced the neutral and fixed expression of a matinee idol w ith pictures of various 
objects, ranging from a bowl of soup to a coffin. Yet the spectators thought the actor's subtlety of 
expression was amazing.^^ Similarly, montage can vividly demonstrate one of the ways imagination is 
engaged w ith and central to our appreciation of film. As V. F. Perkins suggests, in relation to Fritz 
Lang's M, rather than showing m urders, it is far more effective to leave viewers' im aginations to settle 
what went on since, cued by the film, the spectator's imaginings will be more terrifying than what can 
beshow n.^^ For example, Ridley Scott's A lien  imaginatively engages us more than James Cameron's 
sequel, by allowing our im agination a more constructive role. When Dallas is killed, we see only a 
montage of the alien lunging forw ard, followed by blood splattering onto Dallas' white space suit. 
Conversely Cameron, by showing everything gratuitously, over-determines and thus precludes our 
imaginative engagement. In imaginatively engaging w ith a w ork there is a necessary and symbiotic 
inter-play as the work provokes, engages and guides the spectatorial imaginative understanding. We 
must treat our understanding of the medium, conventions, public associations and so on as given. We also 
bring our own stock of private meanings, associations and imaginative understandings to bear. Thus, in 
various ways, we may legitim ately im agine different things. That is, in constructively im agining 
beyond what is given, there may be an ineliminable, blameless variety in legitimate interpretation.
I am not claiming that an artist's intentions are straightforwardly irrelevant. After all, it is on 
the very basis of personal and intentional inferences that one can see artistic developm ent and growth. 
Thus, in many cases, we can relate one work to another in order to see w here the artist is trying to take 
us. An artw ork is never wholly atom istically developed, conceived or engaged with. However, the 
recognition that artistic intention typically has a significant role in constituting the artw ork does not
23 V. F. Perkins, Fihn as Film (London: Penguin, 1972), Chapter 5, p. 106. 
2*1 ibid.. Chapter 7, p. 141.
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entail that it is the sole determ inant of in terpretation. Of course, we may have good reasons for 
assum ing, in our imaginative engagement, that authorial intent has a privileged place. Good artists 
typically know w hat they are doing. Yet, nevertheless, even where we may legitim ately take an 
artist's intentions to be relevant, and where what they were is clear, there may be different legitimate 
interpretations.
Firstly, even where we may only be concerned w ith the intended meaning, there may be an 
inelim inable plurality of interpretations. These may arise from a w ork's am biguity, which may be 
intentionally created by the artist. Thus an artist may intend to allow for a num ber of incompatible 
interpretations, which are all equally open to the spectator. This, as David Hum e recognised, may 
lead to justifiably different evaluations of the w ork based upon differences of interests and values:
"w here there is such a diversity in the internal frame or external situation as is 
entirely blameless on both sides, and leaves no room to give one the preference above 
the other; in that case a certain degree of diversity in judgem ent is unavoidable, and 
we seek in vain for a standard, by which we can reconcile the contrary sentim ents."^^
The plurality  of possible interpretations are not merely partial interpretations, subsum able 
under a minimal, coherent interpretation.^^ For example. Turner's Hannibal Crossing the Alps may 
manifest an understanding of nature as both cruel and kind. W hat is significant and paradoxical in the 
artistic form used is the particular im aginative understand ing  of nature which, in guiding our 
imagination, attem pts to make sense of the cruelty, beauty and goodness of nature. The ambiguities 
inherent in the artw ork may be in terpreted  distinctly  by different spectators. A nother example, 
perhaps more clearly cut, comes at the end of Robert Ham er's Kind Hearts and Coronets. It is plainly 
left ambiguous as to whether Alec Guinness' character is discovered to have committed the m urders or 
not. It is perfectly consistent w ith the entire film, to interpret it either way.2^
Of course, an intentionalist may claim that such ambiguities may be intended by the artist. 
That is, though there may be more than one legitimate interpretation, the artist's intention delimits 
the possible interpretations.^^ To treat the w ork as art, our engagem ent as adequately sensitive
25 Da\ id Hume, “Of the Standard of Taste” in S. Copley and A. Edgar (eds.), David Hume: Selected Exxrzys (Oxford: 
Oxford Uni\ ersily Press, 1993), pp. 149-150.
26 Compare this with the way Simon Blackburn misconstrues Hume, as arguing for a conv ergence conception of 
truth, in his Spreading The Word (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 196-202.
27 This point only counts against those who think intentionalism entails that there can only be one legitimate, all- 
consuming interpretation. For example E. D. Hirsch Jr., Validity in Interpretation (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1967), pp. 218-219.
28 I lake this to be the position of Richard Wollheim’s Painting as an Art (London: Thames and Hudson, 1987), pp. 
13-100.
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spectators must still seek to discover the possible meanings intended by the artist. After all, an artist 
can intend a num ber of incompatible interpretations, which are thus open to the spectator. However, 
intentionalism entails that the artist m ust know the w ork's full meaning and the possible permutations 
therein. Yet, the nature of an artist's action may sometimes only come to be fully known retrospectively. 
Of course, an artist's action may be performed under the intention to create a particular work of art. 
H owever, this does not entail that the artist actually creates w hat he had in m ind. Firstly, the 
artist's response as he acts, his deliberation about and in acting, may modify the original intention 
itself and  thus the action. For exam ple, Francis Bacon's professed m ethod of w orking involved 
'controlled accidents'.2^ Sim ilarly, Maya D eren has described her realist film m aking practice, 
according to which, photography should be "understood as an art of the 'controlled accident.'" The 
cinem atographer "should refrain from over controlling the aspect if he is to retain the authority  of 
re a lity ."30 The thought is that the artificial scene being filmed will seem real, because it occurs 
against a background of spontaneous, unintended and uncontrolled reality.
Secondly, in acting on his guiding intention, the artist may do something which has unintended 
results. Furthermore, the unintended feature may constitute an artistically  significant part of the 
finished artw ork. Thus, an artist m ight produce an unintended, artistically  re levan t am biguity . 
Indeed, the artw ork 's unintended, artistically relevant features may not even be recognised by th e  
artist. Therefore, the artist may create an artw ork different from the one he'd intended. Hence, it could 
be said, the expressiveness of late Van Gogh partly resulted from an increasing visual disorder. Van 
G ogh's visual handicap, rather than his artistic intent, m ight explain broader brush  strokes or 
luminous, striking colours. Indeed, Van Gogh might not even have been able to recognise the brilliance 
of colour he applied. Going even further, it is possible that, parasitic upon an artist's other w ork or the 
practice of art as a whole, an artw ork  may be wholly unintentionally made, a glorious m istake 
perhaps. This is why an artistic expression of anger may be divorced from the intent or feeling of the 
artist. It is the evolution of artistic conventions which enables meaning, apart from a particular a r tis tic  
intent. Indeed, it is precisely because of the evolving construction of artistic practices and conventions 
that there can be something to interpret at all.
Thirdly, the artist may, despite liis intention, fail to create his intended artw ork at all. I may 
intend to write a literary novel and fail to do so because my book is a different kind of artw ork from the 
one I intended. Contrastingly, it may be because the end product lacks artistic w orth of any kind. More 
significantly, the imaginative understandings we often bring to bear in our engagement, and which may
29 See David Syh ester. The Brutality o f Fact: Interviews with Francis Bacon (London: Thames and Hudson, 1987).
30 Maya Deren, "Cinematography: The Creative Use of Reality" in G. Mast and M. Cohen (eds.). Film, Theory and 
Criticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 58.
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cohere w ith the artw ork, often were not or could not have been known about by the artist /1  For 
example, Henry James may have definitely intended readers to take the narrator of Turn of the Screw 
to be reliable. Yet it may be more imaginatively engaging and enlightening to engage with the work on 
the basis of a Freudian understanding of hum an motivation and action.32 Thus, independently of how 
James intended his work, it seems we may imaginatively engage with it on a Freudian basis. This may 
now seem to leave the door w ide open to full blooded constructivism. Namely, that the legitimacy of an 
interpretation makes no reference to the work itself, but is determ ined by the audience. However, that 
is to take too many steps at once.
Unintended interpretations may be legitimate as long as our engagement is constrained by and 
coheres w ith the nature and conventions of the w ork and is imaginatively valuable. Thus we may 
interpret Turn of the Screw in a Freudian light if the story and events can be taken as manifesting, 
developing and exploring Freudian themes. One consideration for the attem pt to do so may be if one 
normally takes a Freudian understanding of hum an affairs to be imaginatively valuable. But this, of 
itself, does not determ ine the legitimacy of the in terpretation. For if it cannot cohere w ith the 
prescriptions of the work in an imaginatively valuable way, then it cannot constitute a legitim ate 
interpretation of the work. Thus, a radical performance of a play, such as Stephen Daldry's direction of 
J. B. Priestley 's An Inspector Calls, may be sound. In this case, the perform ance constituted an 
imaginatively valuable and coherent expressionist interpretation of what was previously considered a 
prim e exemplar of naturalistic dram a. A lthough an artw ork may be intended in a particular w ay, it 
may Justifiably be imaginatively engaged with and interpreted in other ways. We are not interested in 
the intention of the artist for its own sake, except for historical or biographical reasons. Rather, we are 
interested in the artw ork itself. Herein lies the glim m er of truth distorted by those who would decry 
intentional inference in art as a f a l l a c y .33
A rtistic  in ten t is typically  taken as one of the m ost s ign ifican t variab les g u id in g  
interpretation. This is because it is the artistic im agination which enables the imaginative world of 
the artwork to be open to us. We take it that, typically, the artist knows best what he is doing and thus
31 This objection even applies to Alexander Nehamas’ intentionalism, w here the notion of the postulated author is 
argued for as a regulative ideal. Sec Alexander Nehamas, "The Postulated Author; Critical Monism as a Regulative 
Ideal", Criticallnquiry, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1981, pp. 133-149, and his "Writer, Text, Work, Author" in A. J. Cascardi 
(ed.). Literature and the Question o f Philosophy (Baltimore: John Hopkins Uni\ersity Press, 1987), pp. 265-291.
32 See G. Willen (ed.), A Casebook on Henry .James's The Turn of the Screw and Other Tales, 2nd ed., (New York: 
Thomas Y. Crowell, 1969), which includes, amongst other interpretations, Edmund Wilson’s “The Ambiguity of 
Henry James”, pp. 115-153.
33 The crass claim that artistic intentions cannot ever be relevant is made in W. K. Wimsatt, Jr., and Monroe 
Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy” in G. Dickie, R. Sclafani and R. Roblin (eds.). Aesthetics (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1989), pp. 431-441. Unfortunately, Wimsatt and Beardsley conflate explanation, motivation and 
intention. Furthermore, that a particular artwork may be made or interpreted apart from the guiding intent with which 
it was made, does not entail that intention may never fruitfully guide our interpretation.
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that their construal is probably the m ost valuable. We trust that the artist is attem pting to prescribe 
and guide our im aginings in a valuable way, one w hich prom otes a p articu la r im aginative 
understanding. Yet the artist can be mistaken in this regard or he can fail to achieve what he intended. 
Furtherm ore, later developm ents in the practice of art and ways of understanding the world, might 
alter the most fruitful basis upon which to engage w ith the artwork. Therefore, the presum ption in 
favour of artistic intent as a significant variable is a defeasible one. Furtherm ore, with regard to 
collaborative cases, the prinia facie presum ption in favour of artistic intent is much weaker. The 
conventions, genres and m edia of art partly constitute and shape the nature of w hat is communicated, 
the way we imaginatively understand the im agined world. Thus, particularly in collaborative cases, 
unintended or non-intended meanings can arise from what is created. For our imaginative engagement is 
with and constrained by the artw ork itself and not the artist.
Although intentions may play a significant part in the work's constitution, they cannot wholly 
fix the work's meaning. This will hold especially true for media which, like architecture or film, are 
typically collaborative. Similarly, intention will tend to be of lesser potential significance w here the 
form of artistic production is collaboratively organised, as in the hierarchically ordered  artistic 
schools of Renaissance Italy.3^ An extreme and classic cinematic case of the clash of differing intentions 
and conventions, which cut across each other, is The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari. The original political 
allegory was subverted by W iene's direction and W ierle's expressionist design. Thus the originally 
intended radicalism was transformed into a justification of conservative power.3-'*
The nature and purpose of in terpretation is inform ed by and subject to the dictates of 
imaginative value, constrained by the work which guides and shapes our im aginative engagement. 
Im aginative engagem ent is not an instrum ental means of accessing the artistic m ind. Rather, the 
artistic m ind and its creations are there to engage the im agination and  prom ote im aginative 
understanding. Therefore, neither the authorial intention which guided the artw ork's construction nor 
the artw ork's formal features alone can wholly fix the w ork's meaning. Rather, the artw ork's possible 
interpretations are dependent upon and fixed by various potentially significant variables. These range 
from considerations of authorial intent, the w ork's formal features, media, conventions and genres to 
aspects of w hat the w ork is taken to be a representation of and aspects of the audience's imaginative 
understandings. How significant the variables actually are will depend upon the particular artw ork
34 See Maya Dercn's "Cinematography; The Creative Use of Reality" and Erwin Panofsky's "Style and Medium in 
the Moving Pieturc" in G. Mast and M. Cohen (eds.), Fi/m Theory and Criticism (New York; Oxford Universit) 
Press, 1985), pp. 51-65 and 215-233 respectively, for cogent arguments concerning the inherently collatxmitive 
nature of film as an artistic medium.
35 Bruce Murray, Fihn and the German I^ ft in The Weimar Republic (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), 
pp. 26-27.
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being engaged with and w hat categories it is most relevantly seen u n d e r / 6  T q  perceive an artw ork 
through the appropriate categories is a m atter of training, skill and understanding . After all, what is 
lively in Mondrian is almost static or mournful in the work of Miro.
Section 4: Interpretative TCuraCism
It m ight now be thought that, though we should recognise a work is open to the view er's 
constructive, imaginative engagement, our interpretation remains constrained by a detectivist core. As 
Gombrich was the first to recognise, the beholder's share, the view er's imaginative contribution, is 
central.37 Thus we can allow for, and in certain cases prescribe, plural legitimate interpretations. Yet 
these are dependent upon an overarching absolute interpretation. The minimal, absolute interpretation 
should explain the various possible legitimate options available to the spectator, in engaging with and 
interpreting the artwork. Thus it should pick out the imaginative gaps left for the spectator to fill in. 
Of course, all artworks are indeterminate in innumerable, artistically irrelevant respects: for example, 
w hat King Lear's wife was like or w here Cezanne's A Murder took place. However, w hat we are 
interested in, is w hether an aspect of the story which is artistically relevant is indeterm inate or not. 
Of course this is a m atter of degree. It may m atter only slightly that Antonio, in the Merchant of 
Venice, is a m iddle-aged rather than an elderly gentleman. But it m atters a great deal w hether his 
affection for Bassanio is fatherly or erotic or whether Portia's lines to Shy lock are ironically spoken or 
not. E. H. Gombrich discusses the am biguous smile of the Mona Lisa in this vein: it is open to the 
spectator, in his imaginative engagement, to construct and contribute within the fixed frame provided 
by the artwork.38 This is so independently of whether Leonardo intended it to be taken thus or not.
We might conceive of our imaginative engagement with artworks in a manner akin to colouring 
by numbers: certain demarcated patches are deliberately left w ithout a num ber so the viewer may fill 
them in. Therefore, though there is an absolute interpretation to be detected and worked w ithin, it 
cannot fully determine our particular interpretations. Tliis conception of interpretation properly allows 
room for our interests, preferences and judgem ent within the frame determined by the artwork. Thus, we 
can allow incompatible interpretations as to w hether the Mona Lisa intimates an understated, alluring
36 See Kendall Walton's "Categories of Art" in J. Margolis (ed.), Philosophy Looks at the Arts (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1978), pp. 88-114, and Annette Barnes’ On Interpretation (Oxford; Blackwell, 1988), l or 
whom there are a multiplicity of criteria for interpretation.
37 See E. H. Gombrich's Art and Illusion (Oxford; Phaidon, 1977), Ch. VI, especially pp. 167-169, where he 
discusses Reynolds' comments on the indistinctness required to allow for the viewer’s imaginative contribution.
38 E. H. Gombrich, The Story o f Art, 14th ed., (Oxford: Phaidon, 1984), pp. 227-229, where he talks of Leonardo’s 
use ol sftuna to to leave something for the spectator’s imagination.
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fam iliarity or a frosty, distanced im personality. It is im portant to realise that I do not mean 
incompatible in the following sense: it is a fact of the m atter that the Mona Lisa both is and is not 
smiling. After all, contradictions are never true.39 Rather, I mean incompatible in the sense that one 
cannot hold both interpretations in relation to the Mona Lisa at the same time. This is because our 
interpretation is underdeterm ined by the artw ork in this highly significant regard. Note that the 
ambiguity is inherent in the artwork, independently of w hether Leonardo intended it to be taken thus 
or not. In constructively engaging w ith  the Mona Lisa, we may im aginatively realise one of the 
possibilities or even fruitfully oscillate between them. The imaginative richness and value of the Mona 
Lisa lies in its very am biguity. However, we cannot hold these distinct interpretations as applicable 
at the same time. Furthermore, through allowing for the constructive contributions of spectators, th is  
view can allow for a certain kind of inelim inable, blam eless ind ividual, historical and cultural 
relativity of interpretation.
H owever, I w ant to argue, this position rem ains inadequate to ano ther way d iffe ren t 
legitimate interpretations arise. In order to im aginatively engage w ith an artw ork, the viewer must 
bring to bear his own understanding, assum ptions and associations. As Gombrich has most cogently 
argued, there is no such thing as an innocent e y e . 4 6  Interpreting an artwork cannot merely be a case of 
detecting the constraints imposed by the work upon our imaginative engagement. For one cannot wholly 
separate  the process of detecting the fram e from  our im aginative engagem ent and constructive 
contribution. In order to detect aspects of a work, one m ust already be constructing and contributing as one 
imaginatively engages. In our im agining, there is a symbiotic inter action between our constructive 
imaginings and what we take the structure of the artw ork to be and thus prescribe. The aim is to make 
the experience with the artwork, and the imaginative understanding it affords, as coherent, rewarding 
and com prehensive as possible. As we saw above, w hat is relevant here is not so much the actual 
artistic intent but rather what presumptions enable us to make best sense of the artw ork. Thus, the way 
the spectator constructively engages w ith aspects of the work, affects his interpretation of the artw ork 
as a whole.
However, the presum ptions and understanding we bring to the w ork radically differ across 
individuals, cultures and  historical epochs. This makes a crucial difference to w hat is taken to 
constitute a good interpretation. Of course, certain descriptions are obviously true: for example, that 
Bligh was the captain of the Bounty. But the nature of the events, characters' motives, actions or
39 See Robert Sleeker, “Incompatible Intcrpretation.s”, ./uwrzizz/u/Aey/Zzc/zcy Art Criticism, Vol. 50, No. 4, 
1992, pp. 291-298, for an argument against logically incompatible interpretations.
46 See E. H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion (Oxford: Phaidon, 1977), Ch. IX, pp. 250-254, and R. L. Gregory, Eye 
and Brain, 3rd ed., (London; Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1990). Gregory argues that the visual system seeks to 
organise our sensale experience into a meaningful whole by constructing and testing hypotheses, based on 
probability, against the thus apparent structure of the world.
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allegories represented are often far from clear. Thus, as was suggested above, one may bring radically 
distinct concerns to bear upon Henry James's Turn o f the Screw. Thus a reader who values psycho­
analytic explanation may look for an im aginative experience which itself reveals the complexities 
and unfolding force of the unconscious and sexual motivation. Conversely, another reader may set no 
store by psycho-analytic explanations at all. Thus, lacking an interest in and positive evaluation of 
psycho analytic understanding, he takes the narrator's claims at face value, as, incidentally, James 
himself intended.
An example of a less theoretically driven divergence in interpretation is Jacob's Ladder. All 
the cinematic cues and events portrayed are consistent w ith two distinct interpretations. One can 
imagine quite consistently that the Vietnam soldiers w ere subjected to deceptive and disastrous 
experimentation w ith hallucinogenic drugs, to enhance their fighting capacity. Conversely, one could 
imagine that all the events portrayed were in fact the hallucination of a man dying in the battlefield 
in Vietnam. Each interpretation differs not only as to the significance of certain events portrayed, but 
differs as to core features of what is happening at the most basic level. Of course, both interpretations 
are comprehensive, simple and coherent, at least in their own terms. Which one constitutes a better 
interpretation thus depends upon the presumptions and imaginative understanding one brings to bear 
upon the film in the first place. Thus, if one brought to bear a Beckett like understanding of the futility 
of hum an existence, meaning and knowledge, one w ould prefer the second interpretation. However, if 
one brought to bear an understanding of and concern for life as purposive, one w ould tend tow ard the 
former interpretation. In the case of both w orks discussed, the resultant differing interpretations 
diverge over both the significance of certain events and over how under-determined aspects of the w ork 
are to be imagined. Different interpretations tend to place different emphases upon distinct passages or 
features of the work.41
However, it m ight still be objected, from the fact that d ifferent people bring d ifferent 
understandings to bear, it doesn't follow that any interpretation is sound. The different assum ptions 
may be of socio cultural interest. But the fact that they are brought to bear cannot, of itself, legitimise 
their application. Thus, someone m ight argue, we should  seek to dem arcate w hat the legitim ate 
understanding is that we can bring to bear. How else could we make sense of the fact that we may be 
mistaken in applying a certain understanding or bringing certain assumptions to bear upon a particular 
artw ork? Typically, this is thought to entail that the understanding the original or intended audience 
would have possessed should be privileged. Hence, it is sometimes claimed, to appreciate an artw ork
4 1 See Matthew Kieran, “Relative Values in Art”, Journal o f Aesthetic Education, Spring, 1992, pp. 95-102, for a 
development of the argument, based upon Humean considerations, to the effect that a work’s value as art may be 
relative to the outlook we bring to bear upon it.
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properly, we should seek to get ourselves into the mind set of those whom the work was made fo r /^  
However, this reverts back to an appeal to the artist's intentions as fixing the sound interpretation of 
the artwork. But, as we saw, the whole point of the artw ork is not merely to find our way back to the 
artist's intentions.
Furthermore, as we saw, an artist's intentions may be undercut by unintended features, the 
contribution of others or evolving artistic conventions. On the same basis, an artist's intentions may be 
undercut by the imaginative understanding brought to bear in one's engagem ent w ith the work. The 
point of our engagement with an artw ork is not to understand the original audience of the artwork. 
Rather, it is to engage and cultivate our im aginative understanding, through prescribing imaginings. 
Furthermore, we do not require reference to the original intended audience in order to discriminate 
between legitimate and illegitim ate interpretations. Legitimate interpretations m ust be those w hich 
are the simplest, most coherent, comprehensive, non-contradictory and plausible interpretations of the 
artw ork. If the background assum ptions are re levantly  different, w hat constitutes coherence, 
comprehensiveness, plausibility and makes sense of the work's value will be relative.
The first kind of relativity allow ed for the possibility of an overarching explanation. An 
absolute interpretation which could include any two or more partial or contradictory readings, in the  
light of which they would no longer be seen to be contradictory. However, relativity of interpretation 
and evaluation arising from bringing relevantly different associations and understandings to bear, 
cannot admit of such an overarching interpretation. Even assuming different understandings agree about 
the salient features of a work, the insights of feminist, Freudian, Marxist or Leavisite interpretations 
of D. H. Lawrence, for example, cannot all be incorporated into one minimal absolute interpretation. 
The fundam ental insights of one in terp re tation  may be incom patible w ith and negated by the 
fundamental insights of another. Thus one may not even be able to argue as to whether the women in 
The Fox are both lesbians or not, or perhaps not even come to an agreement as to whether the question is 
relevant or not. The spectator's constructive imaginative engagement does not just supervene upon and 
grip onto the fundam ental structure prescribed and wholly determ ined by the artw ork. T hat is, 
spectatorial im aginative engagement does not merely flesh out the artist's work. For our imaginative 
engagement necessarily brings to bear our own understandings, private and public, which enable us to 
engage with the work in the first place.
Fundamentally different understandings brought to bear may lead to a relativity of w hat is to 
be imagined. Of course, m ere difference does not entail divergence. The presum ed understandings 
brought to bear must be relevantly different, before what are taken to be the centrally relevant features 
or under-determined aspects of the artw ork may radically differ. Thus there may be a multiplicity of
42 See Michael Baxandall, Painting and Experience in Fifteenth Century Italy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1972), especially the claims in Chapter 2, Section 3, pp. 36-40, for a sustained attempt to do just that and Anthony 
Savile’s The Test o f Time (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 64, for a similar claim.
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legitimate interpretations, depending upon the different relevant assumptions that may be brought to 
bear upon a w ork and cohere w ith  it. It is im portan t to realise that, again, 1 am not using 
incom patibility in the sense that the interpretations contradict one another. Indeed, interpretations 
which are divergent in this more radical sense are, strictly speaking, compatible. This is because, 
effectively, the validity of the interpretations are relativised to the background assumptions brought 
to bear. Thus the psychoanalytic interpretation and the Jamesian one are not even rivals. There is no 
common standard by which we can compare them, thus they cannot meaningfully disagree with each 
other, Therefore, there can be no contradiction. This is obviously a different kind of interpretative 
pluralism  than that which arises from one's im aginings being under-determ ined by the work, even 
where the same background assumptions are brought to bear.
Once the spectator's particular, constructive contribution is adm itted, it cannot be wholly 
restricted to pools of am biguity, autonom ously fram ed by the artw ork itself. O ur im aginative 
engagement does not merely reveal a work's core structure. Rather, the very nature of the work's core 
structure may itself partly depend upon the assumptions and imaginative understandings we bring to 
bear upon it. Thus, where the pools of ambiguity in  a work collect depends not just upon the structure of 
the work itself, but also upon the spectator. Of course, it does not follow from this that one cannot 
m isinterpret an artwork. We may hold both that different understandings may legitimise different 
interpretations and, nonetheless, that a work my determ inately prescribe us to imagine something. If 
we imagine otherwise, then we are simply m isinterpreting w hat we are prescribed by the w ork to 
imagine.
For some, the realisation of the constructive nature of our engagement w ith artworks has led to 
full blooded constructivism. That is, the idea that the spectator wholly creates w hat is imaginatively 
'there'. Thus all interpretations are taken to be reader response relative, subjective and equally valid. 
Interpretation is conceived as a form of spectatorial projectivism, whether grounded upon individual, 
cultural or critical g r o u p s . 4 3  Typically, claims are m ade about the shattering of the detectivist 
illusion: how we can no longer conceive of artw orks as translucent w indows, looking out upon an 
independently meaningful world. Thus, it is suggested, artw orks can only be opaque sheets of glass, 
m irrors which reflect back w hat is imaginatively projected by the spectator. The underlying basis of 
this conception is the D erridean thought that m eaning is inherently unstable.44 indeed, one cannot 
underm ine or subvert a w ork's meaning as such. The text's meaning itself is taken to be created by 
spectatorial engagement, thus one can only subvert the meaning, and thus the work, created by others.
43 See David Bord well. Making Meaning (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1989), Stanley Fish, Ls 
There A Text In This Class? (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), and Joseph Margolis, Art and 
PM/mop/zy (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980), Chapter 6, pp. 107-144.
44 See Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, ir. G. Spivak, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976).
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The work's meaning is understood to be constituted by the understanding and imaginative resources one 
brings to engage with a work. Thus there exists an infinity of possible interpretations.
The archetypal radical constructivist is Stanley Fish. Fish argues that a work's m eanings are 
made in the process of reading or, generalising the point, engagement. Thus meaning emerges from an 
event. That is, the interaction of a text w ith "the reader's expectations, projections, conclusions, 
judgements, and assumptions."^^ Fish goes on to argue from this, that, in fact, "it is the reader who 
makes literature."46 This is because, he holds, the artw ork cannot have any determ inate meaning, 
considered apart from any context of interpretation. Thus it is that the com m unity of interpreters 
produce meaning and thus fix the possible interpretations of a work. Even the most basic features of a 
w ork are held to be the product of interpretative strategies, rather than features to be discovered by 
interpretation.
The thesis is then radicalised even further by em phasising that the assum ptions, indiv idual 
and cultural, we bring to bear in our engagement will be different. That is, every person's socio cultural 
and epistemic background may differ significantly. Therefore, he argues, meaning is determined by the 
in te rp re ta tiv e  com m unity w ith in  w hich the reader belongs. Thus, the in terp re ta tive  context 
determines the meaning of the w ork and w hat may count as a legitimate interpretation. Meaning is 
relative to the lights of the institutional practice of interpretation. Thus the interpretative practices 
licensed by the particular com m unity one belongs to, determ ine w hat may count as a sound 
in terpretation  and why. An artw ork 's m eaning is constituted by the activities of the particu lar 
interpretative community which the spectator is a constituent of. It is im portant to note that Fish is not 
claiming that at any given time an infinity of interpretations is possible. This is because the limits of 
interpretation are determ ined by the socio culturally determ ined constraints upon meaning. Hence Fish 
does not claim, as some would suggest, that 'anything goes.'
Interestingly this self-proclaimed radical thesis actually lends itself to a highly conservative 
stance. The dom inant interpretation and practice defines what the legitimate interpretation may be, 
justified by reference to the agreem ent of peers. Thus, the status quo in any given interpretative 
community defines w hat is acceptable. One may not even be able to question the fundam entals of a 
dom inant interpretative practice which must, by definition, be sound. Fish cannot even make sense of 
the possibility that an interpretation, thus legitimised, may be inappropriate to a particular work. If 
a critic uses the norms of a particular interpretative community correctly and suggests that the film 
m eans P, then  the film  does so. The p lu ra lity  of in te rp re ta tions is conceived as arising  
straightforw ardly from the plurality of interpretative schools or cultural communities. Where conflict
45 See Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class?: The Authority o f Interpretive Communities (Cambridge Mass. 
Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 2.
46 ibid., p. 11.
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between the differing interpretations of distinct communities arises, there can be no means of settling 
the disputes. Indeed, whether they can ever conflict at all is debatable. Disputes can only be settled by 
reference to the community's own internal standards of interpretation and cannot be inter-communal. 
Thus particular communities are apparently free to engage imaginatively as they will. Artworks are 
conceived as imaginative springboards for communal fantasies.
However, if we bear in mind what we argued earlier, the problems with such an argum ent 
become clear. Radical constructivism adm its of no real constraints on our imaginings by the artw ork 
itself. After all, a particular interpretative community could develop the convention of reading books 
upside down or engaging with and judging novels by virtue of their covers. If such conventions were to 
develop and become dominant in a particular interpretative community, we could not say, according to 
Fish, that their engagement, interpretations and judgements are wrong. That one has to read in order to 
engage with a book is reduced to the interpretative criteria of a particular community. A different 
community might think otherwise. For Fish, there can be no possible mistake, except by the lights 
internal to a reader's own community.
However, the idea that the established dom inant interpretative practice is by definition 
always right is patently false. One could give a story about how a community evolved a particular 
interpretative practice. For example, how books came to be judged by their covers: novels became 
tedious whilst book covers became increasingly valuable as art. Nevertheless, if one judged the book by 
its cover, one could not be engaging with and evaluating Dostoevsky's Crime and Punishment. Crime and 
Punishment is not reducible to a m atter of communal interpretative construction. As we saw, the point 
and purpose of evolving artistic conventions, genres and practice is to enable the constraint and 
prescription of our constructive imaginings. The whole point of an artistic m anipulation of m aterials 
and forms is to engage the spectator. But the radical constructivist construes all artw orks as if they are 
like the poet's work in Cocteau's Orphée: blank sheets upon wliich we can project what we will. But 
this is to forget that the whole point of the exercise is to engage with the artw ork itself, not to bypass 
it.
Constructivism shares certain problems w ith Collingwood's conception of art. Collingwood 
conceives of the artist as producing an internal or mental experience, which is, essentially, the artw ork. 
The perceptible object, the material object produced, is seen as wholly subsidiary and incidental to th is . 
The artw ork itself is thus conceived as an imaginary object. So, for example, in music, the sound is 
merely the means by which the audience can im aginatively reconstruct the work. What is to be 
im agined is not identical with w hat is heard or seen. Rather, the artw ork proper is the im agined 
harmony or picture. Since the perceptible object itself is not the artwork, it is not the activity by virtue 
of which someone is an artist. Rather, it is only by virtue of the artis t's  relation to the aesthetic, 
mental experience. The aim of the artwork, this mental imagined object, is to express emotion and
160
thereby p r o m o t e  u n d e r s t a n d i n g / ^  What is essential in art, for Collingwood, is both the possession of 
unexpressed emotions and the w herew ithal in one's im agination to express them. A good poet will 
make a poet of his reader because the reader is required to recreate, in his imagination, the poet's 
creative act. As spectators, our engagement with the artw ork is necessarily collaborative: we follow, by 
imaginative reconstruction, the expressive path suggested by the artist.
However, for both Collingwood and constructivism, the identification of the artw ork becomes 
wholly problematic. Each spectator supposedly reconstructs the im agined work. Yet, the task itself 
seems impossible. Each spectator brings to the material object different assumptions, backgrounds and 
associations. Therefore, all the im aginative objects internal to each spectator and the artist w ill 
differ, no m atter how detailed and prescriptive the guiding material object is. Only the artist can have 
access to the particular artw ork he created, so the audience m ust literally make their own artw ork 
from the cues provided. But then, if the artwork is as it is constituted in interpretation, then we must be 
dealing w ith many different artworks.
A rtw orks are not to be iden tified  w ith an in d iv id u a l's  or in terp re ta tive  com m unity 's 
authorised consciousness. The artw ork is identifiable apart from what it is taken to be. The artw ork 
gives rise to but is not identifiable w ith the experience of our imaginative engagement. It is produced or 
exists prior to our experience with it and is w hat guides our imaginative experience. If our imaginative 
experience, which gives rise to interpretation, is to be guided, then the artw ork m ust exist apart from 
our interpretations of it. If this were not so, w hat would be the point of the practice of art? Spectators 
engage in order to have their imaginings prescribed and constrained, in order to promote a particu lar 
imaginative understanding. If artworks could do no such thing, and if the context and spectators do all 
the work, then it would be easier all round to do so w ithout bothering to refer to artworks. But this is 
belied by the fact that if we change aspects of a work, then the im aginative horizons open to the 
spectator similarly change. For example, changing the chorus of Beethoven's Choral Symphony to 
'Freedom ' in 1989 brought out aspects at the edge of the work's horizon. Conversely, D ucham p's 
'defacing' of the Mona Lisa could only have the effect it did, given its relation to the prescriptions the 
work itself makes in our engagem ent w ith it. A different kind of case serves to make the same point. 
M agritte's Ceci n'est pas nue pipe can only have the effect it does, given that the w ork itself prescribes 
us to imagine that there is in fact a pipe before us. The horizon of an artw ork must, at least, be partly 
determined by the w ork itself and, furtherm ore, the horizon is not necessarily coextensive with what 
the dom inant interpretative practice takes it to be.
The essential failure of constructivism, is the inability to recognise that w hat is primary is our 
engagem ent w ith the artw ork itself. Recognising the constructive role of the im agination in our
47 R. G. Collingwood, The Principles o f Art (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), Book I, Chapter VII, 
Section 6, p. 151.
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engagement with art in no way entails that the w ork's meaning is wholly constituted by the context or 
community of interpreters. It is the artw ork  itself w hich constrains and guides the nature of our 
imaginative engagement and experience. As spectators we are not free, either individually or as part of 
an interpretative group, to project anything onto the work. The recognition of this fact is quite 
compatible w ith the recognition that the different understandings we bring to bear upon an artw ork 
may lead to a plurality of imaginative interpretations, just as an artwork's creation may depend upon 
artistic intention and action, w ithout its m eaning being reducible to them, so too in the reverse 
direction. That our imaginative engagement, and resultant interpretation of an artwork, depends upon 
the understanding we bring to bear, does not entail that the work's meaning is reducible to the context of 
the w ork and spectator.
M eaning does depend upon and presuppose certain epistem ic, cu ltural and im aginative 
backgrounds and resources. But it does not follow that context is the sole determ inant of meaning. The 
evolving conventions of art and the artistic shaping of the work itself puts constraints and determ inants 
uponour interpretations. The very point of constituting a particular artw ork is that it serves to guide 
and constrain our im aginative engagem ent. It is for the rich enhancem ent of our im aginative 
engagement that the artist m anipulates the media, forms, conventions and genres of art. This is why we 
have the practice and evolving conventions of art in the first place. Thus particular genres and 
conventions evolve to be typical of certain kinds of works, imposing certain kinds of meaning and 
constraints which are there independently of whether a particular community's interpretative practice 
recognises them or not. Thus an interpretative community cannot, by definition, constitute w hat the 
sound interpretation is, A convention's meaning is not reducible to its context, w hatever the relevant 
context is construed as. The conventions, genre constraints and forms of art are themselves grounded upon 
but not wholly determ ined by their emergence from autonom ous intentional hum an activity. The 
evolved meaning of artistic conventions are neither reducible to the intention w ith which they were 
produced nor their context of production or reception.
Interpretation depends upon how the spectator imaginatively builds up  from the substructure 
provided by the artwork. This is why our interpretations and evaluations say something both about th e  
work and ourselves. To appreciate the artwork we must, in a symbiotic relation w ith the work, engage 
w ith and im aginatively construct in order to find. An interpretation of an artw ork grounded in a 
particular imaginative engagement is the construction of one of the m ultifarious possibilities contained 
w ithin the horizon of the work. O ur particular imaginative engagem ent and experience w ith an 
artwork is one of many possibilities, thus pluralism  holds with regard to meaning and interpretation. 
The horizon of an artwork is not fixed across time, cultures and people. Different presuppositions and 
the evolution of artistic conventions may vary the very nature of the horizon offered to a spectator in 
his imaginative engagement. For artworks themselves, and artistic creation, depend upon both previous 
and future possible artistic development. The present meaning of an artwork is grounded upon its inter-
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relation to pre-existent conventions, traditions and the understanding we bring to bear upon it. The 
aspects or im aginative horizon of a w ork may alter, given its shifting relations to past and future 
artworks. Understanding art as an evolving cultural practice allows that the developm ent of art, may 
retroactively affect aspects of a particular artwork.
N evertheless, the spectator is still constrained and guided by the artw ork itself. The very 
point of artworks is that we are not free to imagine whatever we fancy, rather we are prescribed and 
proscribed in our im aginings by the artw ork. For an artw ork is not a m ere springboard  for the 
imagination. Rather, it guides and shapes our imaginings in our interlocking engagement with it. To be 
wholly taken up w ith one's ow n experiences and understanding in engagem ent w ith an artw ork is to 
disregard  w hat one is supposed to be im aginatively engaging with. It is to preclude the work's 
prom otion of a particu lar im aginative understand ing , which may be d istinct from the general 
understanding one brings to bear. In our im aginative engagem ent w ith art, im aginings are prescribed 
which promote a rich, deep and possibly alternative imaginative understanding of oneself, others and 
the w orld . Im aginative engagem ent is a constan t in ter play, and often tussle, betw een the 
understanding brought to bear and the imaginings prescribed and guided by the artwork, leading to the 
development and promotion of a particular imaginative understanding.
We often experim ent in our engagem ent w ith artw orks, leading to a more developed 
understanding of the possibilities and values open to us in our imaginative engagement. What we aim 
at, is the most rew arding im aginative experience. Thus we seek those interpretations which afford 
maximal imaginative value and which develop one's imaginative understanding. This, of course, may 
mean various different and evolving interpretations across one's engagements w ith a particular work. 
Thus it is that there can be better and worse interpretations on the grounds of im aginative value. 
W hether the im aginings and the im aginative understandings are themselves valuable will depend 
both upon what one is prescribed to imagine and the way this is done. This will partly depend upon the 
way the conventions have been m anipulated or the brushw ork handled, to m anifest an idea and 
prescribe what should be imagined. Similarly, the value of the rendering itself, depends upon its inter­
relations w ith and the value of w hat one is being prescribed to imagine. A crass idea can ruin an 
exquisite artistic rendering.
A proper recognition of how our engagement is constructive does not entail that the best w ork of 
art is the one which allows for the greatest num ber of im aginative possibilities. The horizon provided 
by an imaginatively rich artwork, should not be equated w ith one which allows for the greatest number 
of imaginative constructions. Nothing is, after all, less constraining and limiting for the imagination, in 
the sense of an infinity of possible imaginative constructions, than a Rorschach test. But that does not 
make it an artwork. This ridiculous conclusion would be tem pting only if we allow ourselves to forget 
that constraints and conventions evolved and developed in art in order to aid, prescribe and constrain 
the im agination. The best and most valuable artw orks will be ones w hose prescribed im aginings
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promote a rich and profound imaginative understanding. Thus William Golding is to be preferred to 
Jeffrey Archer, Klee to Rothko or Paul Berry's The Sandman to Disney's lesser animation.
A limited imaginative understanding may bring into operation the law of diminishing returns 
rather early on in one's imaginative exploration w ith a particular artwork, even though the a rtis tic  
skill may be great. Yet this should not surprise us. The value of great artw orks lies precisely in their 
potency and profundity; the horizons a w ork opens up largely determ ines its value. Imaginative 
richness fundam entally concerns the quality of imaginative engagement afforded by the artw ork and 
the kind of imaginative understanding it promotes. The quality of the artw ork concerns the overall 
nature of the imaginative experience and understanding, not merely the num ber of different possible 
imaginative constructions available to the spectator. It is the quest to engage w ith and deepen our 
im aginative u n derstand ings w hich drives the evolu tion  of the cu ltural practice of art. The 
developm ent of particular art forms, genres and conventions speak to particular concerns, values and 
interests we may have.
A good artw ork, in its im aginative richness, opens and develops our sensibilities to the 
possibilities and actualities of the world, people around us and ourselves. In engaging, prescribing and 
promoting imaginings concerned with how and w hy people are motivated, think, feel and act as they 
do, artw orks may afford us particular insights into the w orld. For example, the narrative of Neil 
Jordan's film The Crying Game is constructed so one's imaginings and sym pathies are prescribed in a 
particular way. Our imaginative sympathies are engaged, crucially, before one of the central features 
of the situation is revealed. Namely, that the 'g irl' Stephen Rea has fallen for, Dil, is in fact a male 
transsexual. Had this been revealed earlier, the imaginative sym pathy and understanding of many 
spectators w ould not have been extended and  engaged as deeply, if at all. But, through such 
engagement, one is forced to question one's general understanding about the nature of such 'deviants'. 
Here, the prescribed sym pathetic identification prom otes a respect which could be at odds with our 
prior imaginative understanding. Thus it may lead to reflection upon the ambiguous nature of sexuality, 
love and personal identity. All of this may also help to promote one's own self understanding, realising 
more what it is that does and should move one, make one feel, and act in relation to others. Thus it is 
that art may significantly enable us to make imaginative sense of our world.
Thus we can argue that the view of hum anity prom oted in Ridley Scott's Blade Runner, given 
the valued framework and conventions of science fiction and film noir, is a profound though pessimistic 
vision. By contrast one may object that Pedro Alm adovar's Tie Me Up, Tie Me Down promotes a flawed 
imaginative understanding of reality; the characters are superficial, their m otivations and feelings 
simplistic, and the development from pornographic obsession to love is facile. That is, it fails to vivify 
the central characters as driven by imaginatively understandable and complex hum an desires. Hence, 
we may imaginatively understand a work, but reject it on the grounds that the prescribed imaginings
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and understanding are fantastical or inadequate to possible hum an life /8  Cood art should play a part 
both in opening out and deepening our imaginative understanding. Where previously we m ight have 
imaginatively understood a transsexual as not properly deserving of human concern, after The Crying 
Game we should feel otherwise. This change is brought about through art in a way in which no amount 
of theoretical argum ent or assent can achieve. This is because art encourages and promotes valuable 
im aginative understandings of the world, which may modify one's own imaginative understanding of 
life. This in part depends upon the skill and convincing nature of the work of art itself and how it 
engages w ith the understanding the spectator brings w ith him. How the adequacy of one's own 
feelings, values and im aginative u n d erstan d in g  is explored, th rough  w hat is expressed and 
represented, gives rise to our evaluation of the artw ork. Thus the value of a w ork of art is both a 
reflection of the work itself and a reflection upon the spectator.
Ruskin appreciated that art sought properly to prom ote true understanding. At times this led 
him to denigrate aesthetic or sensual pleasure, which he conceived as the operation of mere sense and 
custom. However, our very real pleasure in engaging with artworks does derive from their value as art. 
Thus, art should not be conceived of as aesthetically sealed from the sphere of life. Rather, a r t's  
pleasures derive from the imaginative way art engages us and enables us to interpret and understand 
the world, others and ourselves. As we shall see, Ruskin was right to argue that art concerned and 
demanded the response of one's whole moral being. What Ruskin mistakenly presum ed was that this 
rendered all beauty moral, just as many now render aesthetic the moral and cognitive aspects in art. 
Yet, in Modern Painters, Ruskin so nearly captured the truth of the matter. If only we conceive of art's 
significance not in terms of literal truth, but in terms of imaginative understanding then, indeed, "the 
duty of an artist is not only to address and awaken, bu t to guide the im agination."^^ Artworks can 
enlarge our imaginative experience, whether by showing the familiar in a new light or intensifying an 
aspect to extremes. Hence art can promote our imaginative understanding of our world. Thus, it seems 
plausible to suppose, art may develop our moral sensibilities and understanding. However, quite what 
the relationship is remains unclear. Therefore, navigating the tempestuous waters which concern th e  
relationship between art and morality is the task of the final chapter.
48 See R. W. Beardsmorc, "The Limits of Imagination", British Journal o f Aesthetics, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1980, pp. 
99-114, where Orwell's complete failure to understand Graham Greene's vision of the world, as manifested in The 
Heart of the Matter, is discussed in a similar light.
49 John Ruskin, Modern Painters Vol. 3, D. Barrie (ed.), (London: André Deutsch, 1987), Chapter X, p. 350.
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CHapter 5
Flrt, Imagination and the Cultivation offMoraCs.
" The true purpose of art was not to create beautiful objects, he discovered.
It was a method of understanding, a way of penetrating the world and 
finding one's place in it, and whatever aesthetic qualities an individual 
canvas might have were almost an incidental by-product of the effort 
to engage oneself in this struggle, to enter into the thick of things."
Paul Auster, Moon Palace
Introduction,
It is through what we imagine and the prom otion of imaginative understanding, in engaging 
w ith artworks, that art may make claim to the cultivation of our moral sensibilities. Our responses to 
the various characters or perceptions of the w orld portrayed  are typically aspectival. Firstly, this 
amounts to the claim that the form of what we imagine cannot be wholly separated off from the content 
of w hat we imagine. Since the m anipulation of m edia, conventions and associations distinctively 
constrain what we imagine, the content of our imaginings cannot be divorced from the work's form. Thus 
it is, that we also typically imagine what we do from a particular point of view. 1 his is often to be 
taken as the viewpoint of a particular subject, for example the narrating subject, such as Nick in I he 
Great Gatsby. At other times, the viewpoint concerned requires us to respond directly to the state of 
affairs represented. Furthermore, our imaginings from a particular view point typically involves not 
merely thought but feeling and emotion. Of course, in our engagement, things are often more complicated 
than suggested. For example, the imaginative understanding promoted by the work as a whole, may run 
against that suggested through im agining the relevant state of affairs from one of the represented 
subject's viewpoints. Hence, the ability, enjoyment and insight afforded by oscillating between various 
of these aspectival possibilities may be exploited to great effect by an artist.
it is not merely the content of the proposition that is significant for our imaginative engagement 
w ith artw orks. Rather, the ways of telling are of crucial importance here. What is peculiar to our 
imaginative engagement w ith artworks, as distinct from our more everyday imaginative experience, is 
the artistic m anipulation of the aspectival imaginings prescribed by the artw ork, t hus it is that a r t  
can and does distinctively cultivate our thick understanding. Of course, the thick understanding of 
actual, possible and im possible w orlds prom oted may well bear complex relations to our w orld. 
Furthermore, quite what those relations are may depend upon the understanding we bring to bear and 
the resultant construal of the work in our imaginings. Nonetheless, art's peculiar promotion of our thick
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understanding enables it to constitute a distinct form of understanding. Art is to thick understanding 
what philosophy is to thin understanding. Coupled with the claim that moralit\^ depends upon a thick 
understanding of others, in order to make sound moral decisions, we can articulate the close link between 
most art and morality.
Section 1: UHe Slestfietic CfiaCCenge
The nature of the artw ork's prescribed imaginative content is partly determ ined by the way it 
is shaped and m anipulated to guide one's imaginings; the lyrical description, the jagged, painted 
expression or the draw n out harmony. The artw ork, by virtue of the way it guides our im aginative 
engagement, shapes and determ ines the nature of the prescribed imaginative content. The content is 
partly constituted by the description. Thus we are constrained to imagine a situation presented to us as 
manifested in and through the w ork 's artistically m anipulated medium. This, of course, may well be 
distinct from how the artist or spectator m ight otherwise have chosen to represent it. For example, in 
Paul Beriy's expressionistic anim ated film The Sandman, we are not licensed to imagine the sandman 
as a playful mischievous fairy, as he is usually portrayed. The telescoping shots, angular sets and razor 
sharp face of the sandm an himself prescribes the im aginative understanding that he is, in fact, a 
deeply malevolent, evil threat to the innocent, sleeping child.
The point can be em phasised in another way if one considers two works concerning the same 
subject m atter in distinct media. Le château de Chilian was photographed by Adolphe Braun in 1867 
and painted by Courbet in 1874. Both treat the same scene from precisely the same viewpoint, but in 
different media.^ The im aginative content, in terms of the basic pictorial narrative and conceptual 
material, is the same. That is, precisely the same objects, parts of the world, are being represented from 
the same view point, w ith in  the sam e artistic trad ition  and genre. Nevertheless, the works are  
different and distinct in the im aginings they prescribe. The m anipulation of oils to portray the 
particular scene necessarily prescribes visual im aginings distinct from those prescribed through the 
photographic medium. The nature of the visual descriptions in the two cases are necessarily different, 
deriving almost solely from the distinct and different natures of the m edia utilised. The handling of 
the paint, as contrasted w ith the chemical processing of an exposed image, presents imaginatively 
different aspects.
The same point applies in relation to works in the same medium. The distinct gestural marks 
upon a painting may have expressive characteristics of their own. But what the m arks are expressive 
of, and prescribe us to perceptually imagine, also depends upon their relationship to each other and to
See Aaron Scharf's Ar/awdP/io/tzgrap/zy (London: Penguin, 1983), Chapter 5, pp. 134-136.
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the way other pictorial conventions are used. The way the paint is applied, evoking a flat surface as in 
Dali or prescribing the thick, visceral, layered textures of Auerbach, aspectivally effects what we are 
to imagine. They not only prescribe perceptual im aginings but also significantly preclude the 
possibility of others. Thus, just by virtue of the differences of the m arked, painterly surface, Dali's 
beautifully, sensuously finished portrayal of the crucifixion in The Christ o f Saint Jean de la Croix 
cannot prescribe the same imaginings as the scratched, worked, disfigured surface of Nolde's Life o f 
Jesus . Dali's painterly rendering puts Christ at a distance from us, inviting us to perceptually imagine 
and contemplate the event as if from another sphere or dimension. Nolde's technique and rough finish, 
by contrast, prescribes our imaginings as very much a part of the rough, raw w orld which is vqry much 
of this earth. Of course, this is further enhanced by the distinct spatial relations and conventions 
m anipulated in the paintings. The space from which Dali's Christ hangs is ambiguous. The delineation 
between the world below Christ's feet and the space from which he hangs is unclear. Thus Christ seems 
to free float above the w orld in an undefined space. By contrast, Nolde's perspective is flatter, more 
emphatically compressing Christ's place in our world of clay. Thus, Nolde prescribes us to imagine 
Christ's drama as played out amongst our earthly cares and woes.
Of course, we can come to see the w orld as if it were as it is m anifestly characterised in a 
particular artw ork. Thus, in  this sense, the im aginative understand ing  prom oted by a w ork is 
divorceable from it. So after a vivid experience w ith a Francis Bacon portrait in the Tate, 1 may 
w ander around, im aginatively perceiving others as d istorted , corrupting and diseased. But the 
m aterial sm eared nature of Bacon's paint w ork clearly constrained and guided  us tow ards this 
imaginative understanding of humanity, in our engagement w ith the artwork. That is, the imaginings 
the work itself prescribes, which give rise to the understanding, are anchored to the distinctive nature 
of the artw ork concerned. The point is that the features of the work, the way they are shaped and 
constituted, prescribe our imaginings in a particular way. Through doing so, they thereby shape the 
possibility of a particular imaginative understanding. Hence the form and content of the artwork, and 
what it prescribes us to imagine, cannot be wholly separated off from each other.2
It follows from the inseparability of form and content, that w hat we imagine in engaging w ith 
an artw ork is from a particular point of view. The most straightforw ard case is where the artist is 
representing how and in w hat way a represented subject thickly understands a particular state of 
affairs. First person confessions or reports are often the most straightforw ard cases in this regard. For 
example, in The Great Gatsby we im agine the state of affairs as prescribed through N ick's own 
portrayed understanding of events and his inter action w ith the other characters. O ur im aginative 
understanding of Gatsby himself is shaped through this representation, one which we understand to
2 See Michael Podro's "Depiction and The Golden Call" in N. Bryson, M. A. Holly and K. Mo.xey (eds.), Visual 
Theory (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), pp. 163-189, for a more dckhled philosophical treatment of how the material 
nature of paint shapes our particular engagement with paintings.
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express Nick's own developing understanding. A more complicated example is Crime ntid Punishment. 
O ur perception of the world throughout the novel is tense and often confused. This is, of course, a 
reflection of Raskolnikov's own subjective uncertainty. Yet there are incidents in the novel where we 
are to take the events represented as not witnessed either by Raskolnikov or anyone else. In such cases 
we typically refer to an omniscient author. Indeed, the great realist novelists of the nineteenth century 
often relied almost wholly on this method of representation. But even in these cases, what is being 
represented is nonetheless done so from a particular viewpoint. We cannot but imagine Sonya praying in 
anguish except in a range of possible ways. We imagine her facing a particular way, we imagine th e  
tears running down her left cheek, her face turned inward toward the wall. Where she prays alone, we 
are not prescribed to take the way we imagine her to be as constitutive of the way another character in 
Crime and Punishment sees her. If what we are prescribed to imagine can be taken as reliable, we are to 
take it as the way she is actually praying and we should thus feel for her appropriately.
Of course, such impersonal authorial representation may well turn out to be unreliable. Indeed, 
artists often provoke tension, pace and enrich our imaginings by oscillating between the impersonal 
view points and those of d ifferent characters. Thus questions concerning the re liab ility  of the 
viewpoints we are prescribed to imagine may come to the fore. An extreme example is Kurosawa's film 
Rashomon. It is the story of a single violent occurrence as retold by four narrators, three of them on trial 
in a courtroom . Each time, we are prescribed to im agine w hat each narrato r suggests actually 
happened. Each narrator tells a story apparently  consistent w ith the facts, w hich does credit to 
themselves in some way or other. All agree to the basic facts, that there was an attack, a rape and a 
murder. The point of the film is that there is a truth of the matter which, for various reasons, is being 
covered up by tliree of them. The point is not that what is true is wholly relativised to the viewpoints 
we are prescribed to im agine. Rather, it is that though any representation is from a particular 
viewpoint, nonetheless one character's representation may be sound whilst the others may be false. 
Hence it may be part of the state of affairs we are prescribed to imagine, to wonder as to the reliability 
or otherwise of the representation afforded. Furthermore, though what we are prescribed to imagine is 
from a particular viewpoint, it needn 't be the view point of a particular character w ithin the state of 
affairs to be imagined.
Typically, artw orks prescribe us to im agine states of affairs and characters w ith certain 
feelings. That is, it is often a constitutive part of our imaginings that we feel in certain ways with 
regard to what we are imagining. O ur perspectival imaginings are shaped in order to prescribe our 
attitudes and feelings tow ard the im agined state of affairs. That is, the aspectival nature of the 
artw ork promotes a particular imaginative understanding. Thus it is that artw orks can afford insight, 
reveal significances or re-examine the familiar in fruitful ways. For example, in The Crijing Game, we 
are encouraged to identify w ith Stephen Rea's character. Moreover, he is portrayed as at a loss in the 
face of his feelings for the transsexual Dil, at a stage when both his and the audience's sym pathies
169
have already been skilfully engaged in a particular way. The way our imaginings are guided through 
the film 's narrative construction, the way our sentim ents are engaged and deepened through our 
imaginings, already preclude certain responses prior to the shock revelation that Dil is a man. Thus it 
is, that through engaging our imaginative understanding and deepening it in this way, the film can 
provoke questions about personal identity, sexuality and love which we m ight otherw ise leave 
unasked. The engagement of our imaginative sympathies for the characters, as fitting objects of concern 
and compassion, enables the developm ent of certain possible imaginative understandings.
A very different exam ple is the way Francis Bacon represents d isto rted  ind iv iduals in 
particular ways, as isolated, frightened and rotten, fitting objects of both fear and pity. Our perceptual 
imaginings with Bacon's w ork gives rise to the im aginative understanding of the hum an condition as 
corrosive, searing and brutal. Indeed, after engaging with artworks, we may still fee! the significance 
of the imaginative understanding prescribed by the artwork. Thus when we leave the cinema, say, we 
may still be reflecting upon our imaginative understanding of those we may consider deviant. When we 
leave the art gallery, we may walk round somehow perceiving the corruption, decay and brutalisation 
of humanity in those we meet on the way home. Of course, quite how this imaginative experience 
relates to our own imaginative understanding, will effect both how plausible and profound we take the 
understanding prescribed by the artw ork to be. Hence the relationship betw een art and action is a 
complex one. Nonetheless, if the w ork is valuable as art, the imaginative understanding promoted will 
be both significant and bear certain possible relations to our world.
Of course, a thick understand ing  of others and the w orld is not itself distinctive of art. 
However, what is, is the m anipulation of media and conventions to prescribe our imaginings, in a way 
which enables us to entertain imaginative understandings we otherwise could not achieve. Artworks 
are constitutively aspectival, rather than clear w indow s through to a separable im agined content. In 
part, the artworks constitute the nature of what is to be imagined. The aspectival m anipulation of our 
imaginings by artistry cultivates our imaginative understanding of certain states of affairs, which may 
be taken to bear a significant relation to our actual situation. Art's m anipulation of media, conventions 
and techniques to portray worlds and characters in certain ways, for example Dil as a fitting object of 
compassion, or Bacon's characterisations of butchered figures, is distinctive of art. Their aspectival 
nature means that form and content cannot be separated. Furthermore, it m eans that art's  peculiar 
relation to cultivating imaginative understanding allows for the possibility that art may develop our 
m oral sensibilities.
Yet, the committed aestheticist may argue, how could art bear a significant relation to our 
moral sensibilities? The mere fact that imagination is involved in our engagement w ith artworks does 
not entail that art cultivates our moral aspect. For, the aestheticist claims, the m ode of experience 
afforded by art is necessarily of a different order from that we encounter in the real world. An artw ork 
is constructed in order to engage our imagination. Thus we get pleasure from the delight artw orks afford
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and they serve to distract us from the vagaries of the real w orld. C ontrastingly, the aestheticist 
argues, the real world is not imaginatively constructed. This is not straightforw ardly to deny that the 
im agination plays a significant role in our everyday life. As we saw  in the last chapter, the 
imagination enables us to understand and respond appropriately to the w orld and others. Rather, the 
claim is, what the imagination does in art is unrelated to the imaginative experience arising from the 
real world.
But this cannot be true. For example, consider Picasso's Weeping Woman.^ This, if anything 
could be, is a paradigm atic example for the aestheticist. There is little, if anything, in the way of 
context or narrative to place the expression of grief against. O ur imagination is not even prescribed to 
im agine a particular type of event as giving rise to this grief. Furtherm ore, the techniques of 
abstraction used involve destroying, re-ordering and thus reconstituting the hum an features. The cubist 
concerns under which this process falls are driven by a concern with the nature of sight in particular. 
We do not have to feel such anguish ourselves to recognise the feelings expressed in the work. But the 
fact that the techniques and formal features of the work give rise to its expressive qualities, does not 
entail art's  autonom y from our im aginative experience of life. The very reason the w ork 's formal 
qualities are so expressive is precisely because they vivify aspects of suffering we can recognise from our 
own actual and imaginative experience. The acid tears eat into the face, the jagged features are gouged 
by despairing fingers, the whole physiognomy of the face is distorted. The content of the work cannot be 
wholly divorced from its formal features. The im aginative force of these features arise from our 
experiences and thick understanding of various things; of grief, of crying, of things ripped apart, of 
grasping for something. Thus it is that the w ork's formal features can hope to show us something 
significant about a particular form and understanding of grief. Indeed, it is only because there is this 
inter-relation between our imaginative understanding of the real world and w hat the work expresses, 
that it can hope to shape our response and understanding of a particular form of grief.
It also follows that art cannot even be held to be wholly parasitic upon our understanding of the 
world and our place in it. Now the puritan about art recognises what the aestheticist could not; namely, 
that our understanding of the world feeds, preoccupies and makes intelligible our imaginings in art. 
Nonetheless, the puritan concludes, we would be better off if we wasted less time on art. Rather, he 
suggests, we should preoccupy ourselves with the nature and problems of the real world. This is because 
the puritan holds that though our understanding is engaged by art, w hat we im agine in art aims at 
pleasure rather than truth. Indeed, he suggests, though art cannot im prove understanding, it may 
perniciously degrade or confuse true understanding. Yet this argum ent cannot be sound. The value of 
artworks as such, does not rest upon ideological evaluation. Of course, it may be true that the value of
^ My discussion of Picasso’s Weeping Woman is indebted to Carolyn Wilde's “Painting, Expression, Abstraction” 
in A. Hanison (ed.). Philosophy and the Visual Arts (Boston: D. Reidel, 1987), pp. 29-50,
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an artw ork depends upon the imaginative understanding and insight it promotes. However, this does 
not entail that our imaginative engagement is automatically marred by any association judged immoral 
by the moral theory we take to be true. If this were so, then Ridley Scott's 7492 would be judged a bad 
artwork because of the imaginative sympathy it prescribes for the morally impure European founders of 
North America. But the value of '1492 lies precisely in the insight it affords into the men, conditions 
and events upon w hich civilisations are founded. Such imaginative dep th  w ould be lost, to the 
disvalue of the work as art, if the imaginative understanding prescribed were so overly simplistic as to 
suggest that such men were either wholly good or bad. Thus it is that we are concerned with whether 
the artwork relevantly constrains our imaginative engagement and in doing so conveys and promotes a 
particular, significant imaginative understanding.
Moreover, we are concerned with whether the imaginative understanding promoted is adequate 
to that which it concerns. Thus, the significance of the imaginative understanding promoted must also 
concern whether the work advocates an immoral imaginative understanding or not. Hence the value of 
an artw ork may be m arred to the extent it glorifies or advocates what is morally flawed or evil. For 
example, where the overall imaginative understanding promoted by a work involves inciting racism, 
then the work's value as art is dim inished. This is not to declare that art should correspond to one 
particular moral theory or imaginative understanding of the world. However, if an artw ork is to be 
significant and offer us insight, it must enable us to recognise, understand and discriminate more closely 
and deeply in the world w ithin which we live. Thus there is a necessary link between art and the 
cultivation of our moral sensibilities.
Imaginative understanding anchors the requirement to imagine not just in relation to artworks 
but in our ordinary, everyday, moral dealings in the world. What concerns us as moral agents is how we 
ought to act, what rational considerations and the nature of our world suggests. Our appreciation of how 
we, others and the world are, is strongly rooted in our imaginative understanding. By engaging our 
im agination and enhancing our im aginative understanding, for example of a form of grief, art can 
cultivate our understanding of the real world. Art is not parasitic upon our understanding of life, rather 
the relationship is a symbiotic one. An artwork engages, develops and shows us a possible imaginative 
understanding, in this case of grief and, perhaps, women. Thus, engagem ent with a rt may have a 
modificatory effect upon our own imaginative understanding of the world and others. We may come to 
see, through the insight afforded by an artwork, a certain kind of grief where before our understanding 
had been thin and undiscriminating.
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Section 2: Sirt and îmmoraCTCeasures
Imagining how others might perceive a situation, contrasting different possibilities w ith w hat 
one takes the appropriate description to be, can enhance our imaginative understanding. So one might 
im agine how a friend or m entor w ould understand  one's situation. This may enhance our own 
understanding and the basis upon which it is grounded. Imaginings can also help to prom ote one's 
understandings of others. For example, to understand another im aginatively, we must be able to 
imagine their situation from their viewpoint. Thus, in our imaginings, we seek to grasp w hat they 
would think of as an appropriate description of the possible alternatives open to them and what their 
understanding of the course of action they took is. In the quest to understand another, we may also 
imagine how they would react in different situations, or if various roles were reversed. For example, 
how they would react if they were in our position. Imaginings can range w idely in their scope, from 
imagining one relevant feature is different to imagining an entirely new situation. Imagining under 
w hat im aginative understanding of the w orld a certain act is rendered intelligible, can lead to an 
increased understanding of both the action and the person who performed it. Thus w hat we imagine can 
deepen our understanding and appreciation of the nature of ourselves and others.
New worlds, creatures, situations can be imagined and we can consider how they may relate to 
our actual world and its possibilities. How we categorise and experience the world can be broadened 
through our imagination. Hence imagination can enhance our understanding of our situation within it. 
Thus at a low level one may imagine something to be the case, that one has been betrayed by a friend 
for instance, and through im aginative reflection learn from one's feelings of betrayal. Thus one's 
imaginative understanding about the nature of friendship, trust and the relevance of betrayal may be 
deepened. Similarly, through imaginative reflection upon the story of Adam and Eve, we may learn 
something about our nature and the purpose of life. Indeed, such imaginings may deeply affect our 
conceptions and experience of the w orld. The im aginative understanding prom oted may come to 
constitute part of our own understanding, part of what enables us to grasp the nature of ourselves, others 
and the world.
Imagination is fundam ental to our ordinary day to day lives. In our need to understand the 
nature of situations and how we ought to act, we require recourse to our imagination. Of course, our 
thoughts, feelings, intuitions and perceptions inter sect in various complex ways. But in attem pting to 
make sense of them, we ordinarily  use our im agination. Independently of our engagem ent with 
artw orks, our im agination is central to our everyday, moral lives. It inform s and  enhances our 
deliberation about how and for w hat we ought to act. It enables us to reflect upon, reaffirm, extend or 
modify our imaginative understanding. For example, we use our imagination to test our moral intuitions 
and principles. If we imagine a certain situation, we can see if they are adequate regarding potential 
situations and thus whether they should be modified in responding to actual dilemmas. The level such
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imaginings may operate on can obviously vary. For example, from highly hypothetical and abstract 
examples, such as possible world cases typical of philosophical enquiry, down to more basic low level 
imaginings, regarding the particular nature of a person's character, i.e. what they would be likely to do 
if you broke their promise and so on. Such imaginings help us to pick out and consider which intuitions 
or principles ought to carry across cases, what they are constrained by and whether or not, in the light 
of such imaginings, they ought to be modified, refined or considered appropriate at all.
Thus imagination can help us to develop our grasp of the nature of moral situations. We can test 
our moral intuitions and principles through our imaginings, extending our imaginative understandings to 
different situations. A lternatively we may develop alternative imaginative understandings through 
our imaginings. In complex ways, they may inform and modify the imaginative understanding we hold 
to be appropriate to our world. For example, through my imaginings, 1 may come to understand that 
there are dilemmas where every possible course of action carries with it some immoral consequence or 
aspect. This may be a m atter which, w ithout such imaginative experience, I would have been unable to 
appreciate. Similarly, im agination may play a significant role in developing our self-knowledge. 
Imaginings often involve musing upon possible situations one might be in, how one would think, feel and 
react to particular people in certain circumstances. Moreover, we often imagine what our life would be 
like if we had continued with or commenced certain interests and projects rather than others. Such 
imaginings help us to learn more about ourselves, w hat we understand to be worthwhile aiming at or 
should be avoided. Thus I may imagine what it would be like were I to enlist in the police force rather 
than attem pt to forge a career in academ ic philosophy. W hat I imagine will guide and inform  the 
course of action 1 choose to pursue. This also serves to show the im portance of developing a 
discrim inating imagination, rather than indulging in mere fantasising. The imagination can only be a 
sound guide if it bears a significant relation to how, in fact, things may be.
Of course, quite what the relation is, or is taken to be, may depend upon the im aginative 
understand ing  one brings to bear. For example, P icasso's Weeping Wornati m ay be taken as
discrim inating a particular kind of possessive, vicious grief. Conversely, it m ight be taken as
prescribing an im aginative understand ing  of w om en generally as vicious, possessive and thus 
vulnerable. We might tend to give more credence to the former imaginative understanding than the 
latter. Thus the former im aginative understanding  prom oted by the artw ork  may well effect our 
im aginative understanding of the w orld and others in a way in which the latter will not. What is a 
potentially significant imaginative understanding runs along a continuum, from the plausible to the 
im plausible to the fantastical. The further along the continuum  an artw ork is, tow ard the fantastical, 
the less value we think it has as art. Thus, we may think, the imaginative understanding prom oted by
Weeping Women is more significant in the first interpretation than in the second.
An artw ork may appropriately taken to be insignificant, precisely because it does not develop 
our imaginative understanding. For example, we may criticise the work of Peter Howson on the grounds
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of artistic paucity. The imaginative understanding of the world he prescribes is a crude and facile 
construal of the brutishness of everyday life. His work represents the w orld as only containing thugs 
and their victims, who are merely w eaker thugs. It fails to discrim inate between different people, 
actions and motivations. The world, except in the pages of comic books, is far more complex than that. 
Howson's work, far from affording insight, actually prescribes a w holly inadequate im aginative 
understanding. The same may be true of our more everyday fantastical imaginings. For example, it is of 
no use if, when I imagine my possible career in the police force, I im agine myself as a glam orous 
detective solving all the crimes. If I am contrasting a police career with an academic one, then w hat I 
imagine should seek to promote a sound imaginative understanding of w hat is involved. Thus my 
imaginings should relevantly capture the nature of an active, often tedious, community service. Hence I 
will grasp the fact that it will often involve frustration at being unable to catch petty criminals, trying 
to comfort victims of crime and living w ithin the fram ew ork of an institutionalised m ilitia. Then I 
would be able to compare, meaningfully, my imaginative understanding of life in the police force with 
my imaginative understanding of life w ithin a university as an institutionalised thinker and teacher. 
Thus it is that both art and our ordinary imaginings may develop our appreciation of our world and its 
possibilities. Furthermore, an artwork, if it is of significance and value, will deepen our imaginative 
understanding in a particularly distinctive and powerful way.
However, the argument thus far remains open to a highly significant challenge. Namely, the 
claim that art may instrum entally aid our understanding, but there can be no inherently significant 
relation between art and moral understanding. This objection to the connection between art and moral it)/ 
is based upon the recognition that im moral artw orks may afford us great pleasure. Of course, that 
artworks may promote distinctly immoral imaginings and understandings does not, of itself, d isprove 
the link drawn. After all, we can adm it that an evil person can imaginatively understand the nature of 
a situation and thus, to greater effect, pursue his evil ends. For example, a particularly effective 
torturer may imagine and appreciate the immense am ount of gratuitous pain he would cause if he were 
to cut out the toenails of his victim. Thus, being the evil man he is, he goes ahead and does so. 
Nevertheless, this doesn 't m ean that we should not properly judge the torturer to be an evil man. 
Similarly, the mere fact that an artw ork may prom ote imagining such events w ith pleasure, rather 
than disgust, does not show that we should not evaluate the work as artistically disvaluable.
Nevertheless, it may be claimed, an artw ork should not be evaluated according to moral 
criteria at all. This may not be to deny that w hat is of significant value is the insight an artw ork 
affords. Rather, it is to deny that the insight afforded by artw orks is properly subjected to moral 
evaluation. The basic claim is that any conception which evaluates artworks on the basis of the moral 
understanding promoted, cannot remain adequate to the value we properly place on certain artw orks. 
That is, the artistic value of an artw ork  does not alw ays correlate to the m oral value of the 
im aginative understanding promoted. As has already been argued, form and content cannot be wholly
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separated from each other. On the one hand, works of propaganda or moralising tracts may promote a 
sound imaginative understanding but lack artistic value. Yet, on the other hand, sadistic, brutal works 
may prom ote a distinctly immoral im aginative understanding whilst nevertheless being of a r tis tic  
value. This is to be explained in terms of the pleasures proper to art. W hether something is good art or 
not concerns the vivid, pleasurable im aginings and imaginative understanding afforded. A work 
promoting a sound, moral understanding may of little value as art. This is because the work affords 
little  im ag inative  p leasure. C onversely , a w ork  w hich prom otes an  im m oral im aginative 
understanding may be of great artistic value. This is because the prescribed imaginings are pleasurable. 
Hence it is not the morality of the imaginative understanding promoted, which determ ines whether an 
artw ork is valuable as art. Rather, it is whether the understanding promoted is imaginative or not and 
thus affords pleasurable imaginings.
For example, it could be argued  that The Merchant of Venice prom otes an im aginative 
understanding of Jews as falling outside the rem it of our normal moral concern. This is because it 
intimates that Jews are, by their very nature, sly, untrustw orthy and materialistic. A clearer example 
may be Martin Scorcese's Good Fellas. The work promotes a casual disregard of violence and ultimately 
glorifies the almost compulsive violence of its central Mafioso characters. In his im aginings, the 
spectator is constrained to short circuit any qualms they may have, in order to appreciate the central 
characters as adm irable. Art is concerned only to engage the imagination and prom ote pleasurable, 
interesting or significant imaginative understandings. W hether the understanding promoted is of moral 
w orth or not is irrelevant to the value of the w ork as art. Indeed, artw orks w hich glorify people, 
ideologies and im aginative understandings w hich are evil may be artistically valuable or even 
masterpieces. If the Marquis de Sade's writings prom ote pleasurable imaginings and an im aginative 
understanding not previously en terta in ed , then his w ork is valuable as art. S im ilarly, Leni 
R iefenstahl's Triumph of the W ill, though a record of the 1934 Nuremberg rally, is of value as art. The 
striking images, innovative camera work and tracking shots all prescribe and constrain our imaginings 
in peculiarly powerful and pleasurable ways. W hat they promote, is an im aginative understanding of 
the Third Reich as a force of moral and historical greatness. Yet, the work is, nonetheless, of artistic 
value.
Furthermore, it m ight be claimed, since art does not automatically make people more moral, 
there cannot be a tight link between art and morality. For example, someone m ight be deeply affected 
by an artw ork such as The Crying Game. They im aginatively understand and sym pathise w ith the 
transsexual Dil, as prescribed by the film. Yet, w hen they walk out of the cinema, they may be just as 
dism issive of such people as before. Similarly, som eone who tends to regard people in m erely 
u tilitarian  term s m ight read  Crime and Punishment and  still retain  their u tilitarian  outlook. 
Similarly, a sincere Nazi may have a profound respect for and enjoyment of art. His im agination is 
engaged and stretched through engaging w ith artw orks. Yet, his moral understanding may remain
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im pervious to the im aginative experience afforded through art. For example, a Nazi m ight watch 
Schindler's List and still retain an imaginative understanding of jews as people of lesser moral worth, 
corrupters of society and so on. Perhaps the most challenging counter-example to the link between art 
and morality is itself given in an artwork: Alex in Anthony Burgess' A Clockwork Orange. The two most 
im portant things in Alex's life are the thrill of violence and Beethoven's Choral Symphony. If there 
really w as a tight link betw een art and m orality , then surely the frightening im m ediacy and 
plausibility of Burgess' work would be lacking. Yet, Alex's attitude and actions would seem to be all too 
believable. Conversely, artists who produce highly imaginative artworks may themselves lack sound 
moral understanding. For example, Picasso seems to have glorified in his satyr like nature. Indeed, 
Picasso conceived of himself as justifiably am oral, on the grounds that great artists are beyond the 
concerns of ordinary morality. Therefore, it m ight seem, there cannot be any necessary or typical 
relationship between good art and the moral developm ent of our sensibilities.
It may be true that the deepest form of imaginative pleasures come from combining the playful 
with what is profoundly significant for our world conceptions. To travel in the country of one's mind, 
th rough  im aginative experience, b roadens one 's experiences and im aginative understan d in g  
significantly. The pleasures in art range from the entertaining and distracting im aginings it may 
provide to the fuller imaginative appreciation of our world. The objection articulated need not deny 
that an artwork may contingently cultivate ethical insight. However, it does deny any necessary link 
between art's promotion of im aginative pleasures and the cultivation of moral understanding. Artistic 
value, it claims, is morally neutral. A w ork which gets us to imagine torturing another with pleasure 
may be just as valuable as art, as one which gets us to imagine the same event w ith disgust. This 
explains, it may be claim ed, the evaluative fallacy com m itted by those who would assess art on 
ideological grounds. The artistic value of the im aginative understanding prom oted, may be at odds 
w ith  its moral value. Hence, politically or m orally correct art may be no good artistically and 
politically or morally incorrect art may be great. To think otherwise, it will be suggested, is to conceive 
of the pleasures art affords as being of only instrum ental value. That is, valuable to the extent they 
evoke morally sound responses and understand ings w ithin us. W hereas, the aestheticist claims, the 
tru th  is that the pleasures afforded by art are of value themselves. That is, independently of any 
relation to the appropriate moral understanding of the events portrayed.
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Section 3: ^ e  InstmmentaCist 3{epCy
VVe have seen how artw orks properly  shape our im aginings, to prom ote im aginative 
understanding. Thus the putative link between art and morality does not wrongly entail that artw orks 
which tell us what is good must be good artworks. Nonetheless, the challenge is a substantial one. One 
possible response is to take up an argum ent that has been most succinctly put forward by R. M. Hare. 
Hare was, perhaps, the first contemporary philosopher to see that the prim ary point of art lies in its 
exercise of the imagination. Indeed, Hare argues, it is through fulfilling this purpose that art can thus 
contribute to our moral thinking.^ Art engages one's sympathetic imagination w ith regard to various 
types of people in possible situations. Thus, it may encourage one to consider and become open to people 
and dilemmas which might otherwise have been dismissed out of hand. The imaginings prescribed by a 
particular artw ork are, as Hare recognises, open to the question of truth not in terms of facticity but of 
verisimilitude. That is, whether w hat is represented as happening would really be so and whether th e  
morally relevant features have been highlighted or suppressed. This explains however, he suggests, 
why art can only be, at best, a w eak defence against immoral thought and fanaticism. This in itself is 
no small feat. That art may play such a role is dem onstrated by the im portance we typically attach to 
art and the sym pathetic imagination. Furtherm ore, the recognition of art's instrum ental role is also 
recognised in the attem pt to suppress or subjugate art for the purposes of state propaganda or for 
m ultifarious socio-political causes and institutions.
Yet, despite according art such a potentially im portant role. H are's argum ent establishes only 
a weak link between our imaginings and our moral sense. This is due to the way Hare thinks we learn 
from artworks. Artworks, in addressing particular concerns and interests, will speak only to certain 
people and preclude others from engaging w ith them. The most one can expect is that an artwork may 
engage w ith a particular understanding of the w orld. This may engage w ith and relate to our own 
experiences and understanding. Nonetheless, if we are to learn anything at all, it cannot be confined to 
the particu larities of w hat it is we are prescribed to imagine. That is, w hat we learn m ust be 
relevantly similar to our own experience. It m ust be something that can be brought under the operation 
of a moral rule or principle.
Of course, artworks are not themselves articulations of principles and their groundings. This is, 
for exam ple, w hat philosophy involves. Rather, artw orks prescribe us to im agine particu la r 
characters, situations, dilemmas and consequences. Thus we can learn from the imaginative experience 
they afford, but only in so far as they throw light upon new features or principles. For example, through 
reading Uncle Tom's Cabin, one might come to see the inhumanity of slave laws. Thus an artw ork m ight 
cause one to reflect upon one's moral principles in a new light. A different way one m ight learn from
4 R.M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), Chapter 9, pp. 180-185.
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artworks in this regard concerns the way principles might be applied. All moral principles, if they are 
to be useful, must be indeterminate. If this was not so, they would be infinitely complex, allow no room 
for judgem ent and be of little use. Thus an artw ork may effect our understanding  of how a moral 
principle should be applied. Lastly, an artw ork might help us to learn through vivifying probable 
consequences of applying certain principles. For example, 1984 m ight be thought to show us th e  
inevitable consequences of a communist or authoritarian commitment to centrally control everything in 
the name of equality. Nonetheless, artworks which stimulate the imagination cannot themselves help 
us to separate w hat is morally relevant or likely from what is not. This, Hare holds, could only be a 
m atter proper to thought. Thus any truly significant developm ent of our moral understanding and 
sensibilities can only come from the realm of moral thought. Therefore, Hare concludes, art can only 
provide a small instrumental aid for developing one's moral sensibilities. Art cannot. Hare claims, bear 
any inherently significant relation to our moral sensibilities.
One indication of the problematic nature of H are's view is that it suggests we can only learn 
from artw orks if they are relevantly similar to our own experience and worlds. Yet, it seems, we can 
learn from w orks like H. G. W ells' The Island o f Doctor Moreau which prescribe us to imagine 
experiences which we are never likely to or even could have. Of course. Hare will claim that in order to 
recognise w hat is portrayed as bearing any relevance to ourselves, we m ust be able to bring certain 
aspects of what is portrayed under principles we hold ourselves or, at least, can conceive of holding. But 
how m ight we learn from artw orks where the application of principles in the portrayed regard will 
never have any bearing upon our lives?
Hare's argum ent entails that we will only learn from artworks where they represent w hat is 
likely to happen to us or represent types of people we are likely to be or recognise.^ It is this kind of 
view which, unsurprisingly, lay behind the foisting of moralising tales upon Victorian children. But 
then why should we bother to learn from artworks at all? Presumably it would be better to reflect upon 
the relevant moral principles themselves or learn from the appropriate field of enquiry. Even given 
imagination's significance and importance in our ordinary lives, the relevance of artw orks to our moral 
sensibilities still appears questionable. The point of artworks is to engage our imagination, whereas in 
the everyday world we imagine in order to understand it. For example, it is typically true that the 
empirical knowledge required to gain im aginative acquaintance with a particu lar value is under 
specified. Hence it may be filled out by the imagination, grounded upon one's prior knowledge of the 
world. But this still does not explain why engaging w ith an artwork should peculiarly promote our
^ There are strong parallels here to much contemporary literary criticism. A classic example is Henry Louis Gates, 
Jr.'s, "Talking Black" in C. Ricks and L. Michaels (eds.). The State o f the Language (London: Fat>er and Faber. 
1990), pp. 42 - 50, which argues on these and political grounds for the defense and promotion of a peculiarly ‘Black’ 
literature. Conversely, Frank Pn\mev, Literature and Moral Understanding (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 170. 
suggests that to think art has a moral or social purpose is to reduce, wrongly, artworks to mere vehicles of 
propaganda.
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understanding. It might be better to search for more information, rather than allow ing the imagination 
to be an unreliable substitute for it.
Indeed, it m ight be thought, we should be wary of the power of the imaginings promoted by 
artworks. We might be tempted to mistake their vivacity for justification. After all, art m ediates our 
imaginative experience in complex ways, through constructed authorial, media, genre and conventional 
constraints. Since the way something is represented necessarily influences w hat we are to imagine, we 
should be, if anything, more sceptical about the supposed insights art may afford. Understanding the 
w orld a righ t is tricky enough w ithou t having to deal w ith the com plexities of the possible 
relationships between what we imagine in our engagement with an artw ork and the way the world is. 
M oreover, the possible relationships betw een the im agined and actual w orlds are determ ined by 
theoretical considerations anyway. Therefore, w hether an artw ork is of moral significance or not 
depends upon the relationship of w hat it portrays to moral principles and their application in our 
world.
Hare's argument opens up the gap between artistic value and w hat we may learn from art. 
Indeed, w hat we learn from art for Hare can only bear a contingent relation to artistic value. Thus we 
may learn far more, on his view, from an artistic failure than from an artistic masterpiece. After all, 
the bad artw ork may bring our attention to a particular moral principle we had failed to recognise 
whereas an artistic masterpiece may be concerned w ith a moral principle we had already recognised. 
Thus artworks are only considered as significant to the extent they are taken to be illustrations of moral 
principles. That is, an artw ork is morally significant in precisely the same way an example in moral 
philosophy is. Presumably, the only difference is that the artwork may make us attend to a morally 
relevant feature in a more pleasurable and diverting manner. Although, given H are's severance of 
artistic value and significance, the instrum entally , morally significant w ork may not even be 
particularly pleasurable or diverting anyway.
However, the inevitable partiality of experiences represented in an artw ork do not entail that 
only those with those kind of experiences can engage w ith the artwork concerned. The whole point of 
imagining in our everyday lives, and engaging with artworks, involves the appreciation of experiences, 
identifications and situations we have not or previously could not have imaginatively understood. This 
is true  w hether the im aginings them selves are extrapolations from our own experiences and 
identifications or not. Through engaging w ith artw orks we may come to learn and im aginatively 
understand aspects of the world which we might otherwise have remained blind to. Thus one may learn 
to attend to aspects of the w orld which, prior to one’s imaginative engagem ent w ith a particu la r 
artw ork, one w ould have been dismissive of. This is true of good artw orks, w hether they are of 
apparent, im mediate relevance to our everyday experience or not. Hence we may learn from works 
which represent events far removed from the nature of our world. Thus, for example, one who denigrates 
the role of the emotions and conceives of them as something we should seek to abstract ourselves from.
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may well learn from engaging with, at its best, the science fiction film trilogy Alien. For the films 
manage to evoke an imaginative understanding of w hat it is to be hum an which constitutively includes 
the em otions, as contrasted w ith a scientistic faith in the powers of autonom ous, isolated reason. 
Through Ripley's act of self-sacrifice in the final scene, the last film also manifests, against the th reat 
of a nihilistic universe, the potential goodness and value of humanity.
W hat we m ust appreciate, is that w hat we learn from good artw orks is distinctive in kind 
from, say, w hat we learn by using counter-examples in philosophy, from merely finding out about 
historical events or from reading moralising tracts dressed up as stories. We can see this properly only 
if, as R. W. Beardsmore has argued, we appreciate that not all moral learning and understanding is 
reducible to matters of general principle;
"m orality is not a skill, and though a man cannot learn anything w ithout being 
taught some principles, w ithout his being taught that some actions are good, others 
evil, he will not have learned much if this is til I that he learns."^’
Beardsmore brings the point out via a discussion of Butler's The Way o f All Flesh. The 
essential point is that to conceive of morality as reducible to adherence to moral principles is to remain 
blind to the real dem ands that the w orld and others may justifiably make upon us. It is to regard 
people, dilemmas and situations as always failing under the application of some principle or other. It 
is to act as if what makes an action right concerns whether the action was dictated by or in accordance 
with a particular principle. As Beardsmore suggests, what is lacking here is moral understanding. 
What I am  claiming, is that this amounts to a lack of imaginative understanding and concern for others.
Martha Nussbaum  has argued in a similar vein, that literature enables us to better understand 
moral reality. N ussbaum 's argum ent is, however, som ewhat different from my own. It is, at least in 
part, based upon the claim that m oral reality is necessarily context variable and thus particular. 
Literature, she claims, enables our faculty of moral perception to become more richly differentiated and 
discrim inating. Thus, literature enables us to see m ore clearly w hat is actually the case. This is 
because, she argues, peculiar to literature is the ability to realise the particular, concrete nature of 
experience, a matter reflective enquiry passes over as a m atter of irrelevant indeterminacy. Therefore, 
N ussbaum  argues, literature is a richer, more inclusive and thus superior form of moral enquiry, than 
that afforded through m erely abstract or philosophical reflection.^ However, I want to suggest, the 
dsitinctive moral understanding prom oted in art does not merely arise because it is a more particular.
^ R. W. Beardsmore, ArtandUndersianding (London: Macmillan, 1971), Chapter 6, p. 66.
^ See Martha Nussbaum, "Finely Aware and Richly Responsible: Literature and the Moral Imagination" in her 
love's Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford Univ ersity Press, 1990), pp. 148-167.
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discriminating form of discourse. Rather, something of a different kind is involved and this concerns th e  
centrality of imaginative understanding to moral understanding.
Section 4: SLrt and Imaginative Understanding
The importance of imaginative understanding for our moral understanding can be brought out if 
we think once more about the nature of our ordinary moral thinking. As we argued in the last chapter, 
we should distinguish thick from thin understanding. Thin understanding typically involves the kind 
of reflection Hare suggests is constitutive of moral deliberation, justification and understanding. That 
is, a concern with explicating and critically assessing the nature of moral principles, their relationship 
to a given moral theory and how they should be properly applied. Indeed, this is a typical picture of 
what is involved in doing moral philosophy. C ontrastingly, thick understanding  typically involves 
striving to imagine, grasp and appreciate w hat the appropriate way of looking at and acting in the 
world is. This typically includes matters such as the appropriate way to feel for, regard and respond to 
others. We im agine and im aginatively assess the ways we think of and feel about another under 
certain possible circumstances, how we m ight feel in their situation and how that should effect what 
we might do. Indeed, this is precisely what we typically do in our engagement with and interpretation 
of artworks. Based upon the way the contrast was draw n, it was also argued that im agining plays a 
central, essential role in our everyday, m oral deliberations. This is because, it was claim ed, 
imaginative acquaintance is required in order to fully, imaginatively understand aspects of ourselves, 
others and the world. Therefore, if we are to understand what another is likely to do or what it is right 
for us to do and why, the im agination, far from being useless, is of crucial im portance. If we 
imaginatively understand another, then we will not need recourse to principles or theoretical reflection 
in order to know what he is likely to do. To know what is likely or what it is good to do depends upon a 
sound imaginative understanding of others and the world.
Our moral thinking cannot be reducible to questions purely concerned w ith matters of moral 
theory, principle and their application. This explains why merely learning a set of moral principles, 
and doing moral philosophy, is insufficient for moral understanding. Consider how we encourage moral 
learning. We do not just lay dow n principles and theories as appropriate explanations and guides for 
action. Rather, we typically point to paradigm atic examples of the thing in question. For example, 
imagine your child comes home crying because he's been bullied. He's crying his eyes out and says that 
if he was strong enough, he 'd  squash the boys concerned to a pulp. Of course, w e'd comfort him but 
nevertheless suggest that w hat he wants to do is wrong. When he asks why, we do n 't reply that this is 
because harm  to others is wrong except under circumstances requiring proportional self-defence. This 
would both fail to promote his understanding and serve only to distress him at our apparent lack of
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sympathy. Rather, we would tend to cite w hat exemplary people would do. Thus, we might say, it is 
wrong because Jesus w ouldn't do it.
Now I am not denying that principles have any role to play in moral justification, deliberation 
or learning. After all, if we tell the child not to take the cream egg and he asks why, we might rightly 
reply 'because stealing is w rong'. But cases w here we refer to such crude principles tend to be 
prohibitive. That is, we are telling children what not to do. But moral understanding is not arrived at 
merely by thinking we know what we should not be doing. Rather, we require an understanding of what 
it is we should be aspiring to be and how we should see the world. To cite principles as relevant, 
presupposes an imaginative understanding. For example, the fact that something is wrong can only be 
appreciated as wrong given an imaginative understanding which sees the point of doing the right thing 
in the first place. Our moral principles are formed on the basis of our imaginative understanding, w hich 
may be cultivated. It is cultivated through developing the capacity to im agine and appreciate what 
exemplary, wise and kind people would do under various circumstances. This is, after all, why setting 
an example is of such crucial importance in bringing up children.
One of the prim ary ways children learn is by imitation, by emulating those who are taken as 
good paradigm s. Furtherm ore, ch ildren  typically learn much more from stories than from th e  
explication of principles. This is because people, exem plars and stories afford an im aginative 
understanding of the world which cannot be conveyed merely by citing or blindly applying moral 
principles. The thick concepts of everyday moral discourse and discrim ination can only be grasped 
through the prom otion of im aginative understanding. Of course, we may later come to thinly 
understand their fairly specific criteria of applicability. Nonetheless, to grasp thick concepts, such as 
courage, kindness, tolerance and generosity, we m ust imaginatively understand something about the 
nature of what they are being applied to. Thus, we may be told that tolerance is listening to the opinion 
of others and respecting their right to having them. However, a grasp of w hat it is to be a truly 
tolerant person may require imaginative acquaintance of what can be involved. For example, we may 
imagine the position of, say, Martin Luther King when he defended the right of racists to speak freely.
This conception of moral learning accords w ith the way I suggested, in chapter 1, that we 
understand and talk about art. That is, we do not learn what constitutes good art prim arily through 
developing or possessing a theory about art. Rather, we learn about art by being pointed toward and 
engaging with good examples of it. We try to see what it is that is worthy of such attention, value and 
description. We try to appreciate why it is that the brush strokes should be valued or how the line of 
the face might be seen as being particularly expressive. As our exposure to examples increases, we tend 
to com pare and contrast differing aspects and im aginative understandings. Eventually, we are able 
more and more to come to our ow n conclusions about w hat the appropria te  descriptions and 
interpretations are. Often much of our disagreem ents w ith others rests upon disputes as to what
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constitutes the appropriate description; a m atter w hich may well rest upon distinct im aginative 
understandings.
It is im portant to realise that 1 am not claiming that theoretical reflection and principles 
cannot deepen our understanding of morality and art. Indeed, if I were, then this work would either be 
redundant or a counter-example. However, what 1 am claiming is that such reflection is significant in so 
far as it appropriately modifies our imaginative understanding. That is, theoretical understanding is 
significant because it arises from and may modify imaginative understanding. Thus a m orality based 
purely upon principles, allowing no room for imaginative understanding and judgement can never hope 
to be adequate to the m oral dem ands of the w orld . M orality depends upon an im aginative 
understanding of ourselves and others, in order to make correct moral decisions. Art as such typically 
stim ulates and engages the im agination in order to prom ote a sound appreciation  of w hat the 
imaginings concern and thus serves to promote imaginative understanding. This concerns the quality of 
our thinking about and understanding of the world. It is through the imaginative understanding th a t  
art is necessarily linked to our moral aspect. O ur moral perception and sensibilities are themselves 
dependent upon our imaginative understanding of the world, people and forms of life.
It is imaginative understanding which is prim arily constitutive of moral understanding. Our 
understanding of others arises from our capacity to place ourselves imaginatively in their position, 
imagine how they perceive their position to be, what they feel and thus how they are likely to act. Of 
course, it is easier to imaginatively understand others who are similar to ourselves. It takes a minimal 
effort for me to im aginatively understand another w ho's struggling to finish their thesis, precisely 
because 1 am experiencing similar difficulties myself. In order to understand the other person, I can 
assim ilate m uch of my own situation to theirs. However, it is far more difficult to understand, 
im aginatively, radically different w orlds or those taken to be widely variant from ourselves. For 
example, it may be hard to understand im aginatively those used to living w ithin an authoritarian 
regime. O ur imaginative understandings of the proper attitudes towards authority, for example, may 
be widely at odds. U nderstanding others taken to be widely at odds in an essential regard may, it is 
thought, normally be a task beyond our ordinary im aginings. Our prejudices, say, may ordinarily 
preclude us from imaginatively understanding transsexuals as people deserving a certain kind of respect 
and compassion. This is, it may be thought, w here artw orks can contribute to our im aginative 
understanding. Through the power and vivacity of the imaginings they promote, artworks may engage 
our imaginings about subjects and people to which our imaginings, on their own, would be inadequate to. 
Hence The Crying Game can cultivate our im aginative understanding, w here our more ordinary 
imaginings may have failed us. Thus artworks can extend our imaginative understanding in a way our 
ordinary imaginings could not. Art distinctively cultivates our imaginative understanding and moral 
sensibilities.
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However, though this conception recognises the primacy of imaginative understanding to moral 
understanding, it still leaves unclear how artw orks may be just as insightful about ordinary, familiar 
aspects of our lives. After all, the painting of everyday subjects by artists seeks to illum inate ra ther 
than merely illustrate the banal and obvious. Think of M illet's portrayals of everyday, working 
peasant life, Rodin's The Kiss, Degas' depiction of prostitutes. Constable's evocation of the English 
countryside and so on. The techniques, viewpoints and aspects manipulated in all these artworks aim to 
prom ote imaginative understanding and insight. The insight afforded is not merely/ concerned with 
strange and foreign worlds. Rather, it is typically related, often directly, to our own world. Artworks 
often touch upon features, values and concerns which are of immediate concern to our own lives. Indeed, 
most artworks deal with aspects of hum an life which have immediate contact with aspects of our own: 
representations of life, birth, lust, death, love, work, home, the countryside, urban society, war, 
religion and so on. Their point is to evoke a particular im aginative understanding  in relation to the 
subject portrayed and thus deepen our imaginative understanding of our own world. If artworks only 
illum inated aspects of life radically different from our own, then most of the art which is of a rtis tic  
value would have to be considered otherwise. Yet the artistic value of Dickens' or George Eliot's novels 
does not depend upon whether one is familiar w ith their time, events and settings. If this were so, then 
their w ork would hardly have been of value to many of their contemporaries. The value of their work 
lies in the illumination of what were then familiar, everyday aspects of ordinary life. M oreover, their 
work remains of relevance to our own values, concerns and w orld. This is precisely because though they 
concern the everyday events of their world, the insight prom oted sheds light upon our ow n world. 
Artw orks aim to illum inate our w orlds, w hether through dealing  w ith the fam iliar or radically  
different, rather than merely illustrate the banal and obvious.
So how can art illum inate w hat we are already familiar with? As I have argued, artw orks 
seek to prescribe and shape our imaginings in particular ways. They do so by seeking the right way to 
convey w hat it is they seek to represent. That is, artw orks attem pt to find the right description. The 
right description can develop, through our imaginings, a deepened imaginative understanding of the 
nature of our w orld and possibilities. Artw orks do not function as mere vehicles of information. Of 
course, the choice of subject itself indicates that something is to be taken as w orthy of our attention. 
However, they do not merely repeat the familiar or tell us about the unfamiliar. Rather, they seek to 
bring home a particular im aginative understanding of a w orld. Thus the way our im aginings are 
prescribed and shaped, distinctively effects the nature of w hat we are to imaginatively understand. 
This is precisely w hat makes our im aginative engagem ent w ith artw orks distinct from the flux of 
ordinary experience. Art utilises and provides a common pool of imaginative resources and techniques 
from stock myths and stories through to perceptual categories or feelings. But it is precisely in draw ing 
upon, extending, constructing and developing these resources that art can draw  our attention to aspects of 
our world which we had previously missed. For example, Angela Carter's exploration of standard fa iry
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tales in The Company o f Wo/th’s draw s our attention to themes of sexuality underly ing apparent 
innocence, in both the genre as a whole and the real world.
Good artworks, as distinct from typical pieces of journalism or sociology, do not merely draw  our 
attention to features of the world or imagined worlds. In journalism, sociology or bad science fiction 
w hat we react to are the features, events or possibilities to w hich our atten tion  is draw n, 
independently of the way they are represented. However, in art we react to the way the features, 
characters and events are portrayed. What the artw ork cultivates in our imaginings is a possible way 
of im aginatively understanding the state of affairs represented. The artw ork directs us tow ard how 
certain things are to be seen and imaginatively understood, as opposed to merely stating that 'they are 
or m ight be' or even how they are to be theoretically explained. The work, its m anipulation of 
conventions, style and associations prescribes particular imaginative experiences and, possibly, the re­
ordering of our expectations. It develops a possible way of thickly understanding our natural and social 
world. As we saw, this is even true of such apparently abstracted works as Picasso's Weeping Woman. 
However, the point can be em phasised if we consider another example. Van Gogh's Potato Enters. At 
the time it was painted, the details and features of everyday peasant life w ould have been familiar to 
all. A lthough it may be of sociological interest to us now, it is not here that the artistic value of the 
work lies. What Van Gogh sought was a way of representing his subjects which evoked an im aginative 
understanding of the harsh living and w orking conditions of his subjects. He does this th rough  a 
particular labouring and abstraction of style, attem pting to bring home the rough, coarse, hard aspects 
of their lives:
"I personally am convinced 1 get better results by painting them in their roughness 
than by giving them  a conventional charm ...If a peasant picture smells of bacon, 
smoke, potato, steam - all right, that's not unhealthy...if the field has an odour of 
ripe corn or potatoes or of guano or manure - that's healthy, especially for city people.
Such pictures may teach  them something. But to be perfumed is not w hat a peasant 
picture needs."*
What the work may teach us does not lie so m uch in knowing about the conditions of the 
peasants. This is something most city people w ould have known about and is something we can easily 
find out about from our history books. The w ork is not a substitute for or a paraphrase of such 
information. If this were so, then the point of engaging with the work would be lost as soon as one found 
a more detailed source of information about the conditions of the peasantry. What the picture may
* Quoted from Rosemary Treble, Vincent: The Paintings o f Van Gogh (London: Hamlyn, 1989), p. 32, which is, in 
turn, quoted from The Complete Letters o f Vincent Van Gogh (New York; New York Graphic Society, 1958), No. 
404, 30 April 1885.
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teach us, is that a particular imaginative understanding of the peasant's lives is appropriate. That 
despite, or perhaps because of, their harsh conditions, their lives contain an earth bound simplicity 
and goodness to be recognised and cherished. Van Gogh is concerned to present us with what he takes to 
be an appropriate understanding of these people, through prescribing our imaginings in certain ways. 
The way the peasants are represented as unthinkingly sharing their meagre sustenance. The way their 
gazes are directed and show concern for others, rather than being merely focused upon their share, 
m anifests this im aginative undersanding . Of course, we m ight criticise Van Gogh for such a 
sentim ental, quasi-religious reverence of peasants. W hat w ould be at issue here, is w hether the 
im aginative understanding prom oted by the work is the appropriate one. It is im portant to emphasis 
that this criticism would not arise because the w ork may be fictional. Rather, it arises because the 
claim is that, if Van Gogh was to really deepen our imaginative understanding of peasants, then he 
should have represented them in a slightly different way.
Nevertheless, we may acknowledge both that the im aginative understanding of The Potato 
Eaters is partially inadequate and, nevertheless, that it is of artistic value. This is because it still 
affords a significant possible light by which we may look upon the world and others, one which may 
deepen our own imaginative understanding. For example, the way we imagine the peasants' attention 
as directed  tow ard others, even w hilst in deprived  circumstances themselves, may enhance our 
understanding of generosity of spirit and compassion, of altruism 's relationship to love, fear and death. 
Thus, through engaging with such a work, we may come to see new aspects to the poor, the downtrodden 
and to our relationships with others. Indeed, we may come to cultivate a greater concern for others, 
through the m odificatory affect the w ork has upon our own im aginative understanding. VVe may 
become more aware and appreciate more closely certain aspects of our world, others and ourselves. Art 
is itself a form of understanding precisely because the way something is represented in part prescribes 
and shapes the very content of what is to be im agined and the understanding promoted. Art cultivates 
our imaginative understanding in a distinctive way, a way in which our ordinary imaginings cannot.
This account of the link between art and morality allows us to explain the status of works such 
as Leni Riefenstahl's The Triumph o f the Will. What Riefenstahl's work attem pts to show us, is that 
a particular imaginative understanding of the Nazis and their Führer is appropriate. That H itler is a 
beneficent, modest, saintly man impelled by a vision; a vision to protect the good and cleanse the world 
of all evil. The work cultivates in us the im aginative understanding  that the destiny to which the 
Nazis march is one of a glorious, righteous, victorious crusade against the im pure forces of the world. 
Now, we can recognise the innovative and artistic way our imaginings are prescribed tow ard this 
understanding by the film. Furtherm ore, we may take great pleasure from some of the unusual and 
striking images we perceptually imagine. All of these things are of artistic value and render the work 
valuable. However, the imaginative understanding these imaginings are directed toward promoting is 
itself radically flawed.
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The imaginative understanding prom oted is not just inappropriate in the sense that it is over 
partial, sentimental or naive, in the way we might think of Van Gogh's The Potato Eaters is. Rather, i t 
is fundamentally at odds with virtually every significant aspect of the true nature of Nazism. That is, 
the imaginative understanding promoted constitutes a fundamental and radical m isunderstanding of 
w hat it represents. Far from being an appropria te  description, it cultivates a radically unsound 
im aginative understanding. It does not prom ote true insight but only the adm iration of a viciously 
immoral creed. The imaginative understanding prescribed is false in v irtually  every fundam ental 
aspect. Therefore, though it is of artistic value. The Triumph o f the Will cannot be a truly great 
artwork. It is of artistic value because of the way it prescribes particular imaginings. Nevertheless, it 
is of artistic disvalue to the extent it promotes a fundam entally false im aginative understanding of its 
subject. Similarly, Good Fellas is flawed as an artw ork to the extent it prom otes the im aginative 
understanding it does: namely, that we can casually disregard and dispose of, at will, the lives of those 
outside our particular communities. The insight and im aginative understanding art aims to promote 
constitutively includes m oral understanding . Therefore, to the extent a w ork prom otes im m oral 
imaginative understandings of the world, it is deeply flawed and thus disvaluable as an artwork.
However, it m ust also be recognised that even w here a w ork prom otes an im aginative 
understanding which is immoral in certain respects, it may still have aspects which promote a deep 
insight into the world. For example, Ezra Pound's Cantos, at various stages, explicitly promotes a crude 
and vicious form of anti-semitism:
"And those who had lied for hire; 
the perverts, the perverters of language,
the perverts, who have set money-lust 
Before the pleasures of the senses."^
Although this mars the value of the work, it does not render it wholly disvaluable as a work of 
art. Despite the confusions and repellent aspects of the imaginative understanding Pound promotes, 
there still remain artistically valuable aspects to the work. This is because, fused w ith Pound's brutal 
anti-semitism, there is a significant grasp of the possible requirem ents of intellectual and em otional 
honesty. Pound's use, development and modification of various poetic conventions and devices also serve 
to develop a finer imaginative appreciation of the w orld in this respect. For example. Pound intimates 
how a concern with the poetic element of language may betoken intellectual and emotional honesty: a 
concern passed over by those who disregard the senses or by those whose senses are easily lulled into 
contentment. Of course, the irretrievably immoral aspect of Pound's Cantos may make our imaginative
^ Ezra Pound, The Cantos o f Ezra Pound (London: Faber and Faber, 1975), Canto XIV, p. 61.
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engagement with it extremely difficult. Given, that is, that we are moral people ourselves and do not 
possess the im moral, fascistic understand ing  of Jews that the Cantos advocates. On balance, the 
disvalue of the w ork as art in this regard may outw eigh the possible value of the other aspects of 
imaginative understanding the Cantos has to offer us. Thus, though of some value as art. Pound'sCnntos 
may not truly be considered as good art.
It is quite compatible w ith holding that artw orks are disvaluable as art to the extent they 
promote immoral imaginative understandings of the w orld, that works such as The Trinmph of the 
Will and Good Fellas may even be good artw orks. This is, however, despite the overall imaginative 
understanding they promote. It is only because of the prodigious artistry, the pleasure the imaginings 
themselves afford and the glimpses they afford into how those who constitute the subjects of the work 
m ight im aginatively understand  them selves and m isunderstand  the w orld , that they may be 
considered as artworks. W hether the imaginative understanding promoted is of moral value or not is 
centrally relevant to the work as art. Artworks which engage the imagination are concerned not merely 
to entertain and promote pleasurable im aginings. They aim to intimate through these im aginings, 
particular im aginative understandings of w hat they represent and thus, though the relations are 
complex, our world. As imaginative understanding includes moral understanding, there is a necessary 
link between art promoting imaginative understanding and cultivating moral insight. If the Marquis de 
Sade's work merely promotes pleasurable imaginings but promotes an inadequate, immoral im aginative 
understanding of hum an relations, then his writings cannot be good art. Indeed, if de Sade's writings 
lack even artistry, they can hardly qualify as art at all. This is even more true of Bret Easton Ellis. At 
least de Sade, despite the brutality and immorality of the imaginative understanding prescribed, may 
perhaps provide a small insight into how sexual relations may be understood in terms of power and the 
assertion of the individual will. Ellis' work is so crude and banal as to lack even that small possible 
contribution to our imaginative understanding. *
We are now also in a position to reply to the second kind of case cited against the necessary link 
between art and morality. That is, cases where someone engages w ith an artw ork, yet, afterw ards, 
rem ains apparently  im pervious to the im aginative understand ing  and insight prom oted by the 
artw ork. Firstly, it is quite possible that the person concerned has not grasped the im aginative 
understanding prescribed by the artwork. Obviously, this may be due to misinterpreting the artw ork. In 
tliis case, we would attem pt to show them that their appreciation of the work rested upon a false basis. 
For example, we w ould try to show them  that their interpretation was at odds w ith various key 
features of the work and why certain aspects were to be taken in particular ways. This is not to deny
 ^ Compare, for example, the Marquis dc Sade s JidieUe, tr. A. Wainhou.se, (London: Arrow, 1968) w ith Bret 
Easton Ellis’ 7’iVc//o (London: Picador, 1991).
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in terp re tative pluralism . Rather, it is to recognise that one may m isunderstand  the possible 
interpretations open to one in one's engagement with an artwork.
H ow ever, the more significant case is w here the possible im aginative understand ings 
prescribed by the work are apparently agreed upon but not acted upon. This depends upon the prior 
imaginative understanding brought to bear upon the w ork and how it is taken to inter relate w ith the 
im aginative understanding prom oted by the artw ork. An artw ork  which prom otes a particular 
imaginative understanding may be dismissed by someone on the grounds that it does not promote any 
ethical insight. Thus a Nazi m ay watch Schindler's List and adm ire Spielberg 's artis try , take 
pleasure in the imaginings prescribed and yet, at the end, dismiss the im aginative understanding 
promoted. Of course, such responses are more or less justifiable. In this case, the Nazi's response serves 
only to show how inadequate his imaginative understanding of others and the world really is. If he 
cannot even appreciate the basic insight that Jews, qua human beings, are deserving of the same kind of 
respect and humanity that we expect from others, then that only goes to show how morally blind he 
really is. If he can appreciate that basic imaginative insight, as shown in the film, then the work will 
develop, to some extent, his im aginative understanding  of the w orld. If he both recognises the 
imaginative understanding prom oted as holding in this regard and remains impervious to it, then one 
must say that this shows he is, in fact, truly evil. After all, art cannot be expected to redeem even those 
who would knowingly spurn the requirement to be moral.
A less extreme case is the criticism George Orwell makes of Graham Green's The Heart o f the 
M atter. Orwell criticises the work on the grounds that its fundamental im aginative understanding is 
not only deeply flawed but unintelligible. Therefore, if Orwell is right, G reene's book cannot but 
promote an inadequate imaginative understanding of the world, our place in it and our relations with 
and obligations to others. Thus it is that our evaluation of the value of an artw ork not only constitutes a 
judgem ent upon the work of art, it also substantially reflects our ow n concerns, goals, values and 
im aginative appreciation of the w orld. It m ight be thought that this kind of explanation cannot 
account for the plausibility of Alex's actions in A Clockwork Orange. Yet, consider what happens at th e  
end of the novel, when Alex has broken free from the effects of 'Ludovico's Technique'. He goes back to 
his old ways, but comes to appreciate that such brutally, violent, animalistic ways are wrong. Hence 
his enthusiasm  for it wanes and the pleasure he derives from it is m arred and diminishes. Alex's 
imaginative understanding of the world develops and, he sees, he will try to explain this to his son. Of 
course, Alex knows his son will not understand from his explanation, but, rather, have to find out for 
himself. Yet, this understanding is precisely what constitutes Alex's growing up. Hence, even his taste 
in music changes.
Of course, things are typically much more complex than the hard cases we've discussed would 
suggest. Nonetheless, there are three basic reasons why one who grasps the imaginative understanding 
promoted by an artw ork may not act thereafter on the basis of that imaginative understanding. Firstly,
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one may fail to appreciate the relationship between the imaginative understanding promoted in an 
artw ork and its possible bearing upon the world. A crude instance of this would be the man who walked 
out of The Cnfing Game, apparently interpreted the film properly, and still viewed transsexuals with 
inhumanity. He might do this because he thinks of the film as merely a piece of fiction. What he fails 
to understand , is that the w hole point of the film is to prescribe a particu la r im aginative 
understanding of people as appropriate not just within the fictional world but as holding good in our 
world. We would think that he failed to see the point of the film. Thus, though he may seemed to 
have interpreted the film properly, he has not appreciated its full significance. After all, if true, it 
would be a significant criticism of the film to suggest that its portrayal of transsexuals was wholly 
im plausible.
Secondly, one may fully appreciate an artw ork 's imaginative understanding of the world and 
agree w ith it, yet fail to act accordingly because one may act akratically. That is, mere insight is not 
enough, of itself, to determ ine ethical behaviour. Thus we may believe som ething to be wrong or 
im prudent and, nevertheless, go ahead and do it. An artw ork may intimate and thus lead us to believe 
that a certain regard for others is morally sound. Yet, when we actually meet a transsexual we may 
react w ith repulsion and horror because our ingrained prejudices remain at odds with our imaginative 
understanding. After all, the cultivation of our moral sentim ents tow ard inappropriate objects of 
opprobrium , blame or adm iration may not be easily undone. But, if we recognise the im aginative 
understanding concerned as holding good, we will at least feel a sense of sham e at such a reaction, 
w here previously we m ight not have done. The cultivation of harm ony betw een our im aginative 
understanding, theoretical understanding  and our ingrained prejudices and sentiments is, as Plato 
recognised, a difficult, temporal process. ^  ^
Thirdly, we may not act in accord w ith the imaginative understanding promoted by an artwork 
because we think its insight is only partial. A relevant example, discussed above, is Van Gogh's Potato 
Eaters. Imagine we came to the work with the prior imaginative understanding that poor, peasantry 
tend to be particularly greedy, selfish creatures. Through engaging with the work, we grasp the 
im aginative u n d ers tan d in g  p rom oted . N am ely, th a t peasan ts ' necessarily  em body an anti- 
materialistic, quasi-religious concern for the individual and communal well-being of others. However, 
we might not take the imaginative understanding prom oted on board as our own. Rather, through our 
im aginative acquaintance w ith the sensitivity tow ard others portrayed, we may come to a more 
m odified understanding. For example, that certain harsh, peasant lives may em body an altruistic 
concern for others, often hard to find amongst those who are well off. This, though, is quite compatible 
with holding that a more Hobbesian picture may still be true of some peasants.
*  ^ See Plato, The Republic, tr. W. K. C. Guthrie, (Harmondsvvorth: Penguin, 1956), Book IV, 434e-44Ic, pp. 206- 
217, for Plato’s account of akrasia. Plato recognised, as Socrates could not, that our irrational elements may at times 
override what it is we judge best to do and would therefore, rationally speaking, desire to do.
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Similar kinds of considerations also explain w hy even good or great artists may themselves 
possess an inadequate im aginative understanding of others and the world. This is complicated by the 
fact that the imaginative understanding promoted by an artw ork may be distinct from the im aginative 
understanding an artist intended to intimate. However, even in cases where they may be one and th e  
same, an  artist's w ork may prom ote ethical insight despite the apparent lie given to this by the 
artist's actions. An artist's w ork may promote a sound imaginative understanding in  one regard and yet 
not in  another. This may be because he regards the understanding he has prom oted as itself partial or 
because, though it affords insight, it is flaw ed in some respect. For example, Dickens' Hard Times 
affords us insight into the nature of m en like G radgrind and  how a u tilitarian  understanding  is 
inadequate to a proper understanding of our reciprocal relations with others. Nevertheless, it prom otes 
a flawed understanding to the extent it crudely represents the poor as, necessarily, people of simple, 
honest sentiment.
This suggests how  it is that an  artist may possess and thus act on the basis of a sound 
imaginative understanding in one respect, whilst failing to do so in another. Picasso's Weeping Woman 
may promote our imaginative insight into a certain k ind of female grief. N evertheless, it may also 
reflect Picasso's inadequate understanding and behaviour tow ard women as a whole. Furthermore, an 
a rtis t m ay fail to appreciate the relation the im aginative understand ing  he prom otes stands in 
relation to his or our world. For exam ple, Giacomo Balia may have un d er appreciated  that the 
glorification of technology, speed and domination in his works actually prom oted a morally inadequate 
aestheticisation of war.*^ Lastly, the artist may him self promote an imaginative understanding that 
he himself fails to live up to or does not himself hold as good. Essentially, these considerations are 
similar to those which show why an artw ork which promotes a significant imaginative understanding 
may apparently fail to effect those who engage w ith it.
The common imaginative pool our art provides for us, reveals much about our times and society. 
It reflects our concerns, aspirations and preoccupations. O ur access to the im aginative pool of art may 
serve to expand not only our imaginative resources, emotions and conceptual tools but our understanding 
of ourselves, others and the world. Artworks provide a representation of the imaginative wanderings of 
others. O ur imaginative engagement w ith art may thus prove to be of benefit or, perhaps, detrim ent in 
various ways. Ideally, artw orks prom ote the originality , inventiveness an d  vivacity of our own 
im aginings, guiding us tow ards a sounder im aginative understanding. We can go over our own 
imaginative development, use and engagement of artworks as contrasted w ith others. This process may 
itself lead to the developm ent of the im agination  and  prom ote com m on in te llig ib ility  and  
understanding. The point and purpose of im aginative artw orks is to engage and guide us to better
It would seem, however, that other futurist artists, such as Marinetti, fully appreciated and revelled in tlie nature 
of the imaginative understanding they sought to promote. Sec Robert Hughes, “Futurism” in Nothing I f  Not Critical 
(London: Collins Harvill, 1990), pp. 173-176.
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im aginings than those we could otherw ise m anage, in term s of both vivacity and profundity . An 
artw ork w hich enables us to see more in the im aginative representation of a church or pastoral scene, 
may deepen our imaginative discrimination and understanding of the natural world.
I have argued that peculiar to good art is the capacity to prescribe and shape our im aginative 
experience in various ways. What distinguishes art from our everyday imaginings is the constraint and 
guidance afforded by the various media, art forms, genres and conventions. An artw ork is not just a 
launching pad for the imagination. Rather, it prom otes and shapes our engagem ent and im aginative 
understanding. The m edium , style and conventions partly  constitute the nature of w hat is to be 
imagined: the way something is represented, in part, determines the work's content. It is not just what is 
being represented in an artw ork that moves us, it is the way it is done so. The imagination is pow erfully 
stim ulated by the necessarily aspectival nature of artworks. Hence it may contribute distinctively to 
our im aginative understanding of others. Engagem ent w ith good artw orks does not autom atically 
guarantee an increase in our im aginative understanding and our moral sensibilities. Nevertheless, art 
may distinctively manifest and cultivate im aginative understandings of hum an experience and values. 
Morality depends upon imaginatively understanding others and the world, in order to make correct 
moral decisions. Thus, through prom oting im aginative understanding, art may distinctively cultivate 
ethical insight. This is distinctive in kind from the understanding prom oted by m ere reflection or 
philosophical enquiry. Therefore, art constitutes a distinct form of moral understanding. Art can widen, 
develop and deepen our imaginative understandings of ourselves, others and our world. Good artworks 
will do so for most people, across time and cultures, far better than mediocre ones. Great artw orks are 
those w hich may prom ote the im aginative understanding  of many people, across many times and 
cultures.
Section 5: y i^naC OBjections,
Despite the arguments put forw ard above, there still remain two possible sources of counter­
examples to the account I have given. Firstly, certain artw orks deliberately preclude our im aginative 
engagement and sympathies, yet they are apparently of great value as art. For example, Brecht's p lays 
try to disengage our im aginative sym pathies and, because they do so in  a certain  way, they are 
recognised to be of value as art. As I will show, this objection is not too serious. However, of greater 
importance is the second kind of objection, namely that certain artworks do not promote our im aginative 
understanding at all. Yet, they may be of great value as art. For example, m ost classical m usic and 
abstract art lacks imaginative content, and thus im aginative understanding. Yet, no-one w ould claim 
that works such as Beethoven's Eroica, The Third Sxjmphomj, Kandinsky's Last Judgement and Barnett 
N ewm ann's Eve are not good artw orks. Thus, it may be thought, though I have show n that the
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prom otion of im aginative understanding is of value in certain art forms, I have failed  to show  it 
constitutes the prim ary value of art per se.
The first thing to recognise is that the distancing of our im aginative sym pathies by an artw ork 
does not entail that the w ork precludes imaginative understanding. This is particularly apposite in th e  
case of Brechtian theatre. Brecht's w ork aims to achieve and highlight the k ind of distance and 
imaginative engagement we are involved in, in the very act of w atching a play. N evertheless, the 
whole point of doing so, is in order to prescribe a particu lar im aginative understanding . That is, 
typically, an  appreciation of our own m anipulation by h idden  pow ers and an  em phasis upon the 
inseparability of the aesthetic sphere from  the m oral and political arena of our everyday lives. Of 
course, certain artworks may distance us imaginatively from the subjects of the work without promoting 
this kind of imaginative understanding. For example, Picasso's Portrait o f Atnbroise Vollard. Yet it 
engages our imaginings and promotes our imaginative understanding in other ways. It focuses upon the 
very process and nature of our im aginative engagem ent itself. Thus enhancing our im aginative 
understanding of the nature and value of art itself. Therefore, it w ould be w rong to think that my 
account of art's imaginative value entails that reflexive strategies in art must be of disvalue.
Of course, cubism typically does not allow full imaginative engagem ent w ith the objects and 
people it represents. Indeed, the whole point of cubism lies in its subverting of one's attempts to do so, 
forcing one to oscillate between various different viewpoints. Similarly, films such as Alain Resnais' 
iMst Year in Marienbad or Godard's La Chinoise are highly reflexive. Resnais deliberately undercuts 
our every attem pt to interpret and continuously engage w ith the film. Contrastingly, Godard shows us 
in a different way that w hat we are watching is, after all, just a film, constituted by various m aterial 
processes and conventions. Indeed, many valued artw orks, ranging from Tristram Shandy to Buster 
K eaton 's Sherlock, Jr., foreground the nature of their construction by blocking our im aginative 
engagement in various ways, thus highlighting the means by which they are constructed.
Yet such w orks are of value as art precisely  because they prom ote our im aginative 
understanding of the nature and  value of art itself. The flip side of this coin is that to the extent 
reflexive strategies do not even promote, or mar, our imaginative understanding of art, they are of 
disvalue. But this too seems to accord w ith our evaluation of artworks. For example, contrast the 
artistic value of self-reflexive strategies in  two of G odard 's films. In W eek-End, they enhance the 
w ork 's artistic value greatly  because they both prom ote our im aginative understand ing  of the 
construction of art and the possible destruction of bourgeois society. Yet in La Chinoise, the self­
reflexive strategies are of artistic dis value. Here they fail to enhance our im aginative understanding 
of art. Indeed, they serve only to reinforce the tiresome num ber of times, and the tedious length of time, 
that we are subjected to ideological, M aoist preaching. H ighly reflexive artw orks may be of artistic  
value, but only to the extent they enhance our imaginative understanding of the w orld at large or our 
appreciation of the nature of our engagement w ith art and its value. If a self-reflexive w ork does not
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even achieve this much, then the strategies of reflexivity are otiose and of disvalue to the w ork as art. 
Thus my thesis is more than adequate to the first kind of objection, and the supposed counter-examples 
are nothing of the kind.
However, the second kind of objection and source of counter-examples poses a m uch greater 
th rea t and cannot be dealt w ith  so quickly. The objection am ounts to the claim that my account is 
necessarily partial. My account applies well to art forms such as literature and the representational 
arts more generally. In such cases, we are dealing w ith artworks which are decidedly about something. 
That is, the works have content. Where this is so, it is obviously crucial that the content should both be 
significant and treated in a way appropriate to it. The form and content of the imaginings prescribed by 
such works promote our imaginative understanding. Therefore, in such cases, there is a definite link 
between art and morality. However, the objection goes, both in abstract art and m ost classical music, 
there is no significant content. That is, such works only have significant form. Where this is so, our 
imaginings obviously cannot be prescribed to imagine anytliing at all in our engagem ent w ith the work. 
Hence, these works cannot promote a particular imaginative understanding. Thus, in such cases, there is 
no link between art and morality. In the cases of pure music and abstract art, imaginative understanding 
cannot be prom oted and thus cannot be of any value. Therefore, im agin ing  and  im aginative 
understanding can only constitute the primary value of certain forms of art.
Firstly, I should make it clear that not as m uch rests upon this objection as m ight be thought. 
After all, I have not argued for an essentialist definition of art. As I argued in the very first chapter, 
art is a cluster concept. I am not claiming that there is any strictly necessary condition an artw ork m ust 
fulfil in order to be art. Thus, for example, a higWy beautiful artwork may not manifest any particular 
im aginative understanding at all. Therefore, it w ould  of be no great surprise if certain art forms 
differed distinctly in terms of certain features or vcilues of the cluster concept 'a rf :  in this case in terms 
of the prom otion of imaginative understanding. Rather, all that is essential to my argum ent is the 
claim that im aginative engagem ent is a typical feature of art. Furthermore, that where our imaginings 
are appropriately engaged, they aim  to prom ote particular imaginative understandings. Thus, such 
artw orks may be appropriately evaluated in term s of the imaginative understanding they promote. 
Where artworks do not engage our imaginings or prom ote imaginative understanding, this obviously 
cannot apply. Therefore, my general thesis stands, independently of this particular issue.
N onetheless, I th ink  that the im agination  and  im aginative u n d erstan d in g  is typically  
involved even in the most abstract art and music. Quite how this is so is very difficult to articulate, 
especially in such a short space. What follows are a few tentative suggestions as to how this may be so. 
W hether these suggestions are accepted or not, I have succeeded in establishing th a t im ag inative
See Peter Kivy, “A new music criticism?” and ‘The fine art of repetition” in his The Fine Art o f Repetition 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 296-323 and 327-359 for a succinct articulation and defense of 
this view of music.
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engagement and the promotion of imaginative understanding is typically central to our appreciation of 
most art. Given that moral understanding depends upon a sound imaginative understanding of others 
and our w orld, 1 have established that there is a necessary link between most art and morality.
One way to tlrink about the problem posed, is to turn the question on its head. If classical music 
and abstract art really are w ithout any significant content, then it is surely a puzzling matter as to w hy 
we think they may be so significant as artworks. One m ight be tempted to suggest, though this would be 
far more plausible for abstract art than music, that most works in these forms can only be of secondary 
value as art. Yet this patently fails to do justice to the fundam ental significance of many artworks in 
both forms. Furtherm ore, given my em phasis upon 'a rt ' as a cluster concept, and  as a historically 
evolving cultural practice, I am  hardly in  a position to declare this to be so by fiat. A fter all, the value 
of music and abstract art could lie in  some ineffable, indescribable, irreducible experience. Since the 
problem is so puzzling, it is perhaps im portant to take the two cases cited, classical music and abstract 
art, separately.
Let us first consider the case of abstract art. Presumably what we are presented w ith in abstract 
art must be of significance in some distinctive regard. If this were not so, then it is hard to see how we 
could properly regard abstract art to be artistically valuable in a way in which we do not regard  
Rorschach tests, colour sw atches or ap e 's  d raw ings. W hat abstract a rt has in  com m on w ith 
representational art, and w hat distinguishes it from non-art, is the utilisation of m aterials, m edia, 
conventions and style for a purpose. These are m anipulated in order to constrain and guide our 
spectatorial attention. But if there is no significant content, to w hat is our attention being guided 
towards? It m ust be the formal elements of the w ork itself: the marks on the canvas, the colours, th e  
shapes, the spatial juxtaposition and the various inter-relations of these parts and how they form the 
work as a whole. Although there is no apparent content to such works, nonetheless the formal elements 
are constructed in a certain way in order to shape our spectatorial engagement.
But how can purely formal features shape our attention and response in a particu lar way? They 
can do so precisely because the features themselves may be meaningful and expressive. That this is so, 
is, as we have already seen, w hat explains why the way something is prescribed makes a difference to 
the content of our imaginings, w hen we engage w ith representational art. W hat the formal features are 
expressive of depends upon various factors. In abstract art, it principally depends upon three factors. 
Firstly, the inter-relations of the w ork 's formal parts to each other and the w ork as a whole. For 
example, a particular line in a work by Miro may come across as sombre and sedate. By contrast, the 
same line in a M ondrian w ould come across as joyful and vivacious. This is because the same line, 
standing in different relations to other features, takes on different aspects. Secondly, w hat a feature is 
expressive of also depends upon the conventions of art. For example, because of the history of a r t, 
particular textures or spatial relations of bulk may express a certain corporeality or certain colours may 
suggest ethereal associations. Lastly, our own experience figures in the way an  abstract artw ork
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prescribes and guides our attention. This must be so, because w ithout it there w ould be notliing from 
which we could hope to make sense of the w ork as art. More precisely, the marks of paint may evoke 
the feel or look of other objects, visceral surfaces, and so on. Thus formal features may express and be 
meaningful independently of any significant representational content.
The very surface of the painting, its colour, tones, variegated textures, the various sp a tia l  
relations and tensions are w hat holds our attention. Furthermore, our im agination is involved in our 
attending to abstract art in tlris way. When we engage w ith an  abstract work, we perceptually imagine 
the spatial relations in  w hich the formal features are taken to stand. We may im agine that a black 
m ark is expressive of som ething m enacing and threatening, perhaps em otionally reacting in  our 
imagining w ith fear and loathing. W hether the w ork is any good or not depends upon whether it can 
sustain and prescribe the imaginative attention 1 bring to bear upon it. If it can, then the w ork may 
promote my imaginative understanding.
Abstract art may promote our im aginative understanding in ways sim ilar to self-reflexive art. 
Firstly, it may prom ote my im aginative understanding of art by deepening my understanding of the 
significance of artistic style, conventions and spatial structuring. Secondly, the sensations, feelings, 
spatial relations and associations an  abstract w ork may imaginatively prescribe may be more or less 
significant when related to an appropriate im aginative understanding of the w orld. For example, a 
w ork w hich intim ates that our spatial relations are claustrophobic, am idst sensually  repulsive 
surfaces, may promote a flawed imaginative understanding of the spatial, sensual relations we stand in 
relation to each other and the w orld. It m ight be claimed, that I am now surreptitiously slipping 
content into abstract art through the back door. Yet I do not think I am bestowing upon abstract art any 
more than the minimal formal significance and meaning it requires in order for it to be art at all. This 
is, 1 think, supported by the following consideration. The worry many people typically have about 
abstract art is, precisely, that it often fails to engage even with significant concerns of formal meaning. 
This may be due to various reasons. On the one hand it may be because an artist's w ork increasingly 
veers into an all too private train of association and symbolism. Conversely, it may be because the 
putative artist lacks an im aginative understanding of the significance of formal m eaning and artistic 
conventions and styles in the first place. In such cases we can quite properly suggest that anyone could do 
just as weU. After all, what we look for, even in abstract art, is the point of our imaginatively engaging 
with and attending to the work concerned. In abstract art, this may prim arily concern prom oting an 
im aginative understand ing  of a rt's  conditions of formal m eaning and  significance. N am ely, an 
understanding of the material, conventional and perceptual base which m eaningfully allows artworks 
to prescribe and constrain our imaginings. A bstract art may also, perhaps less typically, prom ote 
imaginative understandings of our spatio-tem poral, perceptual and em otional relations w ith others 
and the world around us.
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I now want to move on to suggest that w hat I have argued is true of abstract art is, similarly, 
true of music. Firstly, it should be realised that to appreciate music we m ust hear the notes as such. 
That is, our experience of the sound emitted from the various instruments m ust be of a certain kind if we 
are to hear it as music, rather than  m erely a noisy assemblage of noises. As w ith abstract art, the 
formal features of a musical w ork m ay possess particular expressive qualities due not only to the 
quality of a particular phrase b u t also to the spatio-tem poral inter-relation of parts, the evolved 
conventions of music and their relation to our own experiences. In engaging w ith the formal development 
and  expressive aspects of a harm ony, the m usical w ork  prom otes a p a rtic u la r  im ag inative  
understanding. Firstly, this understanding is of the music itself. We have a sense of how  the music will 
unfold, of how  the parts w ill develop and relate over time. Secondly, particu larly  th ro u g h  its 
expressive aspects, a musical work may prom ote a particular imaginative understanding. Through the 
inter-relation and developm ent of particular musical structures and expressive features, the w ork may 
intim ate that certain feelings, emotions, commitments and values are central both to our im aginative 
experience w ith the work and imaginatively understanding our world.
If music is to be experienced as profound, it m ust be related to our experience and imaginative 
understanding of the world. The structural and expressive aspects of a work are em bodied in the inter­
relation of the w ork's parts to its whole. Thus in our imaginative engagement w ith the work, we may be 
constantly in terpre ting  and re in terpreting  the significance of the parts, as our expectations are 
prescribed, challenged, modified and promoted. The significance of the purely formal features in music, 
as in abstract art, cannot be separated from their expressive capacity. Hence m usic may guide and 
promote our imaginative engagem ent in particular ways. Thus, 1 w ould suggest, musical works may 
promote imaginative understandings of both music itself and of the world. A piece of music may, for 
example, develop the relations between certain experiences, feelings and associations in certain ways. 
Thus, it may promote an imaginative understanding of the relations between distinct emotions in ways 
which may be more or less sound. On the one hand, it m ight evoke powerful emotions and feelings in 
inappropria te  relations to one another. O n the o ther hand , it m ay deepen  our im aginative 
understanding of the fine discriminations there may be between feeling sad, m ournful and despairing. 
This is precisely why, in A Clockwork Orange, it is so apposite that as A lex 's im aginative 
understanding of the world changes, so too should his taste in music. If music bore no relation to our 
im aginative understanding, then our im aginative understandings and taste in m usic w ould rem ain 
im pervious to each other.
Our imaginings in abstract art and music are a response to and prescribed by the formal shape 
and expressive aspects of the w ork attended to. We im agine particular perceptual, em otional and 
cognitive relations and, by so doing, take up a particu lar im aginative understand ing . Such an 
imaginative understanding may intimate and manifest a way of seeing, conceiving of and responding in 
relation to the world and others which is more or less sound. Thus, it w ould seem, even abstract art and
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music may prom ote better or w orse im aginative understandings. To the extent the im aginative 
understanding promoted is flawed, then so too is the artwork. For example, M ark Rothko's w ork seems 
to degenerate into an essentially overblown, hyperbolic imaginative understanding of num bing vacuity. 
Furtherm ore, given that a sound im aginative understanding  of others and the w orld  is intim ately 
related to our moral understanding, even abstract art and music may be subject to the dem ands of moral 
understanding. Thus, if my tentative suggestions hold good, the link between art and m orality remains 
even in the case of abstract art and music.
ConcCusion
One of the things that distinguishes us as hum an moral agents is our imagination. It is through 
our ordinary imaginings that we can achieve an imaginative understanding of ourselves, others and the 
world. Furthermore, it is through at least m uch of the cultural practice of art that we can develop our 
imaginative understandings in peculiarly significant and powerful ways. The aspectival nature of art 
entails that the way we are prescribed to imagine som ething partly constitutes the nature of w hat we 
are to im agine. O ur im aginings are constrained and guided in particular ways. Thus we may be 
encouraged to imaginatively acquaint ourselves w ith features or aspects of the world we would or could 
not otherw ise have im agined. Thus it is that artw orks may distinctively prom ote our im aginative 
understanding. One of the prim ary values of art lies in its engagem ent and  developm ent of th e  
imagination, in order to cultivate our imaginative understanding. Imaginative understandings of life 
are alw ays norm ative, even if this m erely inheres in their negativity, and are always open to 
normative judgement. Thus a work which promotes a false imaginative understanding of others and  the 
world is disvaluable as art. Since knowing w hat the morally right or good thing to do is, depends upon 
imaginative understanding, there is a necessary link between art and morality. Artworks may properly 
manifest and afford moral insight. Where an  artw ork promotes an immoral imaginative understanding, 
the w ork is disvaluable as art. Art may properly engage our imagination, it can promote, cultivate and 
deepen our ethical insight.
Art thus allows for a distinctive and fuller exploration of possible im aginative understandings 
of the world and others than can be afforded in  our ordinary imaginings. It is in the cultivation of our 
im aginative understanding  that art provides a m ore rounded  quest in m oral enquiry than  m ere 
reflection can provide. But, and this is w here N ussbaum 's perception fails her, art cannot replace or 
occlude philosophical enquiry. For the distance afforded by philosophical reflection enables us to 
become clearer about the nature of our relations w ithin and imaginative understanding of the world. 
N onetheless, im aginatively engaging art constitutes an irreplaceable and distinctive form of moral 
understanding. Of course, it is through imaginatively engaging w ith a truly great artw ork, that one
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will experience w hat it is that makes art such a central hum an cultural practice. Yet still, it is through 
philosophical argum entation and rigour, through the form of enquiry and questioning we have been 
pursuing, that we can come to understand theoretically how and why this is so. That is, because art may 
cultivate and afford a truly deep, imaginative understanding of ourselves, others and  the world.
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